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Youngsung Han, ‘Trinity and Ontology: Towards a Theology of Being as Space in Colin 
Gunton’ (PhD thesis, Middlesex University/London School of Theology, 2017) 
 
This thesis proposes that Gunton’s work on ontology is best understood if they are 
supported by a reconsideration of the concept of space that is used by him but is not as 
fully worked out in his work as much as other terms such as “relation” and “otherness.” 
It develops with the arguments that Gunton’s ontology has an element that can be best 
understood with the help of the concept of space (chapter 1); that most problems 
attributed to Gunton by his critics are problems resulting from their particular 
approaches, rather than residing in Gunton’s work itself (chapter 2 and 3); that Gunton’s 
use of the Cappadocians is truer to the thrust of their works than his critics’ (chapter 4); 
that “spatiality” will better serve Gunton’s purpose as his third transcendental than 
“relationality” (chapter 5); that the notion of “the three” which is not fully accounted in 
Gunton corresponds well with the notion of “spatiality” being suggested in this study, 
the latter encompassing both relation and otherness and the former encompassing both 
the one and the many (chapter 6); that the “one” language used of God in the Bible is 
better understood in an nominal than a numerical sense, corresponding to the notion of 
“the three” discussed in the previous chapter (chapter 7); and that the God of the Old 
Testament is the same God as the God of the NT in that they are “God” or “One” (God 
of all) who is both one and many, both general and particular, both given and shaped, 
rather than the former representing the oneness or unity of God and the latter the 
threeness or diversity of God, with the conclusion that the ontology of being as space is 
more fundamental and so more widely applicable than the ontology of being as 





The completion of this project was possible only with the providential love of my 
Father and a great deal of support from people who have been with me throughout this 
journey and deserve a recognition of gratitude flowing from the deep in my heart. 
 
First to my supervisor, Dr. Graham MacFarlane. I am deeply thankful for everything 
you did for me over the course of this research project, especially your introduction of 
Gunton to my world. My progress was terribly slow, but you did not show any sign of 
discomfort or worry but, rather, stood firm in continuing to encourage me with great 
patience and understanding. Every supervision I had with you will be remembered as a 
time of encouragement, wisdom and enlightenment. Above all, the faith you had in me 
throughout, it was the sole light that sustained me, even when I was losing patience 
upon myself. You did it for the Lord, I am sure, and so will I follow. 
 
To my family who endured, though always in hope, the consequences of the slow 
progress of my study under the circumstances of life we went through together. My wife, 
Youngsil, you have suffered too much for this, and I cannot find a word of comfort for 
you. My daughter, Chaerin, and my son, Joonmin, thank you for doing well thus far, 
bearing with those evenings and nights when I could not be with you. To my parents, 
grandmother, brothers and sisters who could not but wait patiently for this day in prayer, 
I cannot but thank you. 
 
Many thanks are due to our friends, people and churches who were with me through 
prayers, encouragements and financial supports, some even without knowing me. I 
would like to thank the Laing Foundation for the generous scholarship awards at the 
early stages of this project. To Kang Nam Church in Seoul I owe special thanks for 
supporting me in its latter years, particularly to my dear friend pastor Ko and elder Kim. 
I would also like to thank Korean Ealing Church with which I shared half of my 
research period, for having been a community of worship, a real context of theological 
challenge and an important source of financial support. Finally, but not least, London 
School of Theology, staff, colleagues and friends, past and present, you deserve my 
earnest recognition of appreciation for being a wonderful community of people of God 































Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl 
Barth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 2nd edn (1978). 
Yesterday and Today: A Study of continuities in Christology, London: Dart, 
Longman & Todd, 1983. 
Enlightenment and Alienation: An Essay Towards a Trinitarian Theology, 
London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1985. 
The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the 
Christian Tradition. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989. 
The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997 2nd edn 
(1991). 
Christ and Creation, Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992. 
The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of 
Modernity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
A Brief Theology of Revelation, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995. 
Theology Through the Theologians, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996.  
The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1998. 
Intellect and Action: Elucidations on Christian Theology and the Life of Faith. 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000 
The Christian Faith: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001. 
Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes, London: SCM 
Press, 2002. 
Theology Through Preaching, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001. 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit: Toward a Fully Trinitarian Theology, London: 











Chapter 1 Trinity and Being as Communion                                                                               
……...1.1.            Trinity and Ontology                                                                      
           1.2.            Being as Communion                                                                                    
Chapter 2 Social God and Projection                                                              
           2.1.            Gunton and Social Trinitarianism                                                                 
           2.2.            Gunton and Projection                                                                                   
Chapter 3 Substance and Reductionism                                                                          
           3.1.            Substance in Gunton                                                                                      
           3.2.            Reductionism and other criticisms                                                                 
Chapter 4 Ousia, Hypostasis and Koinonia                                                                      
           4.1.           Ep. 38 and the issues of context, form and sense                                           
           4.2.           An interpretation of Ep. 38                                                                                            
           4.3.           Ousia and Koinonia                                                                                         
           4.4.           Conclusion                                                                                                      
Chapter 5 Relationality, Particularity and Spatiality                                                     
           5.1.            Transcendentality                                                                                            
           5.2.            Perichoresis and Relationality                                                                          
           5.3.            Space in Gunton                                                                                              
           5.4.            Spatiality                                                                                                         
Chapter 6 One, Many and Three                                                                                        
           6.1.            One and Many                                                                                      
           6.2.            Three                                                                                                          
Chapter 7 One, God of the World                                                                                    
           7.1.            The Shema (Deut 6:4)                                                                                      
           7.2.            The Shema in the NT                                                                                        
Chapter 8 Trinity and Being as Space                                                                       
           8.1.            One God and the Trinity                                                                                   
           8.2.            Being as Space                                                                                                  










































As one who came to England with the intention to do a doctorate study on the book of 
Job, I had two paths ahead after finishing a MA course on Aspects of Biblical 
Interpretation at London School of Theology. The first was to follow the original plan, 
and the second to change direction towards a further study into what had drawn my 
attention during the course on hermeneutics, what then I called “relation theology” in 
comparison to “process theology.” I chose the latter, and the choice was like giving up 
studying about Job and choosing to do theology like Job (or the Joban author) did. What 
I did not fully appreciate then is an implication of the choice; only by hindsight, I now 
realise that doing theology like Job involves suffering like him to such an extent as to 
lose everything, even cherished thoughts about God, only to gain everything back 
renewed. Once the research project started, however, I was made realise that “relational 
theology” had already begun and been widely discussed, meaning that I had to narrow 
my subject. There were two options suggested by my supervisor: Stanley J. Grenz; and 
Colin E. Gunton.1 The initial research indicated two things that helped me to make the 
decision that was made. One is the engaging style of Gunton’s writing.2 I found 
Gunton’s work preferable to Grenz’ in that the former provides more space for readers’ 
participation in the discussion of the topics chosen by him. Gunton, in other words, 
engages with his subject in such a way to invite readers to engage with the matter 
through his writings. The second is a sort of rapport that I found between the questions 
addressed by Gunton and the questions that had been with me for long, especially the 
questions about the relations between God and the world, between Father, Son and 
Spirit, between the individual and the social, between the one and the many. These are 
not, of course, matters discussed in Gunton alone, yet their combination with trinitarian 
theology by such an engaging way as described above was so inviting. 
 
                                           
1 Colin Gunton appears to have gone through a similar process in the choice of the subject of his doctorate 
project. Cf. Robert Jenson, ‘Afterword,’ in Paul Louis Metzger (ed.), Trinitarian Soundings in Systematic 
Theology, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2005, 218. For a biographical account of Colin Gunton, cf. Metzger, 
‘Forward,’ in Trinitarian, 1–4; and Stephen R Holmes, ‘The Rev Prof Colin Gunton,’ The Guardian, 
Tuesday June 3, 2003. 
2 It was only at a later stage that I found these comments: ‘[w]hat marks Gunton apart from clearly 
evangelical writers such as the English McGrath or Canadian Grenz are the facts that he both writes for a 
wide readership that is not explicitly evangelical and that he is very much a creative theologian who takes 
the content of his faith and applies it to the major issues facing the contemporary church’ (Graham 
MacFarlane, ‘Gunton’s Impact,’ Catalyst 27/2, 2001); ‘[w]hat Reformed folks need to learn from Colin is 
a style of engaged theologizing, participatory knowing and a willingness to advocate strongly for 
positions on contended issues’ (Bruce McCormack, ‘The One, The Three and The Many: In memory of 
Colin Gunton,’ Cultural Encounters 1/2, 2005, 16). 
2 
The significance of the person and work of Colin Ewart Gunton (1942–2003) for 
Christian theology today, not only in England but worldwide, is well noted by those 
who has, unlike me, had personal encounters with him.3 Among them is John Webster 
who says, 
Colin Gunton … was one of the key figures in the renewal of systematic 
theology in Britain in the last thirty years of the twentieth century. He wrote 
prolifically on many themes in constructive Christian theology, especially on 
the way in which trinitarian teaching impacts conceptions of God’s relation to 
creation.4 
With due recognition of the variety of areas and themes Gunton has written about, this 
study has focus on three of them: Trinity, ontology and conceptuality. The doctrine of 
the Trinity takes the predominant place among various dogmas and doctrines discussed 
by Gunton. We can catch a glimpse of the importance of the doctrine in his trinitarian 
articulation of the gospel: ‘the Father interrelates with the world by means of the frail 
humanity of his Son, and by his Spirit enables anticipations in the present of the 
promised perfection of the creation.’5 This shows how trinitarian Gunton’s theology is 
at its core, with perspicuous emphases on the humanity of the Son and the 
eschatological action of the Spirit.6 We can expand the observation by overviewing 
Gunton’s work and critical works on them. First, Gunton’s authorship begins with 
Becoming and Being,7 which presents Barth’s theology under the heading ‘Barth’s 
Trinitarian Theology,’ and ends with Father, Son and Holy Spirit, which has the subtitle 
Essays Toward a Fully Trinitarian Theology.8 In between, we have The Promise of 
Trinitarian Theology, The One, The Three and The Many,9 and The Triune God.10 Even 
in Christ and Creation11 and A Brief Theology of Revelation,12 the titles that do not have 
                                           
3 As for Gunton’s work as it stands, there are 15 authored books, not including 3 volumes of commentary 
on the Lectionary, about 9 edited and co-edited books, and over 115 essays and articles, 34 of which are 
incorporated into his authored books. For a comprehensive bibliography, see Paul H. Brazier (ed.), The 
Barth Lectures: Colin E. Gunton, London: T&T Clark, 2007, 262–71.  
4 John Webster, ‘Systematic Theology after Barth: Jüngel, Jenson and Gunton,’ in David F. Ford and 
Rachel Muers (eds), Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology since 1918, Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007, 258. 
5 Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997 2nd edn (1991), 72. 
6 Two main emphases that run through the essays collected in Colin E. Gunton, Theology Through the 
Theologians, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996. 
7 Colin E. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 2nd edn (1978). 
8 Colin E. Gunton, Father, Son and Holy Spirit: Toward a Fully Trinitarian Theology, London: T&T Clark, 
2003.  
9 Colin E. Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
10 Colin E. Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1998. 
11 Colin E. Gunton, Christ and Creation, Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992. 
3 
a reference to the Trinity, we find these: 
To be God, according to the doctrine of the Trinity, is to be persons in relation: 
to be God only as a communion of being. It is that which is replicated, at the 
finite level, by the polarity of male and female: to be in the image of God is to 
be called to a relatedness-in-otherness that echoes the eternal relatedness-in-
otherness of Father, Son and Spirit.13 
[N]ot the patterns of Platonic formality or of Aristotelian causality but 
trinitarian relationality offer possibilities for drawing analogies between the 
being of God and that of the world. The world reveals the hand that made it in 
the remarkable combination of unity and diversity, of relationality and 
particularity, that it manifests, marks that can be recognised by their analogy to 
the unity and diversity of the triune God.14 
Through the late 90s till 2003, this trinitarian thinking does not abate but continues, 
leading to the publications of The Christian Faith15 and Act and Being,16 the last two 
monographs dedicated to a trinitarian exposition of Christian doctrines and divine 
attributes. Back in the 8os, we have Yesterday and Today,17 Enlightenment and 
Alienation18 and The Actuality of Atonement,19 which are not explicitly trinitarian in 
focus, yet not because trinitarian thinking is absent,20 but because the focus is rather 
Christology, modernity and atonement. That said, there are places in which one may 
find an explicitly trinitarian remark.21 To cite one,  
Just as the language of a successful science must to some extent be the gift of 
that reality of which the scientist asks questions, so, to an even greater extent, 
our language about Christ must be the gift of God the Spirit and he gives to us 
the capacity both to indwell the Christ and to speak authentically of him.22 
                                                                                                                           
12 Colin E. Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995. 
13 CC 101. 
14 BTR 62. 
15 Colin E. Gunton, The Christian Faith: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. 
16 Colin E. Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes, London: SCM Press, 
2002. 
17 Colin E. Gunton, Yesterday and Today: A Study of continuities in Christology, London: Dart, Longman 
& Todd, 1983. 
18 Colin E. Gunton, Enlightenment and Alienation: An Essay Towards a Trinitarian Theology, London: 
Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1985. 
19 Colin E. Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian 
Tradition. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989. 
20 Cf. Stephen Holmes, ‘Towards the Analogia Personae et Relationis: Developments in Gunton’s 
Trinitarian Thinking,’ in Lincoln Harvey (ed.), The Theology of Colin Gunton, London: T&T Clark, 2010, 
32–4; Joseph Sverker, Constructivism, Essentialism, and the Between: Human Being and Vulnerability in 
Judith Butler, Steven Pinker, and Colin Gunton, Uppsala: Upsala University, 2017, 117f n.3. 
21 Cf. YT 133–5, 148f, 155f; EA 140–2; AA 168–71 and 199f. 
22 YT 149 
4 
One can see, finally, how Gunton’s trinitarian theology is actualised in the context of 
preaching. Gunton’s Theology Through Preaching23 is a series of thirty sermons which 
are saturated by the trinitarian themes, insights and theses which are discussed 
systematically in other works. The first chapter, for example, which is a sermon about 
the Bible on 2 Timothy 3:16 ends in these words:  
It [the Bible] so represents God’s reality and love before our minds that it 
makes them real, mediates them to us, and the book becomes the inspiration for 
our lives. Inspiration means the action of God the Spirit, and the Bible is thus 
the means of the Spirit’s action because by it, and through Christ, we come to 
God the Father, creator and redeemer of all.24 
The prominence of the doctrine of the Trinity in Gunton’s programme is also confirmed 
by works of others on Gunton. First, we have Lincoln Harvey edited The Theology of 
Colin Gunton, a collection of twelve essays discussing various aspects of Gunton’s 
theology. While William Whitney introduces six of them as ‘specifically focusing on 
Gunton’s understanding of the Trinity,’25 as a matter of fact the other six also deal with 
a theme or issue that can be appropriately discussed only in reference to Gunton’s 
trinitarian thinking.26 Whitney’s own work on Gunton’s doctrine of creation is one of 
the monographs attesting to the prominent place of the Trinity in Gunton’s work. Other 
works include the six major works on Gunton’s theology published before 2013 and 
surveyed by Whitney.27 There are also works which are not a full engagement with 
Gunton’s trinitarian theology but still treat it to a substantial degree for an 
appropriation.28 Lastly, there are articles published in journals and books.29 Commonly 
indicated by all these works on Gunton is that he is a trinitarian theologian and it is 
necessary, even inevitable, for any work on Gunton to involve an engagement with 
Gunton’s trinitarian theology. 
 
                                           
23 Colin E. Gunton, Theology Through Preaching, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001. 
24 TtP 28. Cf. also, ch.6 entitled ‘The Triune God (Ephesians 2.18),’ which is followed by nine chapters 
on Jesus Christ, ch.15 ‘The Holy Spirit (John 16.14)’ and ch.19 ‘The Church in the World (Ephesians 
1.3).’ 
25 William Whitney, Problem and Promise in Colin E. Gunton’s Doctrine of Creation, Leiden and Boston: 
Brill, 2013, 3. The six essays that Whitney has in mind must be chaps 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12. 
26 They are ecclesiology, anthropology, atonement, providence, modernity and the relationship between 
Gunton and Barth. 
27 Cf. Whitney, Promise, 3–5. 
28 E.g., Esther L. Meek, Loving to Know: Covenant Epistemology, Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011, 
chapter 12, 327–59; Sverker, Constructivism, chapter 4, 117–58. 
29 E.g., Roland Chia, ‘Trinity and Ontology: Colin Gunton’s Ecclesiology,’ International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 9/4, 2007, 452–68; Uche Anizor, ‘A Spirited Humanity: The Trinitarian Ecclesiology 
of Colin Gunton,’ Theomelios 36/1, 2011, 26–41; Paul Cumin, ‘Colin Gunton and the Integrity of 
Creation: Christ as a Particular Human (An Economic Concept of Mediation),’ in his Christ At the Crux: 
The Mediation of God and Creation in Christological Perspective, Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2014, 169–95. 
5 
Yet it needs to be noted that Gunton is not a trinitarian theologian in the sense that he 
has provided a comprehensive account of the doctrine of the Trinity or developed a new 
model of the Trinity so much as that he makes extensive use of the doctrine of the 
Trinity for discussing aspects of Christian faith and life.30 This is not endorsing of the 
first qualification given by Webster for his point,31 if it means that Gunton’s theology 
has significance only in comparison with the works of the British deists.32 Webster is 
more correct on the second note that ‘the fertility of Gunton’s trinitarian theology has to 
be seen in his application of it to his constructive work in other areas, particularly in the 
doctrines of creation and in the formulation of a Christian metaphysic and theory of 
culture.’33 Not surprisingly, though interestingly,34 critical works on Gunton tend to be a 
treatment of his theology not so much on its own terms but in relation to other subject 
matters, such as creation, anthropology and ecclesiology.35 Webster may have a point in 
taking this “fertile” or “constructive” side of Gunton’s work as a balance to what he 
perceives as weak points in Gunton’s work, yet we shall see that Gunton’s constructive 
use of the doctrine of the Trinity might be better understood as revealing as it is the 
essence of his trinitarian thinking, namely, ontology.36 
 
The significance of ontology for Gunton is evident in his overview of the doctrine of the 
Trinity in modern theology, which concludes with an introduction of ontology as a 
challenge that cannot be evaded as ‘the most promising and most difficult of all aspects 
of trinitarian thought.’37 That said, there are three respects, at least, in which ontology is 
central to Gunton’s understanding and use of the doctrine of the Trinity. The first is 
                                           
30 Gunton’s comment on Calvin in the following words appear to apply well to his own work: ‘Calvin’s 
explicit treatment of the Trinity is confined to one chapter of his great work. But, almost everywhere, his 
thought is structured by it’ (FSS 7, emphasis added). 
31 That Gunton’s trinitarian theology, though expounded in many contexts, is not given a fully articulated 
account by Gunton himself; that such terms as “mediation,” “communion,” “person,” and “relation” are 
used with great suggestiveness but not always accorded thorough analytical treatment; and that when the 
history of a doctrine is presented too much ground is covered too quickly. Webster, ‘Systematic,’ 261. For 
a similar comment see Christoph Schwöbel, ‘The Shape of Colin Gunton’s Theology. On the way towards 
a fully trinitarian theology, in Harvey, Gunton, 196. 
32 ‘Gunton’s trinitarian theology has to be viewed against the background of the instinctive deism of the 
leading British theologians from the 1950s on, in comparison with which Gunton’s work has far greater 
depth and richness’ (ibid). The difficulty with which to accept this is simply to do with the lack of a 
further qualification. It may be asked, for example, whether Gunton’s work really has little value in 
relation to other metaphysical and theological vistas, such as monism, dualism, Unitarianism, pantheism 
and even atheism. 
33 Ibid. 
34 For a possible influence of Webster’s comment on Gunton, see Whitney, Problem, 1; David Höhne, 
Spirit and Sonship: Colin Gunton’s Theology of Particularity and the Holy Spirit, Farnham; Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2010, 3, 9. 
35 Of creation (Whitney), anthropology (Sverker) and ecclesiology (Chia, Anizor). 
36 An observation, though minimally, even by Webster, ‘Systematic,’ 262. 
37 Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 954. 
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chronological, namely, that Gunton’s earlier works, seen from the perspective of his 
work as a whole, show a steady movement towards encountering Cappadocian theology 
as the most appropriate form of Christian theology,38 whereas that theology and the 
ontology of God drawn from it play key roles in his later works.39 The second is 
concerned with Gunton’s particular understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity as 
developed in response to Christian experience in order to answer not only ‘the question 
about the identity of the God whom the church worshiped through the Son and in the 
Spirit’40 but also ‘the quite proper Greek question of what kind of God it is with whom 
we have to do.’41 The third is substantial, and has to do with the content of Gunton’s 
“constructive” works, which are concerned chiefly with exploring an ontology of the 
created being and are mostly discussed from the perspective of the being of God as a 
communion of three persons.42  
 
These three aspects are evident in Gunton’s The Promise of Trinitarian Theology. Firstly, 
the book’s essays occupy the middle point of Gunton’s authorship,43 dividing the earlier 
period when his focus is more on the relation between God and the world and the later 
period of which the main subject matter is ontology. Secondly, the theme, direction and 
development which unite the essays are all related to ontology. There are five chapters 
intended particularly as contributions to ontology, which follow discussions of the 
ontology of God in the first three chapters and which are followed by the last three 
chapters in which the matter of ontology is still central. Thirdly, Gunton underlies the 
ontological explorations undertaken in the essays of the book by the belief that ‘it is 
only through an understanding of the kind of being that God is that we can come to 
learn what kind of beings we are and what kind of world we inhabit.’44 The “kind of 
being” is the main phrase whereby Gunton means ontology,45 and, for him, ‘the 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity was the creation, true to the gospel, of a 
                                           
38 As shown in his historical review of the development, for example, in PTT 8–12 and Colin E. Gunton, 
‘The Trinity in Modern Theology,’ in Peter Byrne and Leslie Houlden (eds), Companion Encyclopaedia 
of Theology, London: Routledge, 1995, 938f. 
39 As will be discussed at §3.1. 
40 CF 183. 
41 CF 185. Gunton’s emphasis. 
42 Especially in those works mentioned by Gunton in TC x. 
43 The earliest essay (ch.5) was published in 1985, the latest (chs.9, 10) in 1996, and the rest in between 
1986 and 1991. 
44 PTT xi. 
45 Cf. PTT xxix, 22, (of God), ch.4, 70, 74 (of church), ch.6, 100, 116 (of human), ch.8, 148, 153 and TC 
ch.2 (of world). 
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distinctively Christian ontology,’46 ‘an ontology that was distinctively different from 
those prevailing in the ancient world, though in greater continuity, yet different also 
from the ontology (-ies?) implicit in the Old Testament writings.’47 Gunton believes that 
the understanding of being in terms of communion (rather than something underlying 
communion) is an ontological innovation, though he thinks it was neither maintained in 
subsequent generations nor extended to other areas, such as the doctrine of creation or 
ecclesiology, in which Greek philosophy continued to be influential.48 Part of the task 
Gunton takes upon himself in response to the challenge of the modern condition is to 
retrieve the trinitarian conception of the being of God achieved through ancient 
christological and trinitarian reflections49 and extend it to other areas of ontology (God, 
world, church, human and person).50  
 
To a large extent, therefore, the task is conceptual and transcendental, rather than 
speculative and theorising: ‘we are not here engaging in a mapping of the inner being of 
God, but asking what concepts we may develop in order to characterise the kind of 
being that God is.’51 The point of struggling for an adequate trinitarian conceptuality is 
‘not as some abstract test of orthodoxy, but as a way of expressing coherently and as 
well as possible what it is that we are granted to know of the God to whom we are 
related by the Spirit through Jesus Christ.’52 Simplifying a complex story of history, 
Gunton claims cautiously, though assuredly, ‘a number of conceptual advances were 
made as the result of thought about the God who is indwelt and known in worship.’53 
Exploring and developing some of them is what Gunton says his book The Promise of 
Trinitarian Theology is devoted to.54 This end goes with his view of the history of 
dogmatic development that is stated as follows: 
                                           
46 PTT 60. This is Gunton’s qualification of Harnack’s view that ‘the whole apparatus of early dogmatic 
theology was the imposition of a false metaphysic upon the gospel.’ Cf. also, ‘Trinity,’ 398f. 
47 PTT 58. Cf. also, Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 398f. 
48 Cf. BTR 42–6; OTM 136–41; TC 57–61; 73–9; PTT 56–61. 
49 ‘The efforts of early work on christology were devoted to an examination of the question of the being 
of Christ: of who and what kind of being he is in relation to God the Father and the Holy Spirit, on the 
one hand, and to the rest of the human race, on the other. Similarly, trinitarian reflection centred on the 
nature of God and of his relation to the world’ (PTT 57). 
50 Cf. PTT ch.3 (God), ch.4 (church), ch.5 (person), ch.6 (human), ch.8 (world), all understood in terms of 
a dynamic of being in relation. 
51 PTT 145. 
52 PTT 200, in reference to the suggestion of Thomas A. Smail, ‘The Holy Trinity and the Resurrection of 
Jesus,’ Andrew Walker (ed.), Different Gospels: Christian Orthodoxy and Modern Theologies, London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1988, 63–96, about how we say about ‘the relationships of Father, Son and Spirit 
in God’ in a way that ‘would more faithfully reflect what the New Testament obliges us to say about the 
relationships revealed in the life and in the resurrection of Jesus’ (76–8). 
53 PTT 8. 
54 Ibid. 
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There is not a ‘model’ known as trinitarian doctrine, a fixed set of formularies, 
but rather a process of intellectual development—a tradition—during the course 
of which a number of conceptual possibilities have been shaped. It is the 
possibilities of these concepts for our knowledge of God, ourselves and our 
world that I wish to develop.55 
There are four central concepts to Gunton’s ontological exploration and development of 
the doctrine that being is communion: person, relation, otherness and freedom.56 There 
is another concept, though, that is not mentioned by Gunton here but still plays an 
equally important role to the others for the development of the idea of being as 
communion, namely, space. The ambiguous status of the concept of space in Gunton is 
noted well by Professor Schwöbel. On the one hand, according to his observation, 
‘Gunton had always criticized theology’s taking up of the spatial imagery of popular 
religious imagination to characterize a particular style of doing theology.’57 On the other 
hand, however, the superficiality is transformed by the concept of space being used for 
thinking of the being of the triune God: ‘In this way the superficial notion of space is 
subverted and no longer made to refer to the measurements of three-dimensional objects 
but to the space that is created by letting the other be the other in a relationship of 
unbreakable koinonia in which the Trinity exists and in which we shall be included 
without losing our own space, our otherness, by being swallowed up into the divine 
life.’58 The burden of this study is to see whether that is the case, ultimately arguing for 
the concept of space as central to Gunton’s understanding of the doctrine that being is 
communion as are the other four concepts explicitly mentioned by himself. 
 
If that is the end of this work what concerns us here is the observations and questions 
that have led to the setting up the goal. There are two main places in particular, in which 
one can see how Gunton makes use of the word “space” and ask in what sense he uses it, 
one in his ontological exploration and the other in his transcendental project. Here we 
shall look only at the first, his ‘The Human Creation: Toward the renewal of the 
doctrine of the Imago Dei.’59 In this work, Gunton introduces the concept of space at 
various points in the process of moving towards a doctrine of the image of God. Three 
can be introduced as follows. At the first point, after having considered three different 
                                           
55 PTT 195. Also, 155. 
56 Briefly introduced by Gunton himself in speaking of conceptual possibilities made possible by the 
theological revolution achieved by the s in PTT 8–12. 
57 Schwöbel, ‘Shape,’ 202. For a detailed discussion of this see §5.4. 
58 Schwöbel, ‘Shape,’ 203. 
59 PTT ch.6, 100–17, which is the same as ‘Trinity, Ontology and Anthropology: Towards a Renewal of 
the Doctrine of the Imago Dei,’ in Colin E. Gunton and Christoph Schwöbel (eds), Persons, Divine and 
Human: King’s College essays in Theological Anthropology, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991, 47–61. 
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cosmologies, Gunton says: 
According to the Phoenician scheme, there is no space between God and the 
world, and so no human freedom. According to the kind of Hellenism we have 
viewed, the space is placed in the wrong place: between mind and matter, so 
that there is too little space between the human mind and God, too much 
between one person and another: space here is at the expanse of relation. In the 
third, Hebrew, scheme, there is space, because of the freedom of the immutable 
God to create ex nihilo.  
It is not difficult to know that in this passage Gunton speaks of space between God and 
world and between persons, though it is questionable whether it is used in a 
hermeneutical or metaphysical sense although the former appears to be the case. In any 
case, however, the point to be noted here is that the concept of space is at work on the 
same conceptual level as that of relation, indicating that the former is as important as is 
the latter, both in discussing the relation between beings.60 Gunton continues, however, 
But we need more than space. Indeed, from one point of view, space is the 
problem: individualism is the view of the human person which holds that there 
is so much space between people that they can in no sense participate in each 
other’s being. There is clearly space and space, and our requirement now is to 
find a conception which is correlative with that of relation.61 
At this point, the significance of the concept of space is relativised against the problem 
of space that Gunton finds in individualism. It is from there that he seeks what he calls 
“a conception correlative with that of relation.” The question is whether Gunton has 
shown what it is even later. The answer seems to be in what he says in this passage: 
To be a person is to be constituted in particularity and freedom—to be given 
space to be—by others in community. Otherness and relation continue to be the 
two central and polar concepts here. Only where both are given due stress is 
personhood fully enabled. Their co-presence will rule out both the kind of 
egalitarianism which is the denial of particularity, and leads to collectivism, and 
forms of individualism which in effect deny humanity to those unable to ‘stand 
on their own feet’.62 
It appears, according to this, that Gunton has “otherness” in mind as the conception that 
is correlative with that of relation, something that is indicated earlier when he says that 
‘we require space as well as relation: to be both related to and other than those and that 
                                           
60 Similarly, ‘Coleridge knew that if there was to be personality there had to be both relatedness and space 
at once between God and the world and within the world between finite persons’ (PTT 108, emphasis 
added).  
61 PTT 109. 
62 PTT 114. 
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on which we depend.’63 If this interpretation is correct the place of space in Gunton is 
now ambiguous, with regard to relation and otherness: is it synonymous with otherness, 
both standing on the other side of correlation with relation, or simply preparatory of the 
introduction of relation and otherness? In other words, does the concept of space have 
an independent standing in ontology or only a hermeneutical value supporting Gunton’s 
exposition of other ontological concepts? It appears that the polarity of relation and 
otherness, which is also reflected in various places,64 puts restraints on a fuller 
realisation of the concept of space as his contribution to ontology.65 The same 
consideration goes to the concept of space used in this passage: 
What flows from the concept of God as three persons in communion, related 
but distinct? First, there is something of the space we have been seeking. We 
have a conception of personal space: the space in which three persons are for 
and from each other in their otherness. They thus confer particularity upon and 
receive it from one another. That giving of particularity is very important: it is a 
matter of space to be. Father, Son and Spirit through the shape—the taxis—of 
their inseparable relatedness confer particularity and freedom on each other. 
That is their personal being.66 
One weight of this passage is that it contains “something of the space Gunton has been 
seeking.” And what we find here is not the space between God and world, nor the space 
between three persons of the Trinity, but “the space in which Father, Son and Spirit are 
related in their otherness, conferring particularity upon and receiving it from one 
another.” This space does not serve to introduce the concept of otherness nor is it placed 
on the side of otherness vis-à-vis that of relation. Rather, it is explicable only with the 
help of both concepts of relation and otherness. Put another way, it is about the being of 
God yet of something that is understandable only in respect to Father, Son and Spirit 
and the relations they have with one another. One question here is whether this concept 
of space, which Gunton draws from the concept of persons in communion, is not also 
more fundamental than that of persons in communion, though not necessarily in the 
sense of an impersonal expanse underlying the persons. Another is what Gunton means 
by “that” in the last sentence, ‘That is their personal being’: “relatedness,” or 
“particularity and freedom,” or “Father, Son and Spirit conferring particularity on each 
other through the shape of their inseparable relatedness.” The last appears to be the 
                                           
63 PTT 107 
64 E.g., PTT 110, where Gunton speaks of the ‘particularity of our universe’ and the ‘interrelatedness of all 
that is.’ 
65 Such a restraint is also at work in Gunton’s limiting of the concept of space to the side of otherness and 
particularity: ‘Creation becomes understood as the giving of being to the other, and that includes the 
giving of spade to be: to be other and particular’ (ibid, emphasis added). 
66 Ibid. 
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answer but is it not what he means by the personal space in which the three persons are 
for and from each other in their otherness? This raises a third question, namely, whether 
the concept of space can also be used for indicating the “consequential” aspect of the 
Trinity, resulting from the shaping of the conditional space by the persons coming into it 
and the ways in which they relate to each other. If these questions are valid, or at least to 
the extent that there is some ambiguity about the concept of space used by Gunton, this 
study takes it as a goal to clarify the matter. 
 
The rest of this thesis comprises eight chapters, with the proposal that Gunton’s works 
on the Trinity, trinitarian ontology and transcendental conceptuality are best understood 
if they are supported by the concept of space that is used by him but is not fully worked 
out in his theological and ontological explorations as other terms. Chapter 1 offers a 
detailed account of what Gunton means when speaking of God as a communion of three 
persons by outlining nine aspects of Gunton’s ontology of God. The aim is first to have 
a foundation for engaging with some critiques; second, to show that Gunton’s ontology 
of being as communion has an element that can be best understood by the concept of 
space; and, third, to highlight the need to take a step further than speaking of being in 
relation or communion.  
 
Chapter 2 and 3 are meant to clear the ground for the thesis by dealing with some major 
critiques of Gunton’s work: social Trinitarianism, projectionism, reductionism and 
others. There are two reasons for responding to them: first, that they highlight some 
areas in Gunton’s work that need to be clarified, particularly regarding the ontology of 
being in relation or communion; and that they call attention to the need to examine 
Gunton’s use of the Cappadocians by presenting a different understanding of their 
works. Chapter 4 looks at a Cappadocian text that is traditionally attributed to Basil the 
Great, for the reason that it is used by both Gunton as the basis of the ontology of being 
as communion and his critics for arguing that the text does not support Gunton’s use of 
it. The aim is to answer the questions raised in the previous discussions, mainly as to 
whether Gunton or his critics are mistaken in their uses of the piece of the Cappadocian 
work. 
 
The next three chapters build upon the ground cleared by the previous discussions 
towards a proposal of a theology of being as space. Examining Gunton’s transcendental 
conceptuality, chapter 5 identifies a problem regarding the similarity between his first 
12 
transcendental, “perichoresis,” and the third, “relationality,” with the argument that 
either perichoresis or relationality will suffice to serve as Gunton’s first transcendental 
whereas “spatiality” will better serve than relationality as what Gunton intends by his 
third transcendental. Chapter 6 investigates Gunton’s use of the scheme of the one and 
the many for his ontological and transcendental enquiries, leading to a suggestion of a 
revised scheme in which we have “the three” corresponding to “spatiality” suggested in 
the previous chapter. The sense promoted will be that the one (ousia) is constituted by 
the many (hypostasis) as the three (koinonia). Chapter 7 is the longest chapter, and the 
justification whereby it was carried out is the significance of the subject matter and its 
relevance to the thesis of this study. It will take the previous discussion to a 
consideration of the one God texts in the Bible, seeking to show that there is a 
correspondence between the biblical “one” language and “the three” discussed in the 
previous chapter. Finally, in chapter 8, we shall consider the concept of space in the 
context of addressing two questions: how to understand Gunton’s view, within his 
framework, that the God of the Old Testament is the same God as the God of the New; 
and whether it is appropriate to apply Gunton’s ontology of being in relation or 
communion to understanding all other beings when it is drawn from a particular 
doctrine of the Trinity. After achieving a theology of being as space, the thesis will 
conclude with a consideration of the possibility of spatial ontology of personhood. 
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Chapter 1 Trinity and Being as Communion 
 
The theology of God as a communion of three persons is at the heart of Gunton’s 
ontological explorations and consequently, not surprisingly, is the main focus of 
criticisms of his work. While we shall look at the latter step by step, the focus of the 
present chapter is the former, beginning with a consideration of how to understand the 
development of Gunton’s thinking about ontology. 
 
1.1. Trinity and Ontology 
Key to understanding Gunton’s ontology as well as his work in general is the doctrine of 
the Trinity. Chronologically, however, Gunton’s focused concentration on the Trinity in 
respect to ontology begins to appear in his writings from the late-1980s, not from the 
start of his work. Whilst there is a change, as Stephen R. Holmes correctly notes,1 it is 
doubtful whether we should understand the change, as Holmes does, in terms of a shift 
from one position to another regarding the content and use of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Holmes points to Gunton’s shift from Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity, as a hermeneutical 
way of speaking of God’s being, to Zizioulas’ doctrine of the Trinity, the three persons 
in communion, as an ontological description of God.2 Four things can be said in 
response, guiding the general argument that it is more appropriate to understand 
Gunton’s turning to Cappadocian theology in terms of a continuity or development, with 
a change only in focus or degree of attention, than it is to take it in terms of a change of 
mind. 
 
First, as noted by Holmes, Gunton speaks of Barth’s hermeneutical use of the doctrine 
of the Trinity,3 yet that does not necessarily mean that he takes Barth’s view to be all 
hermeneutical and, by implication, that Gunton’s view is wholly hermeneutical at the 
related stage. Holmes argues by drawing a line between Gunton’s early period of 
hermeneutical use of the doctrine and the later period of ontological use. This division, 
however, is difficult to justify against evidence. For example, Becoming and Being and 
The One, the Three and the Many are two main books belonging to the first stage 
according to Holmes, yet their content is not only language and hermeneutics but also 
                                           
1 Holmes, ‘Analogia,’ 32–48, to which Sverker refers for saying that ‘considering the sometimes hidden 
existence the doctrine of the Trinity had held in Gunton’s earlier theology, the emphasis on the doctrine of 
the Trinity must be seen as something of a new turn’ (op. cit., 117). 
2 Holmes, ‘Analogia,’ 42. 
3 ‘Its function is at least in part hermeneutical.’ BB 186. Gunton’s italics. Twice cited in Holmes, 
‘Analogia,’ 33 and 37. 
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ontology and metaphysics.4 In addition, nine out of the eleven chapters in The Promise 
of Trinitarian Theology,5 the main book of Gunton’s later stage according to Holmes, 
are essays published before the publication of The One, the Three and the Many.  
 
It is questionable, secondly, whether for Gunton the word “person” has ever been an 
“embarrassment,” though he takes note of Barth’s negative, or cautious (because he uses 
it anyway), position towards its theological use.6 In Holmes’ view, however, it was as 
much an embarrassment for Gunton as it was for Barth. He says, ‘listen again to his 
own word: “Three persons” suggests three separate Gods, not the one God in the 
threefold richness of his being, [while the word “substance” suggests a static, 
immovable deity].’7 This is perhaps the only text provided by Holmes as evidence for 
Gunton’s discomfort with the word “person.” There, however, Gunton is speaking of the 
modern situation in which the theological use of person can be misleading,8 rather than 
expressing his own position about the use of the word. Besides, if Holmes’ reading of 
the passage is correct, we would have to say that the word “substance” (also used in the 
latter part of the passage) is an embarrassment for Gunton, too. Gunton’s issue, however, 
has never been with the word “substance” itself, but only with certain notions of it, such 
as were developed by the Enlightenment thinkers, as we will see in more detail later. 
 
It is debatable, thirdly, whether it is correct to say that in Gunton ‘trinitarian analogies 
are replaced by trinitarian mediation.’9 The chief ground of the claim is what Holmes 
makes of Gunton’s Christ and Creation and The Triune Creator in particular; the former 
as the book in which the Irenaean “two hands” of God theme appears for the first time 
                                           
4 For example, the section ‘Ontology in Karl Barth,’ BB 174–7. For a comment on the significance of this 
study for Gunton’s subsequent works, including trinitarian and ontological works, see Robert Jenson, ‘A 
Decision Tree of Colin Gunton’s Thinking,’ in Harvey, Gunton, 8f, and Schwöbel, ‘Shape,’ 183–5. 
5 The exceptions are the last three chapters of the second edition (1997). 
6 For Gunton’s account of Barth’s wish to abandon the traditional designation of the three as “persons” 
and rather use the term “person” as a description of ‘the one God who exists in three modes of being,’ see 
BB 139–41, which is presented without an indication of his own preference or decision. He rather notes, 
‘Even when the expression ‘mode of being’ is employed, it is done with intent “to express by this term, 
not absolutely, but relatively better and more simply and clearly the same thing as is meant by “person”’ 
(141). 
7 EA 141, as cited in Holmes, ‘Analogia,’ 42, apart from the words in brackets, which are added for 
discussion.  
8 The context is similar to that in which Gunton says of Barth’s wish to abandon the use of “person” for 
the three of the triune God, that is, ‘[b]ecause of the connotations of the term “person” and “personality” 
as they are now used.’ BB 141. Emphasis added. 
9 Holmes, ‘Analogia,’ 42. 
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in print,10 and the latter as that to which the recognition underlying the introduction of 
the theme becomes absolutely central.11 The observation may be correct, but what is 
observed can be explained or viewed in a different way than is done by Holmes. That is, 
to see the first occurrence of the Irenaean theme in terms of an answer to a question that 
has been with Gunton,12 and understand that the theme becomes central to The Triune 
Creator simply because the relation of God to the world is the subject matter of the 
book.13 As for “trinitarian analogies,” it is not clear what the reader is to understand by 
that, given the different conceptions of analogy that Gunton is aware of. It can be 
Hartshorne’s, for example, or Barth’s, which for Gunton are quite different systems of 
analogy. Holmes also points to A Brief Theology of Revelation, as a work evidencing 
Gunton’s search for trinitarian analogies as the main thrust of the use of the doctrine of 
the Trinity, with the Irenaean account of mediation appearing as a very muted theme.14 
Yet any adequate survey of the book will show that it is more difficult to find Gunton’s 
search for trinitarian analogies in that work than to find his account of trinitarian 
mediation. Let us examine the passage cited by Holmes for his argument that the 
Irenaean mediation is only in the book as a very muted theme: ‘As we have seen, that is 
not to evade the challenges of rationality, but to establish them on their proper basis: not 
on impersonal Platonic—Aristotelian structures, but the free personal relation of God to 
the world through his son and Spirit.’15 This may be an insignificant, passing comment, 
yet it is more difficult to accept that than to interpret it as an answer to the very question 
that has concerned Gunton, namely, the question of the basis of ‘Christian thought’16 
and ‘our common human life on earth and the institutions which form the framework 
for that life.’17 Besides, the last section of the last chapter of the book has the title of 
‘Varieties of mediation, but one Lord.’ We might also point to Lecture 4, because its 
                                           
10 Holmes, ‘Analogia,’ 41, citing a passage from Gunton, CC 75, with further references. Holmes 
mistakenly links Gunton’s introduction of the Irenaean theme to a belief that ‘mediation must be 
fundamentally an account of persons in relations.’ 
11 That is, the recognition that ‘human and divine persons and relations are to be understood fairly 
univocally, in that “person” and “relation” become the middle terms in the arguments linking divine and 
human’ (ibid).  
12 For example, a question that searches for a way of conceiving the relation of God and the world in such 
a way in which God remains free and other in his relation to his creation, which is one of the major issues 
in Gunton’s comparative study of Hartshorne’s and Barth’s theology. The phrase “two hands” may be new, 
but the concept of mediation is already present to Gunton’s work before its introduction into it in Christ 
and Creation. For an example, see EA 53f and AA 198f. In a later work, the Irenaeus’ analogy is used for 
an argument that the Son and the Spirit are truly and fully God. See CF 181. For a different account of the 
matters of mediation, analogy and two-hand themes than Holmes’, see Lincoln Harvey, ‘The Double 
Homoousion: Forming the Content of Gunton’s Theology,’ in Harvey, Gunton, 87f and 92f. 
13 Cf. Terry J. Wright, ‘Colin Gunton on providence: critical commentaries,’ in Harvey, Gunton, 148. 
14 Holmes, ‘Analogia,’ 41. 
15 BTR 63, italics added to indicate the part cited by Holmes, ‘Towards,’ 48 n.55. 
16 BTR 55. 
17 BTR 49. 
16 
main thrust concerns the mediating work of God the Spirit in salvation and revelation.18 
If “trinitarian mediation” is concerned with the way in which God relates to the world 
through his Son and Spirit,19 then Lincoln Harvey’s appraisal of Gunton’s work appears 
to provide a better account of the development in Gunton: ‘his neo-Irenaean theology of 
mediation is his proposed settlement. The Son and the Spirit, as the “two hands” of the 
Father, hold the world close-yet-at-a-distance, the generosity of God thereby affording 
the creature relative self-standing but never at the cost of God’s genuine presence.’20 
The word “settlement” implies a quest towards it, whereas “shift” or “change of mind” 
suggests a move from one answer (or settlement) to another.  
 
Finally, it might well lead to an oversimplification to criticise Gunton’s work by using 
the scheme that distinguishes between Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity and Zizioulas’ in 
terms of the first as hermeneutical and the second as ontological, for at least two reasons. 
For Gunton, firstly, both doctrines have both ontological and hermeneutical elements, if 
the latter is about the way of speaking of God. Barth in Becoming and Being, for 
example, does not only speak of God for us but also God in himself,21 and Gunton’s turn 
to Cappadocian theology is for a better way of speaking of God, not to make God’s 
existence dependent on the world.22 For Gunton, secondly, there is a similarity between 
Barth’s and Zizioulas’ conceptions of the relation between the economic Trinity and the 
immanent Trinity in their common understanding of the distinction as a device to 
safeguard ‘the freedom of God’ or ‘absolute transcendence of God without alienating 
him from the world.’23 It would be better, therefore, to understand the transition in 
Gunton from Barth to Zizioulas (or the Cappadocians) in terms of a move towards a 
more adequate ontology (and a hermeneutics, but not everything, because some aspects 
of Barth’s approach remains central to Gunton’s programme) with the help of the 
                                           
18 BTR 64–82. 
19 For a definition of mediation of Gunton’s own, ‘Mediation denotes the way we understand one form of 
action—God’s action—to take shape in relation to that which is not God; the way, that is, by which the 
actions of one who is creator takes a form in a world that is of an entirely different order from God 
because he made it to be so’ (CF 5). 
20 Harvey, ‘Double Homoousion,’ 92f. Italics added. 
21 For example, in Barth, Church Dogmatics Volume I: The Doctrine of the Word of God Part 1, G. W. 
Bromiley (tr.), G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (eds), Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975, 370. For Gunton’s 
account of Barth’s speaking of God in eternity, see BB 145–8. 
22 As implied in Holmes’ argument that ‘Claude Welch and Jüngel are cited for the idea that Barth is 
doing something fairly radical in developing a dynamic and relational account of God’s existence, but 
God’s relationality here is used only as a way of speaking of God as essentially relational without falling 
into Hartshorne’s trap of making God’s existence dependent on the world’ (‘Analogia,’ 33. Italics added). 
The implication that Gunton has fallen into Hartshorne’s trap is hard to accept from the argument. Holmes, 
further, downplays the weight Gunton places on Jüngel’s interpretation of Barth compared to Welch’s and 
its significance for his own work to develop in time. 
23 TtT 123. 
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doctrine of the Trinity whose formulation reflects more adequately the reality of the 
God of the gospel.24 
 
1.2. Being as Communion 
We now turn to Gunton’s ontology of God as a communion of persons, partly in order to 
establish a detailed account of it, partly in preparation for an engagement with some 
criticisms of it and partly as a way of introducing a question concerning Gunton’s 
ontology of being as communion. 
 
1.2.1. Cappadocian gift 
Gunton understands that early Christian theologians, in their development of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, moved in the right direction by addressing the theological 
significance of the historic act of God in Christ and reflecting upon its ontological 
implications for the being of God.25 In subsequent generations, however, the doctrine of 
the Trinity tended to be understood in terms indebted rather to Greek philosophy which 
Gunton thinks was surpassed already by the development of the doctrine, resulting in 
not only a loss of the ontological innovation achieved by the 4th century theologians but 
also distortions of the Christian faith and impoverishments of church life.26 Modernity, 
in Gunton’s view, played a key role in revealing some theological problems of 
Christendom, though catastrophically failed to achieve what it wished to.27 With that 
perception of the situation, Gunton takes the doctrine of the Trinity formulated by the 
Cappadocian fathers as ‘the means to an ontology alternative to those of the intellectual 
worlds in which Christianity once took shape, and must now reshape its form of life if it 
is to be adequate to the challenge of modern conditions.’28 And, for him, this is the 
essential teaching gained from them: ‘the first thing to be said about the being of God is 
that it consists in personal communion. Communion is for Basil an ontological category. 
The nature of God is communion.’29 “Being as communion,” therefore, is not an idea of 
                                           
24 For Gunton’s own account of the move from Barth’s ontology to the Cappadocian, see BB 230–3. 
25 PTT 8f. ‘if Jesus … is understood to do the work of God, he cannot finally be separated in thought and 
being from God.’ 
26 As narrated in various places, including PTT ch.3; OTM 80–5; AB ch.3. 
27 For a summary comment by Gunton, see OTM 1; ‘Trinity,’ 942. For a detailed response to modernity, 
cf. EA chs.1–2; AA chs.3–5; PTT ch.2; OTM ch.1. For a critical view of Gunton’s appraisal of modernity, 
Brad Green, ‘Colin Gunton and the Theological Origin of Modernity,’ in Harvey, Gunton, 171–4, and 
Stephen N. Williams, Revelation and Reconciliation: A Window on Modernity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995; also, Paraskevè Tibbs, ‘Created for Action: Colin Gunton’s Relational 
Anthropology,’ in Harvey, Gunton, 123f. A response to this critique is given at §5.1 n.2. 
28 PTT 71. 
29 Ibid. Original emphasis. Reference is made to John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in 
personhood and the Church, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985, 134. 
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Gunton’s own creating, but is based on his understanding of a received doctrine of the 
Trinity, especially from the Cappadocian theologians. 
 
Gunton acknowledges, in the preface to Promise of Trinitarian Theology, that he ran 
‘the risk of romanticising the Eastern tradition,’30 before wiser counsels prevailed so 
that he was finally not tempted to do so. One reason is that it is not his concern ‘to 
canonise any theologian or school,’ nor ‘to play the East against the West.’31 He knows 
that the Eastern tradition, too, has a history of parallel problems.32 Nonetheless, he 
accepts that the Cappadocians made crucial contributions to enabling Christian theology 
to move away from the influence of Greek ontology to gain its own ontological basis.33 
He is convinced that ‘the truly creative achievement of all trinitarian thought was that of 
the trinitarian ontology produced by the Cappadocians.’34 There are three points in 
particular that Gunton highlights: (1) that the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity is a 
genuine advancement from the Nicene theology of homoousios, from the theology of 
God’s being as ‘being in relation’ or ‘a shared being,’ enriching the concept of 
relationality with that of communion;35 (2) that it is adequately formed by paying due 
attention to the actions of God in the economy of creation and redemption;36 and (3) that 
it is an ontological innovation surpassing Greek ontology, enabling conceptual 
possibilities in the light of which further ontological explorations can be undertaken.37  
 
1.2.2. A pattern 
Gunton makes extensive use of Cappadocian theology of God as a communion of 
persons, more frequently than he explains it, yet mostly as the basis of his discussion of 
the ontology of other things. That is the case even with its first occurrence within his 
corpus. Discussing the subject of community in The Actuality of Atonement, he 
comments that ‘the work of Christ and the Spirit is to create, in time and space, a living 
                                           
30 PTT 204. Looking back upon a previous point of time, Gunton says that then he was even tempted to 
call The Promise of Trinitarian Theology ‘Homage to the Cappadocia.’ 
31 Ibid. 
32 See, PTT xii, for the problem of abstraction, and xxii, for the problem of divine energies replacing the 
activities of the Son and the Spirit. For the latter, see also ‘Trinity,’ 940, 950f and FSS 56, n.56, with 
reference to Dorothea Wendebourg, ‘From the Cappadocian Fathers to Gregory Palamas. The Defeat of 
Trinitarian Theology’, Studia Patristica 17.1, 1982, 194–8. Cf. also, T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith: 
The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988, 72. 
33 PTT 8–12 and ‘Trinity,’ 938f. 
34 BB (2001, 2nd edn.), ‘Epilogue,’ 232. 
35 Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 939; PTT 9 and OTM 214. 
36 PTT 171 and 175. 
37 Cf. PTT 8–12; ‘Trinity,’ 938f. Also, John Zizioulas, Being as Communion, New York: St Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1985, 83–9. 
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echo of the communion that God is in eternity.’38 He then draws out from that ‘a notion 
of the church as the community that is created and called to be the finite embodiment of 
the eternal communion of Father, Son and Spirit.’39 ‘Human community,’ he continues, 
‘is the gift of the God who is himself communion.’40 Although these quotations are 
preceded by a brief discussion of the Son and the Spirit mediating God’s love and work, 
insofar as trinitarian communion is concerned, its manifestation here is rather 
unexpected, with an introduction to it neither found in the previous pages of the book 
nor in earlier works in print. It is simply assumed and used as the basis of his discussion 
of the church as community and human community in general.41 That said, it is a pattern 
which repeats in his ontological studies in later works, though that does not mean that 
Gunton has not provided an explanation of the idea of God as a communion of the three 
persons. 
 
1.2.3. Christian ontology  
Being as communion is not a distortion of the doctrine of the Trinity, for Gunton, but a 
correct expression of the ontology developed alongside the doctrine.42 While he thinks 
that the doctrine of the Trinity, not being in the Bible as such, has developed as an 
attempt to answer the question that is raised by the biblical account of trinitarian 
mediation about who the God that Christians worship is,43 at the same time Gunton 
considers it as ‘an answer to the quite proper Greek question of what kind of God it is 
with whom we have to do.’44 To repeat,45 ‘the development of the doctrine of the Trinity 
was the creation, true to the gospel, of a distinctively Christian ontology.’46 In relation 
to the surrounding world, the creation of the theology of being as communion was the 
beginning of the process of overcoming Greek ontology in which ‘to be is either to be 
                                           
38 AA 199. Emphasis added. 
39 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
40 AA 200. Emphasis added. 
41 Holmes, ‘Analogia,’ 42 appears to have a best explanation: ‘a fairly fundament revolution in his 
thought’ took place ‘between 1982 and 1985’ and resulted from ‘his working with John Zizioulas on the 
BCC commission on the Trinity. After this point, he adopted what has become known, rightly or wrongly, 
as an “Eastern” account of the Trinity, stressing the true personhood of the three hypostases and finding 
an account of the divine unity in their relations.’  
42 Cf. Zizioulas, Being, 36–41. 
43 CF 184. 
44 Ibid. Cf. PTT 167–77. The notion of “what kind,” which is prevalent in Gunton’s ontological 
explorations, may be considered as a point, among others, in which Gunton is different from Zizioulas in 
that the latter resists any talk of “what” question vis-à-vis “who” or “how” question. For the contrast 
between “what” and “who” questions, John Zizioulas, ‘On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of 
Personhood,’ in Christoph Schwöbel and Colin E. Gunton, Persons, Divine and Human, Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1991, 44f. 
45 Cf. Introduction, 6. 
46 PTT 60, and ‘Trinity,’ 398f. Cf. also, Zizioulas, Communion, 185f.  
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universal or to be individual: to be defined by virtue of participation in universal form 
or by virtue of material separation from other beings,’47 rather than ‘the victory of 
Hellenistic philosophy over the gospel’ or ‘the imposition of a false metaphysic upon 
the gospel.’48 Gunton adds, though, that these ontological insights were not extended 
into other areas of Christian doctrine while rival ontologies came in to fill the vacuum.49 
Therein lies a reason why it is so important for him to retrieve the ontology of God 
achieved by the 4th century theologians in their development of the doctrine of the 
Trinity upon the reality of God revealed in the economy of the triune God. 
 
1.2.4. Fully Trinitarian 
It is important, for an appropriate understanding, to distinguish between Gunton’s 
speaking of God as a relational being (or being in relation) and his speaking of God as a 
communion (or being in communion).50 If the former is the result of the Nicene 
theologians introducing a note of relationality into the being of God, according to 
Gunton, then the latter is a further development achieved by the Cappadocians paying 
due attention to the Holy Spirit.51 Speaking of God as a relational being would be 
sufficient for Christian theology if it had only the actions of God the Father and the Son 
Jesus Christ. Yet there is also the action of the Spirit, even according to the biblical 
account.52 The description of the Lord and giver of life indicates that the Spirit is also a 
divine being with a distinct mode of action,53 not simply as a divine force, though he is 
indeed, but as a person who is other than the Father and the Son.54 With the threeness in 
being and action of Father, Son and Spirit,55 therefore, Gunton turns to the Cappadocian 
language of koinonia, rather than remaining with the Nicene language of homoousios.56 
Of particular importance for Gunton’s emphasis on the threeness or trinitarian 
                                           
47 PTT 9. 
48 Both phrases express Harnack’s view, the first in the words of Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For 
Us: The Trinity and Christian Life, San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991, 36 and the second in Gunton’s in 
PTT 60. Apart from the appraisal of the doctrine of the Trinity itself, Gunton generally agrees to the view 
of Harnack that ‘the original teaching of Christianity was overlaid with a philosophy that was foreign to 
it’ (ibid.).  
49 Cf. Introduction, 7. 
50 Cf. Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 939. 
51 PTT 9, 48–55. 
52 E.g., Ps 33:6; Ezek 36:27; John 6:63; 15:26; Act 2:4. 
53 IA 104. 
54 See TtT 116 and FSS 47. 
55 If the notion of “begotten” provides a way of conceptually distinguishing a distinct mode of being other 
than God the Father, another is provided by the notion of “proceeding.” Thus says Gunton, ‘The Son is 
eternally begotten; the Spirit proceeds, and is therefore in God in a different way’ (CF 185). 
56 Given that Gunton still uses the word “relation” of the being of God even after the introduction of the 
word “communion” to his work (e.g., OTM 229), a question will remain as to whether we should 
understand them in the light of what is discussed here or as a sign that he is not aware of the distinction 
being made here, between his speaking of God in relation and speaking of God as being in communion. 
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distinctness is Basil’s conception of the Spirit as the perfecting cause,57 as the best way 
for him to consider the distinctive mode of the Spirit in relation to Father and Son.58 The 
reason is that it corresponds best with the biblical emphasis on the eschatological work 
of the Spirit.59 In his view, on the other hand, the eschatological dimension of the action 
of the Spirit is among the most neglected in the Western tradition, though with some 
exceptions.60 It is against the stream that Gunton pays full attention to the Spirit as the 
third person of the Trinity: ‘the Spirit is neither a mode of existence nor a relation; 
rather, he is a person existing in a certain relation—his mode of being—with the 
Father.’61 In drawing attention to the trinitarian distinction, however, Gunton does not 
fail to affirm the unity of the Spirit with the Father and the Son. The three are distinct 
and yet inseparably related to one another, in other words, distinct in relation and related 
in distinction. That is the meaning of the triune communion, whereas communion is the 
meaning of the word God, so far as Gunton’s understanding is concerned.62 
 
1.2.5. Of persons 
The three who constitute the triune communion are not ‘parts’ but ‘persons, who are 
distinguishable but not separable.’63 Gunton knows that “person” is a problematic 
concept to use in a modern context and so needs to be understood carefully. He has 
qualifications for his use of the concept of person, among which we might consider the 
following three as drawn from Cappadocian theology.64  
 
For Gunton, firstly, a person is not an individual,65 ‘in the sense that the latter is defined 
in terms of separation from other individuals, the person in terms of relations with other 
persons.’66 This is not a distinction that Gunton has from the start. Rather, it emerged a 
decade and half later than the publication of his first book as his attention became more 
                                           
57 And the Father, ‘the original cause,’ and the Son, ‘the creative cause.’ Basil of Caesarea, On the Holy 
Spirit, XV. 36 and 38, as cited in IA 104; FSS 114. Gunton would gloss: ‘the Father originates; he creates 
through the Son; and he perfects through the Spirit’ (IA 104). 
58 Cf. also, essays in TtT, particularly from chapter 7. 
59 CF 185. 
60 In Calvin, for example, Gunton finds something similar said of the Spirit to Basil’s conception of the 
Spirit as the perfecting cause: ‘in transfusing into all things his energy, and breathing into them essence, 
life, and movement, he is indeed plainly divine.’ John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, F. L. 
Battles (tr.), J. T. McNeill (ed.), Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960, I. xiii. 14, as cited in IA 104. 
61 FSS 47. 
62 PTT 10. For a definition of ‘fully trinitarian theology’ for Gunton, cf. Schwöbel, ‘Shape,’ 202. 
63 AB 122. 
64 See BB 227–33, for a focused treatment of the person and the Trinity in this regard. 
65 See PTT 11, 39 and 85; TtT 224; AB 122; CF 186. Cf. also, Schwöbel, ‘Shape,’ 192. 
66 PTT 11. The focus of the distinction is relationality or relatedness. For Gunton, in a sense, 
“individuality” is equivalent to “unrelatedness,” though, in another, to “uniqueness.” See PTT 92 for the 
former and 201 for the latter. 
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focused on the doctrine of the Trinity and ontology.67 Once introduced, however, it 
plays a clarifying role in his arguments. He says, for example, ‘To treat the person and 
the individual as the same thing—to define the person as an individual—is to lose both 
person and individual.’68 He also speaks specifically about why it is no longer adequate 
to translate the trinitarian concept of hypostasis as individual, ‘simply because the three 
are not individuals but persons, beings whose reality can only be understood in terms of 
their relations to each other.’69  
 
Secondly, however, persons are ‘not relations, but concrete particulars in relation to one 
another.’70 The definition of the person as a relation, which Gunton finds prepared in 
Augustine, if not created by him,71 and presented as an example in Torrance,72 is an 
attempt to define the concept of person that he thinks has proved disastrous, and so is 
particularly to be avoided.73 There are two grounds for the warning. One is a tendency 
‘to define the personal in terms of the impersonal,’74 and the other ‘making it difficult to 
speak of relations between the persons.’75  
 
Thirdly, the person is a logically primitive notion,76 and an ontologically primitive 
reality.77 As such, says Gunton, ‘we cannot do justice to its reality by attempting to 
define it in other terms, especially terms drawn from impersonal realities.’78 The best 
way to define the person for him is ostensive, that is, ‘by indicating where persons are 
                                           
67 Enlightenment and Alienation has “person” and “individual” used interchangeably. See 105 and 107. 
The first occurrence of the distinction appears in The One, the Three, and the Many: An inaugural Lecture 
in the Chair of Christian Doctrine (14 May 1985, King’s College London, pamphlet, limited publication), 
which is later incorporated into The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (1991) as chapter 5 with a slight 
revision. 
68 PTT 85. We lose them, to gloss, as personal uniqueness is lost in numerical singleness and the latter 
thereby loses its ontological basis. 
69 PTT 39, in speaking of the inadequacy of translating the Cappadocian concept of hypostasis as 
“individual.”  
70 Ibid. This is a point that needs to be held especially against some mistreatments of Gunton as a 
promoter of the concept of person as relation, as will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
71 PTT 40f. 
72 FSS 46f. 
73 PTT 200.  
74 Ibid. It is a concern that is already expressed in his inaugural lecture: ‘a species-being, a universal, is 
impersonal, and it is not possible to base the freedom and society of persons on what is impersonal’ (PTT 
87). 
75 PTT 200. See below n.91 for what Gunton does not mean by relations between persons. 
76 PTT 85 and 200, in reference to P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, 
London: Macmillan, 1982, 101–3. 
77 PTT 200, in reference to Zizioulas, Being, 40f. 
78 Ibid. 
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to be found and the way that they are conceived to be and act.’79 Hence Gunton’s 
speaking of the person in such terms as ‘free, other and yet constituted by relations to 
other persons,’80 ‘whose reality can only be understood in terms of the relations to each 
other,’81 and ‘a being in relation.’82 These all are understandable as reflecting attempts 
to seek the uniqueness or even individuality of a person in the relations one has with 
others.83 
 
1.2.6. Relations between persons 
The concept of relation is yet essential to Gunton’s appropriation of the theology of 
being as communion and our understanding of it. While some aspects of his concept of 
relation are already touched on in the previous discussion, a separate treatment of them 
is advisable for two reasons in particular. First, although relation is discussed in his first 
book, different relations are touched on throughout his work: relations between God and 
the world; relations among the members of the Trinity; relations between individual and 
society; relations between humanity and the rest of the world, and so on. Secondly, then, 
it is not precise to say that Gunton maintains a relational ontology, although that is how 
he describes his pursuit.84 That for Gunton persons are not relations, the point noted 
previously, makes it reasonable to think that there must be a qualified sense in which he 
uses relation or relational for his work.  
 
That said, an approach can be made to an account of the concept of relation operating in 
Gunton’s theology of being as communion by looking at the contrasts he makes 
between the Cappadocians and Augustine.85 Firstly, relation in Gunton’s trinitarian 
theology is primarily about relations between the three persons, rather than 
qualifications of the soul or the inner Trinity.86 The contrast is not made out of concern 
for the social model of the Trinity rather than the psychological. The underlying concern 
is rather the need to have a way to maintain the distinctness of the three persons 
                                           
79 Ibid. Gunton considers another way to define the person, that is, ‘to use a tautology in which the terms 
mutually define each other,’ in reference to Calvin’s definition in Institutes, I.xiii.6 and Claude Welch’s 
interpretation of it in In This Name: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology, London: SCM Press, 1953, 
190f. 
80 PTT 13. 
81 PTT 39. 
82 PTT 114. 
83 PTT 13. 
84 PTT 94. 
85 What is intended by Gunton is not ‘naive’ playing of the Cappadocian tradition against the Western’ 
(Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 951). Cf. also, Schwöbel, ‘Shape,’ 207 n.59. 
86 PTT 102.  
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revealed in the economy,87 not compromising the unity of God yet countering the 
tendency to modalism and individualism,88 and the bearing that the triune relatedness 
can bring on the question of human relatedness.89 
 
Secondly, trinitarian relations are of ontological status, in the sense that they are 
expressive of the ways by which the persons exist and are made what they are.90 This is 
an emphasis that Gunton stresses in contrast to what he finds in Augustine for whom 
relation is rather of logical status, remaining ‘a concept owing more to Aristotelian logic 
than to attention to concrete and personal realities.’91 Gunton simply highlights the 
contrast by drawing out two different kinds of question: ‘What kind of being is this, that 
God is to be found in the relations of Father, Son and Spirit?’ (Cappadocian) and ‘What 
kind of sense can be made of the apparent logical oddity of the threeness of the one God 
in terms of Aristotelian subject-predicate logic?’ (Augustinian)92 
 
Thirdly, being ontological, trinitarian relations are constitutive of what the three persons 
are.93 The three are ‘not persons who then enter into relations, but are mutually 
constituted, made what they are, by virtue of their relations to one another.’94 That is 
one way in which Gunton speaks of mutually constitutive relations. Another is that in 
which it is said that the three together constitute the being of God by virtue of the 
relations they have with each other.95 In Augustine, however, relation is intermediate, 
ontologically speaking, between substance and accident, designating that which can be 
predicated “relatively” of God, not “accidentally” though, yet not “substantially” or 
“essentially” either.96 The link Gunton draws between Aristotle’s and Augustine’s 
thought is therefore not an exact repetition of the former in the latter. What is common 
to them is rather the essential irrelevance of relation to ontology. 
                                           
87 For Gunton’s concern about the distinctness of the three persons against what he sees in Augustine, see 
PTT 4, 35, 42, 50, 57 and 92. 
88 For the tendency to modalism, 42, and the tendency to individualism, 43 and 103. 
89 PTT 102f. 
90 PTT 11. 
91 PTT 95. See also 41. Aristotle’s relation in Gunton’s words: ‘relation is subordinate to substance. 
Relations are what take place or subsist between substances that are prior to them: something first exists, 
and then enters or finds itself in relation to other things, which may change its accidents, but not what it 
really is (short of destroying it)’ (151f). 
92 PTT 40. The Promise of Trinitarian Theology is, with little exaggeration, a response to the first question 
asked by Gunton himself. 
93 See PTT 13, 152 and FSS 47. 
94 PTT 152. Similarly, by conceptual parallels, ‘the being of the church consists in the relations of the 
persons to each other’ (PTT 75). 
95 PTT 39.  
96 PTT 41, in reference to Augustine, The Trinity, V.12 and VII.3.  
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Fourthly, the relations of the three to one another in trinitarian communion are the place 
in which lies the being of God, in the sense that the latter derives from the unfolding of 
the three in their relations to each other.97 The contrast here is with Augustine’s view 
according to which the true being of God is something that underlies the threeness of 
the persons, something other than the God revealed in the economy, some unknown and 
unknowable substance.98 Locating the source of the difference in Augustine’s calling 
attention away from the economy to the individual mind, 99 Gunton draws attention back 
to the economy as the starting point of Christian speaking of the being of God.100 
 
For Gunton, finally, relations in which the three are in eternal communion is the locus of 
the unity of God, in the sense that ‘Father, Son and Spirit in their interrelatedness make 
God to be the God that he is.’101 This unity is neither that of an individual, nor of a 
collectivity, but the unity of communion of persons in relation. It is not unity in the 
narrow sense that is opposite to diversity, but in a more inclusive sense encompassing 
diversity. Here is Gunton’s answer to the question of how the three can be one: ‘this 
God is one only by virtue of the way in which Father, Son and Spirit mutually and 
reciprocally give to and receive from each other everything that they are.’102 
 
These five notions of relation can be challenged, as they have been, from a perspective 
of different understandings of Augustine or the Cappadocians.103 It needs to be said, 
then, that the point here is not whether their presentations by Gunton are correct or not 
but simply that as aspects of the concept of relation operative in his work they need to 
be considered for an adequate treatment of his appropriation of the theology of being as 
                                           
97 The word “unfolding” is from a passage cited twice by Gunton as the heart of the matter for Basil that 
is denied by Augustine: ‘three somethings subsist from one matter (materia) which, whatever it is, is 
unfolded in these three’ (PTT 42 and 95). 
98 See PTT 32, 42, 48 and 54. 
99 See Gunton’s discussion of Augustine’s trinitarian analogies in PTT 42–8, and the discussion of 
community and sociality in OTM 214–29. 
100 Gunton refers to Calvin as one who gets the balance better than Schleiermacher and Tillich concerning 
religion saying, ‘we should remember that for him apart from the Christian gospel we all get our deity 
wrong, fabricating idols which far from saving us in fact enslaves us’ (PTT 161f). 
101 FSS 46. ‘God is indeed one in being: there is only one God. But this very oneness is not a 
mathematical oneness, as Arius and Greek theology had taught, but a oneness consisting in the 
inseparable relation of Father, Son and Spirit, the three hypostases’ (PTT 10).  
102 CF 186. Original emphasis. In other words, ‘God is only what he is as three persons whose being is so 
closely bound up with one another that they together constitute one God’ (ibid). 
103 For a critique of Gunton from Augustine’s perspective, see Bradley G. Green, Colin Gunton and the 
failure of Augustine: The Theology of Colin Gunton in Light of Augustine, Cambridge: James Clark & Co., 
2012; idem, ‘The Protomodern Augustine? Colin Gunton and the Failure of Augustine,’ International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 9, July 2007 (3), 328–41, and, from a Cappadocian perspective, Stephen 




1.2.7. Of otherness and freedom 
God as communion is not only of persons and relations, but also of otherness and 
freedom. According to the trinitarian description of God held by Gunton, the persons 
that constitute the triune communion exist as others in their free relations to one 
another.104 In that picture of God, relation and otherness are two poles essential to what 
it means to be a person.105 While relations are constitutive of what the persons are, as 
shown previously, otherness provides the condition of the relational constitutiveness.106 
In moving his thought in that direction, Gunton is not driven by a desire for a perfect 
image of God, or a sudden change of mind resulting from an uncritical reception of an 
alternative theology, but a focussed attention to the economy that reveals God’s 
presence and action to and in the world through the Son and the Spirit. Gunton says thus, 
of the latter, ‘To speak of the Spirit in the economy is to speak of a personal agent of the 
Father’s action in and towards the world.’107  
 
Also crucial is Gunton’s critique of some concepts of the Spirit, including that of 
Augustine as love and gift. For the following three reasons, among others, Gunton 
thinks that the identification of the Spirit as love and gift has been detrimental to an 
adequate conception of the being of God.108 First, love and gift do not serve the purpose 
of distinguishing the Spirit from the Son, because ‘the Son might equally, perhaps with 
more justification, be described as the Father’s love and gift to the world.’109 Secondly, 
it does not have biblical support, so that ‘the Spirit in himself is conceived to be other 
than he is shown to be in revelation.’110 Thirdly, the Spirit conceived merely as the link 
between Father and Son encourages a conception of the life of God as ‘a closing of an 
                                           
104 For a brief account of the concepts of otherness and freedom in Gunton, see PTT 11f, and for a more 
detailed account, 201–4. 
105 A historical survey of the issue is provided by John Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness: Further 
Studies in Personhood and the Church, London: T&T Clark, 2006, 43–55, with the repeated point that 
otherness is not solely an ethical or psychological matter but is more primitively an ontological matter, 
constitutive of being and existence (11, 14, 25, 27, 49, and 143). 
106 That is, ‘to be a person is to be related as an other. … Personal relations are those which constitute the 
other person as other, as truly particular’ (PTT 11f). Emphasis original.  
107 TtT 122. 
108 Preceded by three problematic identifications, 105–9. followed by three missing features  
109 TtT 109. Robert Jenson, ‘The Holy Spirit,’ in C. E. Braaten and Robert Jenson (eds), Christian 
Dogmatics, Volume 2, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984, 126f. 
110 TtT 110. What the Spirit is shown to be in the economy is not primarily love and gift but rather ‘the 
creator of community,’ ‘the transcendental Lord,’ ‘the life-giving power of God in and towards his 
creation,’ 112–9.  Gunton notes that Augustine’s identification of the Spirit as love is by special fitness. 
For a detailed discussion, see PTT 49–50. 
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eternal circle: love as moving outward to the Son and back to the Father through the 
Spirit, so that the Spirit has little function except as a link in a love that is a relation 
between Father and Son alone.’111 There is otherness in that love too, but not ‘true 
otherness,’ if Richard of St. Victor is correct, as is he for Gunton, with the view that ‘the 
third person of the Trinity is essential if there is to be true otherness in the Godhead. 
There must be three if there is to be a true outwardgoingness and diversity in God.’112  
 
Gunton does not intend to reject the concept of the Spirit as the bond of love between 
Father and Son for the reasons above, or to replace it with the idea of communion, but 
to revise it by taking into consideration other views of the work of the Spirit.113 One is 
that the Spirit is the third person of the Trinity who particularises the persons of Father 
and Son in their relations: ‘to liberate them to be themselves, to be particular persons in 
community and as communion.’114 Another is the view of the Spirit as ‘the one who 
seeks to involve the other in the movement of giving and receiving that is the Trinity: 
that is, to perfect the love of Father and Son by moving it beyond itself.’115 The outcome 
is a concept of the Spirit as the one who not only relates Father and Son in love but also 
particularises them and perfects the love of God. God is love, not so much because the 
Spirit is love116 but because the Spirit enables the community of love to be and perfects 
it as love in community in himself and in relation to the world. Divine love, then, is 
‘neither self-love nor the merely reciprocal love of two for each other, but a love 
intrinsically oriented to community.’117 The Spirit is indeed the dynamic of the divine 
love, completing the relations between Father and Son. However, the relationship is 
now understood not as ‘a closed circle, but a self-sufficient community of love freely 
                                           
111 TtT 126. 
112 OTM 190. Reference is made to Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, 3, xix. For Gunton’s qualifications 
of using this source which is to become controversial by some defenders of Augustine, see PTT 91 and 
TtT 126f. To be noted is that Gunton is resorting only to Victor’s insight about the nature of love. 
113 See TtT 128 and CF 186, for Gunton’s mention of his engagement with the idea of the Spirit as the 
bond of love in terms of revision or correction. 
114 OTM 190. According to the discussion of the Spirit in the economy in TtT 112–9, Gunton bases his 
speaking of the Spirit as the particularising agent on a reconsideration of the economy of the incarnation 
as revealing the Spirit as ‘the one sent from the Father who in personal divine action enables the incarnate 
Son to be himself’ (116). Of particular importance for the discussion here is the theology of Edward 
Irving, with the view of the Spirit as revealed in ‘subduing, restraining, conquering, the evil propensities 
of the fallen manhood, and making it an apt organ for expressing the will of the Father’ (ibid). G. Carlyle 
(ed.), The Collected Writings of Edward Irving in Five Volumes, Vol. 5, London: Alexander Strahan, 1864, 
120. 
115 TtT 127. Emphasis original. See also OTM ch.7; TtT 119–23; IA 104; and CF ch.3, for Gunton’s 
appropriation of the idea of the Spirit as the perfecting cause. 
116 This is Gunton’s understanding of Augustine’s position. For his discussion of the matter, see PTT 49f. 
117 TtT 127.  
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opened outwards to embrace the other.’118 
 
1.2.8. Economic and immanent 
The being of the triune God is a communion of the three persons, not only as revealed 
in time but in himself (in se). There are notable reasons for which Gunton upholds the 
distinction between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity or the necessity of 
the move to the latter from the former. The first is concerned with the breach between 
economy and theology caused by treating the unity of God separately from the 
economic revelation. According to a common practice Gunton finds in some western 
theologies, the divine oneness is philosophically explained, and the threeness of the 
divine action biblically expounded, with priority given to the former over the latter.119 
The result is usually a conception of the one God understood in terms foreign to the 
economy, with an implication that the reality of the being of God is something 
underlying or overlying the revealed threeness of the persons.120 Gunton goes against 
the stream of this practice when he affirms the unity between what God is revealed to be 
(the economic Trinity) and what God is in himself (the immanent Trinity) by appealing 
to Cappadocian theology.121 In this matter, Gunton closely follows Barth: ‘If God is 
what we are given in the economy, then we may conclude that the economy is a reliable 
guide to what God is, eternally and in himself.’122  
 
However, secondly, Gunton is not saying, like Rahner, that ‘the “economic” Trinity is 
the “immanent” Trinity, and vice versa.’123 He, rather, remains with the view of Barth 
that the relation between the economic and the immanent, between knowing and being, 
is asymmetrical, with the explanation that ‘while act is indeed a true guide to essence, 
knowledge of essence does not entail knowledge of the particular acts that God is going 
to perform.’124 What is preserved by upholding this asymmetrical relationship is the 
freedom of God, which is a major concern in Gunton’s work as it is in Barth’s: ‘God 
gives Himself entirely to man in His revelation, but not in such a way as to make 
                                           
118 TtT 128. 
119 Cf. PTT ch.3. especially 30–3, in reference to Karl Rahner, The Trinity, tr. Joseph Donceel, London: 
Burns and Oates, 1970, 17. Cf. also, Zizioulas, Being, 40f. 
120 Cf. PTT 41f. Indeed, ‘something other than the God revealed in the economy’ (54). 
121 Cf. PTT 54f. 
122 TtT 123. See, also, BB 147; CF 184. Barth, Dogmatics I.1., 371. The best description of Gunton’s 
approach might be found in what he says of T. F. Torrance’s: ‘Here, without doubt, Torrance is following 
the method, though not in every respect the content, of Barth’s great treatise on the Trinity. If revelation is 
truly God present to the world, then it is God present to the world, and what is given in time is the saving 
presence of the eternal God’ (FSS 42). Emphasis original. 
123 Rahner, Trinity, 22. 
124 BB 147. 
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Himself man’s prisoner. He remains free in His working, in giving Himself.’125 ‘To say 
that God is already, and eternally, an order of love,’ furthermore, ‘prevents us from 
having to say that it is in some way necessary for God to create a world, to have another 
being alongside himself without which he is not truly himself.’126 Gunton affirms that 
God did not have to create the world but could remain content with his eternal being, 
and for two reasons.127 While the second concerns the integrity of the world, as we will 
see soon, the first concerns God’s integrity as God. As Gunton puts it, ‘A God who has 
to have a world around him is a miserable godlet, a pagan projection, and not the 
omnipotent God of Christian confession.’128 It is worth repeating, especially against 
those who view Gunton from the perspective that contrasts Barth and Zizioulas,129 that 
Gunton rather finds a similarity between them in their common concern for the freedom 
of God, referring to Zizioulas’ understanding of the distinction (between essence and 
energy) as ‘nothing else essentially but a device created by the Greek Fathers to 
safeguard the absolute transcendence of God without alienating Him from the world.’130 
 
For Gunton, thirdly, the point of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is not ‘to speculate 
about the “inner being” of God in any way that takes us away from the implications of 
his action,’ but ‘to provide a ground for the theology of the economy.’131 The economy 
is indeed a guide to a knowledge of the being of God but, for Gunton, that does not 
mean that God is only the economy. It means, rather, that the economy reveals the being 
of God because the former is grounded in the latter. The language of “ground” indicates 
Barth’s influence, or Jüngel’s, as it is first used in Gunton’s account of their works in 
similar ways to that in which it is used later, as shown in the citation above. As for Barth, 
Gunton understands, ‘he has shown that in revelation God relates himself to man. The 
doctrine of the Trinity as relational being both follows from that understanding of 
relation in revelation, and at the same time shows how it is grounded in the prevenient 
                                           
125 Barth, Dogmatics I.1., 371, as cited in BB 147. 
126 CF 187.  
127 ‘Hypotheticals,’ says Gunton, ‘are generally to be avoided in theology, because we are in it concerned 
with what God has done, is doing, and will do. Yet sometimes they are necessary if we are to understand 
the consequences of denying the doctrine of the immanent Trinity.’ Ibid. See, also, PTT 141–3, especially 
for Gunton’s responses to the argument for the rejection of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity on the 
grounds ‘that, if God does not need the creation in some way or other, he must be a distant and unfeeling 
monarch’ (142). 
128 Ibid. 
129 Cf. Holmes, ‘Analogia,’ 41 and others, the former as discussed at §1.1. and the latter as will be 
introduced into our discussion in due course. 
130 Zizioulas, Communion, 202, as cited in TtT 123. 
131 CF 185. 
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reality of God.’132 As for Jüngel, ‘According to his understanding, Barth’s 
understanding of revelation has made possible a radically different conception of God’s 
independent reality (Selbständigkeit), in which God is seen as essentially relational 
being; in which the being of God for us is not something foreign to God’s essence but is 
grounded in his very being.’133 In short, God is revealed as such in the economy because 
this is what God is in eternity, essentially or substantially yet not exhaustively. 
 
Fourthly, as indicated previously, Gunton maintains the distinction of the immanent 
Trinity from the economic for the sake of the world to be itself. Gunton makes this point 
particularly in response to some attempts to remain concrete by casting doubt on the 
necessity of a move beyond the economy.134 He points to Ted Peters’ argument that no 
more is needed than to affirm that ‘God is in the process of constituting himself as a 
God who is in relationship with what is other than God.’135 Gunton finds a similar 
tendency in LaCugna, namely, that ‘all talk of the Trinity must … be in some way a 
function of the economy of salvation,’ and that ‘any doctrine of the immanent Trinity, 
even one derived from an understanding of the economy, is to be rejected.’ 136 The 
danger Gunton notices in these polemics against the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is 
that they sail close to pantheism, endangering not only the freedom of God but also the 
freedom of the world. They bring God and the world so close that ‘there is ultimately 
only one reality, the divine-worldly emanation, which constitutes the world and then 
swallows it up.’137 It is in the face of this danger, then, that Gunton affirms the doctrine 
of the immanent Trinity in relative distinction from the economic, ‘to allow for personal 
space between God and the world.’138 The doctrine serves as ‘a foundation for the 
relative independence and so integrity of worldly reality also, and thus for human 
freedom.’139 Here we have another reason of Gunton affirming that God did not have to 
                                           
132 BB 145. Similarly, ‘because God is in fact related to the world, and to men in particular, through the 
reconciling activity of Jesus Christ, there is an eternal (and so in a sense necessary) relatedness within the 
divine reality’ (159). 
133 BB 142f. Gunton’s emphasis. 
134 By the immanent Trinity Gunton means ‘ontological Trinity ... of who and what kind of being God is 
essentially, in the eternal taxis or order of persons in relation’ (FSS 23). For Rahner, on the other hand, 
‘the immanent Trinity refers to the reciprocal relationships of Father, Son, and Spirit to each other, 
considered apart from God’s activity in the world.’ LaCugna, God, 212. 
135 Ted, Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life, Louisville: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1993, 145, as cited in PTT xvii and FSS 23. 
136 PTT xviii and FSS 23. 
137 PTT xviii and FSS 24. Cf. LaCugna, God, 223. 
138 IA 103. 
139 FSS 24. For the relevance of the immanent Trinity for the human freedom in Gunton’s thinking, see 
PTT 128–35; AB 104–8. 
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create the world.140 That is, the integrity of the world: ‘A sovereign God is able to allow 
the world to be itself, and not simply a function of his being, a “clone” or “puppet” as it 
is fashionably expressed.’141  
 
In the following passage, finally, we might find another, perhaps the most basic, reason 
Gunton gives for the relevance of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity, that is, his desire 
to be true to the gospel: 
The distinction between the doctrines of the economic and eternal or immanent 
Trinities is important. It is not suggesting that there are two Gods, two Trinities, 
but that two different things have to be said about the triune God if we are to do 
justice to scripture: that he is triune as he presents himself to us in our time, and 
that this tri-unity is eternal. We need to know and say this because we need to 
know that we can rely on what God reveals: that what he seems to be, that he 
truly is. Otherwise, how could we rely on his always being loving, holy, 
merciful, powerful and the rest?142 
1.2.9. Thinking trinitarianly 
To speak of God as a communion is admittedly a sort of speculation about the being of 
God, yet not ‘attempting a map of the inner reality’ but ‘to say what we can of the God 
made known in Christ.’143 This can be explained in the following three ways. First, 
Gunton knows that speaking of God is ‘the most perilous of all theological enterprises,’ 
though not chiefly because ‘we cannot penetrate the veil of phenomena.’144 The chief 
reason is rather that ‘we may violate the unknowableness of God by essaying a 
speculative construction of what we suppose God to be’ or ‘run the risk of 
“objectifying” God: of turning him into a static and impersonal object to be subjected to 
our unfettered intellectual control.’145 The point is not a theological renunciation, but a 
necessary caution that has both a negative closing and a positive opening. Positively 
speaking, secondly, theology is made possible by God coming into a relationship with 
                                           
140 ‘Hypotheticals,’ says Gunton, ‘are generally to be avoided in theology, because we are in it concerned 
with what God has done, is doing, and will do. Yet sometimes they are necessary if we are to understand 
the consequences of denying the doctrine of the immanent Trinity’ (ibid). See, also, PTT 141–3, for 
Gunton’s responses to the argument for the rejection of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity on the 
ground that, ‘if God does not need the creation in some way or other, he must be a distant and unfeeling 
monarch’ (142). 
141 FSS 24. In Barth’s words, ‘It is only the heathen gods envy men’ (Church Dogmatics Volume III: The 
Doctrine of Creation, Part 2, H. Knight et al (trs), G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (eds), Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1960, 87, as cited in CF 187. 
142 AB 94. Similarly, ‘How justified would we be in trusting the faithfulness of God’s love if God were not 
eternally loving, but became a loving God when human beings reciprocate his love?’ Christoph Schwöbel, 
‘God is Love: The Model of Love and the Trinity,’ Neue Zeitschrift für Systematishce Theolgie und 
Religionsphilsophie 40, 1998, 322, as cited in AB 132. 
143 PTT 144. 
144 PTT 193. 
145 Ibid. 
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us, and we may speak of God while entering and remaining in that relationship.146 For 
Gunton, however, the relationship between God and us is not only a place where 
theology is to take place. It is also the place in which we have our being as persons 
created in the image of God.147 As he sees, the trinitarian theology began its life with 
those who found themselves being in a relationship with God through the Son and the 
Spirit. It is by being in that relationship that they succeeded in using language to express 
the being of God as experienced and made known. Significantly, to repeat,148 ‘a number 
of conceptual advances were made as the result of thought about the God who is indwelt 
and known in worship.’149 The significance is that Gunton, thirdly, wants to continue the 
process, with such a question as ‘what concepts we may develop in order to characterise 
the kind of being that God is,’150 Thus his enquiry concerns an adequate trinitarian 
conceptuality, though ‘not as some abstract test of orthodoxy, but as a way of expressing 
coherently and as well as possible what it is that we are granted to know of the God to 
whom we are related by the Spirit through Jesus Christ.’151 Greater emphasis, though, is 
given to exploring the implications of any theology of God for expressing ontologies of 
the world, of the human and of the church.152 The programmatic question becomes 
‘whether the concepts generated by our consideration of the economy … have any light 
to throw on the being of that which is not God, but the creation of God.’153 Gunton’s 
aim in pursuing the question is to ‘demonstrate the impact of not so much arguing from 
the Trinity to the world by analogy as thinking trinitarianly through the focus provided 
by the action of God in the world.’154 
 
1.2.10. Question 
Having outlined nine aspects of Gunton’s ontology of being as communion, we are left 
with a question as to whether for Gunton communion is synonymous with relation or it 
means something that includes relation but is different from relation itself. The latter 
appears to be the case, given his understanding that the ontology of being in relation 
was established by the Nicene theologians the concept of relationality was enriched by 
                                           
146 Cf. PTT 6. 
147 PTT 7. 
148 Cf. Introduction, 7. 
149 PTT 8. For the worship as the basis of theology, Gunton refers to Edmund Schlink, The Coming Christ 
and the Coming Church, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1967. 
150 PTT 145. 
151 PTT 200. 
152 See PTT 196f, and chapter 4 (church), chapter 6 (human) and chapter 8 (creation). 196f. 
153 OTM 167. 
154 PTT xxix–xxx. Cf. also, FSS 6–11. 
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the Cappadocians with that of communion.155 Yet has he made it clear enough against 
any misunderstanding? 
 
                                           
155 Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 938f. 
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Chapter 2 Social God and Projection 
 
Over recent decades social trinitarianism has risen to become one of the critical issues in 
contemporary theological discussions.1 Gunton himself is aware of the issue and wary 
of some dangers of the social approach, as we shall see. Yet, interestingly, his own work 
is perceived by some critics as belonging to social trinitarianism.2 There are three 
respects in which it is interesting and so need to be discussed. Firstly, Gunton, seen as a 
social theorist, constitutes a starting point of some critiques of his work. Secondly, such 
a simple categorisation paves the way for other criticisms, the charge of projectionism 
among others. In this regard, thirdly, it would be unacceptable to leave Gunton 
misunderstood if he is, not only as a person but also as a theologian of great significance 
for the study of Christian theology today.3 
 
2.1. Gunton and Social Trinitarianism 
Richard Fermer, perhaps firstly, treats Gunton’s work as promoting a concept of being 
as communion in the sense of ‘a social “fellowship” which might be paralleled by 
human society.’4 More explicit and definite is Karen Kilby’s critique, which puts 
Gunton in what she sees as a deeply problematic group of contemporary social theorists 
                                           
1 As the development and discussions are documented in Claude Welch, In This Name: The Doctrine of 
the Trinity in Contemporary Theology, New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1952, 29–34. 133–51, 295–
302; John L. Gresham Jr., ‘The social model of the Trinity and its critics,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 
Vol. 46, 1993, 325–43; Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self, Louisville, London: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001, 1–20; and Thomas H. McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? 
Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology, Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2010. 
2 E.g., James Mackey, ‘Are there Christian Alternatives to Trinitarian Thinking?’, in James M. Byrne (ed.), 
The Christian Understanding of God Today, Dublin: Columba Press, 1993, 66–75; Richard Fermer, ‘The 
Limits of Trinitarian Theology as a Methodological Paradigm,’ Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche 
Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 41/2, 1999, 158–86; Karen Kilby, ‘Perichoresis and projection: 
Problems with social doctrines of the Trinity,’ New Blackfriars 81, 2000, 432–45; and ‘Trinity, Tradition, 
and Politics,’ in Christophe Charlamet and Marc Vial (eds), Recent Developments in Trinitarian 
Theology: An International Symposium, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014, 73–86; and Mark D. 
Chapman, ‘The Social Doctrine of the Trinity: Some problems,’ Anglican Theological Review 83/2, 2001, 
239–54. 
3 One evaluation from a renowned scholar would suffice: ‘Systematic theology owes Gunton an immense 
debt. He gave intellectual and rhetorical weight to the task of constructive Christian theology in Britain at 
a time when the majority believed it to be redundant.’ John Webster, ‘Gunton,’ in Harvey, Gunton, 29. 
4 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165, in reference to Christopher Stead, ‘Why Not Three Gods? The Logic of Gregory 
of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Doctrine,’ in H. R. Drobner, and C. Klock (eds), Studien zu Gregor von Nyssa und 
der christlichen Spätantike, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990, 158. 
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of the Trinity.5 As her basic characterisation of social theories, she points to the concept 
of God conceived as ‘a collective, a group, or a society, bound together by the mutual 
love, accord and self-giving of its members,’ rather than ‘some individual person or 
thing which has three sides, aspects, dimensions or modes of being.’6 Mark Chapman 
includes Gunton in his list of social theologians, describing him as having been 
‘vociferous in his defence of a social doctrine of the Trinity.’7 Chapman provides 
several factors that he thinks are common to advocates of the social doctrine, the chief 
one being the idea of the Trinity as a community of love and harmony.8 For Stephen 
Holmes, a trinitarian proposal is social if it speaks of God in terms of persons, 
communion or perichoresis, locating God’s personhood or “subjectivity” in the three 
persons rather than in the divine essence or substance.9 He takes Moltmann as 
representing this with the development of ‘an avowedly “social” doctrine of the Trinity: 
three persons, mutually interrelated, mutually constitutive, with no hierarchy.’10 
Zizioulas is another example in that it appears to Holmes that Zizioulas’ ascription of 
volition to the Father, rather than the Trinity, implies that ‘each of the hypostaseis is 
fully personal, possessed of their own will, intellect, and so on, in precisely the way that 
Barth and Rahner warned against.’11 Now, as for Gunton, Holmes’ treatment is 
ambiguous. In his historical review of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity, 
with focus on refutation of the social trinitarianism developed in recent decades, 
Holmes does not explicitly apply the word ‘social’ to his treatment of Gunton. Yet it is 
difficult to avoid the impression that each of his criticisms appears to be said with 
Gunton in mind, whether it is about the concept of person, the use of perichoresis, the 
critique of Augustine, or the appeal to the Cappadocian Fathers. Responding to 
                                           
5 Others who are treated as social theorists with Gunton by Kilby include Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity 
and the Kingdom, London: SCM Press, 1981; Zizioulas, Being as Communion; C. Plantinga Jr., ‘Social 
Trinity and Tritheism,’ in Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. (eds), Trinity, Incarnation, and 
Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1989, 21–47; and Patricia Wilson-Kastner, Faith, Feminism and the Christ, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1983. Leonardo Boff is also mentioned, yet no reference given. 
6 Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 433. 
7 Chapman, ‘Social,’ 246. Here Gunton is treated together not only with Moltmann and Boff but also with 
Conrad Noel, Jesus The Heretic, London: J. M. Dent & sons, 1939; Kenneth Leech, The Social God, 
London: Shelan Press, 1981; and Geevarghese mar Osthathios, Theology of a Classless Society, 
Guildford: Lutterworth Press, 1979. 
8 Chapman, ‘Social,’ 241. And the others are: the doctrine of the Trinity as alternative to monotheism; the 
principle of diversity in unity; direct correlation between the being of God and the being of the world and 
society; and the social being of the Trinity as a model for our social being or as answer to the problems of 
individualism and collectivism. 
9 See Holmes, Trinity, 21, 25, 29 et al. 
10 Holmes, Trinity, 21. Cf. Moltmann, Trinity, 150, 174f. 
11 Holmes, Trinity, 14, especially in reference to Zizioulas’ saying that ‘[i]n a more analytical way this 
means that God, as Father and not as substance, perpetually confirms through “being” His free will to 
exist’ (Being, 41). 
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challenges to his arguments, especially by John Colwell,12 Holmes assures his readers 
that it is a historical objection that he is making against social trinitarianism, rather than 
a systematic one, that is to say, not that ‘you cannot be a social trinitarian’ but that ‘“if 
you are a social Trinitarian, you are separating yourself decisively from a remarkably 
united traditional witness”.’13 The historical claim appears no less strong than the 
systematic because no one would develop a theory of the Trinity that has no historical 
basis. In any case, we are not interested in the question about social trinitarianism 
itself,14 but whether Gunton is a social trinitarian in the sense considered by the critics 
above and therefore one whose understanding and statement of the doctrine of the 
Trinity is separated from the teaching of the Bible and the traditional witness.15 The 
answer that is being attempted in what follows is that there may well be a sense in 
which Gunton is a social trinitarian but not in one of those regarded by his critics as 
common features of the contemporary social trinitarianism: (1) God as communion; (2) 
a communion of persons as distinct subjects with distinct wills; and (3) communion of 
divine persons as a collective, bound by the mutual love among its members, that can be 
paralleled by human society.16 
 
2.1.1. God as communion 
The first response to any critique of Gunton’s theology of communion as a sort of social 
trinitarianism is to highlight the need to reckon with the fact that he consciously 
maintains a certain distance from the social approach itself,17 unlike those who promote 
                                           
12 ‘A conversation overheard: reflecting on the Trinitarian grammar of intimacy and substance,’ in 
Thomas A. Noble and Jason S. Sexton (eds), The Holy Trinity Revisited: Essays in response to Stephen R. 
Holmes, Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2015, 97–109. 
13 Holmes, ‘Response,’ in Noble and Sexton, Trinity, 149. 
14 McCall, Trinity?, 11–50, provides a survey of the discussion of social trinitarianism from an analytic 
perspective, treating it as one of three answers to the threeness-oneness problem (“Social Trinitarianism,” 
“Relative Trinitarianism” and “Latin Trinitarianism”). Interestingly, Gunton does not feature in McCall’s 
discussion of social trinitarianism, while his works appear as an important support to the writer’s thesis on 
the relation of God and the world. See Trinity?, 136, 162, 210, 247f. Cf. also, Sarah Coakley, ‘“Persons” 
in the “Social” Doctrine of the Trinity: A Critique of Current Analytic Discussion,’ in S. T. Davis, D. 
Kendall SJ and G. O’Collins SJ (eds), The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, 123–44. 
15 Kilby comments that her argument is not directed against social analogies themselves because ‘in 
themselves these analogies are perhaps no worse than any other,’ adding that what concerns her deeply 
are rather ‘the way in which they are very often used’ and ‘the claims which are made for them’ 
(‘Perichoresis,’ 433. Emphasis added). 
16 Alan Brown, ‘On the Criticism of Being as Communion in Anglophone Orthodox Theology,’ in 
Douglas H. Knight, The Theology of John Zizioulas, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, 41–5, offers a defence of 
John Zizioulas against critical treatments of Zizioulas as a social trinitarian. 
17 See PTT xix–xx and 198, for example. 
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explicitly “social” programmes.18 Such a distance is seen in the following passage that 
comes a page before Gunton saying that ‘God is what he is only as a communion of 
persons,’19 which is the main feature of social trinitarianism for critics like Fermer, as 
mentioned above:20 
I think that it is important in this context to beware of the apparently tritheist 
tendencies of some of what are called social theories of the Trinity. We are not 
licensed by revelation to speak of a social life; we are, however, to say that if 
the Spirit works in a particular way in the economy as the one who perfects the 
creation, it is reasonable to suppose that he has a similar kind of function to 
perform in relation to the being of God, to the communion that is the life of 
God.21  
This passage, especially the first half, clearly shows how Gunton tries to keep a distance 
from the social approach to the Trinity, with full awareness of its danger of tritheism. 
What is also plainly shown is Gunton’s intent, which is not to speak of a “social” life of 
God even from revelation, but to pursue the theological implications of the distinctive 
work of the Spirit in the economy. Therefore, any treatment of Gunton’s work as a 
branch of social trinitarianism without considering the distance he keeps his work from 
social approaches as seen in this passage can be treated as too simplistic and dismissed 
as a forced classification. 
 
That said, in one instance, Gunton does appear to endorse the classification of his 
theology as a social Trinity by saying of his work that ‘(although) there is developed in 
this book what can be called a social rather than a psychological approach.’22 This could 
be used to support a treatment of Gunton as a social trinitarian, though it is not 
mentioned or used by any critics. Even if they had used it, however, they would have 
had to reckon with what Gunton says in the main clause of the passage from which the 
above-mentioned sentence comes. For there, referring to both the psychological 
approach and the social, he says that ‘those ways of speaking are highly inadequate.’23 It 
                                           
18 E.g., Cornelius Plantinga Jr., ‘Social Trinity,’ 21–47; Richard Swinburne, The Christian God, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994; and Stephen T. Davis, ‘Perichoretic Monotheism: A Defence of a Social 
Theory of the Trinity,’ in Melville Y. Stewart (ed.), The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2003, 35–52; Edward Wierenga, ‘Trinity and Polytheism,’ Faith and Philosophy 21, 
2004 (3), 281–94; William Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-personal God, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 
19 OTM 191. 
20 This is a good place to see whether Fermer’s reading of Gunton takes due consideration of the context 
of a passage he uses against Gunton, the same approach whereby Fermer criticises Gunton and Zizioulas 
over their interpretation of the controversial passage in Basil’s Letter, 38.4, as we will see later. 
21 OTM 190. 
22 PTT 195. 
23 Ibid. 
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follows that Gunton has developed a social rather than a psychological approach, 
despite knowing that both approaches are problematic.24 A common problem mentioned 
by him is a static view of dogmatic development that takes the two approaches as 
alternatives, corresponding to an equally static view of the classical doctrine of the 
Trinity as ‘a “model,” developed in its entirety in the past.’25 
 
It is quite plausible, given the ambiguity between Gunton’s choice of the word “social” 
and the distance he maintains from social approaches, that the choice is made out of 
need, or as a mere adjustment to the known framework, rather than as the exact term for 
his approach. This possibility will be discussed in more detail later. It suffices here to 
anticipate it by highlighting the following four aspects discussed thus far. (1) Gunton is 
nowhere as acquiescent to the psychological approach as he is to the social approach, 
being particularly critical of the former due to the need to conceive the divine threeness 
as revealed in the economy.26 (2) It may be only that distance from the psychological 
approach that brings his work closer to the social, because he works within the 
framework in which they are the only two options available.27 (3) The reason that the 
social is chosen is then not because it is devoid of a problem but, perhaps, only because 
it fits better with the need to conceive the distinctness of the three. (4) His aim is yet not 
to elaborate a theory about the social life of God, but rather to participate in the process 
of conceptual clarification that began with the early Christian thinkers by reflecting on 




Critics of Gunton tend to treat his theological use of “person” as a symptom of social 
trinitarianism, mostly from a perspective, such as they find in Barth, that prefers its use 
for divine unity or oneness, yet without engaging in the actual process which Gunton’s 
thought has passed through. Even in his first book, Gunton took note of Barth’s wish to 
avoid the traditional use of “person” for each member of the Trinity and, rather, use the 
                                           
24 PTT 194. This makes it difficult to answer the question whether or to what extent Gunton is using 
“social” as a synonym to “relational” rather than “a community of three persons.” But more on this at 
§2.1.3. 
25 PTT 194. ‘There is,’ to repeat, ‘not a “model” known as trinitarian doctrine, a fixed set of formularies, 
but rather a process of intellectual development—a tradition—during the course of which a number of 
conceptual possibilities have been shaped’ (195). 
26 PTT 42–8. 
27 PTT 195. 
28 PTT 194f and 11. Also, ‘Trinity,’ 953f. 
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word for the one God and the phrase “mode of being” for what is usually referred to by 
person, resulting in the concept of God as one person who exists in three modes of 
being.29 However, with further development of thought, Gunton concludes that Barth’s 
proposal is unsatisfactory for two reasons: it ‘makes it impossible to redeem the concept 
of person from its modern individualistic usage’ and it ‘replicates the Western tendency 
to make the Trinity practically redundant by depriving the persons of distinctive forms 
of agency.’30 Gunton’s own proposal is not to use “person” for Barth’s Seinsweise,31 or 
to use the latter as an equivalent of person, but to maintain the traditional use of person 
for the Greek hypostasis, and the “way of being” for τρόπος ύπάρξεως as referring to 
‘the way in which the persons are who they particularly are.’32 Despite the 
terminological difference, however, there is continuity in content and purpose. If 
Barth’s desire to use “person” for the one God rather than for each member of the 
Trinity is against tritheism it is despite the danger of tritheism that Gunton wants to 
maintain the use of the word for each member of the Trinity for the sake of the distinct 
modes of divine actions that are recorded in the Bible. Yet Gunton knows that Barth is 
also wary of modalism,33 having no doubt at all about Barth’s intent ‘to express by this 
term [Seinsweise], not absolutely, but relatively better and more simply and clearly the 
same thing as is meant by “person”.’34 In that sense, Gunton trod a narrow path, with 
tritheism and modalism on either side, just as Barth did before him. 
 
The concept of person, theological application of which is so problematic for the critics 
of social trinitarianism, is that of the person as an individual subject with distinct 
consciousness, personality, volition, intellect and so on.35 Critics tend to think that 
Gunton is one of those who think of the trinitarian persons in such terms.36 Interestingly, 
however, that is the very usage from which Gunton wanted to separate the concept of 
person—interesting because it gives the impression that that is the only concept of 
                                           
29 See BB 139, 141f, with reference to Barth, Dogmatics I.1., 350f. Equally critical of using the word 
“person” for similar reasons to Barth’s is Karl Rahner who wants to see the three persons of the Trinity as 
‘three distinct manners of subsisting.’ Cf. Trinity, 104–13. 
30 OTM 191 n.11. Barth, Dogmatics I.1., 355–9. 
31 Barth’s Seinsweise can be translated into “way of being” or “mode of being.” The editors of the 1972 
edition of Church Dogmatics explain that Barth himself indicated that the phrase “way of being” might be 
a better rendering to avoid any hint of tritheism, but they thought it best to preserve the initial rendering 
“mode of being” for his intention to refer back to the τρόπος ύπάρξεως and the modus entis of Protestant 
Orthodoxy. ‘Editors’ Preface,’ Church Dogmatics I.1., viii, as cited in BB 141.  
32 Ibid. 
33 See BB 141. 
34 BB 141. Barth, Dogmatics I.1., 359. 
35 Cf. Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 434. Holmes, Trinity, 14. 
36 Cf. Plantinga, ‘Social,’ 22; Swinburne, Christian, 189; and Davis, ‘Perichoretic,’ 44f. 
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person the critics of Gunton as a social trinitarian have, which therefore cannot be 
applied to the persons of the Trinity. Nowhere, however, does Gunton say that Father, 
Son and Spirit are persons in such a sense of the person as an individual subject with 
distinct wills. What we find, rather, is his speaking of communion with awareness of 
one danger: ‘a form of tritheism that appears to relate the three persons in such a way as 
to suggest that they have distinct wills.’37 As a consequence, when Gunton speaks of 
God as communion, he does so on the firm ground of the ontological unity of the three 
persons as one God.38 This position would be untenable, though, both for those who 
hold to a non-trinitarian view in which three persons can only be three beings and for 
those who suggest a trinitarian programme that can take “ontological” only in relation to 
ousia, substance or essence and not hypostasis or person.39 
 
In later works, however, Gunton indeed speaks of “two wills” and “three wills,”40 which 
again, interestingly, is not mentioned by any of Gunton’s critics as making him a social 
trinitarian. This is mentioned here, despite the risk of complicating the matter, because 
of the appearance of an apparent conflict within Gunton himself. Previously, Gunton 
took note of tritheism as one danger of the concept of communion, that is, a form of 
tritheism that relates three persons in such a way as to suggest that they have distinct 
wills. Now, in his focused discourse on will in Act and Being, he appears to move in the 
opposite direction by saying, ‘There appear to be at least two wills in action here and a 
third if it is not too fanciful to speak of the Spirit’s willing Jesus’ act.’41 Gunton also 
mentions ‘three wills in utterly concerted action,’42 though that is in reference to the 
unified action of God carried out by the mediation of the Son and the Spirit. The 
complexity might indicate a change in position, or a conflict of arguments, or a 
contradiction between the two. Any of these would be the case, however, only if on 
both occasions “will” is used in the same sense and for the same purpose. This is not the 
case, however. Regarding purpose, in his first work Gunton opposes the idea of the 
three persons having distinct wills because of the danger of tritheism. In the later work, 
however, he advances the idea of each person having a distinct will for the sake of 
maintaining the distinct modes of divine action in the economy. When we put them in 
                                           
37 PTT 198. 
38 A point neglected by Mackey when he says, ‘Colin Gunton seems to think that he will avoid that charge 
if he rejects the idea that the three persons have three wills, and talks instead of such interanimation of 
Father, Son and Spirit, that what is done is done by all three’ (‘Alternatives?’, 69). 
39 As we shall see some examples in the next chapter. 
40 Cf. AB 30f; CF 109f. 
41 AB 30.  
42 AB 31. 
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order, we have Gunton’s argument for three wills based on the foundation of the 
ontological unity of the three laid by rejecting a form of tritheism. Hence two different 
purposes, not standing against each other in conflict or contradiction, but related in such 
a way that one follows or presupposes the other. As for the sense, Gunton’s use of 
“will” in the later work has a qualified meaning of ‘person in action, rather than 
attribute.’43 In the former work, on the other hand, in which he opposes the idea of the 
three persons having distinct wills, Gunton appears to use “will” in a sense whose 
validity he challenges in the later work, i.e., “will” meaning ‘an attribute conceived as a 
kind of entity or object, hypostatized in a personal being and possessed by the person.’44 
If he speaks of three wills in the latter sense of “will,” possessed by an 
individualistically conceived person, the result would be a social Trinity of the kind 
pictured by the critics, and the existence of an unexplained change or unrecognized 
contradiction in Gunton’s work. If, however, even his arguing for three wills is done 
within the boundary of the ontological unity of the three persons as one God, and not 
three gods as would be the case had he used “will” in the former sense, any treatment 
that links Gunton to social trinitarianism just because he speaks of God as a communion 
of three persons could hardly be anything but a mistake. If “will” is an attribute 
conceived as a kind of entity Gunton’s position is firm: ‘God can have only one will: 
the idea of three divine wills is problematic for all kinds of reasons.’45 
 
2.1.3. Sociality 
It can hardly be correct to present Gunton as promoting a concept of divine community 
in the sense of ‘a social “fellowship” which might be paralleled by human society.’46 
One reason is considered above, namely that he does not use the word “person” in 
theology in the specific sense of an individual subject with distinct will and intellect. 
Another is concerned with the difficulty of finding a place where he says that the 
community of the three persons is a kind of social fellowship that can be paralleled by a 
                                           
43 AB 31. Speaking against the doctrine of the two wills in Christ, a human and a divine, Gunton presents 
arguments that: natures do not have wills; only persons have wills; yet it is a mistake to make will into a 
kind of distinct entity or object within a person of such a kind that one person can have two of them; will 
is not an attribute of nature but rather ‘person in action,’ or ‘a description of a personal agent engaging in 
a certain form of action’ (AB 28–31). 
44 Ibid.  
45 AB 27. 
46 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
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human society.47 For their arguments, critics tend to rely only on those places where 
Gunton speaks of God as a communion of persons, giving the appearance that a mere 
verbal similarity between communion and sociality is enough for them to link the two 
as equivalent, or that their readings of Gunton are determined by a preunderstanding of 
social trinitarianism.  
 
In any case, in the absence of other materials used by his critics, I suggest the following 
three as possible responses to their treatment of Gunton’s work as promoting a concept 
of divine community from an ideal of human society. The first is to confirm what is 
discussed previously,48  that it is within the boundary of the ontological unity of the 
three persons as one God that Gunton speaks of the communion of the three persons, 
still on guard against the tritheistic danger of social theories of the Trinity. Secondly, 
the parallel between God and his creation in Gunton’s work is mainly conceptual and 
indirect, rather than ontological and direct. Thirdly, the conceptual paralleling operates 
in a certain direction, namely from the divine being to the created being, and not the 
other way around, as will be discussed in more detail when we come to a discussion of 
the issue of projection.  
 
One may argue that what Gunton says is one thing and what he does is quite another. 
We can consider such a probability by looking at a place where he speaks of “human 
sociality” in relation to the “social” being of God:  
In what sense may we understand and live the confession that the human race, 
male and female together, is called to embody in the world a likeness to the 
deity? How is it that this image is restored and perfected in Christ, the second 
Adam? In other words: what form of human sociality best echoes the social 
being of God and embodies the truth of the creation?49  
This passage, especially the last sentence, could have been used by the critics of Gunton 
to indicate that he is indeed a social trinitarian. For us, however, it has significance as a 
place where we can confirm the points made above. In it, firstly, Gunton looks for a 
form of human sociality from the social being of God, which confirms the third point 
above about the direction of Gunton’s thought movement being from God to the world. 
He looks for a form of sociality from knowing the being of God first, not advancing an 
                                           
47 For a possible example of such an idea as supposed by Fermer, see C. Plantinga, ‘Gregory of Nyssa and 
the Social Analogy of the Trinity,’ The Thomist 50, 1986, 325–52, which has an account of ‘Father, Son 
and Spirit’ as ‘related to each other in some central ways analogous, if sublimely surpassing, relations 
among the members of a society of three human persons’ (325 n.1). 
48 §2.1.2. 
49 AA 182. Emphasis added. 
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idea of the social being of God from a notion of human sociality.50  Secondly, the use of 
“echo” confirms the point that the parallel between God and the world in Gunton is 
conceptual and indirect, rather than ontological and direct. The correlation in the 
passage is between God and human sociality, that is, between a being and an idea, not 
between one being and another. Thirdly, ontologically speaking, the parallel is between 
God’s being and human being, the latter individually or together, rather than between 
God and society. While for Gunton humans are ‘essentially’ and ‘irreducibly’ social 
beings,51 nowhere does he say that God is a social being in the sense that God is not an 
individual being. If we use those terms one would have to say that God is both social 
and individual, only though Gunton does not use the terms for the idea that he expresses 
instead by using the one and the many.52 The point here is that, even when Gunton 
speaks of the “social” being of God, he is speaking about “one” God, not three Gods, 
and he is not proposing thereby a divine sociality made of three deities parallel to a 
fellowship of three human persons and opposed to an “individual” being of God. 
 
2.2. Gunton and Projection 
Critiques of Gunton as a social theorist pave the way for other criticisms to follow, as 
noted previously, one of which is the charge of projection.53 Kilby argues that the 
existence of a high level of projection in contemporary social theories of the Trinity as 
she finds is not accidental but so built into the nature of this system that the social 
theorists have to be projectionist.54 Kilby does not deny that projection might have a 
role to play in theology. Her point is that in the contemporary social theologies 
projection plays ‘a distinctive, and a distinctively problematic, one.’55 She considers the 
following five features to be key elements of projection in today’s social theories, which 
are all relevant to a discussion of Gunton’s work:56 (1) Social theorists share the idea 
that the point of the doctrine of the Trinity is to give a particular insight into God; (2) 
they model God on three human persons understood according to an individual author’s 
or the larger society’s ideal for how we should live together in community; (3) to 
resolve the quandary that the three divine persons should be one God, they resort to 
something beyond human understanding, like perichoresis, just because they do not 
                                           
50 A point to be made against the criticism of Gunton’s work as projectionist, which is discussed at §2.2. 
51 Cf. PTT 167; OTM 220. 
52 See, for example, OTM 141. 
53 Other than Kilby, see also Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 184. 
54 Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 439 and 441. 
55 Ibid. 
56 As given in Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 439–43. 
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want to be tritheist; (4) they explain, in turn, the ‘alien’ idea in terms of ‘those things 
which do to some degree bind human persons together into couples or families or 
communities—interrelatedness, love, empathy, mutual accord, mutual giving and so on; 
and (5) they project what is projected onto God immediately back onto the human world, 
with an illegitimate claim for authority.57 Given that Kilby includes Gunton in the group 
of those theologians against whom she makes these points, one might wish to see 
whether they are correct representations of his work, even partially, if not completely. 
What follows are brief responses to each of the five points, arguing that while they are 
indeed Kilby’s problems with social doctrines of the Trinity, they are not exactly the 
problems residing or identifiable in Gunton’s work itself. 
 
1. Gunton is certainly interested in the doctrine of the Trinity, yet nowhere says or 
implies that its point is to provide a particular insight into the being of God. We rather 
find him saying, ‘the value of the theology of the Trinity lies more in enabling a 
rethinking of the topics of theology and culture than in offering a privileged view of the 
being of God.’58 Critics may point to Gunton’s speaking of God in terms of communion 
and perichoresis as a symptom of projection or a desire to know more than is licensed 
by revelation. For Gunton, however, the idea of God as communion or perichoresis is 
what he has received from the trinitarian tradition, as noted previously.59 Indeed, in his 
transcendental project, Gunton takes the concept of communion and perichoresis drawn 
from the doctrine of the Trinity for further thinking and speaking of the being of the 
world and the human being.60 In that sense, one can say, for Gunton the Trinity is a 
source of transcendental exploration into other areas of being and relation. In the same 
sense, therefore, it is a mistake to treat him as one who regards the point of the doctrine 
of the Trinity as giving a particular insight into God. 
 
                                           
57 Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 442. See also Chapman, ‘social,’ 248. 
58 PTT xxix. 
59 See OTM 152, and §2.1. 
60 Cf. OTM 166–73 (perichoresis); 214–9 (communion). 
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2. Gunton’s God as a communion of the three persons is not modelled on three human 
persons understood according to his own ideal of a good society.61 He does speak of 
God as a communion of persons, and yet that is according to his reception of the 
Christian tradition, especially from the Cappadocian Fathers. He may be mistaken in his 
understanding of their works, as some argue, and as will be discussed later in more 
detail. Even if he mistook them, however, the point being made here would not be 
affected. To repeat, Gunton’s God as a communion of three persons is not modelled on 
three human persons by his own or latest ideal of how human beings should live 
together, but only according to his reception of the tradition that he believes is 
established upon the biblical witness to the anteceding revelation of the Father in the 
Son through the Spirit.62 The three concerned are Father, Son and Spirit, to be precise, 
not three divine persons modelled on three human persons. While Gunton uses the word 
“person” of the divine and the human, the theological use is primary, meaning that his 
understanding of the human follows, not precedes, that of the divine. For Gunton, to go 
a step further, the word “person” is always posterior to the real person of whom it is 
used. In other words, Father, Son and Spirit are prior to, and so in control of, the 
meaning of the word “person” used in reference to them. 
 
3. Gunton’s reason for appealing to the Patristic concept of perichoresis is not to work 
out the quandary of how one God is three or vice versa, a question for him that is 
addressed and answered by the Cappadocian theologians in their responses to Arians 
and Eunomians.63 Nor does he appeal to the concept of perichoresis as something 
beyond human understanding. Perichoresis is a human word created for human 
understanding, though created under the impact and guidance of revelation and 
inspiration.64 It is, as such, that Gunton further develops an analogical concept of 
perichoresis to express an aspect of the reality of God on the basis of the knowledge of 
                                           
61 Projection in this sense is one whereby Kilby explains the difference between Moltmann and Wilson-
Kastner on their views of the person drawn from the doctrine of the Trinity. ‘Perichoresis,’ 440–3. On the 
other hand, Holmes, Trinity, 27 has three explanations for a similar kind of difference between Zizioulas 
and Volf on their visions of the church, yet not including projection: (a) results of ‘employing different 
doctrines of the Trinity;’ (b) indication of ‘an error in argument from Trinity to church in at least one’ of 
them; and (c) evidence that ‘ecclesiological programmes cannot in fact be derived from Trinitarian dogma 
and the assumption that they can is a methodological flaw shared by both Zizioulas and Volf.’ While 
Kilby’s explanation by projection is too simplistic to be taken seriously, it is not too difficult to see that 
Holmes’ explanations have more relevance to Gunton’s method, as we will see later. 
62 Relevant biblical passages might include John 5:19–20; 15:26–27; 1 John 1:1; Gal 1:11–12; Eph 3:2–6.  
63 For the Cappadocian treatment of the issue of one God or three Gods, cf. Gregory of Nyssa, To 
Albabius: On “Not Three Gods” (NPNF vol. 5, 331–6); Gregory of Nazianzen, On the Holy Spirit (NPNF 
vol. 7, 318–28). Behr, Formation 2/2, 360–70 is an explication of the latter, and 427–35 of the former. Cf. 
also, Stead, ‘Why not Three Gods?’, 149–63. 
64 OTM 164. 
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God given in the economy.65 Involved in the creation of such a word is a kind of 
process in which a word is chosen and refined by the mind interacting with the object 
which the word will refer to, rather than one in which a word is chosen, defined and 
applied directly to speaking of God in the predefined sense. For Gunton, it is a thought 
process that began with the early theologians, resulting in a group of words that may be 
used for speaking of the revealed God and offering some answers to the basic questions. 
Gunton’s interest is not in dealing with a question that has already been answered or 
creating a new term to describe the being of God anew. It is, rather, in continuing the 
process of conceptual clarification that has already begun by his predecessors, by posing 
his own questions such as ‘whether the concepts developed in trinitarian theology 
enable us not only to conceive the reality of God, but also have transcendental 
possibilities, and so enable us to come to terms with the fundamental shape of being.’66 
 
4. Therefore, Gunton’s account of the idea of perichoresis is not an explanation of a new 
idea introduced by him but is given as part of an established doctrine known to others 
too.67 As he notes, Barth refers to the doctrine of perichoresis as expressing the state of 
affairs in which ‘the divine modes of being mutually condition and permeate one 
another so completely that one is always in the other two and the other two in the 
one.’68 Gunton himself uses similar terms to explain the concept of perichoresis as ‘a 
way of showing the ontological interdependence and reciprocity of the three persons of 
the Trinity.’69 The continuity and similarity between Gunton and Barth concerning the 
meaning of perichoresis raises a question as to whether the critics of Gunton’s work as a 
projection are in effect also criticising Barth’s, a question to which an answer cannot be 
found in Kilby’s work. If Kilby treats Barth differently from Gunton in this matter 
simply because the former has a different response to a problem of which Gunton is also 
aware the question rises as to what she would say about Barth regarding projection, if 
we are correct in saying that his understanding of perichoresis is not much different 
                                           
65 OTM 162. 
66 PTT 140f. See also OTM 153. 
67 OTM 152. Hence, for Gunton, the doctrine of perichoresis. The first reference to perichoresis in Gunton 
appears in BB 145–8, where it is mentioned in explicating Barth’s theology as appealing to the established 
doctrine of perichoresis or circuminsessio for the state of affairs in which God is both one and three, unity 
and trinity.  
68 Barth, Dogmatics I.1., 370, as cited in BB 146. 
69 OTM 152. 
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from Gunton’s, being much more similar than they are different with regard to their 
uses of the word “person.”70 
 
5. If Gunton’s theology is not a projection his transcendental project can hardly be taken 
as a reverse projection. Indeed, the project has an element of projection, because it 
involves a process in which the concepts generated by theology are “projected” onto 
understanding other things. But that is a projection in its broadest sense.71 In such a 
narrow sense as we find in his critics, however, Gunton is also aware of the problem of 
reverse projection (or ‘idealism’) as well as projection. He sees the former, for example, 
in premature appeals to the social analogy put forward to support a particular vision of 
society and those books in the Hegelian tradition which tie the work of the divine Spirit 
with the immanent patterns of modern history and social development.72 There argues 
Gunton, not against the necessity of the ontology of God, but only for the need of a 
process of intermediate argumentation, because ‘moves from the immanent Trinity to 
the created world are not obvious, and are fraught with dangers of idealizing and 
projection.’73 What Kilby is in effect arguing, then, is that Gunton is engaging in a 
practice that he wants to avoid. While Gunton’s transcendental exploration of 
perichoresis is the major ground of her argument, she provides no other reason than her 
own view that in social theories the concept of perichoresis is projected onto God from 
the human and then projected back onto the human. This, however, is too simple, or too 
broad, a description to be applied to Gunton in any meaningful way for three reasons. 
First, Gunton has not created the word perichoresis and its meaning but has received 
both the term and its meaning from the past, as discussed above. Secondly, the initial 
process involved is not that of creating the word by pure projection from the mind but 
rather of creating a notion of it by the mind’s interaction with the divine reality revealed 
in the economy of creation and salvation. Thirdly, the practice of correlating divine 
being and the human by the mediation of language is not wholly new: its root goes back 
                                           
70 See Kilby’s discussion in ‘Perichoresis,’ 433, who puts Gunton among the group she calls social 
theorists, while treating Barth (and Rahner) as outsiders to the group, for the reason that Barth wants to 
abandon the use of “persons” for the three of the Trinity because of the danger of tritheism: ‘when we 
hear “three persons” we inevitably think of three separate “I”s, three centres of consciousness, three 
distinct wills and so on.’ This is a point that draw Gunton’s attention already in his first book. 
71 That is, for instance, we create a word in reference to a thing and then apply (or project) the same word 
to naming all other things of the same kind. 
72 See PTT xx, 171; FSS 23. 
73 PTT xx. Gunton, thus, treads on a relatively narrow path marked by two dangers lying on each side. On 
the one side is the danger of the over-simplification of limiting theological enquiry to the economic or 
historical Trinity. On the other is the danger of the superficiality of using the immanent or ontological 
Trinity to validate causes believed to be worthy ones. 
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to the times of biblical authors who even recorded ‘Be holy, for I am holy,’74 which is a 
divine command as to what the people of God should be based on what God is.75 
 
2.2.2. Projection for Gunton 
Gunton has not produced a response to the charge of his work for projection. Nor has he 
provided a separate treatment of the question of projection, perhaps because it is not so 
vital an issue compared to others, but not because he has no problem with it. There are 
at least four forms of projection about which he is cautious that his critics need to take 
into consideration: (1) projection from anything of the world; (2) projection by negation 
of the world; (3) projection by affirmation of the world in eminence; and (4) projection 
from the economy. There are two respects in which knowing these forms of projection 
in Gunton would be helpful for making further responses to criticisms of his work as 
projectionist: they show the senses in which Gunton is also critical of the problem of 
projection; and failing to take them into consideration can lead to an awkward situation 
such as that in which he is criticised either for the points that he is aware of or for the 
points that he has made against others. That said, space will not allow us to look at all 
four of them. In what follows discussion is limited to the first two because while there 
are some points to make about them to counter the charge of projection which has been 
levelled to Gunton’s work, the other two do not need to be addressed for that purpose.76 
 
Projection from anything of the world 
This is a type of projection that Gunton briefly touches on by introducing Xenophanes’ 
critiques of the Homeric gods. First is the charge of anthropomorphism: ‘Homer and 
Hesiod have attributed to the gods everything that is a shame and reproach among men, 
stealing and committing adultery and deceiving each other.’77 Then that of projection: 
‘The Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black, the Thracians that theirs 
have light blue eyes and red hair.’78 Gunton’s reason for introducing them is not to say 
something particularly about projection but to show how Greek philosophy came under 
                                           
74 Lev 11:45. Cf. 19:2; 1 Pet 1:15–16.   
75 Cf. also, Matt 5:48 for being “perfect” and Luke 6:36 for being “merciful.”  For an act, John 15:9 and 1 
John 4:11. For Gunton’s brief comment on the last passage in the context of discussing two accounts of 
the language used of divinity, see AB 69–71. 
76 While the first two appear in Gunton’s survey of the negative theology, as we will see, the third can be 
identified in his treatment of the theology of Hartshorne in comparison to that of Barth in Becoming and 
Being, and the last in his engagement with the theology of Jürgen Moltmann in various places on the 
question of the cross and suffering. Cf. CC 86–9; AB 130f and 124–32. 
77 Xenophanes, Fragment 11, as cited in AB 39 from G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic 
Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957, 
168. 
78 Xenophanes, Fragment 16. 
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pressure to “the impersonal” and “the intellectual” and “the negative” by beginning with 
critiques of anthropomorphism and projectionism of the old religions. Our reason for 
looking at that brief part of Gunton’s work is to use the kind of projection criticised by 
Xenophanes in order to establish Gunton’s wariness of the first type of projection, that 
is, projection onto God from anything of the world according to an individual’s, or 
society’s, likes, dislikes, desires, wishes or fears. For Gunton, this is a kind of projection 
that is criticised not only by Greek philosophers but also in Scripture and even by 
modern thinkers.79 As such, it would be needless to defend him against a charge that 
relates him to that sort of practice. Kilby, however, gives the misguiding impression that 
we need to do so, by treating Gunton as one of the contemporary social theorists that 
she criticises in similar words to those with which Xenophanes criticises projectionism. 
To repeat her words, ‘much of the detail is derived from either the individual author’s or 
the larger society’s latest ideals of how human beings should live in community.’80 
What can be said in response is not only that Gunton is critically aware of this sort of 
projection but also that he is perhaps more critical of it than is his critic. As he says, 
‘Nice, polite westerners may project a deity who is moderately feminist and in favour of 
ecological responsibility and all worthy things, but if the matter is down to the one who 
projects, there is no end to the demons which can be let loose.’81 It is not that Gunton 
has changed his position after receiving a charge of projection such as Kilby’s. As far as 
this first type of projection is concerned, his wariness of it is already shown not least in 
the works discussed by her.82  
 
Projection by negation of the world 
It is one thing to find fault with a system and another to succeed in providing an 
alternative. That is the light in which Gunton puts Xenophanes’ own theology that is 
built upon a critique of the theology of old religions. In Gunton’s view, that is to say, 
Xenophanes’ theology is not a solution but a beginning of new problems. One difficulty 
is concerned with Xenophanes’s God as ‘universal mind,’83 which is echoed in 
Aristotle’s concept of the being of God as ‘thought contemplating itself.’84 The problem 
                                           
79 See AB 55 and 62.  
80 Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 441. 
81 AB 93. Emphasis added. This is introduced here because of the content, yet the context in which it is 
actually said is that where he criticises negative theology, followed by the saying ‘Salvation depends on 
the unflinching affirmation that the God who meets us in the Son and the Spirit is the only God there is.’ 
82 Cf. OTM 139 and PTT 90, where Gunton refers to the critique associated with Feuerbach that the 
concept of God is projected from the worldly marks. 
83 AB 40, referring to Eric Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 34. 
84 Ibid. 
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is not the concept of God as mind or intellect itself so much as that it is conceived in 
abstraction from, rather than directed to, God’s involvement in the material world. The 
second problem concerns Xenophanes’ God as ‘the mere negation of the finite,’85 which 
echoes Anaximander’s description of the arche of things as the apeiron (‘the infinite or 
unbounded’ or ‘the indefinite’)86 and is fully blown by the time of Plotinus whose the 
One is ‘a shapeless form … indescribable … no name can be appropriate to it … simply 
“the not this”.’87 Nor is the problem here the negative itself, but its employment in such 
a way as to leave no room for the positive, resulting in an uncomfortable implication: 
‘we cannot, if we take this to be a universal rule, attribute even goodness and love to 
God as an inhering, inner quality.’88  
 
What does Greek philosophy, then, have to do with projection when it is considered to 
have begun with a critique of projection in old theologies? Gunton’s answers to the 
question are not found in his survey of Greek philosophy but in his review of a strand of 
Christian negative theology that developed under its influence. Discussing Origen, 
Dionysius, John of Damascus and Aquinas,89 Gunton considers the following problems 
in their works that we might take as his answers to our question. Firstly, the negative 
way that he sees in them is not a denial of theology but a different way of doing 
theology, beginning with worldly attributes, then negating them and finally predicating 
the negated of the being of God: for example, God is infinite and immaterial because the 
world is finite and material.90 Secondly, there are in control of them some metaphysical 
principles by which much of Greek philosophy operated, such as dualism, hierarchy and 
causality, according to which, for example, ‘the lower levels of reality mirror but dimly 
the divine reality which presides over them, while the higher levels—the “spiritual” and 
                                           
85 AB 41, in reference to Edward Caird, The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophies, Glasgow: 
James MacLehose and Sons, 1904, 62. 
86 Ibid.  
87 AB 43, as cited from J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967, 25. Frederic C. Copleston is also cited saying ‘God is absolutely transcendent. … Neither essence 
nor being nor life can be predicated of the One … Moreover, we can legitimately ascribe to the One 
neither thought nor will nor activity’ (A History of Philosophy: Vol I Greece and Rome, London: Burns & 
Oates, 1946, 464f). 
88 AB 44. Cf. also, AB 41f, for Gunton’s account of Plato as an example that there are other features of the 
development than the merely negative. 
89 See AB 44–54. Among those discussed by Gunton are the conception of spirit by the denial of 
bodilessness and materiality (Origen), relentless concentration on ‘the analogically reached doctrine that 
God is essentially what the world is not’ (Dionysius), the negatives piled one upon another before 
anything positive is said (John of Damascus), and the dictum that ‘we cannot know what God is, but only 
what He is not’ (Aquinas). 
90 Projection in Gunton’s words: ‘we take what we believe to be characteristic of finite persons, and 
project this on to God by a process of denying what we take to be the marks of deficiency and elevating 
their supposedly positive features to infinity’ (AB 137). 
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intellectual; that is, the non-material—mirror them more brightly.’91 Thus the material 
things are only used to reach for the immediate only to be kicked away.92 Thirdly, the 
negative way is not wholly negative but behind its unassuming mask lies ‘a movement 
for unity with God,’93 or ‘an almost Promethean aspiration to unity with the divine.’ 94 
As Pseudo-Dionysius says, ‘my argument now rises from what is below up to the 
transcendent, and the more it climbs, the more language falters, and when it has passed 
up and beyond the ascent, it will turn silent completely, since it will finally be at one 
with him who is indescribable.’95 Fourthly, the system of predication operating in them 
is that which, Gunton says, ‘works by projection from below rather than by response to 
particular historical revelation within the structures of time and space.’96 It is a system, 
in other words, that reaches a concept of God by ‘a process of unmediated ascent—
unmediated, at any rate, by anything material like the human Christ.’97 Problematic for 
Gunton is the outcome, which is an understanding of God that sits ill with ‘a knowledge 
of God the Father mediated through his Son’98 and a ‘concept of God whose being is 
known primarily through his historical and particular action.’99 Finally, while Scripture 
could have been a corrective to the dominance of the impersonal, the intellectual, the 
negative and the cosmological considerations, biblical passages tended to be chosen and 
used ‘woodenly’ as proof-texts.100 ‘The economy and revelation,’ says Gunton, ‘have 
been placed in a straightjacket by a conception of divine being constructed a priori.’101 
 
Gunton’s awareness of these problems concerning negative theology has significance 
for our discussion, namely, as a possible response from him to a treatment of his work 
as projectionist from a restrictive perspective that is similar to what he finds in negative 
theology.102 That is, his positive statements about the being of God are not made in 
ignorance of the limits of theology but, rather, in due recognition that the negative way 
                                           
91 AB 62. 
92 AB 63. 
93 Ibid. 
94 AB 65. Reference is made to Paul Rorem saying, ‘The way of negation is the way of union’ (Pseudo-
Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence, New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993, 165f). 
95 AB 64, as cited from Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, tr. Colm Luibheid, London: SPCK, 1987, 
139. Cf. also, 100 cited in AB 17. 
96 AB 62. 
97 AB 63. 
98 Ibid. 
99 AB 40. 
100 AB 48. 
101 AB 17f. 
102 Cf. Fermer’s view of Gunton’s transcendental project as trespassing on apophatic theology; for Kilby, 
projection with an attempt to give a particular insight to God; and for Holmes, diverging from the 
established tradition. 
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is not entirely negative in that behind any operation of the negative is the action of some 
positive principles that operate as if tested and accepted when they are not. As we shall 
see later, Fermer deals with Gunton’s work from a Thomistic perspective without 
showing its validity or superiority over that perspective from which Gunton works, 
which is simply assumed and asserted as a yardstick for judgment at argumentatively 
crucial points.103 In the case of Kilby, as we saw, while she promotes the importance of 
the doctrine of the Trinity simply as a rule for reading biblical stories, thinking and 
talking about the experience of prayer and deploying the words of Christianity in an 
appropriate way,104 it is possible to think that this is not only a suggestion that is made 
to follow her discussion of social theorists, but perhaps the very perspective from which 
they are grouped and examined in the first place. In that case, it would have been better 
if she had also shown the grounds on which we are urged to use the doctrine of the 
Trinity in such a theologically restrictive way as she suggests. For even a successful 
critique of social approaches to the Trinity would not necessarily support the suggestion 
of taking the importance of the doctrine of the Trinity as ‘a kind of structuring principle 
of Christianity rather than as its central focus.’105 
 
2.2.3. Conflict model of the Trinity 
There is a programme to which any charge of projection discussed thus far might better 
apply than to Gunton’s, and that is the conflict model of the Trinity promoted by Mark 
Chapman and David Nicholls.106 Chapman’s arguments are interesting for our 
discussion because while, like Kilby, he treats Gunton as a defender of social 
trinitarianism, his approach differs from hers both in his analysis of the problem and 
suggestions for a way forward. For Kilby, we saw, the problem of social approaches is 
mainly to do with projection, and she finds it especially in the social projectionists’ way 
of speaking of perichoresis, which they tend to explain in terms of interrelatedness, love, 
empathy, accord, mutual giving and so on. Her corrective is to limit the use of the 
                                           
103 ‘Whereas Aquinas considered metaphysics to be the prima philosophia, the science of being as being, 
which could be conducted independently of theology, Gunton/Zizioulas wish to maintain that theology is 
determinative of ontology. The danger here is that we have a deficient ontology opposed [imposed?] from 
above’ (Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 170f). Also, later, ‘if Gunton and Zizioulas move from an ontology of God to a 
general ontology, they have introduced God into the subject matter of metaphysics in a way which 
Aquinas would never have allowed’ (173). 
104 Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 443. 
105 Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 443. If what Kilby suggests is simply a hermeneutical use of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, rather than taking it as an expression of the being of God, there are other questions that need to be 
addressed, for example, whether the so-called “Latin Trinitarianism,” which is often contrasted with 
“Social Trinitarianism,” also needs to be overcome, given that it is also about the “being” of God: one 
substance and three persons (una substantia et tres personae). 
106 David Nicholls, ‘Trinity and conflict,’ Interpretation 37, 1993, 19–27. For Chapman’s, see §2.1. n.2. 
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doctrine of the Trinity and take its importance as a hermeneutical principle rather than a 
free licence to talk about the being of God. For Chapman, talks of God in such terms as 
“love” and “harmony” are also problematic, yet not because they are projections but 
rather because they are deficient in projection, failing to fully reflect the human reality. 
What they express, in his view, is only a ‘longing for concord and a conflict-free zone, 
but it seems quite divorced from the creative and constructive conflict that can plausibly 
be shown to be the foundation for democratic human societies.’107 Henceforth he turns 
to the conflict model of the Trinity proposed by Nicholls to incorporate the reality of 
conflict fully into the doctrine of the Trinity. He suggests thus, 
harmony and unity may not perhaps be all there is to a good community—
indeed, there might be a need for opposition, for conflict, in order to grow; and 
furthermore, it might even be possible to see conflict, or at the very least, 
tension at the heart of our picture of God.108  
This passage, while explaining the need of conflict and the like for a good community, 
has three elements of projection which we saw Kilby use to criticise social analogies to 
the Trinity: a general view of human reality; a move from there to divine reality with 
that view; and the desire to draw a picture of God by that move. For discussion, we 
might expand them with the words from Chapman. First comes a general view of 
human reality that has not only harmony and balance but also ‘dispute and conflict’ as 
‘the normal and proper condition of society, and even of the Church.’109 From that 
understanding of the human reality, secondly, follows a theological move, asking ‘if we 
are to try to model the Trinity, then what place is there for the tensions and conflicts 
resulting from diversity and difference?’110 With that move, thirdly, a picture of God is 
drawn, which in its heart has conflict, opposition, or tension, not only because they are 
human realities but also for the reason that they are thought to be necessary for a good 
community and its growth. While these elements of the conflict model of the Trinity 
appear perfectly fitting with the features of projection in Kilby’s analysis, a more careful 
analysis than that would not find the problems in Gunton’s work.  
 
                                           
107 Chapman, ‘Social,’ 249. 
108 Chapman, ‘Social,’ 251. Things are clearer with Nicholls about what kind of conflict urged to put in 
the picture as he distinguishes two kinds of conflict in this: ‘Not all conflict is ultimately destructive. 
Confrontation and conflict may be necessary conditions of progress and improvement. Although the 
violent and destructive conflicts in Northern Ireland or the Lebanon appear, indeed, to have no redeeming 
features, the confrontations and conflicts inspired and initiated by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther 
King had positive and beneficial results’ (‘Trinity,’ 21). 
109 Chapman, ‘Social,’ 248. Speaking of the church history, Chapman says, ‘Quite simply, then, had there 
been no conflict there would have been no orthodoxy’ (249). 
110 Chapman, ‘Social,’ 248f. 
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Nicholls and Chapman appear to work with a very narrow concept of conflict, even 
between ‘mercy and justice … to forestall an image of God in which mercy totally 
swaps justice.’ The question is whether such an image of God is really proposed by 
Gunton or even the like in their review. Gunton’s speaking of God as a communion of 
persons might be understood in terms of love, yet not in the sense in which God is only 
merciful and not just.111 Besides, in the Bible, mercy and justice are used of God’s 
relation with the world rather than of the relation between the Son and the Father or 
between one picture of God and another.112 Moreover, the main picture of God in the 
New Testament is that of the Son doing the will of the Father in the power of the Spirit. 
The three are united in distinction, together working towards, for or against the world. 
In so far as it concerns their relations to each other, there would be no biblical support 
for saying that they are opposed to each other or are in conflict. They are rather depicted 
as unified, for example, in purifying us from all sins for our fellowship with each other 
(1 John 2:1. Christ defends; God forgives); providing us with a complete salvation (Heb 
7:25. Christ intercedes; God saves); and holding us in the love of Christ (Rom 8:34. 
Christ intercedes; God justifies). Furthermore, for his disciples and those who will 
believe in him through their witness, Jesus prays ‘that they may all be one, just as you, 
Father, are in me, and I in you, that they also may be in us, so that the world may 
believe that you have sent me’ (John 17:21).113 
 
                                           
111 See, e.g., PTT 168, where Gunton implies what picture of God he has by saying that ‘there are a 
number of reasons why the God worshipped by Christians is indispensable for the good ordering of a free, 
just and tolerant society.’ 
112 ‘The picture of God proclaimed by Jesus as the compassionate, loving, merciful Father, needs to be 
read alongside that other picture of God as judge, at least if the Gospel of Matthew is to be taken 
seriously: he will banish the wicked to that place where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth’ (Chapman, 
‘Social,’ 251). 
113 This Johannite concept of oneness can be put into contrast with the Synoptic report of the cry of 
dereliction on the cross, which for some is a definite sign of conflict between the Son and the Father. Thus 
is for J. Moltmann who proposes a theology of crucified God by taking the cross as ‘a God event’ which 
took place ‘between Jesus and his God, between his Father and Jesus,’ implying ‘stasis within God,’ ‘God 
against God,’ and even ‘enmity between God and God’ (The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the 
Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, tr. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden, London: SCM Press, 
1974, 149, 151, 205f and 227). This would be better treated if we included a third type of projection in 
Gunton’s wariness, namely, projection from the economy. That said, one comment can be made here 
concerning Gunton’s understanding of Moltmann’s view of the cross as implying ‘a tritheist denial of the 
unity of the divine action’ (CC 86. Added emphasis) and its contrast with Nicholls’ treatment of 
Moltmann’s ‘defence of patripassianism’ as suggesting ‘a failure to allow for a real distinction of the 
persons and a dangerous modalist tendency’ (‘Trinity,’ 24. Emphasis added). That is, Gunton’s comment 
on Moltmann applies, in fact, partially to Moltmann’s work and more fully to Nicholls’. In other words, 
any critic of Gunton’s conception of God as the persons in communion as projectionist needs to take into 
account that Gunton remains, more concretely and less speculatively than the others, with the biblical 
account of the cross in understanding it as an event that took place between Jesus and the world in a 
unified action of God with the man Jesus, unified towards overcoming evil and suffering in the world; in 
other words, ‘an encounter—the encounter between the power of God undemonically exercised by a man 
and moral, social and political forces demonically exercised by others’ (AA 76). 
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Having shown how Kilby’s charge of projection applies better to the conflict model of 
the Trinity proposed by Chapman than it does to Gunton’s works, we might draw a 
conclusion by looking at the situation as one in which we have two different views of 
projection and two differing approaches to the doctrine of the Trinity, the latter 
involving different understandings of theology. As for the matter of projection, Gunton 
is close to Kilby, both standing against Chapman who appears to have no issue with 
projection itself. For Kilby, projection is problematic in some cases, as in the case of the 
social approaches to the Trinity. She appears to concede that projection might have a 
positive role to play in theology, though she says nothing more about the sense in which 
it might be the case. For Gunton, however, there is no place for projection in its normal 
sense of drawing a picture of God from a general view of the world by the way of 
preference, negation or eminence. As for the doctrine of the Trinity, Chapman’s 
approach is closer to Gunton’s in their common understanding of the Trinity in terms of 
ontology and having implications for our understanding of other things, while Kilby 
might criticise any ontological understanding of the Trinity as symptomatic of 
projection and reverse projection. Chapman would be mistaken, however, if he thinks 
that Gunton has the same view of theology as his, that is, theology as “practical 
wisdom” which, like in politics, involves openness to change in understanding of God 
through practice.114 Gunton has a similar view of theology as a “practical discipline”115 
which aims at wisdom in the sense of light to throw upon the human path. However, 
unlike Chapman,116 he has little interest in modelling the inner life of God according to 
a particular view of reality. His understanding of the Trinity from which he draws the 
ontology of being as communion is firmly anchored in the Bible and the church 
tradition, at least by intention and orientation.
                                           
114 Chapman, ‘Social,’ 239. 
115 OTM 7 and 179. 
116 Cf. Chapman, ‘Social,’ 252, in which Chapman shows his position by saying that ‘it does not seem too 
far-fetched to suggest that the importance of the Trinity is not that it is fixed in its formulation but rather 
that it points towards the constant need for practical transformation, of resolving the conflict for the 
moment, which is the always uncompleted work of the spirit. Doctrinal solutions, like the compromises of 
politics, are temporary and very partial settlements that are always open to change and development.’ 
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Chapter 3 Substance and Reductionism 
 
In addition to the charges of social trinitarianism and projectionism, Gunton is also 
criticised for the reduction of substance. This critique is advanced by Richard Fermer in 
particular, Bernard Nausner closely following him.1 The critique of Fermer, who has 
already been introduced in previous discussions, is quite comprehensive, not only 
touching on the issues of social trinitarianism and projection but also including 
reconsiderations of the works of the Cappadocians, thus enabling Nausner to claim 
without further ado that Gunton’s transcendental project, though laudable, has failed to 
do what it intended to do.2 Given the apparent weight of this argument, it is necessary to 
examine Gunton’s work and the validity of the challenge. Because most of their 
arguments are concerned with the concept of substance or ousia, we shall begin with a 
survey of the concept of substance as it is used in Gunton’s work. 
 
3.1. Substance in Gunton 
Gunton’s use of the word “substance” is more complex than is assumed and treated by 
his critics. The complexity arises partly because he continues to use it while his 
theology develops through interactions with various works of others, and partly because 
the process involves different stages in which the concept of substance itself undergoes 
changes or modifications in its sense or reference. The following six stages or features 
outline the development of the concept of substance in Gunton’s work: (1) simple use of 
substance for Greek ousia; (2) decision to continue to use the word substance; (3) 
identification of a problematic notion of substance; (4.a) use of substance in apposition 
to the being of which it is a primary predicate, in the sense of what a being substantially 
is; (4.b) relative freedom of substance from being used for ousia; and (4.c) suggestion 
of a transcendental use of substance in reference to the particular. 
 
1. Gunton’s use of the word substance starts with his first book Becoming and Being. 
The use of the word at this point is simple and negative: simple because it is used only 
as part of explicating the theologies of Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth;3 negative 
because each is presented as having negative views of the language of substance. For 
                                           
1 Bernard Nausner, ‘The failure of a laudable project: Gunton, the Trinity and human self-understanding,’ 
Scottish Journal of Theology 62/4, 2009, 403–20. 
2 Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 420.  
3 See BB 18f, 59, 142f, 199, and also 237 (as part of the epilogue added in the 2nd edition, belonging to a 
later stage of the development of his thought). 
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them, that is, substance is too “static” a concept to be used for predicating the 
“dynamic” being of God (Barth) and the “dynamic” reality of the universe 
(Hartshorne).4 Finding himself in a situation in which the concept of substance has been 
progressively weakened, Gunton takes note of two suggestions regarding what to do 
with the concept of substance. One is to reject the use of the language of substance 
along with the whole conception of philosophy or metaphysics that seeks entities that 
one cannot see, hear, taste, touch or smell.5 The other is to replace substance with a 
word of more dynamic nuance such as “event” or “becoming,” to accommodate the 
contemporary views of the world.6 Yet Gunton adopts these options, neither here nor 
later,7 though his awareness of both the problem and the alternatives offered by Ayer 
and Hartshorne indicates that there is a decision to be made on his part about what to do 
with the language of substance, as the one made in the next stage of his thinking. 
 
2. Gunton pays attention more directly than previously to the concept of substance as he 
turns to a discussion of the status of Christological statements in his Yesterday and 
Today. With his focus on the relation of our language to reality, Gunton asks whether 
the word ousia or substance is now obsolete as a model for modern Christology.8 In 
developing an answer, he offers the following five considerations, which is to become 
the ground of his decision to continue to use the word. The first concerns the function of 
the classical notion of substance as indicating something real and the significance of this 
notion in arguments against reductionism. For the former Gunton cites Donald 
MacKinnon, saying that ‘the category of substance was used by Aristotle as a means of 
indicating something that is really there.’9 For the latter he draws on Christopher 
Stead’s point that, ‘To characterize God as a substance is to stake a claim against 
reductionist theories which in effect represent God as dependent on the human 
experience which he is invoked to explain.’10 The second concerns the fact that whilst 
substance has various senses its theological use does not necessarily imply a “static 
                                           
4 For Hartshorne, see BB 19 and 59 for Hartshorne and, for Barth, 142f and 199. This is something to be 
noted against those who criticise Gunton’s use of the word “person” on the basis that Barth wanted to 
avoid its use for the three of the Trinity. 
5 BB 19, and Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollancz, 1946, 40–3. 
6 See the references given in BB 19, of Hartshorne’s works. 
7 Gunton’s response to the suggestions appear in his YT, 155–8, as we will see later. 
8 By “models” here Gunton means ‘the words and concepts by which the tradition, and we, in so far as we 
can indwell the tradition in order to speak in our own words, attempt to articulate the reality of Jesus 
Christ’ (YT 159). 
9 YT 156, and D. M. MacKinnon, ‘“Substance” in Christology—a Cross-bench View,’ in S. W. Sykes and 
J. P. Clayton (eds), Christ, Faith and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 279–300 
(294, 297). 
10 YT 157, as cited from G. C. Stead, Divine Substance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 273. 
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ontology.”11 Stead is cited again saying, ‘God can be, and has been, represented as a 
changing substance, and indeed as one that is ever-changing and infinitely adaptable.’12 
In other words, ‘the description of God in terms of substance does not of itself prejudge 
the question whether God is, or is not, involved in change.’13 Consequently, to regard 
“substance” and “being” as static, and “event” and “becoming” as dynamic, offers little 
more than mere products of association.14 In addition, Gunton notes that there are prior 
questions to be addressed, such as what we mean by “God” and “human” and whether 
God’s eternity precludes dynamic interrelationship with the temporal.15 Thirdly, 
however, even “dynamism” (or “change”) is not the sole measure of theological 
language. The doctrine of the homoousios, for example, has at its heart an element of 
“stability” or “continuity,” namely ‘something about what he always is, so that we may 
understand that he is a present and future as well as a past reality.’16 The fourth 
consideration is the success of early Christian theologians in adapting language to what 
they wished to portray, in other words, using contemporary language in such a way as to 
bring different aspects of the reality of Jesus Christ into expression without forcing the 
reality of their experience into language.17 Gunton notes that ousia or substance is an 
abstract term or second-order language, operating at a higher level of abstraction than 
statements of doctrine like the incarnation, yet not merely as language about language,18 
but rather as a theological control on the more basic models, still concerned with what is 
out there.19 For Gunton, finally, more important than whether “substance” has a 
dynamic or static meaning is the framework in which it is conceived and employed. For 
example, homoousios is open to dualistic as well as non-dualistic interpretations, with 
different results. If taken within a dualistic framework, regardless of its predefined sense, 
dynamic or static, substance can develop a problematic notion, as happened with 
Schleiermacher.20 On the other hand, if used in a non-dualistic framework, substance 
can still successfully express what the early Christians designed it to do,21 namely to 
                                           
11 YT 157. Cf. Stead, Substance, 158, 274.  
12 A repeated point in Substance, 106, 171 and 274. 
13 Stead, Substance, 275. 
14 YT 156. Cf. BB 199f.  
15 YT 158. 
16 YT 157–78. We might add, from BB 236, that ‘there are different forms of dynamism and not all are 
acceptable theologically.’ 
17 YT 157. 
18 As is suggested by Richard A. Norris Jr., ‘Towards a Contemporary Interpretation of the Chalcedonian 
Definition’ in R. A. Norris (ed.), Lux in Lumine: Essays to Honour W. Norman Pittenger, New York: 
Seabury Press, 1966, 62–79 (78). 
19 YT 159. 
20 YT 158. 
21 Ibid. 
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express two aspects of Jesus’ reality—‘of one substance with the Father’ and ‘of one 
substance with our humanity.’22  
 
That said, we might consider the following three as additional markers of Gunton’s use 
of substance at this stage. Firstly, while Gunton’s attention is turned to the concept of 
substance it is not yet fully drawn to its sense or meaning. Rather, his focus is on the 
function of the word as a theological term or model. Secondly, the five considerations 
for which Gunton chose to use substance remain as grounds for his continued use of the 
term beyond this stage. With none of them revoked in any later work, they are to be 
reckoned with by anyone who wishes to argue that Gunton rejects the concept of 
substance or reduces it to something other than its traditional meaning. This is a stage, 
thirdly, in which Gunton’s use of substance is rather conventional, corresponding to the 
Greek ousia conceived in distinction from hypostasis,23 as demonstrated in the 
examples cited above.24 
 
3. Gunton’s next use of substance is found in his book Enlightenment and Alienation, 
which is still simple and conventional, similar to the uses found in the first and the 
second stages and mainly in discussing the works of others. Its distinctness lies in the 
fact that his attention is now turned to the sense of substance, though it is a problematic 
one found in the theories of perception developed by the pioneers of the 
Enlightenment.25 In agreement with Berkeley and Coleridge about the importance of 
correct understanding of perception as the key to a proper understanding of the relation 
between God and the world,26 Gunton argues that the theories of perception developed 
by the early modern thinkers are responsible, to a large extent, for producing a notion of 
substance that has created an unfortunate condition in which the person is alienated 
from the world.27 Berkeley is used to demonstrate the problem, namely the view that 
perception takes place passively as ideas are thrust by some outside agency into the 
mind through the senses (with the difference only that for Descartes the mind is at birth 
furnished with a number of ideas and for Locke the mind obtains the whole of its 
                                           
22 YT 12, 16, 40f, 100 and 155. 
23 As the distinction is seen, for example, in YT 158. 
24 Cf. also, YT 155: ‘What, then, of this word οὐσια or substance as it has since come to be translated?’ 
25 Gunton does not deny that the Enlightenment taught us many good things, for example, its success as a 
spur to human liberation, advance and discovery. Cf. EA 1, 2, 4, 6 and 44. He is doubtful, however, that 
the Enlightenment has brought in a condition in which we humans are truly free, for example. 
26 EA 11, 26 and 30. 
27 EA 16–21.  
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contents from without).28 While Gunton takes the concept of an outside agency 
thrusting ideas into the mind and causing the mind to perceive from without as 
Descartes’ understanding of substance,29 he considers Locke to have taken such a notion 
of substance further into obscurity by theorizing that it is “qualities” possessed by 
objects that directly transmit ideas into the mind.30 Substance is still part of the cause of 
perception, but now lies behind the qualities that cause perception, being not the direct 
source of the data that flow into the mind but some senseless and imperceptible matter 
lying under or behind the qualities that cause the mind to perceive what is actually 
perceived.31 The problem here for Gunton as it was for Berkeley is how one can think of 
ideas, which are rational, purely as a result of the mechanical impact of such senseless 
matter on the mind through qualities. Gunton follows Berkeley in challenging whether it 
is not a categorical mistake to take mere material things or qualities possessed by them 
as the cause of perception, if ideas belong in the mind and perception is a rational 
activity.32 Berkeley was determined, according to Gunton, ‘to replace the concept of 
substance with that of an active, ever-involved God, as the sole cause and explanation of 
why things are as they are.’33 Yet the replacement of the concept of substance with that 
of God is not the way Gunton takes.34 It is sufficient for him to have identified a 
problematic notion of substance responsible for the alienation of the person from the 
world, namely substance as some senseless and unknowable matter underlying what 
meets the senses.35 The significance of this identification for our enquiry is that while 
Gunton has no reason to discard the word substance he now has his own ground to find 
or develop a notion of it that is less problematic or more adequate than that which has 
been identified at this stage.  
 
4. Having looked at three distinct stages of Gunton’s use of substance, we are now 
approaching a fourth stage in which we might grasp Gunton’s own conception of 
substance, especially as it appears in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology and The One, 
the Three and the Many. Yet this is a stage in which the concept of substance is taken in 
                                           
28 Texts used by Gunton are: George Berkeley, Three dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, in 
opposition to Sceptics and Atheists, London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1910; John Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding; The Philosophical Works of Descartes Volume 1, tr. Elizabeth 
Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931. 
29 EA 16f. 
30 EA 18f. 
31 EA 20 and 26. 
32 Berkeley, Three, 246. Cf. EA 27. 
33 EA 30, in the belief that rational ideas that belong in minds must be the gift of a constantly creating and 
preserving deity. 
34 For a reason, see OTM 198f. 
35 Cf. EA 28f. For Gunton’s critical treatment of Berkeley in other aspects, see EA 45f, 49f; OTM 198f. 
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various directions, making it too complicated to deal with it as a single stage or multiple 
stages. In what follows I shall first trace the movement in terms of three aspects of one 
stage developing in close relation to each other. 
 
a. The first is that in which Gunton uses substance in apposition to the being of which it 
is a primary predicate, as seen in saying, ‘The substance of God, “God,” has no 
ontological content, no true being, apart from communion.’36 These are surely 
Zizioulas’ words explicating Cappadocian theology, though Gunton’s use of them is 
noticeably approving, with no question raised against any part of it here or elsewhere. 
Rather, as we saw in chapter one, the idea of the substance of God—God—as 
communion is to become the core of his theological programme. Thus, in Gunton’s 
words, ‘God is no more than what Father, Son and Spirit give to and receive from each 
other in the inseparable communion that is the outcome of their love.37 Just as Gunton 
found a problematic notion of substance in the philosophy of modern rationalists now 
he has found a better way of using the word in the Cappadocian theology laid out by 
Zizioulas. 
 
It needs to be noted that we should not understand Gunton’s use of Zizioulas’ words in 
terms of a shifting or jumping to a latest idea but his theology converging on 
Cappadocian theology through the mediation of Zizioulas’ work. It is equally important 
to note that whilst the works of the Cappadocians and Zizioulas certainly provide 
Gunton with resources to advance his work they neither provide the resources nor 
constitute the work. As we have already seen, Gunton’s move towards an appropriate 
concept of substance has been determined independently from a detailed contact with 
the Cappadocian theology through Zizioulas.38 In that sense, his turn to the idea of the 
substance of God as communion is to be seen as a natural move from the previous stage 
in which he has the concept of substance deprived of the problematic notion of it as 
referring to something other than what meet the senses. An operation of such a concept 
of substance in theology would result in a notion of the substance of God that is sought 
in something other than God. Yet that is not what he understands by the substance of 
God, which is rather concerned with the ontology of God, what God really is, or the 
being that God is as he is revealed. It is that sense in which Gunton finds part of what he 
seeks in the Cappadocian idea advocated by Zizioulas, that “substance” has no 
                                           
36 Zizioulas, Being, 17, cited by Gunton in PTT 9. 
37 PTT 10. Gunton’s emphasis. 
38 And, as we will see, Gunton does not follow the Cappadocian or Zizioulas’ theology from end to end. 
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ontological content (apart from the communion of the three persons).39 It means that 
there is no predefined concept of substance that Gunton brings into speaking of the 
substance of God, which needs to be known rather than presumed. That is the 
significance of his placing of substance in apposition to the being of which it is a 
primary predicate (viz. the substance of God is …), only to predicate of it by the words 
deriving from reflecting on the ways in which God is revealed. 
 
b. The second aspect is that in which the concept of substance gains a certain distance 
from ousia as Gunton chooses “being” as his preferred term for what is normally 
referred to by it along with other terms, including substance. Such a move is seen in 
various places. For example, in his speaking of communion: ‘Communion is the 
meaning of the word [God]; there is no “being” of God other than this dynamic of 
persons in relation.’40 Here, we find, not only is the word “being” used but also put in 
emphasis. A more definite example is his suggestion of ‘one in being’ rather than ‘of 
one substance’ as possibly the best translation of homoousion today.41 His reason for 
deselecting the latter rendering is to avoid the interpretation that God is in some sense 
“substance” with the implication that ‘there is impersonal being under- or over-lying the 
three persons in relation.’42 The effect of the choice is that substance obtains relative 
freedom from the realm where it is normally located with other terms for ousia: relative 
because Gunton still uses substance for ousia; and freedom from its link to ousia to 
support it to mean what a being substantially is. A good place to see this is his last 
monograph, Act and Being, where being is his de facto word for ousia while substance 
rarely appears except in citations of others.43 For instance, ‘The three persons are the 
being of God, and if we know the Father through the Son and in the Spirit we know the 
being of God.’44  
 
Having said that, we have a complicating element in the passage immediately preceding 
the one cited above. ‘If we know the hypostases—by the mediation of scripture and the 
church’s life and proclamation—then we know the substance, being, essence, Wesen, 
                                           
39 The latter part is put in bracket to maintain our focus on substance and be not distracted by its link to 
the word “communion.” For the same idea as presented in the text that is expressed without using 
communion, see Zizioulas, Being, 41: ‘the substance never exists in a “naked” state, that is, without 
hypostasis, without a mode of existence,’ with references to Basil, Letter 38, 2; G. L. Prestige, Patristic, 
254 and 279; Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 42; and Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius 1. 
40 PTT 10. Original emphasis. 
41 PTT 198. Cf. YT 12, 14 et al, where we have ‘of one substance with the Father.’ 
42 Ibid. 
43 See AB 6 (Rene Descartes), 98 (Karl Barth) and 111 (Robert C. Doyle). See also CF 89f. 
44 AB 112. Gunton’s emphasis. 
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etc. of God, for there is nothing else to be known.’45 Substance here is used with other 
terms for the same referent, yet in italics and I wonder why. To say that it is meant as a 
simple emphasis does not help to answer the question since it might be further asked 
why emphasis is given only to that word. One possibility is to look at the emphasis as 
reflecting Gunton’s awareness of the complexity involved in his use of substance for 
ousia: not only for the Greek ousia, but also in the sense of what a being really is, even 
with a relative freedom from being a word for ousia. Another is then to view the use of 
the italics as an indication of the unique place of substance among all the words used 
alongside it. What we have been discussing thus far is how substance in Gunton goes 
through variant phases of use along with the development of his thought, in contrast to 
the other terms which remain more or less the same throughout. Such a status indicates 
a further possibility, which is that substance in this passage is in semantic control over 
the others in determining their common meaning, rather than standing with the others 
for the meaning defined by them in their normal senses. 
 
c. The third aspect of Gunton’s use of substance at the stage under discussion concerns 
his consideration of taking substance ‘to refer simply to the particular entities—things, 
people, creatures—of our everyday experience.’46 The complicating element here is that 
the use of substance for referring to these entities is at variance with the traditional use 
of substance for ousia, and even with Gunton’s own use of substance discussed thus far. 
It is only with the recognition that Gunton’s project in which the suggestion is made is 
one of the most experimental phases of the development of his work, so far as the 
concept of substance is concerned, that we can move on in search of ways to understand 
what the suggestion is about.47 
 
To begin with, the problem against which Gunton makes the above suggestion is not 
substance or substantial thinking but what they have been made of and the framework in 
which they have been operated.48 What Gunton has in mind is a particular notion of 
substance which he identified in the early modern thinkers in terms of something that 
                                           
45 Ibid. Gunton’s emphasis. While the use of “etc.” after the four words indicates that more can be added 
to the list, the absence of ousia among them is interesting, not only because it makes a contrast to its 
presence in his previous works but also because it raises a question as to whether Gunton has simply 
missed it out for no reason or he did not use it simply because the four words are all translations of it or 
he has finally abandoned its use for a reason, for example, to avoid misunderstanding or because he is not 
speaking of it. In any case, I think, it is important to give priority to what Gunton says over its relation to 
the meaning of ousia in the Cappadocian use. 
46 OTM 195. 
47 Webster calls Gunton’s The One, the Many and the Three ‘most ambitious book’ (‘Systematic,’ 261).  
48 OTM 193f. 
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underlies what meets the senses. That idea now is ‘the dragon that has to be slain,’ 
being a point in which his criticism of that notion of substance is extended backwards so 
far as to include Parmenides’ quest for a timeless and changeless underlying reality and 
forwards to include the Kantian category of substance.49 Gunton argues, ‘there is no 
need to take literally the “below” of the latinate word we use.’50 What he also has in 
mind is the tendency to get to the real by passing over the appearances,51 a tendency 
directing the philosophical refusal ‘to accept that a thing is primarily what it concretely 
is in its temporal and spatial relationality’52 and effecting the theological refusal ‘to 
remain with the concrete hypostases in their relatedness, but to seek instead some 
underlying principle of deity.’53 It is only against such a tendency and a concept of 
substance that Gunton suggests the use of substance to refer to the particulars. 
 
By this suggestion, however, Gunton does not mean to say that surface is all that there 
is but to establish what he calls the substantiality of things, i.e., to say that a thing or a 
person or a work of art is already real, sufficiently substantial, by existing as a particular 
entity in time and space in relation to the others.54 Gunton argues, in contrast to the 
prevailing tendency, ‘to be real, a being need not be supported by timeless monads or 
underlying substratum.’55 Even ‘a musical tone has its own proper being, given it for its 
brief time of existence by its relation to player, instrument, air movement and the rest; it 
has its own substantial being in space and time.’56 In other words, ‘even those most 
apparently evanescent of realities, musical tones, have their own way of existing 
concretely.’57 Gunton does not deny that perceptions can be erroneous; appearances can 
be misleading and everything can be more than what it appears to be.58 He only opposes 
the combined tendency to think that appearances are less than real (or, the most real is 
other than appearances) and to seek the primary reality in something that underlies 
them.59 
                                           
49 OTM 200. 
50 OTM 195. Cf. also, PTT ch.3. 
51 OTM 200 n.29.  
52 OTM 200. 
53 Ibid. 
54 By ‘something is real’ Gunton simply means ‘what it is and not another thing’ (ibid). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid.  
57 OTM 201 n.32. 
58 See OTM 200f. 
59 Cf. OTM 200 n.29. Gunton draws on Donald MacKinnon’s study of substance in Christology and 
Victor Zuckerkandl’s study of the phenomenon of musicality, against the Gnostic belief, shared by 
modernism and late modernism, that ‘because material particulars appear to be evanescent, they lack the 
kind of substantial reality that art has usually ascribed to them’ (ibid). 
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As might have been noticed in the music tone passage above, what Gunton means by 
substance in his suggestion of it as referring to the particulars is a thing as a whole, not a 
part of something. This is an important point that can easily be passed over. Let us 
listen to Gunton further: ‘The crucial and concrete realities of our world are the 
particular things—substances—which are what they are by virtue of being wholes that 
are constituted indeed of parts but in such a way that they are more than simply the sum 
of the parts.’60 The connection of “substances” with “wholes” would not be an issue in 
the usual association of ousia with the general and of hypostasis with the particular. Yet 
we are dealing with a passage in which “substances” is plainly linked to “particular 
things,” before they are together connected to “wholes.” To follow them by the order in 
which they appear, we would have this: particulars = substances = wholes. The 
particular here (and so substance) is not “the particular” in the Cappadocian 
conceptuality that is related to “the common” to explain the distinction between 
hypostasis and ousia.”61 They are rather particular objects of our experience (e.g., 
“people,” “cabbages,” “tables,” “tones,” and “works of art”), whose substantiality, 
though obvious, tends to be lost in the drive towards the underlying reality or disappear 
into insubstantiality in the opposite drive towards the surface.62  
 
5. By using the concept of substance in the ways shown above, Gunton puts the reader 
in a complicated position in which it is difficult to find a coherent account of his 
conception of substance. We could simply leave the situation as it is, but in preparation 
of the discussion of the criticisms of Gunton’s work related to his concept of substance, 
I shall go further to present the following clarifications. 
 
a. Firstly, regarding the concept of substance Gunton links to the particular, it does not 
much help to understand them via the ousia-hypostasis scheme. One obvious reason is 
that substance in Gunton is linked to hypostasis as well as to ousia, and both in 
particular ways, as we have seen. More importantly, the focus of his project is to 
develop a notion of substance that suits his purpose to establish the transcendentality of 
the particular, though with the help of the Cappadocian concepts, not in order to 
expound their terminology. Besides, Gunton uses substance linked to the particular only 
of the created beings, nowhere applying it to speaking of Father, Son and Spirit. As for 
the latter, there are other terms that he consistently uses, i.e., hypostasis or person. As a 
                                           
60 OTM 201.  
61 Cf. St Basil, Ep. 38.4; Ep. 236.6. 
62 Cf. OTM 194–202. 
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theological term, however, he employs substance only for what he also calls the being 
(or ousia) of God, even after his proposal of the use of substance as referring to 
particular entities.63 
 
b. If we are to understand Gunton’s conceptuality in relation to the Cappadocian then 
there is perhaps a better way than doing so by the ousia-hypostasis scheme, namely, that 
of ousia-hypostasis-prosopon. There are two things that, when combined, might help to 
shed light on this perspective. The first concerns what we previously considered in 
terms of Gunton’s detachment of “substance” from being in the word group with 
“being” by choosing the latter as a better word for ousia.64 In such a move we see 
something similar to what Gunton thinks the Cappadocians did with the words ousia 
and hypostasis in their own context, that is, ‘making what were synonymous terms into 
words of distinct meaning.’65 In a large part of Gunton’s work, that is to say, substance 
and being are synonymous but his focused work on the concept of substance in his 
transcendental project results in their differentiation into different nuances so that 
“being” is now understood by the concept of “substance” that is moved closer to the 
Cappadocian hypostasis or the particular. The second concerns Gunton’s suggestion of 
using substance for referring to particular things and people. The expected effect of this 
linking of substance to the particular is a lifting of the particular things of our 
experience from being regarded as insubstantial or unreliable to the status of being seen 
as substantial realities, i.e., the most real things that there are.66 This is an effect similar 
to that which Gunton understands in terms of the Cappadocian synonymisation of 
hypostasis and prosopon, the process whereby ‘the former word lost its connotations of 
something underlying; the latter its suggestion of mere surface reality.’67 Similarly, by 
the process of connecting substance to the particular, the former is helped to remain 
concrete on the surface while the latter gets substantial support to be real. The 
difference remains that the Cappadocian synonymisation is of theological terms whereas 
Gunton’s is of transcendental terms. 
 
                                           
63 Cf. AB 112. 
64 §3.1.4.b, in reference to PTT 198. 
65 OTM 191. Gunton’s mention of the Cappadocian desynonymizing is immediately followed by what has 
become a controversial part of his work, which will be taken up for discussion in the next section. Cf. also, 
Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 939f, in reference to Coleridge. 
66 OTM 200 n.29. 
67 OTM 197 n.22. 
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The best way to understand Gunton’s use of substance functioning in two ways is 
perhaps against the background of his understanding of what the Cappadocians did with 
the concept of hypostasis, namely, in relation to “being” (ousia) as the locus of its 
substantiality and to “the particular” (prosopon) as the support to make its reality 
substantially enough. This encourages us to have, if required, a correlation of Gunton’s 
“being,” “substance” and “particular” with the Cappadocian ousia, hypostasis and 
prosopon, though not as definite translations or exact equivalents, but in their common 
functionalities for enabling conceptual explorations. An implication is that to look at his 
conceptual works from a perspective that operates only with the Cappadocian 
distinction between ousia and hypostasis can be rather misleading and even distorting.  
 
c. In the case of Gunton’s use of substance in apposition to the being of which it is a 
primary predicate in the sense of what that being really is, substance is placed closer to 
ousia than hypostasis. Yet, the movement to consider here is not just between ousia and 
hypostasis, or from the particular to the general, but from ousia through hypostasis back 
to ousia due to the fact that Gunton uses substance (ousia) for the shape of a being 
known through the particular (hypostasis) without denying the generic sense of ousia. 
This encourages that we posit two concepts of ousia (and being) at work in Gunton, 
corresponding to the two ways in which the concept of substance functions in his work. 
One is the concept of ousia that is not much different from that advocated by his critics 
as Cappadocian and providing the grammar of unity. Gunton does not explicitly uses 
this concept of ousia but it is nonetheless supposed in his thinking of the three persons 
as divine yet not as three Gods. The other is the concept of ousia that is positively 
promoted by Gunton in a specific sense supported by the concept of substance that he 
develops from the Cappadocian concept of hypostasis.68 To speak of the divine ousia in 
the first sense we need only to know the divine nature and its attributes. Yet, in the 
second sense, we can speak of the divine ousia only by knowing its particular 
representations in concrete situations. In other words, whilst the ousia of God in the first 
sense is knowable regardless of a knowledge of the particulars and their relations, that 
knowledge is indispensable to knowing the ousia of God in the second sense.  
 
The best way to hold the concept of ousia in these two senses is by understanding the 
first ousia in the sense of “given-ness” (or, metaphysical form given to God), and the 
second ousia in the sense of “constituted-ness” (or, ontological shape revealed by Father, 
                                           
68 As is done in OTM 188–95. 
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Son and Spirit). These notions of ousia are both present in Gunton’s work, as we saw, 
though his focus in his transcendental project is concentrated on the second (“the 
general being of God,” “the real substance of God,” “what he really is”). That is what 
he appears to have tried to develop with the help of Cappadocian theology and his 
critics like Fermer and Nausner appear to have failed to appreciate by holding onto the 
first. 
 
3.2. Reductionism and other criticisms 
With a detailed account of the concept of substance, being or ousia in Gunton, we are 
now in a position to deal with the criticisms of his conceptual work by Fermer and 
Nausner as introduced in the first pages of this chapter. Among the arguments to 
respond are the following six:69 (1) Gunton, along with Zizioulas, works with a concept 
of ousia that is different from the concept of ousia operating in the works of the 
Cappadocians; (2) the priority of the particular over the universal promoted by Gunton 
is an unwarranted assumption that creeps into his argument; (3) Gunton selects and 
privileges certain terms and concepts over others without stating their criteria; (4) he 
reduces the traditional concept of substance to the concept of communion or hypostases; 
(5) he dissolves the concept of particularity to relations; (6) and he abolishes the balance 
between ousia and hypostasis that the Cappadocians worked hard to achieve. The 
problems pointed out by these criticisms appear to be serious enough to draw attention, 
yet few responses have been made.70  In such a situation, this part of discussion aims to 
produce what Nausner has called for, viz. ‘a defensible version of Gunton’s project.’71 
What follows are responses to the arguments listed above,72 mainly discussed over the 
following passage from Gunton for the reason that most of them are directed at what he 
says in the passage:73  
It could here be argued that when the Western tradition took the decision to 
translate the Greek ousia by substantia, which is in point of fact a literal 
                                           
69 As found in Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165–7 and 175–84; Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 413–20. 
70 I have found no response to Fermer’s work, despite its use by other critics of Gunton. As for Nausner’s 
work, we have only Mark Thompson, ‘Has Colin Gunton’s Theological Project Really Failed?,’ 
http://markdthompson.blogspot.co.uk/2009/12/has-colin-guntons-theological-project.html, accessed 
14/04/10, perhaps as the only response available. Giving an outline of Nausner’s critique of Gunton, with 
some critical comments in defence of Gunton, Thompson anticipates a more extensive response to 
Nausner’s article. Yet, the expected work, Höhne, Spirit and Sonship, is not as expected, with an actual 
response to Nausner’s (or Fermer’s) critique of Gunton missing. 
71 Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 420.  
72 The order in which the arguments are discussed might be slightly different from that in which they were 
introduced. 
73 The excerpt is long, and part of it is already used. Yet the length is the same as it is cited by Fermer in 
critique of Gunton’s promotion of the being-as-communion thesis. See his ‘Limits,’ 166. 
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translation of hypostasis, it effectively deprived the concept of the person of 
due weight because it introduced a stress on the underlying reality of God. On 
such a translation, the thought is encouraged that the real substance of God, 
what he substantially is, is the being that underlies the particular persons. What 
was lost was the force of the Cappadocian desynonymizing of ousia and 
hypostasis: of making what were synonymous terms into words of distinct 
meaning. By using hypostasis to refer to the concrete particulars—the 
persons—and then proceeding to say that the ousia—general being—of God is 
constituted without remainder by what the persons are to and from each other in 
eternal perichoresis, these theologians made it possible to conceive a priority of 
the particular over the universal. God is what he is as a communion of persons, 
the particularity of whom remains at the centre of all he is …74 
1. Reduction. This argument was made initially by Fermer and repeated by Nausner: 
‘what Gunton is effectively doing here is reducing the classical concept of substance to 
the concept of communion instead of keeping both concepts in a balanced dialectic, a 
balance that the Greek Fathers tried to maintain.’75 Putting aside the issue of balance for 
now, we focus here on the argument that Gunton reduces the concept of substance to 
that of communion.76 A proper treatment of this argument would require a comparison 
of Gunton’s work (and the critics’) with the work of the Greek fathers,77 yet here there 
are three things that can be said without recourse to them. Firstly, it is important to take 
more care in using the word “substance” than Nausner does in his engagement with 
Gunton. What the critic has in mind by “the classical concept of substance” appears to 
be the Cappadocian concept of ousia, as indicated by the reference to Gregory of 
Nyssa’s work.78 In that case, there are at least two things that Nausner should have 
taken into consideration, both noted in the previous discussion.79 One is that Gunton’s 
use of “substance” is connected to hypostasis as well as ousia,80 whatever this may 
mean.81 The other is his choice of the word “being” over “substance” as a better 
translation of ousia, leaving the latter word “substance” to stand relatively free from its 
use in link with other terms, such as ousia, being and essence.82 It follows, therefore, 
that any criticism regarding Gunton’s use of substance needs to accompany a 
qualification concerning the meaning of substance; otherwise, of better service to the 
same purpose would be the word ousia (like Fermer’s) or being (as preferred by 
                                           
74 OTM 191. Original emphasis. Cf. also, PTT 9 and 94. 
75 Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 414. Emphasis added. Cf. also, Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
76 Nausner, ‘Failure,’ also advances this “reduction” argument in terms of ‘the abandonment of the 
theological concepts of substance and the subject’ (417f) and ‘the sublation of substance-talk in 
relationality-talk’ (413). 
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Gunton). Nausner’s use of substance in his criticism of Gunton thus indicates that he is 
not aware of the complexity involved in Gunton’s use of substance. Fermer is better 
informed regarding the term as he consistently uses Greek terms, though it is difficult to 
find a place showing that he has distinguished the subtle difference noted previously 
between the concept of substance and that of ousia in Gunton’s work. 
 
Secondly, Nausner’s critique of Gunton reveals more about his own approach than it 
reveals a problem in Gunton’s work. Nausner thinks that substance is always a word for 
ousia, yet it is an assumption that may hold well in other cases but not in dealing with 
Gunton’s transcendental work. Gunton indeed uses substance as an equivalent to ousia, 
but only to a certain point until his work reaches a stage where he is more conscious of 
that use than before. It is a stage, to repeat, in and after which Gunton tends to leave 
some markers to minimise misunderstanding regarding what he means when he uses 
substance for ousia.83 The passage under consideration here clearly belongs to that stage, 
with a concern about the unfortunate effects brought about by the incorrect translation 
of ousia by substantia.84 In the passage, further, substance is used only once, and even 
this instance does not occur in the part of the passage cited by Nausner. Besides, the 
one-off use of the word is used in italics (“substance”), preceded by a qualification 
(“real”), with a gloss following (“what he substantially is”). These are all necessary 
elaborations for Gunton to make sure what he means by substance before predicating of 
it as a communion of the persons. Yet they are made redundant by Nausner and his use 
of the word substance in such a determined way as to ignore the actual words used by 
Gunton. The same is true of Fermer’s work, yet it has two advantages over his fellow 
critic’s comments. One is that it engages with the Cappadocian text used by Gunton and 
thereby provides a common authority against which one can run a cross examination of 
the two arguments, as one will be done in the next chapter.85 The other is that Fermer’s 
constant use of Greek terms followed by English equivalents in brackets helps to have 
the issue in clearer terms, for example, ‘why they appear to reduce the concept of ousia 
                                           
83 See OTM 193, where Gunton’s use of the term “substantiality” rather than “substance” is said to have 
been made to minimise misunderstanding. 




(essence/substance), found in the Cappadocians, to the concept of koinonia 
(communion).’86 
 
Thirdly, while the concept of ousia in its generic sense as advocated by Fermer may be 
absent in Gunton’s work, this is not due to Gunton reducing the term to koinonia to say 
that koinonia = ousia, but rather because the generic sense is not required for saying that 
ousia = koinonia. As aforementioned, Gunton’s speaking of the ousia of God as a 
koinonia of the three hypostases supposes that they are all divine, that the divine nature 
is what they hold in common, and even that they are one God and not three. In our 
passage, however, he is focused on what he calls the “substantiality” of God, which is 
still substance for him, yet not in the sense of something located under or over the 
divine particulars but rather of what the one substance really is. Also, it is the common 
or the universal standing vis-à-vis the particular, as in the works of the Cappadocians, 
only not as something determined by the general nature of divinity (the ousia for 
Fermer) but as the one being constituted by the three hypostases in their relations to 
each other. In sum, while Fermer may be correct in identifying the Cappadocian ousia 
and its difference from Gunton’s ousia, the identification by itself would not be 
sufficient to justify his argument that Gunton therefore reduces the concept of ousia to 
that of koinonia. 
 
2. Disparity. The question here is whether Gunton’s ousia is different from that found in 
the works of the Cappadocians. Fermer argues, immediately after his citation of the 
above passage, ‘This does not fit with Basil of Caesarea’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s use 
of ousia as a general term for the essence of God.’87 While this is also an argument that 
calls for an examination of the works of the Cappadocians, it can be said here that 
“ousia as a general term for the essence of God” is not what Gunton disproves in the 
passage. Gunton also uses the concept of ousia as a “general” term for the “essence” of 
God, as in speaking of “the ousia–general being–of God.” This leads us to say that the 
difference between Gunton and his critic is not whether ousia is a general term for the 
essence of God but rather what they mean by “general” and “essence.” For Fermer, 
ousia as a general term for the essence of God refers to ‘the common nature, of which 
                                           
86 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. This question becomes definite after a few lines later (how the phrases found in 
the Cappadocian works justify ‘the reduction of ousia to koinonia.’ The same happens in Nausner who 
turns the probing question into something definitive (“as the result of the reduction …” or “Gunton is 
effectively reducing …”). See ‘Failure,’ 414. 
87 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 166.  
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one predicates general features, such as uncreatedness, omnipresence, 
incomprehensibility, infinity etc., common to all three hypostaseis.’88 What is general 
here has a “generic” sense, concerning and predicable to all deities of any kind. In this 
passage, on the other hand, Gunton approaches the general aspect of God, rather 
hypostatically, in the sense that its ontological contents are understood by the 
hypostases and their relations to each other. What is sought here is not the divine nature 
or its features that can be applied to any deity but, rather, be drawn only from the 
particular being in question. Fermer may be correct in noticing the absence in this 
passage of the idea of ousia in its generic sense, but his introduction of it as showing 
Gunton’s ‘apprehension at the idea of a genera or species of “divinity” over and above 
the hypostaseis’89 is misleading and revealing: misleading because, insofar as it 
concerns what is said in this passage, what “causes apprehension” in Gunton, if any, are 
rather an effective deprivation of the concept of person of ontological due weight by 
stressing on the underlying reality of God and the submersion of what he calls 
“substantiality” under the “being that underlies the three particular persons,” and 
revealing in that it shows that Fermer approaches Gunton with a predetermined concept 
of ousia. 
 
3. Privileging. Fermer argues that Gunton selects or privileges certain concepts 
(principally koinonia) over others (mainly ousia) without stating the criteria of his 
choice.90 This argument is not made in direct reference to the passage under 
consideration but, nevertheless, is treated here not only because it is repeated in Nausner 
but also for its significance as the opening argument against Gunton’s appeal to the 
Cappadocians, facilitating the introduction of other arguments that are being treated 
here. That is, once it is established that Gunton’s conceptuality does not agree with that 
of its alleged source the critic will have a considerable obstacle removed for the 
subsequent arguments. Another reason concerns the absence of Gunton’s work Fermer 
uses for making the argument apart from the idea of God as a communion of the three 
persons contained as in our passage.91 Fermer refers to some of the Cappadocians’ 
works to show that they used a variety of concepts without privileging one over the 
other, but brings in nothing from Gunton’s side (or Zizioulas’) to show where such 
                                           
88 Ibid. The references are made to Gregory of Nyssa, Letter 38.2; Contra Eunomius I.227, and Basil, Eps. 
210, 214, 236. 
89 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 166. In these words, he introduces Gunton’s passage under discussion. 
90 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 164f. Cf. also, Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 413–6. 
91 See the discussion in Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 164f. 
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selectivity takes place in their works or in what way it occurs. The reader is simply 
expected to follow Fermer when he states that Gunton privileges some concepts over 
others without stating the criteria of selectivity. 
 
That said, there are two things that can be said in response to Fermer’s appeal to the 
Cappadocians against Gunton. First, while Fermer may be correct in saying of the 
Cappadocians that they employed a variety of strategies and concepts to safeguard the 
trinitarian unity (ousia, monarchia, schesis, physis, koinonia, single energia, an attack 
on “divine arithmetic”), he needs to show in more detail than he does how this 
observation negates Gunton’s work (or Zizioulas’). In fairness to Gunton, most of the 
concepts mentioned by Fermer are found in various places in his corpus, and thus 
Gunton’s work needs to be addressed as a whole, as Fermer does with the 
Cappadocians’. Since Fermer would hardly mean that in every single place the 
Cappadocians treated all the strategies and terms on equal basis, so the same should 
hold true of Gunton’s work. Each piece of his work has a different focus according to 
which different words are chosen and employed. Even in this passage, as an example, 
four of the concepts listed by Fermer (ousia, hypostaseis, koinonia and schesis) are used 
to express the idea of the being of God as a communion of the three persons. It is indeed 
a kind of selectivity, yet not the kind pictured by the critic but rather the kind that 
selects and uses different concepts according to an overarching idea. The latter should 
not be particularly unique to Gunton’s work. He simply had particular challenges and 
situations to respond to for which he uses various concepts in his ways just as Fermer 
thinks the Cappadocians did.92 Yet Gunton is unfairly treated by the critics who also 
operate a similar kind of conceptual selectivity despite their emphasis on the importance 
of unity or balance. In their works, for example, ousia and physis are given more 
prominence than koinonia and schesis, with hypostasis and monarchia barely featuring 
in their positive arguments. If their response is that it is only for the sake of recovering 
the lost balance the question is whether the same is not true of the prominence of 
koinonia and schesis in Gunton’s work. 
 
Secondly, while Fermer implies that Gunton’s conceptual selectivity is problematic 
because it is selective and disruptive of the trinitarian unity that the Cappadocians 
laboured to achieve, his use of the word “unity” is questionable. As discussed 
previously, Fermer uses unity in two different ways, one in a broad sense close to 
                                           
92 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
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harmony, and the other in a narrower sense attached to ousia in the same way as 
distinction is attached to hypostasis. What can be added here is that he operates them as 
a double standard against Gunton. When speaking positively of the Cappadocians’ 
works, he uses “unity” in its broader sense that has a hermeneutical independence over 
both ousia and hypostasis.93 When dealing with Gunton’s work, however, Fermer’s use 
of the word shifts to its narrower sense attached to ousia (oneness) and not hypostaseis 
(threeness).94 If that is the case there are two remarks that can be made: first, Gunton’s 
speaking of God as communion of the three persons is about the ontological “shape” of 
the being of God revealed in Scripture and believed by Christians; and, second, that is 
possible only on the basis of the ousianic unity advocated by Fermer as well as the 
hypostatic distinction emphasised by Gunton. The absence of further arguments 
provided by Fermer begs the question whether his critique of Gunton could not be 
understood in the very terms in which he frames Gunton’s work, only in an opposite 
way, namely a privileging of certain concepts (principally ousia) over others (mainly 
koinonia) without stating the criteria of their selectivity. 
 
4. Balance. The concept of balance plays an important role for both Fermer and Nausner 
in their critiques of Gunton, functioning as the measure by which they identify problems 
and the standard against which they make suggestions.95 The argument to consider here 
is that Gunton destroys the kind of balance that the critics find in the works of the 
Cappadocians.96 There are three responses that we can consider according to the kind of 
balance spoken of by the critics. The first is about the balance between ‘the oneness and 
threeness of God, the unity and distinctness,’ which Fermer argues the Cappadocians 
attempted to achieve in their responses to the Sabellians and Eunomians but is disrupted 
by the idea of being as communion promoted by Gunton and Zizioulas.97 This argument 
has already been touched on in dealing with the issue of unity.98 To repeat, whilst it is 
possible to take the promotion of the idea of the being of God as a communion of the 
persons as disruptive of the balance between the oneness and threeness of God, it is 
equally possible to view that as having been done on the basis of that balance, because 
its promotion supposes that Father, Son and Spirit are all divine, but one God and not 
                                           
93 Cf. Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 164 and 166. 
94 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 166. 
95 See Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 166f; Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 413–6. 
96 For Fermer and Nausner, the being-as-communion thesis, priority of the particular over the universal, 
one-sided emphasis on relationality, and the reduction of substance to communion all contribute to 
destroying of the balance they find in the works of the Cappadocians. 
97 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 166f. 
98 §3.2.3. 
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three (threeness in ousianic unity), and that the one God is Father, Son and Spirit 
(oneness in hypostatic distinction).99 
 
Nausner provides another type of balance by speaking of balance in link with the 
‘distinction between assumed opposites or orders of priority such as substance and 
relation, body and mind, subject and object.’100 It is in this broad sense, particularly in 
reference to the balance between relations and parts, that Nausner says, ‘If the balance is 
lost we have nowhere to go.’101 If this is said with Gunton in mind, as it appears to be, a 
simple response can be made by showing places in his work where such a balance is 
rather supposed, maintained and even promoted. One example is a passage quoted by 
Fermer, in which Gunton warns of the danger of defining persons as relations by saying 
that ‘it tends to define the personal in terms of the impersonal, and that it therefore 
muddies the waters, making it difficult to speak of relations between persons that are so 
important if we are to hold the unity and threeness of God in appropriate tension and 
balance.’102 While the concern to “hold the unity and threeness of God in appropriate 
tension and balance” confirms the point made above, we might take the caution about 
“defining persons as relations” as an indication that Gunton, too, is wary of the problem 
of reducing person to relation or identifying them.103 
 
There is a third kind of balance that Nausner argues the Cappadocians maintained but is 
abandoned by Gunton, i.e., the balance between ‘substance’ and ‘communion.’104 What 
the critic means by the balance here is not clear from the information given, and even 
the Cappadocian passage he provides does not contain the word “substance” or 
“communion,” let alone have them in “balance.”105 The reader might follow that by 
correlating “the common” in the citation with substance, but then the next expected 
correlation of “the peculiar” with communion can be done only with a difficulty 
because the traditional correlate of the peculiar is “hypostasis” and not communion. Yet 
this appears to be what Nausner means by the balance between substance and 
                                           
99 Even the priority of the particular over the universal would require such balance as a precondition for 
its operation. 
100 Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 415. In Nausner the use of balance is more frequent and complex than we find in 
Fermer. See, ‘failure,’ 414–8. 
101 Nausner, 415. Not clear who Nausner has in view. 
102 PTT 200. Gunton’s emphasis, as cited by Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 181 n.94, though with an incorrect page 
number. 
103 Cf. §§2.5 & 6. 
104 See Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 414f. 
105 It hardly draws Nausner’s attention that the Cappadocian passage he uses has a movement from the 
common to the peculiar, as we will see later. 
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communion, namely the balance between the common (ousia) and the peculiar 
(hypostasis). That is confirmed later when he says of ‘the necessity of keeping an 
appropriate balance between the concepts of the one ousia and the three hypostaseis 
(and koinonia).’106 What is revealed, then, is an operation of the concept of balance as 
an impassable divide between two realms, with communion forced to stay in the realm 
of hypostasis. Perhaps this balance only, operated in such a binding way, explains why 
Nausner finds Gunton’s talk of the being of God as communion so problematic.107 
Interestingly, however, Fermer has an argument that the Cappadocians used the concept 
of koinonia in link to ousia rather than hypostasis, as in “communion of nature” (physis 
koinonia) or “community of essence” (ousias koinotas).108 Accordingly, Gunton’s 
communion of persons has nothing to do with the Cappadocian koinonia. The former is 
not simply a misuse of the latter, but they are two different things. While this is a matter 
to be examined later over the works of the Cappadocians, it can be said here that the 
difference of the place of koinonia in Fermer and Nausner in their common argument 
for balance can be taken as indicating that Nausner has mistaken Fermer, meaning there 
is no support for his argument from the Cappadocians, or that their works countervail 
each other. 
 
Nausner argues, finally, for the balance between relationality and particularity.109 To 
respond from Gunton’s position first, it is doubtful whether the argument for this 
balance can carry a point against Gunton who not only puts the emphasis on 
relationality but also maintains particularity in doing so. In the passage under discussion, 
after speaking of the being of God as communion of the persons, which is for the critics 
the example of Gunton’s emphasis on relationality, he continues to speak of the persons 
as each having a distinct way of being. A further example is his development of the 
transcendentality of perichoresis, substantiality and relationality, the three in balance to 
each other, if not by result then at least by intention. Interestingly, Nausner argues also 
for relationality as a hermeneutical device against the reductive move he finds in 
Gunton. It is interesting because a strict operation of Nausner’s arguments for the 
                                           
106 Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 416. 
107 It is interesting, though, that despite their common claim, Nausner speaks of balance in a slightly 
different sense from Fermer. Balance in Fermer is equivalent to harmony, both standing over the 
distinction between oneness and threeness, unity and distinctness, ousia and hypostasis, whereas balance 
in Nausner is much closer to the conceptual distinction itself, as we saw. However, there is a similarity 
between Nausner’s use of balance and Fermer’s use of unity against Gunton in that they use unity or 
balance as a double standard, i.e., approvingly of the Cappadocian works and critically of Gunton’s work 
mainly in their narrower senses. 
108 See Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
109 See Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 415f. 
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balance between relationality and particularity and for the use of relationality as a 
hermeneutical device would be counteractive to each other, demanding the balance to 
pull relationality towards particularity as a concept of ontological significance, thus 
weakening his critique of Gunton’s ontological use of relationality and his suggestion of 
relationality as a hermeneutical device against reductionism, or particularity towards 
relationality as a hermeneutical device alongside relationality, hence contravening his 
ontological argument for particularity. 
 
5. Priority. According to what Gunton says in this passage, the priority of the particular 
over the universal is his interpretation of the Cappadocian theology.110 For Fermer, 
however, it is ‘an unwarranted assumption which has crept into the argument.’111 While 
this is another issue to be examined in reference to the Cappadocian work, the point to 
note here is that Gunton speaks about or from the works of the Cappadocians. The 
priority of the particular over the universal may be an idea absent in their works, or 
Gunton may be mistaken in interpreting them as moving from knowing the hypostaseis 
to speaking of the ousia, yet neither the priority nor the movement is a product of 
Gunton’s innovation, but both are what he understands by the Cappadocian theology. 
Fermer challenges, however, 
Why can it not be held that there is one God, and that certain attributes are 
shared in common between the three hypostaseis of that one God, yet not 
purely as a result of their relationality, but because of their common ousia, 
which provides the grammar of unity?112  
This question is the only argument provided by Fermer against Gunton’s speaking of 
the priority of the particular over the universal, yet it sounds like an argument from a 
personal understanding rather than an established view of the Cappadocians. That said, 
it is questionable whether Gunton ever denies the existence of one God, or the three 
hypostaseis of that one God, or certain attributes shared in common between them. 
There is a notion of oneness that he denies, but not the idea of oneness itself.113 He 
speaks of the three hypostases of the one God, though not as three parts of the one God. 
He does not deny the idea of the three hypostases sharing certain attributes in common, 
                                           
110 For an approving observation, cf. Schwöbel, ‘Shape,’ 192 and Harvey, ‘Double Homoousion,’ 93. For 
some basic principles going with the priority of the particular or person, see Webster, ‘Gunton,’ 21f. 
111 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 166. Repeated in Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 414. 
112 Ibid. Questions are the main ways whereby Fermer advances his argument against Gunton and 
Zizioulas, though most of them, like this one, are not pursued and yet nevertheless function for his 
follower as if proven points. 
113 See, e.g., PTT 10; CF 84, 183. 
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yet nor does he pursue that either.114 It is not certain what Fermer is referring to when he 
says that for Gunton it is ‘purely as a result of their relationality’ and for him it is 
‘because of their common ousia.’ It could be the oneness of God or the sharing of 
certain attributes in common between the three hypostaseis or both. In any case, he 
needs to show where Gunton says of them ‘purely as a result of their relationality.’ In 
the passage, indeed, we have ‘God is what he is only as a communion of persons,’ yet 
that is neither against oneness nor sharing of attributes but about the substance of God 
in the qualified sense of it as what God really is.  
 
As for “the grammar of unity” that Fermer says is provided by the common ousia, there 
is a complexity to take into account, since it is not certain what he means by “unity.” 
There are two possibilities since, as we saw, he uses the word in two different ways. 
One way is found in his argument that the Cappadocians’ use of a variety of strategies 
and concepts is part of their attempt ‘to safeguard the trinitarian unity.’115 Unity in this 
case has a broad sense, standing over conceptual distinctions of various concepts used 
by the Cappadocians. If unity in that broad sense is what Fermer has in mind when he 
says that Gunton suspends the grammar of unity, he needs to show why giving the 
particular a priority over the universal suspends the grammar of unity when it could be 
taken as a different way of maintaining the balance. That said, Fermer has another usage 
of unity in operation, as we can see it in this question: ‘Was it not the case that the 
Cappadocians were precisely attempting to achieve a harmony, a balance between the 
oneness and threeness of God, the unity and distinctness in their responses to the 
Sabellians and Eunomians?’116 While “harmony” in the early part of this citation is 
close to the concept of unity in its broad sense considered above, the latter part shows 
the other sense of unity, i.e., unity attached to the concept of ousia that is distinguished 
from hypostasis that is associated with the idea of distinctness. If this is what Fermer 
has in mind in the case under consideration, as indicated by both the proximity between 
the two citations above and the promotion of the idea of unity as provided by the ousia 
common to the three hypostaseis with certain attributes shared in common between 
them, then we might say that unity in that narrower sense is not suspended by Gunton 
but supposed. Otherwise, he would not have anything to prevent him from speaking of 
the three hypostases as not all divine or as three Gods. It is, rather, upon the supposition 
                                           
114 This is also true of the Cappadocians, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
115 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 164. 
116 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 166f. Emphasis added. 
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of the ousianic unity (thus unity in narrow sense) that he further speaks of the being of 
God as a communion of the three hypostases.117 
 
6. Particularity. The argument that Gunton dissolves the concept of particularity into 
the concept of relationality or the mark of relation is also commonly advanced by 
Fermer and Nausner.118 The first response is to highlight that the critics’ treatment of 
the passage under current discussion is unbalanced, if not biased. To quote in full what 
they use only in part, ‘God is what he is only as a communion of persons, the 
particularity of whom remains at the centre of all he is, for each has his own distinctive 
way of being or τρόπος ύπάρξεως.’119 One can hardly miss the concentration on 
particularity in this passage without ignoring what is said in it, especially in the second 
and the third sentences or clauses.120 Yet that is what is done by Nausner and Fermer 
with exclusive focus on the first clause.121 We may abstain from making a comment on 
Fermer for the reason that he uses the passage not to discuss the matter of particularity. 
Nausner, too, may be justified in using only the first part of the passage as his attention 
at the point of his citation of the passage is not yet on the question of particularity. The 
problem is that even later, when arguing for particularity, Nausner does not consider 
Gunton’s concentration on particularity in this passage.122 
 
It is questionable, secondly, why Nausner argues for particularity against Gunton over a 
passage in which it is Gunton’s prime concern, as noted above, unless the critic has a 
different concept of particularity. A hint is given in his defence of the idea of person as 
‘a single, and thus unique matter-mind-stuff, entity, which is also able to influence and 
constitute the relations and without which there would be no relations at all.’123 From 
the given information, it is not easy to know what it is being defended here against 
                                           
117 As discussed at §2.1. 
118 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 175–184; Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 415f. 
119 OTM, 191. 
120 Also said in the immediately following passage is this: ‘Therefore—and here we move from our 
understanding of the creator to a notion of transcendentality—the particularity of created beings is 
established by the particularity at the heart of the being of the creator’ (ibid). 
121 Fermer’s long citation abruptly ends after the second part of the citation (b), which even is not cited by 
Nausner. 
122 We might add that two chapters of Gunton’s book of the Bampton Lectures are dedicated to the 
question of particularity, the seventh chapter to developing an answer to the problem discussed in the 
second. Speaking of the former chapter, Gunton states that ‘the proposals in this chapter are among the 
most important of the work,’ as ‘an answering attempt to develop a way of dealing with the particularity 
of things that does not reduce them, as do so many of the pressures of modern life, to a bland 
homogeneity’ (5). For others’ observation of the same feature, cf. Paul Cumin, ‘The Taste of Cake: 
Relation and Otherness with Colin Gunton and the Strong Second Hand of God,’ in Harvey, Gunton, 82 
n.39. 
123 Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 415. 
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Gunton’s work. Whatever it is, however, because the critic advances it against Gunton, 
it can be assumed that it is something different from what he finds in Gunton. That is 
“singularity,” as noted by Nausner later,124 and perhaps singularity as personal 
singleness or numerical oneness or ontological sameness, as speculated from what he 
says in reliance on the works of Fermer and Harris.125 Obviously, this is not the concept 
of particularity about whose loss in the modern context Gunton is so concerned, which 
is rather to do with the particularity of things whereby we know them as what they are 
and not as something else.126 That is, particularity in reference to what a particular thing 
really is in distinction from others within as well as without the genera or species that 
they belong to. Gunton wants to save that notion of particularity from the tendency to 
pare the true personhood down to abstract qualities supposedly held in common.127 He 
may have failed to provide a solution, as argued by Nausner, yet it is up to the critic to 
show how an emphasis on the idea of the person as “a single entity” or “unique mind-
matter-stuff” provides a better condition for exploring an answer to the question of 
particularity, particularity even in the sense of singularity. 
 
Thirdly, while both Fermer and Nausner point to Gunton’s use of relationality as the 
main cause of the problem, their use of relationality is not without a problem. For 
example, they tend to treat relationality, perichoresis and communion all as relational 
terms and so interchangeable for the same purpose.128 Clearly, these terms have similar 
meanings, but they need to be considered carefully when dealing with Gunton’s work 
because they are brought in at different stages of its development and when used 
together play different roles. Our passage is an example in which different terms are 
used together for expressing a single idea: that the being (ousia) of God is a communion 
(koinonia), constituted by what the three persons (hypostaseis) are to and from each 
                                           
124 For Nausner’s use of the word “singularity,” see ‘Failure,’ 416 and 419. 
125 As noted previously, they are all concerned about “personal identity” (‘what it is to be the same person 
over time’) in distinction from “personhood” (‘what it is to be a person’). Fermer, ‘Failure,’ 181 n.96 and 
H. A. Harris, ‘Should we say that personhood is relational?’, Scottish Journal of Theology 51, 1998, 214–
34, in particular 216f. 
126 As noted by Nausner himself. See ‘Failure,’ 412. 
127 See, for example, Gunton’s discussion in OTM 46, 47 and 49. 
128 For example, Nausner’s discussion of the problems of relationality in Gunton progresses from a 
critique of “perichoresis” as proceeding to ‘the higher level of a unifying principle, suddenly connecting 
the two distinct concepts on a meta-level’ (‘Failure,’ 413), through an appraisal of “communion” as 
‘raised to the level of ontological primacy,’ effectively ‘reducing the classical concept of substance to the 
concept of communion’ (414), to a proposal in these words: ‘To put matters in a nutshell, in regard to the 
doctrine of God, the concept of “relationality” must not evoke a new kind of universal, which 
immediately becomes a new form of reductionism, but rather it should be used as a hermeneutical device 
against reductionism and thus remind us of the necessity of keeping an appropriate balance between the 
concepts of the one ousia and the three hypostaseis (and koinonia)’ (416).   
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other (schesis) in eternal perichoresis (perichoresis). Whether this correctly represents 
Cappadocian theology is not the question here, which is whether it can be appreciated 
properly if approached from a perspective that treats the three terms (schesis, 
communion, perichoresis) homogeneously and without differentiation. 
  
There is one last problem that needs to be addressed before we leave the current 
discussion. That is, Fermer and Nausner develop arguments against others which are 
then applied to Gunton. For example, Nausner discusses David Cunningham’s 
suggestion of viewing ‘the Trinity as relations without remainder’ to make the argument 
that ‘[t]he result is that the notion of the subject tends to vanish completely, and 
particularity gains its meaning solely as a derivation from the concepts of polyphony 
and participation.’129 There is no link established between Cunningham and Gunton but, 
nonetheless, this example constitutes an important element of Nausner’s argument 
against Gunton, despite no evidence showing that Gunton suggests a view of the Trinity 
as relations without remainder. As shown already in this study and even noted by 
Fermer,130 Gunton does not reduce persons to relations,131 at least by intent, nor does he 
speak of the Trinity only as relations but as persons and relations and the latter as 
‘relations between persons.’132 In the case of Fermer, we have the argument that ‘this is 
to sacrifice numerical identity at the altar of qualitative identity, and hence to deny a 
basis from which personal being can relate.’133 While this is directed to Zizioulas,134 
whether it is correct or not, it would not be appropriate if Fermer assumed without 
providing evidence that the same argument applies to Gunton. While Fermer draws 
attention to the human side of a human person,135  Gunton stresses the person side yet 
without dismissing the common side. To say in Cappadocian terms, Gunton’s move is 
                                           
129 Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 415 n.45, in reference to David Cunningham, These Three are One: The Practice of 
Trinitarian Theology, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, with no page numbers given. 
130 §3.2.1., and Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 181 n.94. 
131 Cf. PTT 39 and 200. 
132 PTT 200. In OTM 194, ‘ontology and relation, stand or fall together rather than are opposed 
approaches to the way we understand things.’  
133 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 182. ‘Numerical identity’ and ‘qualitative identity’ are terms borrowed from Harris, 
‘relational?’, 214–34, yet it is an article that cannot be easily used for arguing against Gunton because 
what it argues against (e.g., confusion of personhood and personality) is not what Gunton argues for and 
what it argues for (e.g., ontological priority of persons over relations) is not what Gunton argues against. 
134 In reference to Zizioulas’ application of the Cappadocian distinction between the what (ti) and the how 
(hopos or pos) to anthropology in a way to transcend the former (human nature or biological existence, or 
“numerical identity”) for the sake of the latter (personhood, or “qualitative identity”). Cf. J. Zizioulas, 
‘The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The significance of the Cappadocian contribution,’ in C. Schwöbel 
(ed.), Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on divine being and act, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995, 44–60 
(55). 
135 Fermer, ‘Limit,’ 182f, with reference to David McNaughton, ‘The Importance of Being Human,’ in 
David Cockburn (ed.), Human Beings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
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not to hypostasis (the person) away from ousia (the human), or simply from the former 
to the latter, so much as from ousia (a human person) through hypostasis (a human 
person) to ousia (not back to the human person but this human person).136 The second 
ousia may be not found in the Cappadocians, but that is what we understood Gunton 
meant by ousia in such a passage as the one under discussion. 
3.3. Conclusion 
The point of the foregoing discussion is not to say that Gunton’s work is immune to 
challenges and critiques. One point is to show that the specific problems identified by 
his critics are not problems residing in Gunton’s work itself so much as problems 
formed by particular ways whereby they approach the matter, including superficial 
readings of Gunton’s texts, ignoring the complexity of his conceptuality and operating 
different understandings of theological terms. Another is to note that the critics have 
contributed to highlighting the areas in Gunton’s work that may be ambiguous to some 
eyes open to misunderstanding and to raising the need to examine the works of the 
Cappadocians as the common source of Gunton’s project and its criticisms. Among the 
questions raised during the course of discussion are the following five: (a) whether the 
Cappadocians really worked for the balance between ousia (unity, oneness) and 
hypostasis (distinction, threeness) as the main goal of their work, or whether they rather 
worked through them towards an articulation of something else as we saw in Gunton; 
(b) whether they had the concept of koinonia as strictly attached to the realm of 
hypostasis as in Nausner’s argument, or equally strictly to the realm of ousia as argued 
by Fermer, or even whether the Cappadocians’ use of the concept is ambiguous, with 
room for different understandings; (c) whether Gunton’s speaking of God as 
communion of persons has nothing to do with the Cappadocian theology, or if it is truer 
to its source than has been suggested by critics; (d) whether or not the Cappadocians 
gave priority to the particular over the general and moved from knowing the hypostaseis 
to speaking of the ousia; and (e) whether there is any resonance in the works of the 
Cappadocians of what we understood in terms of two concepts of ousia in Gunton. 
 
                                           
136 §3.1.5.c. 
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Chapter 4 Ousia, Hypostasis and Koinonia 
 
In approaching to the question as to whether Gunton is mistaken in his understanding 
and use of Cappadocian theology, as some are now realising that they were,1 or whether 
his critics are mistaken in saying so, especially over the issues discussed in the previous 
chapters, there are two preliminary observations to consider regarding any use of the 
works of the Cappadocians. The first concerns the statement that ‘whether one can talk 
of a unified “Cappadocian theology” is something of debate in Patristic scholarship.’2 
Fermer comments that he does not intend to take a side in his critique of Gunton’s and 
Zizioulas’ use of the Cappadocians’ theology but, nonetheless, his critique begins with a 
challenging note that ‘they assume that there is such a thing as a “Cappadocian 
theology”.’3 The preference implied by the challenge is to avoid referring to the 
Cappadocian theology, even a Cappadocian theology, and treat the three theologians 
separately. In this study, however, “Cappadocian theology,” as singular and without an 
article is used for two reasons. Firstly, it simply follows Gunton’s approach, in the belief 
that, with regard to these teachings, the three Cappadocians share sufficient 
commonalities to be treated together, and with the doubt that Gunton is unaware that 
there are differences between the theologies of Basil of Caesarea, his brother Gregory of 
Nyssa and their friend Gregory of Nazianzus.4 Secondly, using alternatives like 
“Cappadocian theologies” or using only individual references such as “Basil’s 
theology” or “Gregory of Nazianzus’ theology” are not much more satisfactory. For, 
while there are cases when they need to be treated individually or plurally, perhaps in 
most cases, there are also cases when they need to be treated together.5 Furthermore, a 
strict application of the logic behind the concern about diversity against any unified 
treatment would require that we should not even say ‘St Paul’s theology,’ ‘St. 
                                           
1 Cf. Holmes, Trinity, 199; Fred Sanders, ‘Redefining Progress in Trinitarian Theology: Stephen R. 
Holmes on the Trinity,’ in Noble and Sexton, Trinity, 20. 
2 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 164 n.28. 
3 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 164. 
4 Cf. Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 939. Fermer appears to take Brooks Otis, ‘Cappadocian Thought as a Coherent 
System,’ Dumbarton Oaks Papers 12, 1958, 95–124, as arguing against talking even of Cappadocian 
theology. If he does, it needs to be pointed out that the paper is about ‘ thought,’ singular, beginning with 
a general recognition of ‘the agreement of thought among the three great s’ (96), expressing its aim as ‘to 
trace the main lines of their system and to indicate where it was and where it was not logically coherent’ 
(97), the area given not enough explicit attention then, and having as one of its concluding words, ‘More 
positively there is an agape in the Platonic eros of Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa—
also in Origen—which is neither Platonism nor Augustinianism’ (124). 
5 Fermer refers to Anthony Meredith, The Cappadocians, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1995, for his 
argument that ‘in his section on “the Cappadocians and the Trinity” he treats each Father separately,’ yet 
that section in fact is a part of Chapter Six, “The Cappadocian achievement,” which is devoted to saying 
more about ‘the specific contribution made by each separately and all together to the doctrine of the 
Trinity and to Christology’ (102).  
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Augustine’s theology,’ ‘Karl Barth’s theology,’ and so on, let alone ‘Latin theology’ or 
‘Byzantine Theology.’6 Interestingly, despite their outcry for sensitivity to individual 
differences, Gunton’s critics tend to treat him indiscriminately with others like Zizioulas 
and Moltmann in the areas in which they are clearly different, perhaps more different 
than Basil’s theologies are different from Gregory of Nyssa’s theologies.7 
 
Secondly, although Cappadocian theology plays a significant role in his work, Gunton 
may be seen as having provided little reference to the Cappadocian works as such, 
though that is not the case in his later works. That said, the lack of reference is not 
particularly problematic but, rather, can be taken as a stylistic matter, which allowed 
Gunton to focus on the matters of his interest and purpose.8 Whilst he could have 
provided more information in references, even with detailed exegeses, this would not 
necessarily be any more satisfactory because, even if he had done so, there would still 
be those who might find that insufficient. The need is, rather, to focus on what he 
actually did with the materials that he used. For it would be quite problematic if he had 
indeed misunderstood or misrepresented the materials he appropriated for his theses. 
Hence the main purpose of this chapter is to examine whether that is the case. For that 
purpose, we shall look at the Cappadocian letter, entitled To his Brother Gregory (or 
Peter), On the difference between ousia and hypostasis.9 The reason is twofold. First, 
this letter is commonly used by Gunton for his argument and by Fermer for his critique 
of Gunton’s use of it. Secondly, therefore, the letter can be used as the common 
authority against which to examine the validity of Gunton’s work and Fermer’s (and 
others’) critiques of it. 
                                           
6 The diversity of theories about the Father, Son and Holy Spirit has led some to run a blog called 
‘trinities’ (http://trinities.org/blog/). If what is meant is more than a stimulation, then someone can run a 
blog, say, “gods” or “gods of those who call themselves christians.” 
7 Cf. Otis, ‘Cappadocian,’ 98, which locates Gregory of Nyssa’s originality in his development of a body 
of inherited ideas from his seniors, Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus. 
8 The same can be said about Gunton’s uses of the Bible, Irenaeus, Barth, Coleridge, and so on, as similar 
complaints are made against them. An insight into Gunton’s way or style is provided by Holmes, 
‘Analogia,’ 43, as he speaks about Gunton taking up a hint from tradition and making it his own and in 
particular about his excitement after reading a few paragraphs of John Duns Scotus on theological 
language. If Holmes is referring to it as a shortcoming I would like to point out that the style itself cannot 
be a problem for a systematic theologian for whom, as will be argued later, the question is not how many 
texts are used but how they are related to each other or whether even a single text is correctly used or not. 
9 Hereafter, Ep. 38, in due recognition of the debate about its authorship, which Gunton is also fully aware 
of. See PTT 10. Fermer’s “Basil’s (Gregory of Nyssa’s) letter 38” only reflects that the authorship of the 
treatise is still in dispute. For a brief introduction of the matter, see Lucian Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa 
and The Concept of Divine Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 47f, and G. Maspero, M. D. 
Espositi, and D. Benedetto, ‘Who wrote Basil’s Epistular 38? A Possible Answer through Quantitative 
Analysis,’ in J. Leemans and M. Cassin (eds), Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium III, Leiden: Brill, 
2010, 579–94, both assuming Gregorian authorship, the latter with the conclusion that ‘Ep. 38 was very 
probably written by Gregory of Nyssa. … the statistical probability of error in this attribution is less than 
5%’ (591f). 
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4.1. Ep. 38 and the issues of context, form and sense 
Gunton uses Ep. 38 for three purposes. The first is to draw attention to the 
Cappadocians’ innovation achieved in the process of the development of Christian 
theology: ‘God is “a sort of continuous and indivisible community”’ (the communion 
passage hereafter).10 By this Gunton means to say that the Cappadocians provided 
further conceptual tools for explaining the teaching of the homoousios.11 The second is 
to argue from there that the conceptual clarification achieved by the Cappadocians is 
what Augustine failed to appropriate and thereby ‘allowed the return of a Hellenism in 
which being is not communion, but something underlying it.’12 The third purpose is to 
reclaim the ontology of God established by the Cappadocians to speak of ‘a oneness 
consisting in the inseparable relation of Father, Son and Spirit.’13 
 
For Fermer, however, Gunton’s use of this Cappadocian letter is problematic in the 
following three respects in particular.14 Two are given in his argument that Gunton, 
along with Zizioulas, uses the communion passage for the being-as-communion thesis 
out of context and in a wrong sense:15 out of context, because the context in which the 
passage is located is where the common ousia is affirmed, followed by a list of the 
general qualities predicable of it; and in a wrong sense, because what is said in the 
passage is not that ‘koinonia = ousia, rather that what is in common or what is the 
source of unity is the ousia.’16 Fermer’s third point against Gunton is that the most 
common form in which koinonia is used in relation to the Trinity in the works of Basil 
and Gregory of Nyssa is as part of a compound noun like in “community of essence” 
                                           
10 PTT 10 and 94. This communion passage is also used in CF 186 and Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 939, 941, the 
latter showing the source of the “community” language when his main use is “communion.” That is, 
Maurice F. Wiles and Mark Santer (eds), Documents in Early Christian Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975, 34. There are at least two differences between Gunton’s way of using the source 
as this and what we read in the text itself: ἀλλά τινα συνεχῆ καὶ ἀδιἀσπαστον κοινωνίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς 
θεωρεῖσθαι. As they are clear now, the first difference concerns Gunton’s use of the word “God,” which is 
not in the text, and the second the place of the cited phrase in the original as the grammatical subject of 
the sentence. Devoid of the problems, the translation presented by Fermer is closer to the text, that is, 
‘“What we see here is a sort of continuous and indivisible community”’ (op. cit., 165). That said, the 
translation is not an issue between them, nor for us, as Fermer raises no voice against Gunton’s. 
11 PTT 8–12; ‘Trinity,’ 938f. Cf. also, Zizioulas, Being, 83–9. 
12 PTT 10. ‘That is the matrix out of which the objectionable features of Western “theism” have arisen: 
‘the breach between East and West and the dualism of which Barth and Rahner have made us aware, 
between God’s “being” and his “becoming”, and between the one God and the triune’ (10f). 
13 PTT 10. For Gunton’s position against a unitary conception of the oneness, see PTT 104f; OTM 24f; CF 
84 and 181. 
14 All given in Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
15 For this argument, Fermer gives no reference to Gunton’s or Zizioulas’. 
16 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
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(ousias koinotas) or “communion of nature” (physis koinonia).17 Gunton must have 
responded to this critique18 but, as noted previously, no formal response to it is available 
in print. The situation, then, is that Fermer’s critique is still open to be used as a basis 
for further criticisms of Gunton’s work, as is done by Nausner in his critique of 
Gunton’s transcendental project.19 
 
All the above—the importance of Cappadocians’ works for Gunton’s own programme, 
especially Ep. 38, Fermer’s reinterpretation of the letter in his critique of Gunton’s use 
of it for promoting the being-as-communion thesis and Nausner’s utilising of Fermer’s 
work for his own critique of Gunton’s transcendental project—point to the need for a 
reconsideration of this relevant letter in order to determine whether Gunton 
misappropriates it, or whether Fermer’s interpretation of it is mistaken, or whether there 
is a sense in which both have problems or each has a point. What follows is a response 
to these questions, comprised of discussions of the issues of context, form and sense as 
they are raised by Fermer, and an interpretation of Ep. 38. In all these matters, to say in 
advance, Gunton’s work appears to be more in accord with the text he draws on than 
Fermer’s reinterpretation of it may suggest.20 
 
4.2.1. Context 
Fermer’s first objection to Gunton’s use of the communion passage is that ‘the opening 
of the paragraph that contains it, begins with an affirmation of the common ousia.’21 
Although it is not clear what Fermer means by the “opening of the paragraph,”22 I 
assume that he refers to “in the community of substance,” the phrase occurring at the 
beginning of the passage under discussion. If so a simple reply would be to point out 
that that phrase in fact occurs in a passage in which what is affirmed as a whole is the 
distinct notes of the hypostases, not the common ousia. If this observation is correct the 
                                           
17 As noted previously when comparing the place of communion in Fermer’s account of the Cappadocians 
and Nausner’s. For examples of the phrases in the Cappadocian works, see the references given by 
Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
18 As is indicated by Fermer himself in ‘Limits,’ 158 n.1. 
19 §3.2. 
20 Text and translations used for discussion are Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (eds), A Select Library of 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Volume 8. St. Basil: Letters and Select Works, tr. 
B. Jackson, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1895, 137–41; and Goold, George P (ed.), Saint Basil. The Letters, 
tr. Roy J. Deferrari, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1926, 196–226. 
21 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
22 The ambiguity is due to the lack of reference or citation given. The same is the case with the critic’s 
mention of “the next paragraph” just a sentence later, although this time a citation is provided and so we 
can identify its location, which however is near the end of the section, thus compounding what he means 
by “paragraph.” 
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phrase could hardly be used for such a context argument as Fermer’s against Gunton’s 
use of the communion passage. 
 
Fermer is correct in noticing that ‘the sentence which precedes it lists the qualities 
shared in common to be predicated of that common essence,’23 yet its force against 
Gunton is not sufficiently strong enough: a list of common qualities preceding the 
communion passage does not necessarily mean that the concept of koinonia used there 
does not refer to the “community of persons.” Rather, the reason is that it is difficult to 
find a direct textual link between the list of common-qualities and the community 
sentence that so commands an interpretation of the latter in the light of the former. 
Rather, there is a clause occurring between the two sentences and not mentioned by 
Fermer, in which the three persons are clearly affirmed: “I am speaking of the Father, 
the Son and the Spirit.”24 This is an important clause for a correct interpretation of the 
communion passage, at least as important as the common-qualities sentence.25 As such, 
Fermer should have taken it into account, rather than simply pointing to the common-
qualities sentence as the main support for his interpretation. To the extent of his neglect 
of this clause Fermer’s use of the common-qualities sentence for his context argument 
loses its efficacy. 
 
Three more matters can be taken into consideration in response to Fermer’s context 
argument in the wider context of Ep. 38 as a whole. The first is to do with the 
development of the discourse of the letter. Section 126 begins with an identification of 
some dogmatic errors of relevance to the failure to distinguish between ousia and 
hypostasis. Section 2 explains the conceptual difference between ousia and hypostasis 
by considering two kinds of nouns and introduces the analogy of the common and the 
                                           
23 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
24 Ep. 38.4. Turcescu’s translation used. 
25 The importance can be seen in its use by two patristic scholars for different interpretations of the 
communion passage, one by Turcescu and the other by John Behr, Formation of Christian Theology 
Volume 2: The Nicene Faith Part 2, Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004. According to 
Behr, the communion passage is said simply to specify that the author is speaking of the Father, the Son, 
and the Spirit because the divine nature does not exist in the abstract. This understanding goes with his 
conclusion that ‘the “certain continuous and uninterrupted communion” that appears in them is not, 
therefore, a “communion” or “community” between the persons, as the analogy of three distinct human 
agents might suggest, but rather the invariability of the nature that is contemplated equally in each, the 
continuity of the being of the Father in the Son and the Spirit’ (420f). On the other hand, Turcescu, 
Gregory, 58, views the passage as signalling an abrupt change of the subject from the preceding sentence 
where the author gives the impression of returning to consider the divine nature in more detail. For 
Turcescu, therefore, the reference to the three persons indicates that the author intends to speak of a 
“communion of persons” in the following sentence, not “community of substance.” 
26 The division here by sections follows that of NPNF Vol. 8, 137–41. 
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particular. Section 3 uses the analogy for defining the meanings of ousia and hypostasis, 
with a biblical example and a brief consideration of them in theology, followed by a 
short treatment of ousia. Now this is the first matter to take into consideration: by the 
end of section 3 the analogy of the common and the particular is well used and put in 
the background; it does not come to the foreground or play a major role in section 4 and 
thereafter. 
 
Secondly, while Ep. 38 moves to section 4 for an exposition of the Trinity, the author 
provides a broad context for reading that section at the end of the previous section, in 
which he expresses his intention for the section to direct attention only to the qualities 
of those whereby the three hypostases are marked off—that is, peculiar properties of the 
persons, not the common qualities shared among them. In his words, 
since it is necessary, by means of the notes of differentiation, in the case of the 
Trinity, to keep the distinction unconfounded, we shall not take into 
consideration, in order to estimate that which differentiates, what is 
contemplated in common, as the uncreate, or what is beyond all comprehension, 
or any quality of this nature; we shall only direct our attention to the enquiry by 
what means each particular conception will be lucidly and distinctly separated 
from that which is conceived of in common.27 
This statement of objective may not have been intended to dictate the meaning of every 
line of section 4, although, as a general framework supplied by the author, it might 
justify viewing in that light each line of the section that speaks of general features of the 
divine nature. However, to select and use such a line as the context for interpreting the 
communion passage is likely to result in relegating the passage itself to a secondary 
place or to the background, against the natural flow of the letter we have been following 
thus far.  
 
The third to consider is concerned with the introduction of the analogy of the separated 
and the conjoined at the latter part of section 4. The analogy of the common and the 
particular surely plays an important role in this letter, yet only in the early parts for 
setting the scene and defining the meanings of ousia and hypostasis. In the latter parts 
of the letter, although that analogy is still present, the major role of explanation is 
played by the analogy of the separate and the conjoined, such as that of “chain” (section 
4), “bow” (section 5), “light” (sections 6 & 7) and “image” (section 8). From section 3 
onwards, in other words, the account of ousia and hypostasis by the distinction of the 
                                           
27 Ep. 38.3. 
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common and the particular gradually fades away into the background, perhaps 
indicating the author’s awareness of its limited value in explicating the doctrine of the 
Trinity, while the analogy of the separate and the conjoined, introduced in section 4, 
continues the development of the discourse even when there appears no reason to do so, 
indeed if all that was needed was to explain the conceptual difference between ousia 
and hypostasis in terms of the common and the particular.28 
 
Contextually speaking, then, the grammar of the common and the particular has two 
restrictions: it cannot be taken as the only tool used by the author for explaining the 
doctrine of the Trinity; and it cannot be the definite context for interpreting the 
communion passage. To use that analogy as the sole grammar for understanding the 
meaning of koinonia which is under consideration, even at the expense of the other 
analogy, can be far from being helpful or sufficient for arguing that Gunton uses the 
passage in disregard of the context in which it is located; for the location of the context 
is determined by what follows the passage as much as by what precedes it. Besides, the 
fact that the koinonia of the communion passage is more associated with hypostaseis 
than ousia makes Fermer’s interpretation of it in connection to the ousia understood 
according to the grammar of the common and the particular appear no more congruent 
with the drive of the letter under consideration than Gunton’s understanding of it in 
association with hypostaseis. 
 
4.2.2. Form 
The issue of form is raised by Fermer’s challenge to Gunton (and Zizioulas) to ‘explain 
how the phrase “communion of nature” (physis koinonia) or “community of essence” 
(ousias koinotas), which is the most common form in which koinonia is used in relation 
to the Trinity in the works of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, justifies the reduction of 
ousia to koinonia.’29 It has already been shown that it is better to understand Gunton’s 
concept of koinonia as supporting or further predicating ousia than as reducing ousia to 
koinonia.30 The question here is whether the critic is correct in saying that the use of 
koinonia as part of a compound noun as in the “communion of nature” or “community 
of essence” is the most common form found in the works of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa. 
                                           
28 See Behr, Formation 2/2, 420, for an interpretation of the communion passage as enunciated in the 
context of returning to the grammatical distinction of the common and the particular. 
29 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. Examples given by Fermer for the first phrase, “communion of nature,” are Basil, 
On the Holy Spirit, 18.47; Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, 1.31 and 2.34. Examples of the second 
phrase, “communion of essence,” are On the Holy Spirit, 17.41; Against Eunomius, 2.4.  
30 §§3.1.4.b and 5.b. 
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To deal with this question we do not need to go beyond the letter under discussion, for 
three reasons: Fermer’s reference to the Cappadocian works is not sufficient for us to 
launch a full survey of all the works of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa; even within the 
letter itself there are enough examples over which to discuss Fermer’s argument; and 
focus here is the word koinonia as it is used in Ep. 38 and its section 4 in particular. 
 
The first point to be made about Fermer’s challenge is that while he provides four 
references to the works of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, a careful reading of Ep. 38 does 
not support his argument that koinonia is mostly used as part of a compound word. As 
noted by Turcescu, while koinonia is used in four different places in the letter,31 in none 
of them it makes a compound noun with ousia or physis. And, in two cases, it is more 
directly linked to hypostases than to ousia or physis: “a certain communion is seen in 
them”32 and “a certain communion and distinction is apprehended in them.”33 To be 
precise, therefore, it is κοινότης that is mostly used with ousia or physis to construct the 
compound word in Fermer’s examples,34 while koinonia is used in closer connection to 
the three of the Trinity, certainly in affirmation of the ousia, yet not directly as part of a 
compound word with ousia.35 
 
Secondly, there would be a sense in which Fermer’s form argument is correct, if all the 
common- words used in the letter (koinos, koinotis, koinonia and their variants) are 
treated as referring to the same thing. Here, however, we are dealing with a formal issue 
raised by Fermer against Gunton’s use of the letter for the idea of communion of the 
persons. We are discussing, in other words, how the word koinonia is used in the works 
of the Cappadocians. Fermer might use other works of the Cappadocians but, as far as 
Ep. 38 is concerned, he can say what he says about the most common form in which he 
argues koinonia is used only in relation to koinotis or koinos, not koinonia. The only 
condition for that to be accepted would be given by ignoring the “formal” difference 
between the words used, yet it is doubtful whether that could be done without 
undermining the basis of Fermer’s form argument. 
 
                                           
31 Ep. 38.2.15; 4:33, 49, 84. Turcescu’s line numbers here and afterwards. 
32 Ep. 38.4.49. 
33 Ep. 38.4.83. 
34 Turcescu’s examples are 2.7, 13; 3.9; 4:39, 86; 5.48, 62. 
35 This is the basis on which Turcescu propose to render κοινότης by “community” and κοινωνία by 
“communion,” saying that Communion passage ‘envisages the “communion of persons”.’ Gregory, 58.  
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Thirdly, among about 21 common- words occurring in the letter,36 the particular 
koinonia used in the communion passage is not preceded by a definite article.37 While 
more will be said about this when dealing with the sense issue below, it suffices here to 
point out that this feature can hardly be ignored in discussing a formal issue without 
going against the purpose, since the communion and a communion are formally 
different, much more so if they appear in that order in the same text. As an awareness of 
the difference is more likely to lead the critic to mention it than to ignore it, Fermer 
appears to have failed to discern this formal difference or, if he were aware of it, to have 
failed to give reasons for not addressing the matter in his interpretation of the 
communion passage, once again weakening his form argument. 
 
4.2.3 Sense 
Fermer continues his case against Gunton (and Zizioulas) by arguing that, while 
koinonia is being used as part of a compound noun, what it means is not ‘that koinonia 
= ousia,’ but rather ‘that what is in common or what is the source of unity is the ousia.’38 
Although this sense argument constitutes an important part of Fermer’s critique of 
Gunton, its strength would certainly be undermined if our discussion of the form issue is 
correct in saying that koinonia is not being used as part of a compound noun in the letter 
under discussion. It is, then, only by treating koinotis and koinonia as the same word or 
as having the same reference that one might be able to see any point of the first part of 
Fermer’s sense argument. Yet even the latter part of the argument is made to lose its 
point against Gunton by the formal difference between koinonia and koinotis since what 
Fermer says there is not about koinonia or its relationship with ousia but about a 
compound noun made up of koinotis and ousia or physis. 
 
Even if we ignore the formal differences between koinonia and koinotis as used in Ep. 
38 it is still difficult to see a point in Fermer’s saying in his criticism of Gunton that 
‘what is in common … is the ousia.’ Firstly, it is not a proposition that Gunton denies, 
because for him, just like the Cappadocian author and any reader of the letter, ousia is to 
hypostasis as the common is to the particular.39 Secondly, Gunton does not attempt to 
                                           
36 7 of koinotis, 4 of koinonia, and about 10 of koinos. 
37 The passage that has the fourth occurrence of koinonia has also interesting formal features as we will 
see later.  
38 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
39 At least before the complicated stage 4 discussed in the previous chapter (§3.1.), which we decided 
though is not a departure from the previous stages so much as a move on from them towards a conceptual 
clarification. Interestingly, that the same is true with Ep. 38 is what we will see below (§4.3.). 
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surmount the word ousia itself or such phrases as ‘community of ousia’ but simply 
questions the appropriateness of understanding the ousia (or substance) of God as 
something that underlies God himself.40 Thirdly, Gunton draws on  Cappadocian 
theology only for the reason that in it he finds an answer to his quest for a conception of 
the ousia (substance, being) of the God corresponding to the revelation of God as the 
Father in the Lord Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.41 This is not fully appreciated by 
Fermer who, rather, suggests that Gunton is pursuing a question that the letter itself does 
not deal with and in a way that the author himself would not approve of. This charge 
needs to be examined in more detail, but here it can be said that the position from which 
Fermer criticises Gunton’s idea of the ousia of God is not far from the very position that 
Gunton thereby wanted to overcome. Also, it is difficult to accept Fermer’s saying that 
‘what is the source of unity is the ousia’ without asking about the meaning of the 
“unity.” If what he means is the unity of ousia or physis, as something not affected by 
the existence of the hypostaseis and their relations to each other, the point made above 
can be repeated; that such an idea of unity is in Ep. 38, yet features only in the early part 
of the letter and hardly at all in the rest. If, on the other hand, it is the trinitarian unity, 
i.e., the unity of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, Fermer is in effect speaking of the 
unity of the hypostases because koinonia is linked to ousia through its more direct link 
to hypostasis. As such, this is very close to Gunton’s way of speaking of the ousia (of 
God) as a koinonia constituted by the three hypostases. 
 
The resulting question is whether ousia is only the source of the trinitarian unity or 
whether there is a sense in which to think of its connection with the hypostases and the 
relations between them. This is one of the questions that need to be borne in mind in the 
discussion of the next section. Here suffice it to summarise the difference between 
Fermer’s position and Gunton’s. For Fermer, ousia is what is in common to the three 
hypostases and is the underlying source of the unity of the hypostases, while koinonia is 
to do with something of the common ownership of the general features of the ousia.42 
The implication is that the content of Fermer’s ousia is not affected by how many 
hypostases are concerned, let alone how they are related to each other; rather, the former 
affects how we are to think of the latter. For Fermer, therefore, koinonia and hypostases 
have no ontological bearing on the meaning of ousia. For Gunton, on the other hand, the 
ousia of God is revealed only in hypostases and the relations they have with each other. 
                                           
40 §§3.1.3 and 4.c. 
41 Cf. PTT 9–12, 53–5 et al; OTM 188–95. Also, the discussion in Introduction. 
42 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165f. 
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Gunton does speak of the being (ousia, essence, substance, etc.) of God, even in later 
works where he has his own conception of the term,43 yet there he tends to use it in 
reference to the taxis or shape of the relatedness that the three hypostases have with 
each other,44 rather than God in a generic sense as something that we know sufficiently 
by knowing what divinity means, namely, ousia in Fermer’s sense. For Gunton, 
therefore, the content of ousia is determined by the three hypostases and the relations 
between them. Indeed, both Fermer’s and Gunton’s positions have a place in Ep. 38, yet 
Fermer’s understanding of ousia fits only with the early part of the letter with the 
analogy of the common and the particular (up to section 3) whereas Gunton’s 
understanding of the being of God goes better with the later part of the letter with the 
analogy of the conjoined and the separated (from section 4). With these differences over 
the issues of context, form and sense in mind, we now turn to a discussion of the 
communion passage on its own terms to see in what sense the word koinonia is actually 
used in that controversial passage. 
 
4.2. An interpretation of Ep. 38 
We begin an interpretation of the Cappadocian letter at issue by reading the communion 
passage more attentively than normally done by Gunton’s critics in its immediate 
context as follows: 
Therefore, in the commonality of the essence, we say, there is no compatible or 
common thing regarding those peculiar notes assigned to the Trinity whereby 
the particularity of the persons handed down in the faith are made known, each 
being apprehended distinctively by its own peculiar notes. Hence, it is by the 
marks just mentioned that the distinction of the persons is ascertained. Yet 
regarding the infinite, the incomprehensible, the uncreated, the uncircumscribed 
by space, and all such things, there is no variation in the life-giving nature—I 
am speaking of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit—but a certain 
continuous and unbroken communion is observed in them.45 
There are three common- words occurring in this passage, which are marked out in 
italics for discussion on the hypothesis that they hold the key to the interpretation of the 
communion passage—the last sentence in the citation. To be noted before looking at 
them respectively is that the question for us is not whether they all mean the same but 
whether the third word is to be understood as pointing to the same thing as the first one, 
as in Fermer’s argument, or as having an independent stance from it, as in Gunton’s use 
of the passage. Let us begin the investigation with the first phrase that Fermer uses in 
                                           
43 §3.1.4. 
44 Cf. PTT 110, 145; OTM 207, 225; AB 107. 
45 Ep. 38.4. Turcescu’s translation of Ad Petrum 4.45–50, as presented in Gregory, 58. 
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his criticism of what he calls the being-as-communion thesis. 
 
The commonality of the essence (τῇ … κοινότητι). This can hardly be thought as 
something newly asserted in the passage wherein it occurs. For it presupposes some 
common knowledge between the communicators at the point of its enunciation. It is 
certainly new within the boundary of Section 4 in the sense that the phrase itself is not 
mentioned previously before it is mentioned here. Yet the phrase has some features that 
draw our attention. Firstly, the use of the definite article signals that its compound noun 
“commonality of ousia” indicates most likely something mentioned beforehand or 
something known commonly. The same is indicated, secondly, by the phrase being in 
the subordinate place within the whole passage wherein it occurs. By contrast, thirdly, 
there is little contextual evidence that would support a view of the phrase as decisive of 
the meaning of the whole passage in which it occurs, let alone the communion passage 
which comes 5 lines later. What these observations suggest is then a reading of this 
koinotis phrase as a presupposition or context for what follows, though that does not 
mean that it should also be in control of the meaning of the whole passage; it only plays 
a role of stage for the main sentence in which the following assertion is made. 
 
There is no common thing (ἀκοινώνητα) regarding those peculiar notes assigned to the 
Trinity. This is what is asserted in the context provided by the pronouncement of the 
commonality of ousia. Considered within the passage in which it occurs, its salience 
against the koinotis phrase is indicated by the fact that it comes in the main clause while 
the commonality of ousia is affirmed in the subordinate. In addition, from the start of 
Section 4, while the author’s attention is focused on showing the peculiar notes of the 
Father, the Son and the Spirit that distinguish them from each other, it is only here that it 
is stated that there is no common thing among the three regarding their peculiar notes. 
However, if considered in the wider context beyond the section in which it occurs, the 
statement that there is no common thing regarding the peculiar notes whereby the 
particularity of the three persons is made known is not entirely new because that has 
already been expressed in the previous sections with the help of the analogy of the 
common and the particular. The question is then whether this akoinoeta sentence is the 
main or focal point of the whole passage under consideration, or whether it is another 
stage for something newer to be asserted upon it. To answer this question depends on 
how we interpret the last sentence of the passage cited above. 
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We now have enough reasons for turning to the communion passage: a certain (τινα) 
continuous and unbroken communion (κοινωνίαν) is observed in them. The initial 
impression is that here the author is speaking of the communion of essence rather than a 
communion of the persons. Yet there are four things that may render such a reading 
superficial. The first concerns the terminological and formational differences between 
koinotis and koinonia. As shown previously, the author’s consistent uses of koinotis in 
connection to ousia or physis with the definite article and of koinonia always with 
regard to the Father, the Son and the Spirit are too observable in this passage to be 
ignored simply on the ground of the commonality or similarity of the sense of the terms 
used.  
 
Secondly, if it is the author’s intention to refer to the common nature in the communion 
passage, then as Turcescu correctly points out,46 there would be a numerical accord 
between “nature” and its object (communion in “it,” not “them”) unless a mistake has 
been made, which is highly unlikely. Yet the actual form we have in the text is “a 
certain communion in them,” not “the communion in it.”  
 
The third point is concerned with the author’s repeated use of the term “a certain 
(τινα),” perhaps for the same purpose. In section 3, he explains the introductory part of 
the book of Job by saying that the Joban author uses the word “a certain” to specify 
“Job” as a particular man called by that name, while remaining silent as to the human in 
general. It is reasonable to think therefore that just as the Joban author uses “a certain” 
in respect to Job as a particular man so the Cappadocian author places “a certain” before 
“communion” not so much to indicate what is already known (the commonality of 
substance or nature) as to indicate the Trinity as a subject having a particular ontological 
shape. To ignore the apparent parallel between the “a certain” of Section 3 and of the 
communion passage would be more objectionable than interpreting the latter in 
consideration of the former.  
 
Logically, as Turcescu also points out, the Cappadocian author would not add that there 
is “a certain communion” of nature after saying in the same sentence that there is no 
difference regarding the common nature, ‘because it would mean that actually there is a 
difference in the common nature.’47 Turcescu does not appear to be concerned to 
                                           
46 Turcescu, Gregory, 58.  
47 Ibid. 
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support Gunton.48 His interpretation, nonetheless, agrees better with Gunton’s use of the 
communion passage than Fermer’s reinterpretation of it. 
 
That said, there is another example of “a certain” occurring in the following passage at 
the end of Section 4, which appears to be supporting of the argument being developed 
here more decisively than the previous ones: 
There is apprehended among these three a certain ineffable and inconceivable 
communion and at the same time distinction, with neither the difference 
between their persons disintegrating the continuity of their nature, nor this 
community of substance confounding the individual character of their 
distinguishing notes. Do not marvel if we assert that the same thing is both 
joined and separated, and if, as though speaking in riddles, we devise a certain 
strange and paradoxical united distinction and separated conjunction.49 
This passage (the distinction-and-conjunction passage hereafter) is comprised of three 
major parts, together constituting the crux of the letter as a whole in that afterwards are 
taken no further or higher steps regarding the author’s elucidation of the mystery of the 
Trinity. What is asserted in the first sentence, confirmed in the second and supported in 
the third is neither the communion of ousia nor the distinction among the hypostases, 
though both are mentioned, but “a communion and distinction” and “a certain united 
distinction and separated conjunction.” Note that here “communion” and “distinction” 
are considered of the same subject, the Trinity,50 as one in whom neither is the 
continuity of nature disintegrated by the difference among the hypostaseis nor the 
peculiar notes of the hypostases are confounded by the community of ousia. The 
decisive nature of this passage compared to the previous examples lies in that while 
there one still may ignore the word “a certain,” interpreting the koinonia as referring to 
the communion of ousia or physis, here it is difficult to do the same with the current 
passage. That is not only because of the recurrence of the word “a certain” but also 
because of the following example given to illustrate the point being made, that is, the 
bow or rainbow. 
 
It is also important that, in taking the example of rainbow, the author is not speaking of 
one rainbow in relation to another but only of the rainbow whose brilliance is both one 
                                           
48 That it appears to be otherwise is suggested by his comment, somewhat abruptly added at the end of the 
paper: ‘I should also add that, in contrast to a widespread, misinformed opinion of the twentieth century, 
the s did not state a priority of the persons over the substance, but kept the two together in worshiping 
God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as in Basil’s Ep. 236.6’ (Gregory, 60). 
49 Ep. 38.4. 
50 For Gunton, CF 186, the subject is God. 
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(continuous) and many (divided). In both cases, of course, there is an element of 
relation or communion, but not in reference to the same things. That is, while the first 
concerns the relation between one rainbow and another, fitting well with the analogy of 
the common and the particular, the second concerns the relation among the particulars 
that constitute rainbow as rainbow with that shape of being, thus corresponding better 
with the analogy of the conjoined and the separated. The difference between the two 
analogies is that the focus in the former is more on the particulars of the same kind (e.g., 
Paul as a man, Timothy as a man, Silas as a man, etc.), whereas the latter is more about 
one kind of the particulars being together in a special way (e.g., the chain having two 
ends so that the one who holds one end of the chain pulls the other to him at the same 
time). To say of the latter by examples of the former, Paul is what he is and not what 
Timothy also is, or the Earth is what it is and not what the Venus also is. 
 
It is now safe to say of the communion passage that it is in the presupposition of “the 
community of ousia (or nature)” (and “the hypostatic distinction”) that “a certain 
communion” is announced in a move towards the enunciation of “a certain strange and 
paradoxical united distinction and separated conjunction.” Framing the matter this way 
helps us to present some considerations regarding the questions raised at the end of the 
previous chapter. Firstly, the second phrase (“a communion”) relates not only to the first 
(“the community”) but also to the third (“a united distinction and separated 
conjunction”) in such a way that, if a choice is to be made, a better correlation would be 
made by linking the second to the third (as in Gunton and Turcescu) than to the first (as 
in Fermer and Behr). The reason is that while the first is concerned with the common 
ousia the second and the third are more about the general after talking of the particular 
notes of the hypostases. Of course, the use of koinonia by the Cappadocian author 
contains a certain degree of complexity,51 and that might justify an interpretation of the 
exceptional formation in the communion passage, “a certain communion,” in the light 
                                           
51 According to the discussion thus far, there are at least three different things to which koinonia is 
associated in Ep. 38: (a) the common ousia or physis (in link with other common- words); (b) anything 
shared in common between the three of the Trinity; and (c) one in which the three are to and from each 
other in the commonality of ousia. Of particular difficulty is the distinction-and-conjunction passage cited 
above, in which the word koinonia is once used, yet in connection with both the definite article directly 
and an indefinite article indirectly (ἀλλά τις ἄῤῥητος καί ἀκατανόητος ἐν τούτοις καταλαμβάνεται καί ἡ 
κοινωνία καί ἡ διἀκρισις), not surprisingly resulting in quite different translations. One is ‘But the 
communion and the distinction apprehended in Them are, in a certain sense, ineffable and inconceivable’ 
(Schaff and Wace, NPNF, 139). Another is ‘there is apprehended among these three a certain ineffable 
and inconceivable communion and at the same time distinction’ (Deferrari. Basil, 213. Cf. Turcescu, 
Gregory, 59). 
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of the more common phrase “the communion of essence” (Fermer),52 or according to 
the grammar of the common and the particular (Behr).53 However, secondly, such an 
interpretation involves problems of misunderstanding the context in which they stand 
and ignoring what is too obvious to be ignored, let alone the discourse movement that 
reaches what appears to be the acme of the letter as a whole with the enunciation of ‘a 
certain strange and paradoxical united distinction and separated conjunction.’54 Among 
those that should not be disregarded are the formal difference in the letter’s use of 
koinotis and koinonia and its repeated use of the word tina for specification. And the 
context that must not be mistaken is that the communion of essence, if considered 
according to the grammar of the common and the particular, is not asserted in Section 4 
and onward but rather remains at the background. What is asserted is, rather, the 
communion of essence among the three persons in hypostatic distinction, which is 
explained by the analogies of the chain and the rainbow and expressed in terms of “a 
certain strange and paradoxical united distinction and separated conjunction.” Thirdly, 
that the analogy of the chain not only precedes the distinction-and-conjunction passage 
but also follows the communion passage is of crucial significance for our discussion, in 
that thereby it establishes a parallel structure between the two passages. That is to say, 
just as what is said in the distinction-and-conjunction passage is supported by the 
illustration of the rainbow, so the example of the chain is used for illustration of what is 
said in the communion passage. Both examples fit better with the analogy of the 
conjoined and the separated than with that of the common and the particular. An 
implication is that the koinonia in our passage would be much better understood 
prospectively in a broader sense of it meaning something similar to “a united distinction 
and separated conjunction” than retrospectively in a narrow sense of it indicating “the 
communion of the common (ousia or physis)” that stands in opposition to “the 
distinction of the particulars (hypostaseis).” If the latter is Fermer’s approach which 
appears to take even the ousia in the distinction-and-conjunction passage as an example 
of the Cappadocian use of ousia in a generic sense55 Gunton’s is very close to the 
former approach in interpreting the passage as meaning that ‘God is only what he is as 
three persons whose being is so closely bound up with one another that they together 
constitute one God.’56 
                                           
52 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
53 Behr, Formation 2/2, 420f. 
54 Ep. 38.4. 
55 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165. 
56 CF 186. 
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4.3. Ousia and Koinonia 
The remaining question concerns the relationship between ousia and koinonia as they 
appear in Ep. 38, in particular over the issue of whether there is a sense in which the 
letter justifies Gunton’s identification of the ousia of God with the koinonia of the three 
hypostases or confirms Fermer’s objection to it with a view of the ousia as predicable 
only by the attributes of the common physis regardless of how the hypostases relate to 
each other. There is surely a sense in which Fermer’s view of ousia is closer to the 
Cappadocian ousia, in that the letter has no explicit predication or identification of 
ousia with koinonia or koinotis. This might confirm the correctness of Fermer’s account 
of the Cappadocian ousia, yet that does not necessarily give support to his critique of 
Gunton’s conception of the ousia of God as a communion of persons.  
 
Two things can be considered as follows. The first concerns the difference between 
Gunton’s concept of ousia used in the last stage of the development of the concept of 
substance in his work and Fermer’s concept that is put forward to counter it. For Fermer, 
as we saw already, ousia refers to nothing but what is common to the hypostases, of 
which one predicates general features of divine nature.57 Yet, as we saw, this is not what 
Gunton means by ousia when speaking of the ousia of God in his ontological and 
transcendental explorations. There he does not use the term ousia (being, substance, 
etc.) in reference to that which underlies the hypostases, appearing immutably through 
the three persons, but to the very being whereby he apprehends the mystery of the triune 
God.58 Given the difference, the weakness of Fermer’s critique of Gunton’s work is that 
he has not investigated Gunton’s conception of ousia before criticising Gunton’s 
identification of ousia with koinonia. 
 
The second reason concerns the notion of ousia as it appears in Ep. 38, which, in fact, is 
as ambiguous as the ousia we found in Gunton, not straightforward as appears to be 
assumed by Fermer.59 Particularly in the early part of the letter, the Cappadocian author 
uses ousia in the context of explaining two kinds of nouns—one more general like 
“man” and the other more particular like “Peter.” Here ousia is used to refer to the 
common of the kind extending to all particulars (Peter, Andrew, John, James and so on) 
under the common category (man). Applied to trinitarian theology, it refers to God in its 
generic sense as the common nature held by the three persons, only though that is not 
                                           
57 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 165f.   
58 Cf. PTT 145; OTM 191; AB 112; CF 185 et al. 
59 Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 166f. 
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final. For the author also uses ousia in reference to the Trinity rather than God, if we 
distinguish them conceptually.60 Near the end of Section 5, for instance, we read the 
following: 
In the case of dogmas which transcend our comprehension faith is better than 
apprehension through processes of reasoning, for it teaches the distinction in 
hypostasis and the conjunction in ousia.61 Since, therefore, reason has 
distinguished what is common and what is peculiar in the Holy Trinity, what 
reason shows is common is referred to the ousia, and the hypostasis is the 
individualizing note of each member of the Trinity.62 
This is the place whereby the term ousia returns to the foreground from staying in the 
background throughout Section 4. Here ousia still refers to what is common, yet the 
example of illustration used in the preceding lines is the rainbow, an example of the 
analogy of the conjoined and the separated, in which the common is that which goes 
with the several colours, rather than referring to something that is common to many 
rainbows: as is said, ‘even in our example, what flashes forth the many-coloured beam 
is one ousia … but the colour of the phenomenon is multiform.’63 These two ways of 
the concept of ousia used in Ep. 38, if correct, makes it difficult to find a sense in which 
the letter would support Fermer’s rather rigid view of ousia fixed to one side of the 
spectrum. Gunton’s concept of ousia also appears to be one-sided, fixed to the other 
side of the spectrum, yet the ambiguity we find in his work reflects, at least, the 
ambiguity we have identified in this Cappadocian letter. 
 
We might go further and ask what sense could be made of the two ways in which the 
Cappadocian author uses the concept of ousia as represented above. If we exclude the 
likelihood that the author is working with two “conflicting” or “inconsistent” concepts 
of ousia, an option considered neither by Gunton nor his critics, the remaining path 
would be to consider whether there is some coherence or unity that runs through them. 
Such an approach as Fermer’s would not help to induce a move in that direction because 
the opposition of the two usages of ousia to each other is almost definite for him, each 
represented by his view of the Cappadocian ousia and by the concept of ousia promoted 
by Gunton in his understanding. An alternative approach can be made by recognising 
that the concept of ousia in Ep. 38 is used on three different levels of thought.  
                                           
60 For Gunton God is the Trinity or Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and so it would not make a difference 
which word is used. Yet here we are encouraged for the sake of discussion to distinguish between “God” 
as a general term and “the Trinity” as referring to the being that can only be designated by that name. 
61 Or, as a single object, ‘that which is separated in person but at the same time united in substance.’ 
62 Ep. 38.5. 
63 Ibid. 
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The first level is indicated by the author’s concern that some people do not distinguish 
between ousia and hypostasis, rather treating them as synonymous.64 For them, 
therefore, it does not make a difference which term is used for explicating the Trinity, 
with the result that some of those who accept “one ousia” are pleased to speak also of 
“one hypostasis” while those who accept “three hypostaseis” are bound to assert the 
same number of ousia, “three ousie.” It is under this problematic circumstance that the 
author has composed the letter in order to help his brother (or the reader) avoid falling 
into a similar error.65  
 
Thus, the author’s differentiation of ousia and hypostasis creates a second level on 
which one might think of the Trinity. As are found in the second section of the letter, 
ousia is to do with hypostasis just as the common is to do with the particular. According 
to the given explanation, some nouns, like man, have a more general sense extending to 
all particulars under the same name, while other nouns, like Paul, have circumscribed 
denotation, indicating no extension to what is common to those of the same genus or 
species but a specification of the particular man who is known by that name. Likewise, 
with the doctrine of the Trinity, though only by analogy, what is common in the Trinity 
(such as “uncreated” and “incomprehensible”) is referred to the ousia and what is 
specific to the hypostasis.66 Considered from the perspective of this distinction (i.e., 
hypostasis indicating that which is specifically spoken of and ousia that which is 
generally spoken of), it would be no longer viable to speak of the Father, the Son and 
the Spirit as “one hypostasis” or “three essences,” just as it is not allowable to speak of 
Paul, Silvanus and Timothy as “one hypostasis” or “three ousie.” They are three in 
hypostasis and one in ousia. 
 
If we need the first level for that in which ousia is synonymous with hypostasis, and the 
second for that in which ousia is distinguished from hypostasis, for referring to different 
aspects of being, a third level of thought is called for as the Cappadocian author 
continues to use the concept of ousia for explaining an aspect of being to which the 
distinction of ousia and hypostasis in terms of the common and the particular can be no 
longer of much service. In section 3, as an example of illustration of his point, the 
author speaks of “a certain man called Job,” not as Job along with Eliphaz, Bildad and 
                                           
64 ‘Athanasius lets us clearly see that for him—and for his contemporaries—ousia and hypostasis mean 
exactly the same thing.’ Zizioulas, Being, 87, with reference to PG 26: 1036. 
65 Ep. 38.1. 
66 Ep. 38.2. 
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Zophar under the generic term man, as in the first example in Section 2, but as the one 
whose identity is marked out from the “common” definition of man by “particular” 
notes of identity such as name, dwelling place, character, possessions and family 
members. All these elements, general in themselves and applicable to any man, are 
combined in a specific way to create a certain man Job.67 The identification of Job in 
this manner involves a thought move from the common (“man”) through the particulars 
to the identification of the general (“Job”). Now, by applying this,68 the author arrives at 
an understanding of the Trinity, rather than God, whose being (still, ousia) is constituted 
by the three hypostases in the community of ousia. This interpretation is not an attempt 
to reduce ousia to hypostasis or break down the balance it makes with hypostasis, but a 
result of following the flow of the discourse moving from the account of the Trinity by 
the distinction between ousia and hypostasis to something explainable only by 
hypostasis—the kind of flow the Cappadocian author finds in the book of Job.69 In 
Section 5, when the ousia of the Trinity is finally affirmed as referring to the common in 
comparison to the hypostasis, it is now in the changed context that is facilitated by the 
example of Job, with the focus having been on the hypostases and the overriding 
analogy being that of the conjoined and the separated.70 
 
Comprehended from this perspective of the three levels of thought, the use of the 
concept of ousia for two or three different things in Ep. 38 is no longer a problem but, 
rather, turns out to be constituting a dynamic approach to the being of God as is 
understood by the Cappadocian author. If, therefore, Ep. 38 is going to be used for 
presenting an account of the Cappadocian concept of ousia only in the generic or 
specific sense it requires an unacceptable condition that takes only one part of the letter 
into consideration while ignoring the rest of it which contains changes in focus and in 
                                           
67 ‘When purposing to narrate the events of his life, Job first mentions the common, and says “a man;” 
then he straightway particularizes by adding “a certain.” As to the description of the essence, he is silent, 
but by means of particular notes of identity, mentioning the place and points of character, and such 
external qualifications as would individualize, and separate from the common and general idea, he 
specifies the “certain man,” in such a way that from name, place, mental qualities, and outside 
circumstances, the description of the man whose life is being narrated is made in all particulars perfectly 
clear’ (Ep. 38.3). 
68 ‘Transfer, then, to the divine dogmas the same standard of difference which you recognise in the case 
both of essence and of hypostasis in human affairs, and you will not go wrong.’ 
69 ‘As to the description of the essence, as having no bearing on the scope of his work, he is silent … If he 
had been giving an account of the essence, there would not in his explanation of the nature have been any 
mention of these matters [name, place, mental qualities, and outside circumstances].’ 
70 Section 5, speaking of ‘the essence emanating the many-coloured radiance,’ ends this: ‘Since then our 
discussion has included both what is common and what is distinction in the Holy Trinity, the common is 
to be understood as referring to the essence; the hypostasis on the other hand is the several distinctive 
sign.’  
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the supporting analogy of the point being made.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The factors discussed thus far indicate that Ep. 38 gives more support to Gunton’s use 
of ousia considered by and with hypostasis than Fermer’s use of ousia considered only 
before or regardless of hypostasis. Among them are the following six: (1) the distinction 
between ousia and hypostasis by the analogy of the common and the particular, and its 
partial service in the early part of the letter; (2) the eclipse of the account of ousia for 
the sake of enquiring into hypostasis; (3) the arrival of the analogy of the conjoined 
(ousia) and the distinct (hypostasis), and the examples of Job, the chain and the 
rainbow; (4) the use of the word koinonia itself in the context in which focus is on the 
account of the Trinity by hypostasis and the second analogy; (5) the concept of koinonia 
more directly linked to hypostasis than to ousia, yet neither fastened to the realm of 
hypostasis nor separated from the realm of ousia; and (6) the constant move of the 
account towards an appropriate expression of the same subject (the Trinity), reaching its 
final point with the notion of “a certain strange and paradoxical united distinction and 
separated conjunction.” These are factors that we have identified in the Cappadocian 
letter, which are better reflected in Gunton’s work than Fermer’s. 
 
It is interesting that Gunton’s use of ousia has been a problem mainly for those like 
Fermer who approach with a view of ousia to which only general attributes of divine 
nature can be predicated. Yet we are now in a position to be able to say that such a 
concept of ousia does not fully reflect the actual use of the term in the source used for 
the argument. In fact, as we saw, ousia is not only used in connection with the common 
nature that is predicable by general features of divine nature but also in consideration of 
the distinct persons together. What we have also noticed is that the two ways of ousia 
being used in Ep. 38 are neither contradictory nor loosely put together but, rather, have 
an order in which the ousia in the first sense (Godhead) provides a stage for a focused 
consideration of the hypostases (Father, Son and Spirit) to come up with the ousia in the 
second sense (a communion of the three persons), something similar to what we have 
identified in the development of Gunton’s concept of substance.71 
 
The problem remains regarding Gunton’s proposal of the conception of the ousia of 
God as a communion of persons because one definite sense in which ousia is used in Ep. 
                                           
71 §§3.1.5.c and 3.3. 
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38 certainly concerns the common contrasted with the particular. Yet it should be noted 
that it is not an issue that can be treated well in such a way as suggested by Fermer and 
followed by Nausner, namely by approaching it with a concept of ousia whose meaning 
is limited to the nature held in common by all particulars under the same name. The 
reasons are several, including the following three: (1) that Gunton’s use of the 
communion passage is not wholly mistaken; (2) that Fermer’s use of Ep. 38 against 
Gunton reflects more his own view of the matter than what is actually said by Gunton; 
and (3) that the concept of ousia (and so substance) advocated by the critics has 
problematic implications for theology and the doctrine of the Trinity: for the former, all 
deities worshipped in the world are thus of one Godhead, just as all humans are of one 
humanity;72 and, for the latter, the incarnation and economy or God’s involvement in the 
world through the Son and the Spirit has little bearings upon how we speak of the being 
of God and the created being.73 
 
A better solution lies in the recognition that even the concept of ousia used in Ep. 38 has 
a certain degree of ambiguity similar to what we have identified in Gunton. Firstly, to 
repeat, ousia is used in line with the example of “man,” as referring to the common vis-
à-vis the particular (hypostasis), “Paul” or “Timothy.” The expected thought movement 
here is from the common to the particular, with the result of a conception of Paul or 
Timothy as a particular case of the species to which they commonly belong. In respect 
to the common, Paul and Timothy are one and the same and there is no variation 
between them. Secondly, however, ousia is also used in line with the example of “Job” 
for which both the common (ousia) and the particular (hypostasis) are considered, now 
the common for, say, Job as Job, and the particular for what make up the being called 
thus. The expected progression in thought here is from the common (man) through the 
particular (all particular characteristics) to the general (Job), not back to the common 
(man), if we distinguish the latter two. We now have sufficient ground to think of them 
as parts of a dynamic movement from one account of the Trinity by the analogy of 
common and particular to another by the analogy of joined and distinguished. Otherwise, 
we would have to think of the existence of two “conflicting” concepts of ousia, which is 
very unlikely. Consequently, we are put in a similar situation to that in which previously 
                                           
72 This may sound true in theory, especially within a monotheistic framework, paradoxically leading to 
polytheism. As far as theology is concerned, however, it is a far cry from reality. Cf. Peter Cotterell, One 
God: The Deity Revealed In Jesus, Milton Keynes: Authentic Media, 2006. 
73 The concern that Gunton had, with little exaggeration, throughout his authorship. ‘In sum,’ says Gunton, 
‘God’s being is known in and through his action, his triune act’ (AB 113). 
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were we when examining the concept of ousia in Gunton.74 There an attempt was made 
to maintain the two different meanings of ousia identified in Gunton by understanding 
one in terms of “given-ness” (metaphysical form) and the other of “constituted-ness” 
(ontological shape). What we are now encouraged to do with the two concepts of ousia 
identified in Ep. 38 is similar to that, namely to understand the first ousia (in the 
analogy of the common and the particular) as referring to Godhead, the common nature 
of Father, Son and Spirit, and the second ousia (in the analogy of the related and 
distinguished) as referring to the divine aspect that is known only through the 
hypostaseis and their relations to each other and is non-existent without them.75 
                                           
74 §3.1.5. 
75 The order is only for the sake of discussion because, ontologically speaking, the result of the movement 
in the opposite direction would or should be the same. ‘No sooner do I conceive of the One than I am 
illuminated by the splendor of the Three; no sooner do I distinguish them than I am carried back to the 
One’ (Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration, 40.41., as cited in OTM 149). 
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Chapter 5 Relationality, Particularity and Spatiality 
 
In the previous discussions, we observed some ambiguities regarding Gunton’s concept 
of ousia (or substance), which led to an attempt to explain them in terms of a double use 
of the concept, especially in response to some misunderstandings. We also saw that 
such interpretations of his conceptual work as reducing the concept of ousia or breaking 
the balance between the realm of ousia and that of hypostasis (and koinonia) are not 
supported by a careful examination of Gunton’s work which, rather, suggests that the 
concept of ousia advocated by the critics is also present in Gunton’s work, though not 
playing in the foreground of his discussion. We were then led to think of a move in 
Gunton’s thought from the ousia through the hypostasis to the koinonia for an 
understanding of his concept of ousia conceived as a koinonia by looking at the three 
hypostases and their relations to each other. A similar move has been revealed by our 
examination of the Cappadocian work used by both Gunton and his critic. The question 
for this chapter is what to do with this ambiguity concerning Gunton’s use of the 
concept of ousia. One option is to leave it as it is left by Gunton. The problem with this 
is that Gunton is likely to continue to be misunderstood as we have already seen.1 A 
more positive option would be to ascertain a way in which Gunton’s conceptuality can 
be better understood, as the present study aims. An opening step towards the goal can be 
made by looking at Gunton’s transcendental enquiry in more detail than previously 
done in this study, which will lead us to two destinations: identification of a problem 
that appears to be closely related to the problem of using perichoresis or relationality for 
two different purposes; and consideration of the concept of space as having an answer to 
the problem, that is, to have spatiality for what he appears to have intended relationality 
as his third relationality. Due to the subject matter being concentrated in the One, the 
Three and the Many, the discussion here will be focused on Gunton’s transcendental 
project as it appears in that work. 
 
5.1. Transcendentality 
Gunton’s transcendental project has a concern for the objective truth of universal 
application, especially for a better way of living in the world and with one another than 
the modern way.2 His analysis is that several problems of the modern culture derive 
                                           
1 Fermer’s challenge to Gunton’s concept of ousia is simply given by Sverker, Constructivism, 125 n.45 
and 127 n.50, as if it is a valid qualification of Gunton’s ontology.  
2 Cf. OTM chs.2–3. 
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from ‘the loss of the concept of truth and, with it, all the connotations of objectivity and 
universality that it once had for much of Western intellectual history.’3 In his view, 
while the modern revolt against the past has a justification in exposing its weaknesses,4 
the outcome is so catastrophic5 that Gunton is led to look at modernity in general in 
terms of “realm of paradoxes”6 and “coincidence of opposites.”7 He locates the 
epicentre of the problem in what he calls ‘displacement,’8 meaning thereby that when 
God is excluded something else, such as human reason, will or agency eventually takes 
the place of God as ‘the focus of the unity and meaning of being,’9 or the place of the 
world as ‘the seat of rationality and meaning.’10 That is, when God is displaced as the 
focus of the unity of things, functions traditionally attributed to God do not disappear 
but are ‘exercised by some other source of unity.’11 Thus, for Gunton, exclusion of God 
is not a solution but, rather, the cause of much of the predicament of the human 
condition in the modern era.12 What he seeks in such a situation is transcendentals, 
namely, ‘ways to rehabilitate or reinvigorate the concept of truth, without, however, 
ignoring the genuine weaknesses of that against which much modern thought has 
reacted.’13  
 
                                           
3 OTM 129. Brad Green draws on Williams, Revelation, 172, to suggest that ‘‘because Gunton’s analysis 
of the nature and origin of modernity is somewhat flawed, likewise Gunton’s suggestions for what 
provides healing in the light of modernity indeed may be flawed’ (‘Gunton,’ 171). There are two flaws 
considered by Green: ‘the tendency to construe our modern quandary mainly in terms of improper 
theological construals or constructs (particularly certain intellectual missteps or errors)’ and ‘the tendency 
to see our alienation as flowing from rather than contributing to the various intellectual errors and 
missteps that developed in the modern era’ (ibid). Against these problems, Green suggests that ‘more 
attention should be given to the cognitive and noetic effects of human sinfulness’ (ibid). There are many 
places in Gunton that can be taken to dispute the validity of this argument. One is this: ‘If the settlement 
which created Christendom introduced contradictions, we have the Enlightenment to thank for their 
revelation. Modernism is the ideology which lives from the exposure of those contradictions. Its tragedy, 
and ours, is that it lives from little else: indeed, its contradictions are deeper and more deadly than those 
of Christendom, largely because of its demonic human self-confidence and lack of a doctrine of sin’ (AA 
176). From OTM, ‘That orientation of being [towards its perfection by the free creativity of Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit] is, of course, distorted and delayed by sin and evil, and returns to its directedness only 
through the incarnation and the redeeming agency of the Spirit’ (166). 
4 OTM 5, 38.  
5 Such as the alienation of culture from nature (14f), divinization of the finite (91), epistemological and 
moral relativism (106f). 
6 See OTM 13, 33, 76, 99f and 106f. 
7 See OTM 18, 34 and 37. 
8 As discussed in OTM 23–34. Cf. also, 72, 87, 89f, 114, 123, 141f, 145 n.24, 147f, 152, 156.  
9 OTM 28. Cf. also, 71f and 89. 
10 Ibid. 
11 OTM 31. 
12 Cf. OTM 71–3; PTT ch.9.   
13 OTM 129. The weaknesses of the past that Gunton think are revealed in modernity include a unitary 
concept of God (24, 38f), development of a doctrine of creation with the aid of Greek philosophy (54), 
Parmenidean tendency to elevate the one over the many (26, 33f), tendency to stress salvation to the 
neglect of creation (55, 159), and tendency towards underlying principles (46f, 49, 200).  
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Further light can be thrown on the meaning of Gunton’s transcendentals from a 
perspective knowing the problems of foundationalism and non-foundationalism 
identified by Gunton.14 Firstly, regarding foundationalism, the problem is not the search 
for foundations so much as the forms the quest has taken thus far.15 Failure to find a 
particular kind of certainty does not necessarily mean failure to discover truth at all. In 
addition, to equate the two is a failure to distinguish between ‘foundationalism’ and 
‘foundation.’16 Secondly, whilst anti-foundationalism is not a way forward, even for 
securing particularity, its voice needs to be understood as ‘the voice of a siren’17 or ‘a 
reaction to the failure of the discovery of certainties.’18 Gunton is aware of the problem 
faced by those who entirely reject the need for foundations—they either yield to ‘some 
form of subjectivism (“I have my story, and you have yours”)’ or operate ‘an implicit 
and not always acknowledged form of foundationalism.’19 Thirdly, the search becomes, 
therefore, a quest for what Gunton calls ‘non-foundationalist foundations,’20 which is 
not simply an expression of belief in some middle way so much as Gunton’s attempt to 
maintain moments of truth in both foundationalist and non-foundationalist contentions 
for a reasoned approach to truth in which particularity and universality, unity and 
plurality, each have their place.21  
 
Gunton has further qualifications for his pursuit of non-foundational foundations in 
terms of transcendentals. Firstly, his transcendentals are ‘those notions which we may 
suppose embody “the necessary notes of being,” in the pre-Kantian sense of notions 
which give some way of conceiving what reality truly is, everywhere and always.’22 
Truth, here, is not the kind assumed by the foundationalist mind in the sense of absolute 
certainty, nor the type of truth only applicable to a particular realm as preferred by the 
                                           
14 OTM, 132–4. On foundationalism see, also, Colin E. Gunton, ‘The Trinity, Natural Theology, and a 
Theology of Nature,’ in K. J. Vanhoozer (ed.), The Trinity in A Pluralistic Age: Theological Essays on 
Culture and Religion, Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1997, 88–92; idem, ‘“No other foundation”? Revelation and 
the Theology of Nature’ in BTR 48–52. The former essay is the later version of the latter. 
15 OTM 135. Cf. Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 91. The situation is understood in a similar way by Daniel W. Hardy 
saying, ‘What is important here is to recognise that a failure at the pragmatic level does not falsify at the 
transcendental level; it only shows that the particular interpretation of the transcendental level has failed’ 
(‘Created and Redeemed Sociality,’ in Colin E. Gunton and D. W. Hardy (eds), On Being the Church: 
Essays on the Christian Community, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989, 31). 
16 Ibid. Gunton considers this confusion to be at the root of the appeal in recent theology to narrative, for 
example in Ronald Thiemann, Revelation and theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise, Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1985. 
17 OTM 134.  
18 OTM 135.  
19 OTM 135 n.6. 
20 OTM 134. 
21 Ibid. Cf. also, 142. 
22 OTM 136, with reference to Hardy, op. cit., 25. 
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anti-foundationalist position, but ‘a truth which is in its own way both particular and 
universal, both subjective and objective, while acknowledged to be the work of fallible 
human minds.’23 Secondly, Gunton’s transcendentals are grounded in the fact that ‘God 
is creator and the world is creation,’24 or ‘God created the world in such a way that it 
bears the marks of its maker.’25 This follows his denial of transcendentals as ‘the forms 
through which being displays itself,’ for the reason that ‘that might suggest a priority of 
“being” over God.’26 Imposing a priori philosophical categories on the being of God, in 
Gunton’s view, is responsible for the failure of the old quest, and he wants to avoid the 
traditional error. For him, rather, the being of God is the source of transcendentals, 
though not any God but the God revealed in Christ through the Spirit. Thirdly, by 
transcendentals Gunton means ‘fallibilist’ foundations, in due recognition of their quest 
as that ‘engaged in by fallible, finite and fallen human beings.’27 This is, however, not 
to assume that finite human beings cannot find moments of universal truth. What it 
denotes, rather, is that Gunton seeks a proper basis, now in awareness of its fallibility, 
on which to establish human rationality.28 
 
Gunton further qualifies his programme as ‘a trinitarian analogy of being and 
becoming’ by considering Aquinas’ and Barth’s programmes.29  His programme is like 
Barth’s in taking the economy of creation and redemption as the locus of God’s 
revelation of himself. However, like Aquinas’ analogy of being, it aims to find ways of 
speaking of all beings.30 Gunton believes that the classical programme is correct at least 
in orientation, though its failure lies in developing transcendentals rather independently 
of the doctrine of God.31 Gunton’s, therefore, is a programme that is intended to be 
thoroughly trinitarian, with three following stages of developing trinitarian 
conceptuality: (a) economic observation of the divine involvement in the world; (b) 
                                           
23 OTM 131, with reference to M. Polanyi who attempts to achieve a frame of mind in which, he says, ‘I 
may hold firmly to what I believe to be true, even though I know that it might conceivably be false’ 
(Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1962 [2nd edn], 214).  
24 OTM 136f.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
27 OTM 135.  
28 BTR 63.  
29 OTM 141.  
30 ‘I am going to ask … and raise the question of whether the concepts developed in trinitarian theology 
enable us not only to conceive the reality of God, but also have transcendental possibilities, and so enable 
us to come to terms with the fundamental shape of being’ (PTT, 140f). 
31 Gunton draws on the analysis of the problem by M. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987, 55, and Norman Kretzmann, ‘Trinity and 
Transcendentals,’ in R. J. Feenstra and C. Plantinga (eds), Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement: 
Philosophical and Theological Essays, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989, 87. 
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theological reflection upon its implications for understanding the eternal being of God; 
and (c) transcendental exploration of the concepts emerging from the interaction of the 
mind with the being of the triune God for understanding the being of the world and the 
human being. 
 
Gunton is aware of the problem of any programme of analogy becoming ‘a dialectic of 
time and timelessness in which the reality of life in time is evaded or negated by a flight 
to the eternal.’32 Thus, referring to Sabina Lovibond’s transcendental parochialism,33 he 
qualifies his transcendentals as the ‘concepts which are not absolutely transcendental in 
the platonic sense but which in some way or other belong in our embodiedness in the 
world.’34 Yet Gunton’s transcendentals are differentiated as “open,” rather than 
“parochial,” in the sense that what he looks for are ‘the concepts which succeed in 
representing the universal marks of being and becoming with their clarity and certainty 
derived from appealing to ordinary language,’35 and whose value should be found in 
their ‘suggestiveness and potentiality for being deepened and enriched, during the 
continuing process of thought, from a wide range of sources in human life and 
culture.’36 In other words, the type of transcendentals Gunton seeks should be concepts 
that are sufficiently profound, inexhaustible and dynamic to enable us not only to find a 
place for both unity and plurality,37 and also to transcend the absolute opposition of, for 
instance, objectivism and subjectivism.38 
 
Something of what he looks for does Gunton find in Samuel Coleridge’s notion of idea, 
with the Trinity being ‘the primary Idea, out of which all ideas are evolved.’39 Gunton is 
drawn to Coleridgean ideas, firstly, because they are not meant to be timeless 
abstractions or the particular mental data of empirical experience or the innate ideas of 
the rational tradition of the kind succumbing to Locke’s critique; rather, they are 
concerned with common ways in which the mind interacts with reality rather than with 
                                           
32 OTM 143. 
33 Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 
1983, 210f, understood by Gunton as a form of ‘renunciation of the … impulse to escape the conceptual 
scheme to which as creatures … we are transcendentally related,’ and by Sami Pihlström as ‘a refusal to 
attempt to transcend “the human perspective”’ (Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defence, 
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005, 38). 
34 Lovibond, Realism, 210f. 
35 OTM 142f and PTT, 139f. 
36 OTM 142f.  
37 OTM 142.  
38 OTM 145f.  
39 Kathleen Coburn and Merton Christensen (eds), The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Volume 4, 
1819–1826, London: Routledge, 1990, 5294, as quoted by Gunton in OTM 144. 
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fixed or static concepts. Secondly, whilst they may appear vague and woolly, this is due 
to their profound and dynamic nature that gives rise to possibilities for deeper 
involvement in the truth of things. Thirdly, these ideas are mediatory in the sense that 
other concepts are generated by the mind interacting with them.40 Gunton’s 
transcendentals, in other words, are developed through the interaction of the mind 
interact with the idea of ideas, the Trinity.41 
 
What Gunton’s transcendental project seeks to achieve is similar to what Václav Havel 
calls ‘a kind of universal system of coordinates,’42 something both think modern people 
have lost with the displacement of God.43 When Gunton speaks of the reason why we 
need such a system of coordinates, he also speaks of his transcendental conceptuality: 
‘We need coordinates if we are to know who we are and what our world is—a 
perspective from which to view and assess our various interests and actions.’44 The 
question is, ‘Can we again find transcendent coordinates which will enable us to find 
our place in and way around the world? In sum, does a development of trinitarian 
transcendentals enable us to contribute to a discussion of the nature of created reality?’45 
Of note here is the fact that it is a contribution that Gunton desires, not a complete 
answer, though with an expectation that the contribution will open up new lines of 
thought and practice for matters of truth, relationality, particularity and temporality. 
 
Craig Bartholomew appears to represent many in expressing a caution about Gunton’s 
transcendental conceptuality in the immediate context of its publication.46 He is 
unconvinced by Gunton’s three transcendentals, especially because of the danger that 
‘they become abstract and speculative.’47  While such a caution needs to be heeded, 
Gunton’s strong awareness of the danger of abstraction and speculation also needs to be 
noted,48 because it would not make a good point to apply the charge of abstraction to the 
                                           
40 OTM 145.  
41 This is what Gunton does in chaps. 6, 7 and 8 of The One, the Three and the Many. For an explicit 
remark on this matter, see, for example, OTM 154 or PTT 139.  
42 Václav Havel, Open Letters: Selected Prose 1965–1990, ed. Paul Wilson, London: Faber and Faber, 
1991, 94f. 
43 OTM 71. 
44 Ibid. See also OTM 156, 161 and 166. 
45 OTM 152. 
46 Craig Bartholomew, ‘The Healing of Modernity: A Trinitarian Remedy?’ European Journal of Theology 
6, 1997 (2), 111–30. 
47 Bartholomew, ‘Healing,’ 128f. Cf. also, Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 443; Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 417 and 420. 
48 See, OTM 16, 44, 49, 52, 54, 85, 90–3, 117, 143, 150, 159, 179, 191–4. Cf. also YT 123, 136f; PTT xix–
xxi. ‘The point of the development is not simply … to generate concepts, however interesting, which will 
solve abstract problems about transcendental categories; rather the aim is to use them to throw light on 
those areas of human being in the world—intellectual, moral and aesthetic’ (OTM 150). 
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one who knows that abstraction is helpful in some cases without first engaging with him 
on that. For example, speaking of the doctrine of perichoresis, Gunton says that ‘The 
most abstract and speculative appearing doctrines have in fact the opposite function: 
they keep language about God down to earth.’49 Bartholomew reveals what he means by 
abstraction and speculation in his suggestion of anchoring transcendentals rather in ‘a 
biblical understanding of creation order.’50 This suggestion, applied to Gunton, would 
beg the question: which biblical understanding of creation order is to be used? In other 
words, by what criteria is one proposal considered to be biblical and the other not? To 
pursue this question is not the point here, and yet it needs to be noted that Gunton’s 
transcendental project is an outcome of his engagement with the contemporary world in 
the light of the gospel and the Trinity, although as a theologian he expresses such a 
hope that ‘it will illuminate both the gospel and the modern condition, so that a 
continuing dialogue between them may take place.’51  
 
What concerns the present study regarding Gunton’s transcendentality is the apparent 
similarity between Gunton’s first and third transcendentals and the ambiguous status of 
the concept of space in his work for them. Put differently, why does Gunton suggest two 
similar transcendentals for the relational (perichoresis and relationality), one for the 
substantial (particularity or substantiality) and none for the spatial? This question is 
comprised of three separate queries, the first about the similarity between the first and 
the third transcendentals, the second concerning particularity/substantiality as the 
second transcendental, and the third regarding the lack of a transcendental developed for 
the spatial. The last is introduced because it is closely related to the first question in 
such a way that a consideration of the latter invites a consideration of the former. 
Regarding particularity and substantiality as Gunton’s second transcendental, there can 
be little debate. Admittedly, there are subtle, not unimportant, differences between them. 
However, in accordance with his interchangeable use of them,52 Gunton does not 
propose them as separate transcendentals but two alternatives for the one transcendental. 
As will be shown later, Gunton’s specific understanding of the notion of substance as 
                                           
49 BB 147. This is one of the two points Gunton makes with reference to Barth and Jüngel: first, that there 
is a sense that in which all concepts are abstract, like for Hartshorne; and yet, second, that ‘the abstract 
description in fact performs the function of ensuring that we understand the reality of God in his concrete 
becoming’ (137). 
50 Bartholomew, ‘Healing,’ 128f. 
51 OTM 1. 
52 Both ‘particularity’ (e.g., OTM 191, 223) and ‘substantiality’ (e.g., OTM 206f, 212) are used by Gunton 
in an interchangeable way in reference to the transcendental indicating that everyone or everything is 
what it uniquely is as a particular being.  
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referring to a particular entity or being of our experience rather than as something 
underlying it seems to help him to link and interchange them.53 
 
5.2. Perichoresis and Relationality 
Gunton suggests perichoresis and relationality as two separate transcendentals in his 
conceptuality, yet there appears to be little to distinguish between them, except the kind 
we might find between particularity and substantiality. That is, both concepts of 
perichoresis and relationality are engendered by Gunton from the doctrine of the 
Trinity;54 both are meant for universal application;55 and both are of the notion that 
everything and everyone are what they are by virtue of their relation to others.56 Thus, 
insofar as source, meaning and scope are concerned, perichoresis and relationality do 
not appear to have a substantial difference between them that would require us to think 
of different aspects of being for them as there is between perichoresis (for the relational 
or the one) and substantiality (for the particular or the many).57 That might justify taking 
Gunton as if he had suggested only two transcendentals.58 Having said that, the fact 
remains that Gunton has suggested perichoresis and relationality as two separate 
transcendentals, the first and the third respectively in his transcendental project,59 
implying that an undifferentiated treatment of them might result in a misunderstanding 
of the project and that an identification of a difference between them might lead to a 
better understanding of Gunton’s work.  
 
The question to be raised at this point is what difference Gunton has in mind between 
perichoresis and relationality if not in source, meaning and scope. Put another way, 
what is it for which Gunton introduces “relationality” as a third transcendental when 
what is meant by it and the function it is meant to play are already covered by his first 
transcendental, perichoresis? An answer can be sought in two ways. Firstly, what 
Gunton seeks in his move towards the third transcendentals is something that concerns 
                                           
53 Cf. OTM 194f. 
54 Regarding source, see OTM 169 (perichoresis) and 215, 218, 227 (relationality).   
55 As for application, see OTM 165f (perichoresis) and 229f (relationality).   
56 On significance, see OTM 163f (perichoresis) and 215–9 (relationality). 
57 We will have another occasion to look at Gunton’s transcendentality in relation to the scheme of the one 
and the many at §6.1.3. 
58 As a matter of fact, however, critics show a tendency to treat Gunton as one who has a sole emphasis on 
relation (relationality, communion and perichoresis). Cf. Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 175–83; Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 
415–8.  
59 As expressed in OTM 212, where the enumeration ‘three’ is mentioned, implying that relationality is a 
third open transcendental, and 229–30, where it is said that relationality is a (third) transcendental which 
allows us to say something about all creation and ‘at the same time enables us to incorporate the insights 
gained from the discussion of the other two transcendentals, perichoresis and substantiality.’ 
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both the one and the many, especially against the modern tendency to lurch between 
them, capable of obviating the failure ‘to do justice to the interests of both society and 
person, one and many.’60 In that respect, Gunton’s first and third transcendentals are 
different in the sense that while perichoresis is mainly concerned with the one, as 
substantiality is mainly concerned with the many, relationality is mainly concerned with 
both the one and the many.61 Secondly, Gunton approaches the third transcendental with 
the help of the concepts of sociality, community and communion, not in a narrower 
sense of them standing vis-à-vis individual or person but all in the sense of ‘shared 
being’62 or ‘being in relation.’63 Here then is a second difference between perichoresis 
and relationality: that while the first transcendental is mainly concerned with relation, 
and the second mainly with otherness, the third is mainly concerned with both relation 
and otherness.64  
 
The point can be illustrated by looking at Gunton’s transcendental project as going 
through a double process of questioning and answering: for questioning, from matters of 
(a) “truth” (culture) through (b) “creation” (world) to (c) “theology” (God); and, for 
answering, from matters of (cˊ) “theology” through (bˊ) “creation” and back to (aˊ) 
“truth.” Gunton traces the problems of truth and meaning at stage (a), through 
problematic transcendentality at stage (b), back to theological problems at stage (c). 
Ultimately, for Gunton, an inappropriate doctrine of God is the source of a problematic 
account of truth.65 For answering, then, the key to an appropriate account of being is to 
be derived from an adequate doctrine of God.66 Here concepts gained properly at stage 
(cˊ) become, through transcendental exploration at stage (bˊ), the basis for erecting a 
renewed theory of truth and meaning at stage (aˊ).67 This sketch of the movement of 
                                           
60 OTM 213. 
61 ‘mainly’ is repeated to be precise because both the one and the many appear in Gunton’s development 
of the transcendentality of the three concepts. 
62 OTM 214. 
63 OTM 215. 
64 Following Gunton’s terminology here, we would say “relation and ontology” or “relation and 
substance.” See OTM 194. If, however, by transcendentals Gunton means to speak of different aspects of 
ontology, as he appears, “relation and otherness” would be in a better agreement with his work as a whole. 
This duality of the concept of relation in Gunton is also observed in the context of a discussion of 
Gunton’s doctrine of creation and mediation. Cumin, ‘Taste,’ 74, and Christ, 182f. 
65 Gunton aptly makes a double-edged comment, ‘We might say: the transcendent and apparently 
oppressive single deity is swept away only to be replaced by the demonic alternatives we have met’ (OTM 
38). Cf. also, OTM 84, 129. 
66 To the relevant question, Gunton answers, ‘Only a concept of relationality based from the outset in 
God’s economic involvement in the world of the many will be adequate’ (OTM 140). Cf. also, 151, 225. 
67 Cf. OTM 7, 50f, 150, 201, which, put together, give a summary of the movement in a way of suggesting 
a theory of being, on the implications of a renewed theology of creation, which is possible on the basis of 
a doctrine of God whose being is relation in otherness and otherness in relation of Father, Son and Spirit. 
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thought in Gunton’s transcendental enquiry will help us to make a further comment on 
Gunton’s relationality, namely that while relationality in general might belong to all 
stages above, relationality as Gunton’s third transcendental belongs to stage (aˊ) as an 
alternative to the problematic conception of relationality that belongs to stage (a). That 
said, things would be complicated if the same could be said of Gunton’s first and 
second transcendentals as it appears to be the case. That is, perichoresis and 
substantiality as Gunton’s first and second transcendentals belong to stage (aˊ), given in 
response to the problems of relation and otherness belonging to stage (a). This leads us 
to another way of understanding the difference between Gunton’s first and third 
transcendentals, this time by considering the three different levels of thought in which 
relationality is discussed in Gunton.68  
 
The first can be termed as a level of “philosophical generality” in which words and 
concepts are still open to various takings or conceptualisations. It is a level of thought 
and discussion in which, in other words, various philosophical theological concepts co-
exist with each other. Gunton thinks of relationality on this general level when he states 
that relation is not additional, or accidental, but essential to being.69 This view is not 
exclusive to Gunton but is shared with others in the presence of contrasting views that 
take relation as secondary to ontology or allow relation no ontological bearing.70 The 
same can be said of particularity, yet not of perichoresis and substantiality as Gunton’s 
first and second transcendentals for which we need a different level of thought that is 
open to particularity. 
 
The second can be introduced as a level of “theological particularity,” differentiated 
from the first level in the sense that it is a level of discussion in which a general concept 
of relationality is affirmed, supported and defined by a particular theological concept of 
                                           
68 Similarly, Bernard Nausner mentions “three levels on which Gunton’s argument proceeds,” which 
might be represented here as the levels (a) of theological conceptualisation; (b) of conceptual similarities 
between the divine being and the created being; and (c) of transcendental quest. ‘These levels,’ says 
Nausner, ‘have to be perceived as a hermeneutical circle in which one level cannot be fully appreciated 
without the other two’ (‘Failure,’ 408). If the representations are correct the reader might well consider 
them in comparison to the previous discussion of Gunton’s transcendental project in terms of a double 
process going through three stages of questioning and answering and the current discussion of it in terms 
of three levels of thought. 
69 For Gunton’s brief account of the concept of relation, see PTT 150–4. 
70 Cf. John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, London: Faber, 1967, 17 and 69; Alistair I. MaFadyen, The 
Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the individual in Social Relationships, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, 183–5. For an account of the idea of persons in relation coming into Gunton who 
then traces it through Sir William Hamilton, Coleridge, Calvin, Richard of St Victor to the Cappadocians, 
see Schwöbel, ‘Shape,’ 191f. 
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perichoresis. The issue at stake now is not simply whether or not relation is essential to 
being71 so much as which conception of relation and how to get to it.72 This level 
appears in Gunton as he qualifies his relationality by distinguishing his view from an 
idealising account teaching that things can be known only in so far as they are related to 
us as being a realistic one where things can be understood only in relatedness to each 
other and the whole including us.73 The idea of the latter is that people and things do not 
simply enter into relationship with others but relationships are constitutive of what they 
are in relation to others: ‘people and things are what they distinctively are by virtue of 
their relations to other people and things.’74 This notion of relationality is and can be 
discussed on a level of generality,75 yet for Gunton only in the sense supported by a 
concept that he draws from a particular tradition of Christian theology and develops as 
his first transcendental, perichoresis. 
 
Even perichoresis can be used as a term of general nature, yet not for Gunton when used 
in combination with relationality. Thus, for Gunton, “relational perichoresis” is not a 
probable way of combining the two words whereas “perichoretic relationality” and 
“non-perichoretic relationality” are.76 Likewise, while “substantial particularity” and 
“insubstantial particularity” are used by Gunton,77 “particular substantiality” is not, 
although again substantiality can also be used as a general term as much as particularity. 
‘Perichoretic particularity’78 and ‘substantial relationality’79 are also possible in the 
same line of thought. That is, perichoresis and substantiality as the qualifying are prior 
to relationality and particularity as the qualified due to the specific connotations the 
former concepts have and the latter do not. If it is reasonable to regard relationality as 
equivalent to and interchangeable with perichoresis at this level it could be understood 
as “perichoretic relationality” in contrast to any notion of relationality in which things 
are not conceived perichoretically. 
 
                                           
71 For the topic, cf. F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn 
to Relationality, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003, 12–33; idem, Reforming the Doctrine of God, Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005, 5–9; and idem, Christology and Science, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. 
72 Cf. PTT, 139; OTM 149, 225. 
73 OTM 37, n.53, 194. 
74 OTM 70. Cf. also, 66, 169f, 191, 197f, 214.  
75 Cf. OTM 169f. 
76 Cf. OTM 169 (‘non-perichoretic conception of relationality’), 170 (‘perichoretic reciprocity’), 173 
(‘perichoretic relations’). 
77 Cf. OTM 193 (‘insubstantial’ particulars) and 203 (‘substantial particulars’). 
78 As suggested by his transcendental notion of particularity or substantiality at OTM 196, 200–203, 207f. 
79 As implied by the use of ‘insubstantial relationality’ (OTM 195). 
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Another level of thought appears when Gunton offers relationality as his third 
transcendental since it is not simply a general concept of relationality open to various 
designations as yet, nor merely a specific concept of relationality defined through a 
transcendental development of the patristic concept of perichoresis, but rather a notion 
whose meaning is understandable only with the help of the senses developed for both 
the first and second transcendentals. It refers to a notion of relationality as something 
‘suggested by’ the other two transcendentals80 and ‘incorporating’ the insights gained 
from the discussion of them.81 This notion of relationality appears to be most closely 
concerned with what Gunton seeks in his quest for ‘a truly relational account of what it 
is to be’82 and ‘an account of relationality that gives due weight to both one and many, 
to both particular and universal, to both otherness and relation.’83 It is difficult therefore 
to treat Gunton’s third transcendental at the same level of thought at which the other 
two are discussed because it is a more comprehensive concept than perichoresis 
developed in respect to the one and substantiality in respect to the many. 
 
There are two possibilities open to consideration within Gunton’s framework. The first 
is to follow Gunton and take relationality as a third transcendental after the first and the 
second.84 The problem with this option is that relationality as the third transcendental 
will in effect make the suggestion of perichoresis and substantiality as the first and 
second transcendentals meaningless because the third is suggested as a concept 
encompassing within itself the senses developed for the previous ones. The second 
possibility is to think that when suggesting relationality as a third transcendental Gunton 
simply intends the same for the first and the second as he does for the third. That is to 
say, to understand the first with the help of the second and the third, and the second with 
the help of the first and the third, just like he understands the third with the help of the 
first and the second. This interpretation is in fact supported by the cases in which 
Gunton uses the first and the second transcendentals in such a way.85 In that case, 
however, the question we have faced earlier arises again, namely the point of having 
                                           
80 OTM 214f. 
81 OTM 229f. 
82 OTM 6. Emphasis added. The connection between Gunton’s transcendental quest and his theology of 
being through the doctrine of the Trinity was mentioned earlier. 
83 OTM 7. Emphasis added. Cf. also OTM 37. 
84 OTM 229f. 
85 Of perichoresis, for example, ‘It [the world] is perichoretic in that everything in it contributes to the 
being of everything else, enabling everything to be what it distinctively is’ (OTM 166) or ‘A perichoresis 
which dissolves particulars is no longer perichoresis, being rather unrelational homogeneity’ (186). Of 
substantiality, ‘Both persons and things are hypostatic in the sense of being substantial particulars, and 
rendered such by the patterns of relations that constitute them what they distinctively are’ (203). 
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perichoresis and relationality as two different transcendentals with the same meaning, 
function and scope.  
 
These difficulties face us with a situation: either to give up the third transcendental or to 
dispense with the first and the second transcendentals. Neither is advisable even within 
Gunton’s framework, considering his intention for three transcendentals with different 
purposes. There is, however, another way to ameliorate the conundrum, i.e., to take the 
problem facing us as lying in Gunton’s choice of the word “perichoresis” or 
“relationality,” rather than in what he aims to achieve by them. This could offer an 
alternative approach, namely, to revise the question asked previously from seeking to 
know why Gunton introduces relationality as the third transcendental now to why he 
chooses relationality when he has already introduced a similar word, perichoresis, as his 
first transcendental for a different purpose. For the sake of the flow of discussion, this 
question will be deferred for a later discussion in order now to turn to the third question 
of this chapter concerning Gunton’s use of the concept of space. 
 
5.3. Space in Gunton 
Gunton’s use of the concept of space is no less significant than that of relation, 
substance or otherness. As we have already seen, however, he uses the ideas of 
“relation” and “otherness” to develop his transcendentals but interestingly does not give 
“space” the same opportunity. Gunton has a very clear reason for this, as we shall see 
below,86 but this particular choice is potentially responsible for creating the conundrum 
discussed in the previous section concerning how his transcendental enquiry ends up 
suggesting two similar transcendentals for relation (perichoresis and relationality) and 
only one for otherness (substantiality or particularity). Put more positively, as indicated 
in various places in the previous discussion, the concept of space has the capacity to 
clarify some ambiguities in Gunton’s work and, as will be argued, spatiality could better 
serve what Gunton intends with “relationality” as his third transcendental. However, 
first, we focus on the concept of space as it is used by Gunton. 
 
Gunton’s use of the term “space” on various occasions and in different senses is 
considerable, to the extent that it would have been helpful had he provided a separate 
                                           
86 §5.4. 
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section on this important concept.87 That said, this diversity does not mean that any 
reader will have difficulty in understanding which sense of space Gunton has in mind 
each time he uses the word. As he comments in a different context when talking about 
two senses of “creation,”88 context will show which sense is being used. What follows 
is an attempt at a clarification of the concept of space used by Gunton by classifying it 
into the following three conceptions. 
 
5.3.1. World-space 
The first usage in which Gunton makes of the term “space” is in reference to the world 
of space and time as a whole. Space in this sense has, more or less, the same meaning as 
what is signified by “the world,” “the created world,” or “creation.” Thus, Gunton 
speaks of: ‘the material world of space and time;’89 ‘the economic divine involvement 
in the world of time and space;’90 God’s involvement in time and space;91 ‘incarnation 
of the Son in time and space;’92 ‘personal action of God in time and space;’93 ‘the 
presence of God to space.’94  In this case, as the examples show, space can be used on 
its own, or together with time as “time and space,” or together with world and time as 
“the world of time and space.” The world referred to here is the physical world of space, 
time and matter in which we humans live with other living and non-living things. This 
is a conception of space in which “space,” “time,” or “space and time” can without 
much trouble be replaced by the term the world, the universe or the creation. We call 
this conception of space “world-space,” which involves the following two senses. 
                                           
87 A relatively long treatment of space is found in YT 103–35. That being the case, it needs to be noted 
that Gunton’s use of the concept of space exceeds that of most of his contemporaries, at least more 
comprehensive than found in other trinitarian theologians. For example, T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and 
Incarnation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, 4f, 56–59, understands that there were two concepts 
of space at work in the time of early Christianity: ‘relational conception of space’ and ‘container notion of 
space.’ These two concepts of space serve well in elucidating his theology of incarnation, but both of 
them can be regarded as two contrastive ways of understanding what is designated in this work as world-
space. J. Moltmann, God in Creation: An ecological doctrine of creation. The Gifford Lectures 1984–
1985, London: SCM press, 1985, 140–157, has drawn out three kinds of space from his meditation on 
space: ‘absolute space’ (the essential omnipresence of God); ‘the space of creation’ (God’s world-
presence); ‘relative places’ (space in the created world). This scheme has its own merit and is indeed more 
helpful in understanding the concept of space than what we find in Gunton’s writings, in a sense that 
Gunton has not provided such a list or clarification. Nevertheless, there is another sense that the scheme 
of Moltmann seems to lack a conceptual tool for what is covered by between-space in Gunton, which 
turns out to be a main point of contrast between the two theologians. 
88 TC 1f. The two senses of creation are creation as the act of creating and creation as the product of the 
act. For different senses of creation, see Hardy, op. cit., 31–3. 
89 OTM 97. 
90 OTM 84. 
91 Cf. OTM 164. 
92 CC 78. 
93 TC 95. 
94 Colin E. Gunton, ‘Barth, The Trinity, and Human Freedom,’ Theology Today 43, 1986 (3), 317. 
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The first concerns the concept of space as used in reference to the ‘distinctive 
characteristics intrinsic to this world.’95 Space, in this sense, is one of the ‘parameters of 
this world,’96 or ‘functions of there being a created order.’97 Gunton uses the term in 
two ways. Firstly, he puts temporality and spatiality of this world into contrast with ‘the 
supposed timelessness and unlimitedness of the world beyond,’98 not to bring in a two-
world theory, but in the sense of the world not being continuous with God the creator.99 
Secondly, Gunton understands space as not merely interchangeable or connected with 
time: they are also clearly distinct. As such, time and space are not the parameters or 
functions of the created order but two of them. Consequently, time and space should not 
be mixed up by their closeness so that time is spatialized and space temporalised. They 
are, rather, superlative examples of co-existence and interconnectedness within 
creation.100  
 
The second sense is in contrast to the first in that it is space in the sense of the 
“condition,” or “context,” for the world. Here it is not the world that by being created 
demarcates the boundaries of time and space but the other way around. Gunton 
illustrates this by speaking of this universe as ‘limited in time and space,’101 or ‘taking 
shape in time and space.’102 Gunton’s intention in using the concept of space in this way 
has rather to do with emphasising the limitedness or finitude of this world. Among the 
examples showing that are Gunton’s speaking of ‘temporal and spatial limitedness of 
the creation,’103 ‘creation’s finitude, its being in time and space,’104 and human 
‘boundedness in time and space.’105 Consequently, the apparent contrast between space 
and time as “conditions” of the world on the one hand and as “functions” of there being 
a world on the other does not necessarily need to be taken as pointing to a contradiction 
in Gunton because it is equally possible to take it as showing his understanding of time, 
space and the world as a dynamic of relatedness. 
                                           
95 Zizioulas comments that the Greek term for space, διαστημα, is used in the sense of both space and 
time (Communion, 3). 
96 OTM 76. 
97 TC 143. 
98 OTM 76. 
99 TC 143. 
100 ‘[I]t appears to be … that there is much to be said for the doctrine that space and time are in certain 
respects different, however much they are equally features of one space-time universe’ (TC 140). 
101 OTM 171. 
102 TC 143. 
103 OTM 167. 
104 TC 92. 
105 OTM 214. 
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Gunton’s use of the concept of space in this first usage, then, is mainly referential, 
referring to the physical world, or the universe, encompassing its entirety on a large 
scale, with time and space demarcating it as well as being demarcated by it. In addition, 
world-space includes reference to space itself as distinct from time, which is what is 
implied when Gunton in his work on Christology says that ‘all depends on how we 
conceive space.’106 As such, this first conception of space, especially in the latter sense, 
is the one for which diverse meanings are suggested by scholars, and Gunton has his 
own contribution to make to its understanding.107  
 
5.3.2. Of-space 
The second conception of space in Gunton refers to the space that encompasses or 
belongs to particular things. This can be introduced by considering Gunton’s account of 
relationality which frames the question of relationality in such a way as to aim for it as 
that in which due weight is given to both parties under consideration of relation. This 
particular framing of the question operates in almost every relation Gunton considers 
and has as its goal to reach what he calls ‘relation-in-otherness,’ or ‘otherness-in-
relation.’108 Gunton’s chief way of achieving that goal is to give due “space” to 
particulars in relation, whether any given way of thought allows the other “space” to be 
itself playing as the principal criterion for his enquiry into various issues on relation. 
The concept of space here is not the same as the one we have considered above, and so 
we differentiate them by designating the new one as of-space to signify space in the 
sense of either belonging to or encompassing particular things. 
 
Examples of of-space abound mostly, not surprisingly, in places where Gunton deals 
with the matters of relation between particulars, although the contexts vary. One is in 
his expression of ‘a concern for space in which the human can be human.’109  Another is 
found in a context in which Gunton moves towards a way of holding God and the world 
together in their otherness in terms of the one and the many, that is, when Gunton talks 
of ‘the forms of the one that fail to give due space to the many,’110 arguing for giving 
due “space” not only to the one but also to the many. As we shall see later, his argument 
                                           
106 YT 114. Cf. CC 78. 
107 See, especially, YT 103–38. 
108 According to Gunton, ‘an account of relationality that gives due weight to both one and many, to both 
particular and universal, to both otherness and relation, is to be derived from the one place where they can 
satisfactorily be based, a conception of God who is both one and three, whose being consists in a 
relationality that derives from the otherness-in-relation of Father, Son and Spirit’ (OTM 7). 
109 PTT 109. It is a concern he draws from or shares with S. T. Coleridge. 
110 OTM 37. 
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for that space would be groundless unless it were underwritten by the assumption that 
there is due space given and so belonging to the many for existence, as seen in his 
suggestion of a conception of providence in terms of two models: ‘the Son as the giver 
of structure, and the Holy Spirit as the one who gives the world space to become within 
but not apart from that structuring,’111 the ‘space in which the creation can be properly 
itself.’112 The reference to the Spirit provides an opportunity to look at another example 
regarding the work of the Holy Spirit in relation to the humanity of the Son: ‘The Spirit 
is the one who mediates the action of God the Father in such a way that the life of the 
Son … is given space to remain authentically human.’113 What Gunton says here can 
also be understood as a corrective of what he perceives to be the tendency to fail to give 
the being of the Spirit space to be itself in relation to the Father and the Son.114 
 
It might be noticed that this second conception of space is very similar to the first, i.e., 
space as condition or context for the world. However, the similarities between them are 
marginal compared to the differences. Firstly, while the former has the context of the 
whole universe, the context for the latter is mainly of the particulars existing within that 
whole, although they could be the whole universe in relation to its creator.115 While, 
secondly, the former plays mainly a referential function in Gunton, the latter’s function 
is more regulative and hermeneutical. Thirdly, the former is relatively limited to 




The third conception of space is the space existing between particular things and people. 
This can be introduced by recalling what has led us to of-space, i.e., Gunton’s concept 
of relationality in terms of “relation in otherness,” and by coupling it with his concern 
for “freedom.” The full significance of freedom for Gunton’s theology is saved for a 
later discussion.116 Let it suffice here to say that Gunton’s concern for freedom 
introduces another key note of space into his discussion of relation. What we have seen 
                                           
111 TC 192. 
112 TtT 133. 
113 TtT 147. Cf. PTT 69. 
114 Cf. TtT 105–28. See also PTT 128–35. 
115 Cf. TC 143. 
116 A summary of Gunton’s thought on the matter of relation and otherness can be found in, for example, 
PTT 143–5 and 201–4, though they deal with the matter from a slightly different perspective from each 
other.  
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thus far is Gunton’s way of reaching the idea of relation in otherness by giving 
particulars in relation due space to be themselves. Put differently, the purpose of giving 
space is mainly to secure freedom for the other, i.e., freedom to remain other or to be 
itself or oneself. For there to be this kind of freedom, Gunton argues, ‘there must be 
space.’117 By mentioning space in this way, Gunton not only presupposes of-space but 
also, more specifically, he refers to a different kind of space, namely space existing 
between the particulars. It is by this observation that we can have a third conception of 
space distinct from the other two by the designation of between-space. While the 
difference of the third from the first is relatively clear, as it is similar to the difference 
between the first and the second, the difference between the third and the second is 
subtler. An explanation can be put thus: while of-space is like a “place” with dimensions 
of depth, width and height in which the particular exist, between-space is closer to the 
concept of “distance,” or “distinction,” that exists between the particulars. 
 
Examples of Gunton’s use of space in this third way reflect a similar use to that of of-
space and appear mostly in discussions of the relation between particulars within a 
given totality in diverse contexts. One is that of ‘a conception of some kind of space 
between the divine and the world,’118 which, according to Gunton, involves any doctrine 
of creation and all theologies of transcendence.119 Thus, contrary to the modern 
‘displacement of the other, transcendent deity into human subjectivity,’ Gunton argues, 
If there is no space between God and the world; or, rather, no God to 
give things space in which to be, we lose the space between one another 
and between ourselves and the world of particulars without which we 
are not truly what we are.120  
By “no God” Gunton appears to mean some atheistic philosophies which give no space 
to the divine, and by “no space between God and the world” some inadequate theologies 
which derive from inadequate metaphysics. In Gunton’s view, for example, Hegel’s 
philosophy, so influential on modern Christian theology, was very close to pantheism in 
conceiving the action of the Spirit too immanently and thereby failing ‘to space God 
and the world in such a way that they can be understood to be distinct.’121 In addition, 
Gunton traces the root of what he perceives as the modern tendency to pantheism to the 
Greek philosophy, especially to that of Plotinus, to whom he considers ‘whether his 
                                           
117 PTT 129. 
118 OTM 36. 
119 TC 36; OTM 36. 
120 OTM 71. 
121 OTM 148. 
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doctrine of emanation leaves sufficient space between the two.’122 In contrast, argues 
Gunton, a trinitarian theology of creation can construe the relation between God and the 
world in such a way as not to close ‘the space between God and the created order.’123 A 
similar conceptual scheme positing between-space continues to operate in Gunton’s 
discussions of the doctrine of the Trinity,124 entailing some contrast with those of other 
trinitarian theologians who in his view conceive the Father, the Son and the Spirit too 
closely.125 As other examples Gunton also speaks of the space between: human 
‘persons;’126 ‘ourselves and the world of particulars without which we are not truly what 
we are;’127 ‘Christian theology and the Bible;’128 and ‘the words of Genesis and their 
theological interpretation.’129  
 
What is reflected in these examples of between-space is Gunton’s concern for freedom 
and otherness which lies at the heart of his theology of relation. As Gunton puts it, ‘the 
personal otherness, the self-sufficiency, of God is the basis on which freedom depends 
because it is the ground for the otherness of the human in relation to God.’130 It is in 
order that this may occur that Gunton draws on the concept of space, arguing for 
“space” in order that the created world may be free to be itself in relation to God,131 
“personal space” that allows humans to be free in relation to the divine132 and to one 
another,133 and “greater space” between the persons of the Trinity than he finds in some 
others’ works.134 
 
Let us close this section by considering a dynamic of space with regard to the three 
conceptions delineated above. Firstly, space is given (world-space), in its entirety, to 
those particulars that come into it and live in it, by the one who is its maker, giver and 
benefactor, both in conjunction with and distinct from time. Secondly, into this givne 
                                           
122 TC 36, 65. 
123 TtT 149f. 
124 IA 101–106; PTT 133f; TtT 104. 
125 For example, Robert W. Jenson, ‘The Triune God’ in C. E. Braaten and R. W. Jenson (eds), Christian 
Dogmatics volume I, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984, 83–191; LaCugna, God, 210–32; Ted Peters, 
God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life, Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/ John 
Knox Press, 1993, 145f. 
126 OTM 39. 
127 OTM 71. 
128 TC 42. 
129 TC 111. 
130 PTT 135. 
131 Cf. PTT 201–4; TC 99–102 and 178–82. 
132 Cf. PTT 107–9; OTM 39, 71. 
133 Cf. PTT 114, 123 n.7. 
134 See Gunton’s discussion of R. Jenson’s theology in PTT 128–35. 
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space do particulars enter, thereby creating space for them to exist within (of-spaces). 
Finally, as particulars come into the scene one after the other, simultaneously or over a 
long period of time, a new space is created between them (between-spaces). There is a 
dynamic interrelation between these three kinds of space in the sense that they both 
affect and are affected by each other. On the one hand, world-space provides space to be 
filled in by particulars which are the determinants for the emergence of of-spaces and 
between-spaces.135 On the other hand, the general shape of world-space is affected by 
the appearance, formation and disappearance of both particulars and spaces in and 
between which they exist. World-space would remain empty were it not for particulars, 
let alone no of- or between-spaces, and would be shapeless without their activities and 
relations to each other. Put more abstractly, the given whole provides a condition for the 
parts and is formed into a shape by them (what they are, how they relate to each other, 
what they do separately and together, etc.).  
 
There is a conceptual parallel between what is being said here—the duality of the whole 
(conditioning and formed) and the significance of the particular for the shape of the 
whole—and what we met in a previous discussion of the Cappadocian concepts of ousia 
in two senses in relation to hypostasis: the first as in terms of “given-ness” and the 
second of “constituted-ness.”136  The point is not to suggest an application of the former 
to the latter but only to show how a careful consideration of the concept of space used 
by Gunton can help us to have a clearer picture of his work. The question is whether 
Gunton’s use of the word “space” is not considerable enough to invite a transcendental 
development of “spatiality.” 
 
5.4. Spatiality 
We begin a spatial transcendentality by asking why Gunton did not pursue spatiality in 
his transcendental enquiry despite his extensive use of it for his ontological explorations. 
One reason is found in this: ‘to give transcendental status to that which is simply part of 
the created order is to misplace the object of worship, and so to misconstrue the kind of 
                                           
135 For example, if the universe has been expanding as scientists observe through the Hubble Space 
Telescope, then it would be the case that world-space affects all things within it on a grand scale. Cf. 
http://hubblesite.org/hubble_discoveries/breakthroughs/cosmology. That said, however, it is rather 
surprising that the solar system does not appear to have been affected by that alleged expansion over the 
last 6,000 years. This may be because this amount of years is less than 0.06 second in a macrocosmic time 
scale or because the universe expands in such a way that does not affect the order of the solar system. 
136 §3.1.5.c. 
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being that it is.’137 This is, for Gunton, a theological lesson regarding what he perceives 
as the failure to achieve freedom for the many in modernity by displacing God. For us it 
is the decision indicated previously as responsible for Gunton’s transcendental enquiry 
ending up in the questionable way discussed thus far. By reaching this very decision, 
and abiding by it, Gunton deselects a concept that could have offered a better service for 
his third transcendental than relationality, let alone his ontology in general. The 
following three considerations are taken as an invitation to reconsider the decision. 
 
Firstly, it is questionable whether “being part of the created order”138 can be a sufficient 
reason for not giving space transcendental status at all, considering that it is only one 
sense of space among those used by Gunton, as we saw, and that the scope of his use of 
space is not much different from that of substance, relation or otherness, as can be seen 
in various places.139 This can be discussed over the following passage: 
Because God is involved economically in time and space, he cannot be 
conceived merely timeless and non-spatial. Perichoresis implies an 
ordered but free interrelational self-formation: God is not simply 
shapeless, a negatively conceived monad, but eternal interpersonal life. 
There is thus a richness and space in the divine life, in itself and as 
turning outwards in the creation of the dynamic universe that is 
relational order in space and time.140 
In this passage,141 the word “space” occurs three times. In the first and third cases, space 
is metonymically used, along with the word “time,” for referring to the created world in 
which humans live and God is involved economically. To use our terms, space in both 
cases is that of world-space referring to the physical world, though the latter one in the 
specified sense of the condition of the world. Space in the second case, however, does 
not have the same reference. Nor does it appear to be used in any other sense of the 
three conceptions discussed in the previous section.142 In any case, our focus now is not 
its sense so much as the following observations. Firstly, despite Gunton’s caution 
against giving space transcendental status he continues to use space for saying 
                                           
137 OTM 156. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Cf. PTT 107–9 and 201–3. Gunton acknowledges that he owes the concept of space used in the first 
context to D. W. Hardy, ‘Coleridge on the Trinity,’ Anglican Theological Review 69, 1988, 145–55. 
140 OTM 164. Gunton’s emphasis.  
141 In this passage Gunton speaks in such a way that in which it is difficult to know whether he is 
speaking for himself, simply explicating Barth’s thought, or his words are created in the words of Barth. 
In any case, the first two stages of the process of Gunton’s transcendental development mentioned 
previously are present: economic observation of the divine involvement in the world; and theological 
reflection on the implications of the economy for an understanding of the eternal being of God.  
142 It might be taken either as an example of world-space, extended to the metaphorical use to include the 
divine realm, or an example of of-space, applied to the being of God. 
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something of the life of God, though in speaking of the thought movement in Barth.143 
This is significant for our enquiry because, for Gunton, God is the source of 
transcendentality,144 implying that this space can be considered as a candidate for 
developing spatial transcendentality within his own framework, as he does with 
relationality and particularity. It is interesting, secondly, that divine spatiality is 
mentioned as an implication of the perichoretic life of God.145 This interesting point is 
that the reader wonder whether Gunton does not use the concept of perichoresis, at least 
in this passage, in a closer sense to spatiality than to relationality. The third observation 
is that it is in the context of developing a transcendentality of perichoresis that Gunton 
speaks of divine spatiality. This raises a question as to why then only perichoresis is to 
be given the transcendental status if divine spatiality is also an implication of God’s 
involvement in the world. Gunton’s reason is already mentioned, but it is now 
weakened by these observations and questions.146 Having said that, Gunton’s cautious 
attitude towards space, expressed at the beginning of his transcendental quest, persists 
until the end of the quest, leading to a set of transcendental concepts with no 
transcendental related to space and yet two similar transcendentals related to relation: 
perichoresis, substantiality or particularity, and relationality.147  
 
Let us turn to the question of why Gunton has come to suggest “relationality” as his 
third transcendental despite its similarity with perichoresis in meaning, function and 
scope. There are two phases in Gunton’s exploration of his third transcendental that 
might help to answer the question if given more attention than is normally done. Firstly, 
as we saw, Gunton’s quest for a third transcendental concept begins with an 
introduction of the concept of “sociality,”148 and is mostly covered with expositions of 
                                           
143 As Gunton finds in Barth, Dogmatics II.1., 468–90 (on spatiality and omnipresence) and 608–40 (on 
eternity). See also, Gunton, ‘Transcendence, Metaphor, and the Knowability of God,’ Journal of 
Theological Studies 31, 1980, 514f; Gunton, ‘Barth,’ 316–9. 
144 For Gunton’s talk of God, the triune God, as the source of his transcendentality, See OTM 145, 167, 
168, 177 and 225. 
145 For divine spatiality in Barth see Dogmatics II.1., 461–90. In particular, 467f (‘divine spatiality’); 
470–6 (‘general presence of God in His creation’); 476–8 (‘special presence of God in His creation’); 
483f (‘God’s presence in His Word’). 
146 For further examples of Gunton’s use of space for describing the being of God, see PTT 110, 128, 134 
and 202. According to them, God is not only said to have space but also to be space. To quote one 
example, ‘The personal otherness, the self-sufficiency, of God is the basis on which freedom depends 
because it is the ground for the otherness of the human in relation to God. That freedom derives from the 
gift in both creation and redemption of the God who has and is personal space and so can be the creator of 
such space’ (135). 
147 OTM, 163–73 (perichoresis); 188–209 (substantiality); 212 (summary of both); 219–31 (relationality); 
229–30 (summary of the three).  
148 ‘The trinitarian conception suggested by the two transcendentals—perichoresis and substantiality—is 
that of sociality’ (OTM 214). 
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the ideas of sociality and communion. For Gunton, however, these two concepts are 
suitable only for consideration of personal beings. As such, secondly, he suggests 
“relationality” as a transcendental for what he has considered and explained mostly in 
terms of sociality and communion. In other words, the third transcendental is meant to 
indicate the same aspect of ontology as he wants to indicate by “sociality” and 
“communion,” with the sole difference being in the scope of application. The 
implication is that we need to understand Gunton’s third transcendental in a broader 
sense than that of relationality distinguished from particularity. As they stand, however, 
it would be difficult to defend it against any misapprehension and misappropriation, 
even if he meant it otherwise.149  
 
For anyone, therefore, who wishes to criticise Gunton’s transcendental concepts or 
appropriate them in a way devoid of the problem of having two similar terms for 
different purposes, the following three options are open to consideration regarding the 
third transcendental developed in reference to the ontological aspect Gunton considers 
in terms of a communion of particulars in relation to each other: (1) take “relationality” 
as suggested by Gunton; (2) turn to “sociality” or “communion” by ignoring the 
distinction he makes between the personal and the impersonal; or, (3) use “spatiality” as 
an alternative. The third option, i.e., to take spatiality as equivalent to Gunton’s third 
transcendental is favoured for the following nine reasons: (a) the weakness of Gunton’s 
concept of “relationality” in indicating fully what it is meant to represent; (b) the 
validity of the distinction Gunton makes between the personal and the non-personal; (c) 
the inadequacy of “sociality” being applied to non-personal beings; (d) the same 
concern for “communion” as Gunton has for sociality, that both are features of personal 
beings; (e) Gunton’s actual use of the concept of “space” in crucial points in predication 
of the being or essence of the triune God without giving an impression that he regards it 
as less suitable than relation and otherness for theological and ontological uses;150 (f) 
the capacity of the concept of spatiality for being used both for the personal and the 
non-personal; (g) the fact that spatial imagery (chora) is embedded in the patristic 
concept of perichoresis; (h) the possibility of better service of the concept of spatiality 
than that of relationality as a supporting or corresponding idea of perichoresis if 
perichoresis is to be taken to characterise the particular shape of the being of the triune 
                                           
149 To be included among the critics who treat Gunton’s relationality in a narrower sense than that of 
communion or sociality, yet not discussed later, is the critique of Zizioulas. See the discussion in the next 
chapter (§6.1.2. 136 n.56). 
150 Cf. PTT 110, 114, 128, 134, 135 and 202. 
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God; and (i) its merit of encompassing the ontological aspects that Gunton intended to 
deliver by using the concepts of relation and otherness and at the same time marking out 
the being of God that he thinks is constituted by the three persons in relation to each 
other. 
 
Introducing the concept of spatiality is not meant to undermine or distort Gunton’s 
transcendental conceptuality but only to make it less problematic for understanding and 
more comprehensive for application. It is for the same purpose that I suggest a 
modification of Gunton’s scheme corresponding to taking his third transcendental in 
terms of spatiality rather than relationality. That is to understand the being of the triune 
God as consisting in a “spatiality,” rather than in a “relationality,” deriving from the 
otherness-in-relation of the Father, the Son and the Spirit.151 The reason for the 
suggestion is twofold: that the repetition of similar words (relation and relationality) is 
avoided, without failing to deliver what Gunton intended with them; and that the 
concept of spatiality will actually better serve the purpose of indicating the ontological 
aspect that Gunton derives from the otherness-in-relation of the Father, the Son and the 
Spirit. If acceptable they would allow us to have a revised version of Gunton’s 
transcendental conceptuality, in which we have “particularity” in support of irreducible 
substantiality of being in relation; “relationality” in respect to the relational aspect of 
ontology; and “spatiality” to indicate the ontological shape constituted by the particulars 
and their relations to each other in otherness.152
                                           
151 Cf. OTM 7. 
152 In broader senses, Gunton’s three transcendental concepts—relationality, perichoresis and 
substantiality—can serve the purpose of indicating what is being developed here with the concept of 
spatiality. Cf. OTM 179 (perichoresis), 191 (substantiality), and 229 (relationality). 
130 
Chapter 6 One, Many and Three 
 
This chapter continues the quest that was begun in the previous chapter in search of a 
way to have Gunton’s transcendental conceptuality better understood and applicable, 
yet now with focus on the scheme of the one and the many Gunton uses for his 
transcendental enquiry. The aim is to lead the discussion to a revised version of the 
scheme in which we have the one, the many and the three, the last more explicitly than 
its original use by Gunton in correspondence to the notion of “spatiality” that has been 
suggested in the previous chapter. 
 
6.1. One and Many 
Gunton’s use of the one and the many in his theological and transcendental projects is to 
such an extent that a careful examination of these terms will lead to the heart of his 
programme, though it is difficult to find one who has dealt with his use of the abstract 
terms. Critics of his conceptuality tend to focus on his transcendental concepts 
developed through deployment of them, criticising them as “abstract” or “general.”1 
This is odd since it is quite natural to expect that questions formed using general and 
abstract terms are given answers made of terms that are equally general and abstract.2 In 
response to criticisms that Gunton’s transcendentals are abstract or general, therefore, a 
simple answer might be given: they are thus because they are generated in response to 
general questions and for wide application. If, therefore, abstractness or generality is to 
be an issue regarding Gunton’s transcendental conceptuality his use of the one and the 
                                           
1 The issue of abstraction and speculation raised by Bartholomew, ‘Remedy?’, 128f; Kilby, ‘Perichoresis,’ 
443; and Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 417 and 420, which are already addressed in the previous chapter. Here a 
note on Fermer’s concern about generality (‘Limits,’ 185 n.106; cf. also, Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 417 and 420). 
Fermer says that his concern with Gunton’s “transcendentals” is an issue of which Gunton is well aware, 
namely their “extreme generality” (‘Limits,’ 153), yet that is what Gunton says about Coleridgean ideas, 
not his transcendentals. If, besides, Fermer’s argument is correct that the ontology developed by Gunton 
is deficient because it is determined by theology, or a particular theology, the problem of Gunton’s project 
would be particularity rather than generality, especially in comparison to the ontology developed by a 
philosophy of more general nature as he finds in Aquinas (‘Limits,’ 170f). 
2 Apart from Gunton’s, the following are among the contemporary discussions in which the terms of the 
one and the many are employed for dealing with similar questions to Gunton’s: Joseph A. Bracken, The 
One in the Many: A contemporary reconstruction of the God—world relationship, Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2001; W. Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics, 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2001; Richard S. Briggs, One God Among Many?, Cambridge: 
Grove Books, 2006, 3–28; John Zizioulas, The One and the Many: Studies on God, Man, the Church, and 
the World Today, Alhambra, CA: Sebastian Press, 2010; Marc A. Pugliese, The One, the Many and the 
Trinity: Joseph A. Bracken and the Challenge of Process Metaphysics, New York: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2011. 
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many should be addressed first, for example by asking whether it is appropriate to use 
such terms for discussing concrete and particular matters.3 
 
Some critics approach this matter with caution. Paul Collins, for instance, when dealing 
with Zizioulas’ ontology of the Church,4 notes the danger of using the one and the many 
in such a way as to privilege one strand of Christian tradition over others. He then 
proposes a use of them as a ‘hermeneutical tool to enable dialogue between different 
traditions and ecclesial authority and polity’ in order to ‘not only allow differing 
traditions, with different polities, to dialogue with one another, but also to find an 
authentic means of acknowledging each other’s understandings and forms of ecclesial 
authority.’5 This may be a valuable suggestion in certain respects, yet it raises questions 
as to whether such an approach does not reduce ontology to hermeneutics as well as 
what other concepts it has for use for discussing the being of the Church.6 In the 
absence of alternatives, the proposal of the hermeneutical use of the one and the many 
could be perceived as depriving the Church of her primitive conceptual tools for her 
self-understanding while paving the way for privileging a kind of ontology without 
going through necessary argumentation. This certainly appears to be the case with 
Collins’ vision of the ‘one Church with different but comparable forms of polity.’7 If the 
idea is meant to be a hermeneutical description, as seems likely, a question may be 
raised as to what Collins means by “one Church” and by “many forms of polity” in 
                                           
3 Other areas where the one and the may are employed include: in philosophy, for example, Edward C. 
Halper, One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: the Central Books, Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1989; Ancient Near Eastern religions, Barbara Nevling Porter (ed.), One God or Many: Concepts of 
divinity in the ancient world, Chebeague Island: the Casco Bay Assyriological Institute, 2000; 
Christianity and other religions, Paul F. Knitter, One Earth Many Religions: Multifaith dialogue and 
global responsibility, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995; one Church and many churches, John, F. Nash, 
Christianity: the One, the Many: What Christianity Might Have Been and Could still Become, 
Bloomington, IL: Xlibris, 2007; the Bible, Christine Helmer and Christof Landmesser (eds), One 
Scripture or Many? Canon from Biblical, Theological and Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004; mission, Richard Tiplady, One World or Many? The Impact of Globalisation on 
Mission, Pasadena: William Carey Library, 2003; faith and nation, Rachel Morton, One Island Many 
Faiths: the Experience of Religion in Britain, London: Thames & Hudson, 2000; poetry, Beth E. Roberts, 
One Voice and Many: Modern Poets in Dialogue, Cranbury, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 2006; art, 
Grant H. Kester, The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context, Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2011; and politics, Paul Kingsnorth, One No, Many Yeses: A Journey to the 
Heart of the Global Resistance Movement, London: the Free Press, 2003. 
4 Paul Collins, ‘Authority and Ecumenism,’ in Douglas H. Knight (ed.), The Theology of John Zizioulas: 
Personhood and the Church, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, 147–58. 
5 Collins, ‘Authority,’ 156. 
6 Collins, ‘Authority,’ 157, introduces three categories that can be used in conjunction with the concept of 
the one and the many: ‘personal,’ ‘collegial’ and ‘communal.’ Yet they appear to be meant not as 
alternative so much as supplementary to the concept of the one and the many. For he suggests them as ‘to 
be used to highlight the tensions between the different traditions’ emphases on different ecclesial 
authority.’ 
7 Ibid.  
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relation to the existence of many actual churches and the belief in one Church. If, on the 
other hand, it is perhaps meant to be an ontological description he may still be 
challenged to answer the question as to whether it is appropriate to discuss the matter by 
reducing the ontology of many churches to different forms of polity. The Church as the 
body of Christ is surely not subject to periodic or sporadic fluctuations, yet the idea 
itself of the body of Christ as one and many is in the Bible and as a way of Christian 
understanding of what the Church is.8 The focus of this chapter, therefore, is not on 
whether we should give up using the one and the many for discussion of ontological 
matters. Attention will be given, rather, on how Gunton uses the terms, the one and the 
many, and whether there is a need for clarification or room for further development. 
Three questions can guide us in conducting an examination of Gunton’s scheme: (1) 
why Gunton uses the general and abstract terms in a quest for concepts which are 
intended to be applicable even to understanding of a particular being (or person); (2) in 
what way Gunton uses the one and the many, or what exactly he refers them to; and (3) 
how complete the scheme is in dealing with the questions that Gunton attempted to 
answer by using the one and the many. 
 
6.1.1. Gunton’s rationale 
There are two things that can be considered as reasons for why Gunton uses the terms of 
the one and the many in his theological and transcendental projects. Firstly, Gunton uses 
them in line with his perception that certain questions arise ‘in different but 
recognizably similar forms,’9 in different times and places.10 Among them are questions 
concerning relations between society and the individual, between human beings and the 
rest of the world and between God and the world—the three main areas addressed in 
Gunton’s transcendental project.11 These questions are too “big” to be dealt with lightly, 
with myriad factors to take into account, and yet any society or generation can hardly 
avoid them without taking the risk of letting itself to run into conflict or disorder unless 
its members are all good enough to live together in peace and order, with no need for a 
general council or decision. As a theologian Gunton took upon himself the task of 
dealing with these questions by identifying some problems of the culture of his times—
                                           
8 Cf. Rom 12:4–5; 1 Cor 10:16–17; 12:12–27; Eph 4:11–13. Cf. also Gal 3:28; Col 3:15, for being one in 
Christ. 
9 OTM 16f. 
10 Especially so among people with the same faith. As one says, ‘people in places as far removed as 
Australia and Jamaica, or Scotland and California, all asking much the same questions about what it 
means to follow Jesus in today’s world’ (John Drane, The McDonaldization of the Church: Spirituality, 
Creativity and the Future of the Church, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2000, ix). 
11 Cf. OTM 18f and 218f. 
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such as individualism, collectivism, fragmentation and homogenisation—and the 
framework under which such problems took shape and providing alternative 
frameworks that might help to promote less problematic and more wholesome ways of 
thinking and living in the world.12 It is to serve these purposes that he uses the one and 
the many, thereby enabling his discussion to deal with complex issues and questions in 
clear yet comprehensive terms and to express his own understanding of the matters in 
simple yet wide-ranging terms. 
 
It will remain true that using the one and the many involves generalisation and 
abstraction to some degree, an issue that has been briefly mentioned previously. In case, 
however, that one wishes to challenge Gunton’s use of the one and the many for that 
reason, arguing that we should abstain from using these terms, two further notes need to 
be made about Gunton’s own position. The first is that Gunton knows that ‘all 
generalisations are dangerous,’13 even though he himself engages in some sort of 
generalisation and abstraction, as noted by critics.14 The reason is that the issue for 
Gunton is not generalisation or abstraction in themselves but, rather, what kind of 
generalisation and abstraction they are and, to add, for what purpose and to what extent 
they are made. Thus, secondly, using the general and abstract terms of the one and the 
many does not necessarily mean a suppression of the particular and the concrete. The 
opposite is the case, insofar as Gunton is concerned. That is, he focuses on the general 
and the abstract for the sake of the particular and the concrete.15 Gunton, in other words, 
                                           
12 Gunton’s The One, the Three and the Many is comprised of two parts which are solely dedicated to this 
task, with its main focus on rethinking of the “framework” within which human life takes place. See, in 
particular, 7, 51, 59, 87, 140, 157, 196 and 227. 
13 IA 22, in the context of speaking of Hellenism. 
14 As noted by Webster, ‘Gunton,’ 27, according to which Gunton’s reading of Barth is ‘more of a 
presentation of the grandes lignes’ and has the disadvantage of ‘criticism by generalization.’ That said, in 
two respects, Webster’s reading of Gunton (TC 162–5) appears problematic, perhaps more than Gunton’s 
presentation of Barth. First of all, while Webster bases his argument on some quotations from Gunton, he 
does so without doing justice to the context in which Gunton actually speaks of the “merit” of Barth’s 
“renewed attention to the relation between creation and redemption” (162). Moreover, Webster does not 
note that Gunton expresses no objection to the proposition that ‘the covenant is oriented to the election of 
the human race’ (ibid). The issue for Gunton is the tendency he finds in Barth ‘to treat the created order 
instrumentally, as a means to an end in which it shares, indeed, but not as fully as it should’ (165). This is 
a point that should have been addressed by Webster but is absent in his dealing with Gunton’s treatment 
of Barth’s doctrine of the relation between God and the world. Webster’s defence of Barth’s doctrine of 
election as ‘God’s self-election to life in partnership with creature in the creatures own active life of 
obedience’ (ibid) is rather untoward. 
15 Cf. OTM 191; BB 147. Cf. also, §5.1, 112 and n.49. 
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is so concerned with the status of the particular and the concrete that he is at the same 
time concerned with the general and the abstract.16 
 
The second reason for which Gunton uses the abstract terms of the one and the many is 
concerned with his intention to develop a transcendental conceptuality in and for wider 
context than theology itself, to include both the social and the cosmic realms.17 This is a 
result of Gunton’s framing of his programme by locating it between Aquinas’ and 
Barth’s programmes, i.e., in a way to be more like the latter in its starting point and like 
the former in its orientation.18 Thus, to repeat,19 Gunton’s programme is like Barth’s in 
developing a theology through reflection on God’s particular actions in the world 
through the works of the Son and the Spirit as recorded in Scripture, while it is more 
like Aquinas’ in aiming at a transcendental system that can be applied to the 
understanding of being in general.20 This eclectic combination of the two preceding 
programmes helps Gunton to lay foundations for his ‘trinitarian transcendental analogy 
of being and becoming,’ that is to say, ‘a conception of the structures of the world in the 
light of the dynamic of the being of the triune creator and redeemer.’21 Of course, were 
it not for the triune act of salvation there would be little support for using the one and 
the many in Christian theology. Yet, without a transcendental purpose, like Gunton’s, 
there would be little point in doing so, since there are less abstract terms like “God,” 
“Lord,” “Father,” “Son” and “Spirit” that can be used for discussing or expressing 
Christian faith. 
 
Gunton shares a commonality with Zizioulas in using the terms of the one and the many 
for further development of Christian thought, though with the difference that Zizioulas 
                                           
16 The word “individual,” for instance, let alone other terms such as “society” and “world,” is surely an 
abstract term in the sense that it refers not so much to a concrete thing (David, John or Paul) but just any 
one of the many from which it is abstracted and to which it is directed. Despite being abstract, however, it 
has a crucial function to indicate one among the many in relation to other ones, and so needs to be 
properly defined in the realm of abstraction and generality. For Gunton’s discussion of the matter, see BB 
137 in reference to Barth, Dogmatics I.2., 881 and Eberhard Jüngel, Gottes Sein ist im Werden, Tübingen: 
J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1967, 43. 
17 Cf. OTM 18f and 218. 
18 Cf. OTM 140f. 
19 Cf. §5.1. 109f. 
20 For a critique of Gunton in respect to some aspects of Barth, see Webster, ‘Gunton,’ 27–9. For a critical 
view of Gunton’s programme in relation to the theology and language of Aquinas’, see Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 
173; Holmes, ‘Analogia,’ 43f.  
21 OTM 141. The significance of the doctrine of the creation for Gunton’s transcendental project is 
manifold: (1) as the primary context for the question of the one and the many; (2) as a place where 
problems of antiquity and modernity are identified; (3) as a stage on which the doctrine of God and 
transcendental concepts are tested; and (4) as a field for seeking different ways of inhabiting the world 
and treating its inhabitants. Cf. OTM 53, 123 and 230; TC 26 and 49. 
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does so in regard to the ontology of the Church and Gunton more in respect to being in 
general.22 ‘The Church,’ says Zizioulas, ‘is built on the historical experience of those 
who, from being scattered and opposed to one another, were brought together, 
reconciled and united in the person of Christ.’23 ‘For the Apostles John and Paul, and 
for Saint Ignatius of Antioch,’ he continues, ‘this assembly of God’s people in one place 
and with one mind is the foundation of all ecclesiology.’24 He goes further to say that 
‘the Church, although one, exists as Churches, in the plural, and these Churches exist as 
one Church.’25 This can be seen as something new, if Scripture’s use of the one and the 
many is understood as primarily consisting of the relation between the members of one 
gathering,26 and something  controversial, if it is seen as privileging one ecclesiological 
vision.27 That said, while this ontology of the Church as simultaneously one and many 
is surely Zizioulas’ version of ecclesiology,28 it is hard to deny its firm rootedness in the 
biblical idea of “we” as one and many,29 as it is in the 4th century Christian theology 
which he understands as teaching, ‘the way in which God exists involves 
simultaneously the “One” and the “Many”.’30 As for the relation of Zizioulas’ work to 
Gunton’s, the former’s precedence may well suggest the latter’s dependence.31 The 
relationship, however, is more complicated than a simple reliance, as noted by Jenson.32 
                                           
22 D. Knight evaluates Zizioulas’ work as ‘the most searching enquiry into the relationship between the 
one and the many’ (Zizioulas, 4), though it needs to be qualified because Zizioulas’ enquiry is more into 
personhood and the ontology of the Church than into the notion of the one and the many itself. That is, he 
uses the one and the many for the sake of discussing personhood and ontology. More or less, the same can 
be said of Gunton’s use of them. The notion of the one and the many itself is, I suppose, still in need of ‘a 
searching enquiry.’ 
23 Zizioulas, Lectures, 128. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Zizioulas, Lectures, 161. Zizioulas uses the word “Church” with a capital letter even in reference to a 
local church, reflecting his idea of “the catholic Church”: ‘each local Church represents the whole 
Eucharistic assembly and the recapitulation of all things, in each particular place,’ in contrast to the view 
in which the catholic Church is seen as ‘the worldwide or ecumenical Church precedent over the many 
actual churches’ (140). 
26 In Paul’s letters, references to ‘we’ as one body with many members (e.g. Rom 12:3–5; 1 Cor 10:17; 
Gal 3:28; Col 3:15) are mainly directed to local gatherings in their immediate contexts (in Rome, the 
Galatia, Colossae and Corinth). However, given the place of Paul as the one who writes them to churches 
in different locations with the same idea and in the same spirit, it is not unreasonable to think of the 
biblical image of one body and many members as applying to relations across churches as well as among 
the members of one local church. 
27 As found in Collins, ‘Authority,’ 154–6, according to which Zizioulas’ use of the Pauline motif of the 
one and the many to support an ecclesial structure is not ‘culture-free.’ 
28 Cf. Brown, ‘On the Criticism,’ 35–78. 
29 See n.9 above for biblical references. 
30 J. Zizioulas, ‘The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution,’ in 
Schwöbel, Trinitarian Theology Today, 48f. 
31 Cf. Gunton’s own comment on his indebtness to Zizioulas: ‘I write as someone who has learned from 
him important lessons not only about all the topics I have discussed so far, but also about the need to 
specify the type of actions performed by—and therefore the kind of eternal qualities possessed by—the 
particular persons of the Trinity.’ Gunton, ‘Persons and Particularity,’ in Knight, Zizioulas, 107. 
32 Jenson, ‘Decision,’ 12. 
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As far as the use of the terms of the one and the many is concerned, it would be safer to 
assume that Gunton has his own way of using them. 
 
6.1.2. Gunton’s scheme of the one and the many 
Gunton’s primary use of the one and the many appears in his analysis of the history of 
western transcendentality in reference to two different realities: God and the world; the 
eternal and the temporal; the immaterial and the material; and so forth. To begin with, in 
pre-Socratic times, perhaps due to a monistic drive, the one and the many were put in 
conflict so that either the one or the many, but not both, must be of transcendental 
significance. In this context, by the one and the many, Gunton refers to two ontological 
principles; by the one, “being” or “stability;” and by the many, “becoming” or 
“changeability.”33 Plato synthesised his predecessors’ thinking into that whereby the 
many gain the real standing but only in subordination to the one which is the sole 
transcendental. Here, by the many, Gunton indicates the “material” and by the one, the 
“immaterial” or “intellectual.”34 Philo played a significant role, according to Zizioulas, 
in mediating between the Greek and the Hebrew thoughts by his identification of the 
One with God himself; ‘God is the only true “One” because he is the only one who is 
truly “alone”.’35 Within the budding Christianity itself, which was not exempt from the 
cultural and religious influences, a tendency emerged to express Christian faith in a 
similar way to link the one, or the One, with the God of Scripture and the many with the 
world of time and space.36 An extreme case might be Gnostic theologies and 
metaphysics in which the one (“spiritual”) is put in radical opposition to the many 
(“material”) in such a way that the world of the many is seen as not real at all and so 
depreciated.37 There were Christian theologians whose minds were less influenced by 
Greek philosophy, yet, as a matter of regress from Christians’ progressive overcoming 
of the Greek transcendentality, the idea of the one as the sole transcendental and the 
many as something to be overcome was maintained even within the mainline western 
theology.38 One significant consequence is that the transcendentality of the one (the 
“eternal”) is consolidated into the soil of the West, while the status of the many (the 
“temporal”) remains dubious or ambiguous.39 This is the background against which 
                                           
33 OTM 16–8; TC 26f. 
34 OTM 20f, 50 and 70; TC 28–31. 
35 Zizioulas, Communion, 163. 
36 OTM 51–61 and 120–3. 
37 OTM 94–100 (97); TC 47–50. 
38 OTM 140f. 
39 OTM 24. 
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Gunton understands both the modern revolt against Christianity and its failure to come 
up with an alternative. Modernity, in his understanding, represents a strong assertion of 
the many (“the world” or “humanity”) over against the oppressive one (“God”). Yet the 
assertion was made in a way that elevated the many to the sole transcendental status, 
while rejecting the one for the sake, or in the name, of the many.40 This brief review is, 
admittedly, an oversimplified version of Gunton’s still concise overview of a complex 
history. Its purpose, at this point, is to example his use of the one and the many in 
reference to two kinds of reality of ontological difference as it appears in his view of the 
western transcendentality. 
 
Before looking at the second way in which Gunton uses the one and the many, it would 
be helpful to see how they are also used by Zizioulas because there is a difference as 
well as a similarity between the two. To begin with, Zizioulas uses the one and the 
many in various ways, including those already shown. In his theological discussions, the 
one is used to refer to “God,” “nature” or “substance” and the many for the three 
“persons” of the Trinity.41 In his Christological discussions, on the other hand, he uses 
the one in reference to Jesus Christ as an “individual being” and the many in reference 
to Jesus Christ as a “corporate being,” corporate with God and the Church, so as the one 
and the many.42 Another way of using the one and the many appears in his discussion of 
the ontology of the Church, where, by the one, he refers to the “catholic Church” and, 
by the many, “actual local Churches.”43 Lastly, he also applies the one and the many to 
the relation between the “bishop” (the one) and the “community” (the many).44 Given 
this variety, one might say that Zizioulas’ scheme of the one and the many is not 
consistent or constant and so not very helpful. It needs to be noted, however, that there 
is in it an element of consistency. For Zizioulas, that is to say, the one and the many are 
used to indicate two essential aspects of ontology, whether it is of the being of God, 
Christ or Church.  
 
The second way Gunton uses the one and the many is similar to what we have seen in 
Zizioulas, yet we can approach it by noting the problem that Gunton actually tackles in 
his transcendental project. The problem is the long-standing tendency in the West to 
                                           
40 OTM 33, 35 and 39. 
41 See Zizioulas, ‘Doctrine,’ 48f; Communion, 163. 
42 Cf. Zizioulas, Being, 130f. 
43 Cf. Zizioulas, Being, 112, 145–9, 206; Lectures, 140. 
44 Zizioulas, Being, 136f. 
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think that only either the one or the many is real, while the other is subject to the sole 
reality, or not considered to be real at all. The tendency can operate in various forms, 
including what we might call “absolute monism” and “oppositional dualism,”45 each 
exercising its force upon the mind to achieve the transcendentality of one only, at the 
expense of the other. For Gunton, however, there is no question regarding the reality of 
those referred to by the one and the many in the context of the relation between two 
different realities, e.g., God and the world. Gunton has theologies of God and creation 
that strongly support the full reality of the being of God and that of the world with their 
own time and space.46 If there is a problem for him, therefore, it is neither the one nor 
the many, nor even those referred to by them; the one and the many are simply 
conceptual tools used in reference to something of real existence or ontological 
significance. The problem is more concerned with the forms given to the one and the 
many and their references: for example, “the one suppressing the many”47 refers to a 
problematic conception of God in relation to the world; and “the many disregarding the 
one,” a deficient conception of the world in relation to God.48  
 
Gunton’s conclusion of his analysis is not that antiquity succeeded in maintaining the 
transcendentality of the one but failed with the many, whereas modernity failed with the 
one while succeeding in maintaining the transcendentality of the many. If that were the 
case it would be sufficient to combine the ancient form(s) of the one with the modern 
form(s) of the many. For Gunton, the one that fails to uphold the many is itself a 
problem and the many that fail to respect the one is not a solution.49 He takes antiquity 
as an example of the one that failed to uphold the rights of the many and modernity as 
an example of the many that did not succeed even in supporting the rights of the 
many.50 In their failures, however, each era highlighted the importance of both the one 
and the many. Modernity, for instance, shows the inevitability of the one by bringing in 
new forms of the one such as an aggregate of the ones, a homogenised mass or a new 
universal.51 The one, much like the many, indicates something that cannot be removed 
                                           
45 By “absolute monism” is meant the kind of metaphysics wherein either the one or the many is regarded 
as the sole reality, with the other being denied its status of being real; and by “oppositional dualism” that 
in which the one and the many are both given ontological significance yet in a way to oppose or exclude 
each other. 
46 Cf. OTM 204–9; PTT 110, 202; TC 134–45. 
47 For Gunton’s critique of a unitary conception of God, see OTM 24f, 37, 177, 199. 
48 For Gunton’s critique of a revolt of the many against the one, see OTM 122f. 
49 The two problems are discussed in terms of ‘Christianity’s false eternity’ (OTM 80–5) and ‘Modernity’s 
false temporality’ (OTM 85–9). 
50 Cf. OTM 16–21. 
51 OTM 28–37. 
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from its ontological place but only ignored, displaced, replaced or responded well to. 
Gunton thus ends his analysis with a conclusion that there is a common failure in both 
eras to secure the status of the many because of a common failure to have an adequate 
form of the one: hence, as a maxim for him, there can be no genuine freedom of the 
many without an appropriate form of the one.52 
 
Consequently, Gunton aims to find an appropriate form of the one, yet still with a great, 
perhaps greater, concern for the many.53 For Gunton it becomes a quest for a third 
concept in which the one and the many each have a due place. To be more precise, it is 
a quest for “the one that respects the many” or “the many that respects the one.”54 
Gunton’s use of the one and the many here comes closer to that which we have seen 
above in Zizioulas. Like Zizioulas, Gunton draws on Cappadocian theology for a 
conception of God as a communion of the Father, the Son and the Spirit.55 In his own 
words, the being of God consists in ‘a relationality that derives from the otherness-in-
relation of Father, Son and Spirit.’56 In Gunton’s conceptuality, therefore, the concept of 
“communion” is to large extent equivalent to that of “relationality,” both concepts 
becoming linked to his quest for an appropriate form of the one. Here the many is used 
in reference to Father, Son and Spirit, whereas the one refers to the one God as 
communion or relationality constituted by the three persons in relation and otherness.57 
Gunton takes theology understood this way as the basis for his development of a 
doctrine of creation, or a theology of nature, whose being he also conceives as 
consisting in a “relationality” that derives from the otherness-in-relation of particular 
                                           
52 OTM 37; PTT 129. 
53 See OTM 148, 161, 173, 190, 227, 229–31; PTT 143, 205; TC 118, 145, 190. 
54 OTM 50 and 131. 
55 See OTM 31, 165, 191, 215; PTT 71, 94; TC 9. 
56 OTM 7. This description of the being of God as communion appears to be the place where a critique of 
Gunton’s conceptuality can begin, yet it needs to be noted that it is Gunton’s conception of the being of 
God, expressed in his own choice of language, so it is necessary to carefully treat Gunton’s work in 
relation to it. 
57 Relationality for Gunton, like Zizioulas, is not the ultimate ontological ground of the being of God. 
Zizioulas correctly says that Gunton rejects the Father as the cause of the Trinity, yet it is incorrect to 
infer that Gunton’s rejection of the priority of the Father inevitably leads to ‘the position that it is the 
relations that constitute the Trinity’ (Communion, 136 n. 70). There are four things that can be said in 
response to Zizioulas’ interpretation of Gunton’s saying that ‘all three persons … together the cause of the 
communion in which they exist in relations of mutual and reciprocal constitution’ (PTT 196): (1) that for 
Zizioulas the Father is the cause of the communion and for Gunton it is the three persons together, not 
relation or relationality (see PTT 196, 205; OTM 164); (2) that relations for Gunton exist only between 
persons, and so it is person, not relation, that for him is primitive both logically (like Strawson) and 
ontologically (like Zizioulas) (see PTT 200); (3) that relationality in its one sense used by Gunton is 
almost equivalent to Zizioulas’ concept of communion (see OTM 229); and (4) that the concept of 
relationality Zizioulas criticises as Gunton’s is rather closer to that of Alan J. Torrance whose comparison 
to Zizioulas made by Gunton appears more helpful to understanding Gunton’s position than represented 
by Zizioulas (see PTT, xxiii–xxiv). 
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things and people.58 Here, again, the one and the many are used for indicating two 
aspects of the one reality of the creation: the many in reference to people, animals, 
plants and things that make up the world; and the one in reference to the world as one 
constituted by them in their relations to each other. In his second use of the one and the 
many, to summarise, Gunton uses them for discussion of the ontology of a being, 
whether it is that of God, World, Church or a Person.59 
 
By using the one and the many in such a twofold way as shown above, operating both 
within one order of reality and across different realities, Gunton provides a 
comprehensive scheme of the one and the many. In summary, “the one” is used not only 
in reference to God in relation to the world, but also to the being of the triune God 
constituted by the three persons and the one world made up of many things and people. 
In the case of “the many,” in addition to its traditional use in reference to the world vis-
à-vis God, it is also used in reference to the three persons of the triune God and to those 
that make up the world. This way of using the one and the many has enabled Gunton to 
bring almost all areas of ontology and relation under his purview.60 
 
6.1.3. Evaluation 
The question remains as to how complete or comprehensive Gunton’s scheme of the 
one and the many is. An approach can be made by looking at how Gunton operates the 
scheme in relation to his transcendental concepts: perichoresis, substantiality and 
relationality. In Gunton, as noted previously, there is a correspondence between his first 
transcendental “perichoresis” and the question of the one, as he presents the former as 
an answer to the latter, i.e., the form of the one, or the relation of the many, within one 
order of reality,61 in response to the problematic ones such as collectivism, 
totalitarianism and homogenization.62 For Gunton perichoresis also has a function to 
play in helping to understand the relation between the world (the many) and God (the 
                                           
58 See OTM 229–31. Cf. also, Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 954. 
59 For an argument for the use of the term “being” of God, see Zizioulas, Lectures, 55. 
60 Gunton’s use of the one and the many may well correspond in its comprehensiveness to Barth’s theory 
of two kinds of relation: “relation within one order of reality” and “relation between one order of reality 
and the other” (Barth, Dogmatics II.1., 311. Cf. BB 160f). There would be a difference, however, if Barth 
thinks of the relation within one order of reality (God or the creation) as that of “necessary” 
interdependence while there may be “ontological” independence between one order of reality and the 
other. For Gunton stresses, especially in his later works, that the Father is related to the Son and the Spirit, 
and things and people are related to one another, yet in otherness, never by necessity, even within one 
order of reality. 
61 See OTM 163–73, 191; PTT 134, 140, 151, 198; TC 227. Cf. Barth, Dogmatics II.1., 620–31. 
62 See OTM 13, 122, 104, 125, 152, 204. 
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one),63 although it is now accompanied by an understanding of God and the world, 
respectively, as one and many on their own ontological ground, as shown above. 
 
Similarly, Gunton proposes the concept of “substantiality,” after refining it in the 
theology of the Trinity, as an answer to the problem of the form of the many—the 
particulars within one order of reality. What Gunton wants to establish by developing 
the transcendentality of substantiality is ontological particularity or uniqueness of a 
being (this thing and not another), in response to modern problems of the many found in 
individualism, disintegration and fragmentation of culture.64 Gunton’s substantiality is 
also meant, though less explicitly expressed, to be applicable to understanding two 
distinct realities (e.g., God and the world, or the personal and the impersonal) as 
substantial beings which are related to each other and yet distinct from and other than 
each other.65  
 
More or less the same can be said of Gunton’s third transcendental, “relationality,” at 
least as is intended by Gunton. There are two difficulties, however, that one may not 
face when considering the other two. First, on an inattentive reading, it is difficult to 
know what problem Gunton has in mind when exploring his third transcendental that 
has not yet been considered in his previous explorations of perichoresis and 
substantiality.66 It is difficult to know, secondly, whether his third transcendental 
concept has a corresponding element in his scheme of the one and the many as the other 
two have.67 Having established the first and second transcendentals, each in respect to 
the question of the relational (the one) and the substantial (the many), Gunton’s third 
move should apply to another aspect of being. We have caught a glimpse of it above 
when his concept of the being of God is considered to be in a “relationality” deriving 
from the otherness-in-relation of the many.68 On closer inspection, however, we notice 
that a full grasp of this concept of relationality, if meant to be distinct from the concepts 
of “perichoresis” and “substantiality,” would require a framework in which there are 
                                           
63 See OTM 38, 173–8, 185. 
64 OTM 188–95. 
65 See OTM 193–5; TC 153. 
66 In developing the transcendentality of “perichoresis” and “substantiality,” Gunton deals with the 
problem of “relation” (OTM ch.6 corresponding to ch.3) and that of “otherness” (ch.7 corresponding to 
ch.2). 
67 “the many” is already used in reference to the substantial, i.e. concrete particulars, and “the one” in 
reference to the relation of the many as a whole. Using them for different purposes and with different 
references may not be a problem itself, but it could be problematic and confusing unless the difference is 
indicated or explained. 
68 §6.1.2. 
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three, rather than two, conceptual supports. The reason is that what Gunton intends to 
indicate by that “relationality” about the being of God comes into light only after, or in 
distinction from, knowing “relation” and “otherness” of the three persons, in such terms 
as ‘a unity that also respects plurality,’69 or ‘a oneness which is not at the expense of the 
many,’70 over against ‘a form of society in which the particular is suppressed.’71 This 
notion of unity or oneness is not about the one that simply stands in contrast to the many 
but in a mutually constituting relation with the many in such a way as that in which the 
many are related to each other as well as to the one. The trouble for us, if not for Gunton, 
is that the schematic framework of his project has only two operational and referential 
factors, namely the one and the many.  
 
Consequently, an imbalance is created between the intention to present three 
transcendentals and the scheme utilised for that purpose. This imbalance is, in my view, 
the major quandary in Gunton’s works, yet not limited to his works, and thus deserving 
a careful examination. Let us look at the notions of the one and the many as they are 
used by Gunton in his transcendental project, this time with the problem identified 
above in mind. While for discussion’s sake it is said above that “the one” corresponds to 
“the relational” and “the many” to “the substantial,” a closer examination will show that 
it is unclear whether Gunton uses “the one” in correspondence to relation, substance or 
something of both. In his diagnosis of the problem, he shows a use of “the one” in 
contrast to “the many,” mainly in the sense of the relation of the many.72 Yet, as noted, 
he also uses “the one” in respect to the ontology of God, the world, human society and a 
person, considering each being to be substantial as well as relational.73 These two 
different ways of using the one can be confusing or a source of misunderstanding when 
co-present without a clear demarcation. One might well think that what Gunton 
intended to refer to in the second way might be better expressed if he selected another 
term for that purpose rather than repeating “the one,” for the simple reason that it has 
already been used. Yet it should be noted that whilst Gunton repeats the same term he 
does not use it in the same sense; one is used in a narrower sense in contrast to the many 
and the other in a wider sense inclusive of the many. 
 
                                           
69 OTM 21. 
70 OTM 212. 
71 OTM 221. 
72 In OTM 151 and 213, for example, Gunton refers to “society” by “the one,” which he uses in contrast to 
“the many,” by which he refers to “the individual” or “person.” 
73 In OTM 212 and 221. 
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It is the many, not the one ever, that Gunton uses in relation to his discussion of 
particularity or substantiality.74 Here again, however, Gunton’s project is hampered by 
his actual use of the term, the many, mainly in a collective sense despite intending to 
use it in relation to the particular rather than the general. He argues that everything and 
everyone can find their true being as they are related to each other and to the one.75 He 
also argues that the many are each distinct and different by virtue of the fact that they 
are related to each other.76 Yet, to be precise, what is being argued is the ontological 
status of the many, i.e., in relation to each other and to the one, rather than an ontology 
of a particular being. This consideration of the ontology of the many mainly in relation 
to, or over against, the one, leaves an impression that the many in Gunton is considered 
only collectively, despite his attention to the substantiality of each being of the many.77 
 
The point can be pressed further by looking at Gunton’s concept of substantiality 
against the background of his scheme of the one and the many. Substantiality is 
intended by Gunton as a conceptual support of the particularity or uniqueness of things 
and people, especially against modern threats of collectivism and homogenization.78 
That said, there appears a mismatch between that intention and his description of the 
substantiality of God as residing ‘not in his abstract being, but in the concrete particulars 
that we call divine persons and in the relations by which they mutually constitute one 
another.’79 This is a controversial part of Gunton’s work, often cited for criticism,80 yet 
the point here is that Gunton’s development of the concept of substantiality is made in 
an argument for the transcendental status of “the many” yet in reference to “the one.” 
This double standing of Gunton’s concept of substantiality raises a question as to 
whether his substantiality should be understood as meant for a hypostatic being or an 
ousianic being or for both. If it is meant for the substantiality of a hypostatic being (like 
that of the Son) the reader would face a discrepancy between the connotation of the 
collective sense of “the many” (meaning particular beings) and the idea meant for a 
particular being which Gunton wants to promote by the concept of substantiality. If, on 
                                           
74 See OTM 6, 44, 190f, 204f. Gunton’s use of the one and the many is quite clearly demarcated by having 
in the conceptual group of the one “relation,” “relatedness,” “unity,” “universality,” “perichoresis” and so 
forth, and in the group of the many “particularity,” “otherness,” “distinctiveness,” “plurality,” “diversity,” 
“individuality” and so forth. 
75 OTM 37f. 
76 OTM 45. 
77 See OTM 189 and 191. 
78 See OTM 6, 196, 203, 213, 219, 228. 
79 OTM 191. 
80 E.g. Fermer, ‘Limits,’ 166; Nausner, ‘Failure,’ 414. 
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the other hand, it is intended for the substantiality of an ousianic being (like that of 
God), the reader would be left with no further referential or conceptual tool with which 
to refer to a hypostatic being vis-à-vis an ousianic being. 
 
Further light can be shed on the point under development by turning back to Gunton’s 
concept of relationality as his third transcendental. Given that Gunton suggests 
“perichoresis” as the first transcendental to support the ontological significance of the 
one (or relation), and “substantiality” as the second transcendental to support the 
ontological significance of the many (or otherness), it is not sensible to construe his 
quest for a third transcendental as a search for what is already established. What he 
seeks to understand with the aid of the new concept should be something else, because 
it is something that results from Gunton’s first and second transcendentals coming 
together as fully developed.81 In other words, an ontological aspect in which both 
relation and otherness (equivalent to the one and the many in his ontological discussion) 
contribute to our understanding.82 His term for the third transcendental, however, is 
“relationality,” which within his conceptuality is almost interchangeable with the term 
that he uses for his first transcendental, perichoresis.83 Besides, as we saw, there are 
cases showing that his use of the concept of perichoresis overlaps with what he means 
by relationality as his third transcendental. Hence our speaking of Gunton’s double use 
of relationality or perichoresis despite his suggestion of them as two distinct concepts: 
on the one hand, as his first transcendental, they are meant to give a conceptual support 
to the perichoretic relation of the many, or the relational aspect of ontology;84 as his 
third transcendental, on the other hand, they are meant to help to conceive what he 
considers as a particular being in relation, the very thing that his development of 
substantiality is intended for.85  
 
                                           
81 As indicated by Gunton beginning the last chapter, “The triune Lord. Towards a theology of the one and 
the many,” by saying that ‘[t]he trinitarian conception suggested by the two transcendentals we have 
examined in the previous chapters—perichoresis and substantiality—is that of sociality’ (OTM 214). 
82 Cf. OTM 214–9. 
83 OTM 229. 
84 OTM 163–73. 
85 Cf. OTM 214–29. In speaking of “God” as one and many, the “world” as one and many and “society” 
as one and many, Gunton appears to intend to say more of the being of God, world or society than simply 
saying that they are both one and many. According to his theology of the Trinity, for instance, it is not 
only that God is one and many but also that they are related to each other in a particular way, so a 
communion. Likewise, he does not simply consider “relationality” of the world and “sociality” of the 
society. In the light of his theology, he also moves toward alternative (particular) forms of relationality (a 
trinitarian doctrine of creation) and sociality (a trinitarian sociality). 
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Concerning Gunton’s use of relationality and perichoresis, they have features that make 
it difficult to draw a distinguishing line between them, as we saw three of them. What 
can be considered here in addition to them is that they are both capable of carrying the 
narrower sense of “relation” and the broader sense of it closer to “communion” to the 
extent that not much difference would arise even if perichoresis were exchanged with 
relationality in Gunton’s transcendental conceptuality. This raises a question about the 
concept of perichoresis: whether modern theologians, including Gunton, have delivered 
the Patristic concept correctly, incorrectly or differently from its sense as conceived in 
its original context in their linking of it with “relationality” rather than with something 
else, like “sociality” or “communion” or “spatiality.”86 This question is closely related to 
other questions pursued in this work, and an answer was in the preceding chapter with 
the suggestion that the notion of spatiality is a plausible alternative to Gunton’s 
relationality as his third transcendental. It will suffice here, however, to add that as far 
as Gunton’s work is concerned the concept of perichoresis is used in both ways, either 
with “relationality” in its narrower sense (as distinct from particularity or substantiality) 
as meant for his first transcendental, or with “relationality” in its broader sense (almost 
equivalent to communion, sociality or spatiality) as meant for his third transcendental. 
 
6.2. Three 
The problem identified thus far regarding Gunton’s transcendental project is not that his 
first and third transcendentals refer to the same thing. The facts remain that he intended 
three transcendentals, not two, all with different purposes, however they are interpreted 
or misinterpreted, and that it is only after having established the first and second 
transcendentals that he introduces the third in relation to the ontological aspect that he 
has not yet considered.87 The problem, rather, is that Gunton has produced his 
transcendental conceptuality in a way likely to cause confusion and misunderstanding 
by using almost synonymous terms to indicate two different aspects of ontology: the 
relational in a narrow sense of it as distinct from the substantial; and that which comes 
into light as something that encompasses both the relational and the substantial. I have 
attributed this problem to the discrepancy that appears to exist between Gunton’s 
project, which suggests three transcendentals, and the referential system used for 
                                           
86 “Spatiality,” again considering that in the middle of the word perichoresis lies a word of spatial imagery 
(chora). Both proponents of the concept of perichoresis and their critics tend to link it with the concept of 
relationality, which is also implied in the word though. 
87 A simple fact that is ignored by most critics who treat Gunton’s transcendental conceptuality as if it had 
two of the three as one and the same, as noted previously and will be treated in more detail later.  
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developing them, which has two elements, the one and the many, locating its epicentre 
in his decision to use “relationality” as his third transcendental.  
 
We might leave things as they are now but, given the critics’ common failure to 
understand Gunton’s transcendental conceptuality, even as it is left by Gunton, it might 
be advisable to go a step further. In the previous chapter, I argued that “spatiality” 
would better serve than relationality as his third transcendental, suggesting a revised 
scheme of Gunton’s transcendentality in which relationality is replaced by spatiality. 
What can be added here is an amendment in the use of the one and many in a way that 
fully accommodates the three ontological features explored by Gunton: that is, to 
correlate “spatiality” (Gunton’s relationality) to “the three” (for which Gunton develops 
his third transcendental considering both the relational and the substantial). The 
outcome is a scheme in which we have the one and the many and the three, 
corresponding to relationality, particularity and spatiality. If, as in Gunton, “the one” is 
for the universal (along with unity, oneness, relation), and “the many” for the particular 
(diversity, manyness, otherness), “the three” is for the general in which the two sides are 
related to each other into an ordered whole.  
 
It should be noted that what we are pursuing in terms of “the three” is not something 
alien to Gunton’s conceptuality but what he tried to express in such phrases as “forms of 
the one that fail to give due space to the many” or “a unity that also respects plurality or, 
in human terms, individuality and freedom.’88 In fact, as Esther Meek notes, ‘The book 
title [The One, the Three and the Many] suggests both the problem and the solution he 
will put forward: faulty assumptions that set up the false dualism of the one and the 
many are the problem, and he alludes to the solution by inserting “the three” between 
them.’89 Unfortunately, it remains a suggestion, because “the three” in the book itself 
refers, primarily, to the triune God as ‘the source of all being, meaning and truth,’90 and 
the word “three” appears mainly in relation to the three realms of the world (personal, 
material and cultural)91 and to the three realms of culture (intellectual, moral and 
aesthetic).92 While, further, it is the aim of Gunton’s project to use an appropriate form 
of theology (broadly speaking, a trinitarian theology against unitary conceptions of 
                                           
88 OTM 37 and 21. 
89 Meek, Loving, 333. 
90 OTM 177. 
91 Cf. OTM 168. 
92 Cf. OTM 151 and 176. 
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God) for developing an integrated understanding of different realms of being and 
meaning (especially against the fragmentation of culture), there is an obstacle: that he 
uses the one and “the many” in his discussion of the created,93 whereas he uses the one 
and “the three” in his speaking of the Trinity.94 For the three of the Trinity, in other 
words, Gunton does not use “the many” but always “the three,” while he does not use 
“the three” but always “the many” for the three realms of the world or culture. There is 
one place where we can see the contrast most clearly, part of which has already been 
mentioned: 
An account of relationality that gives due weight to both one and many, to both 
particular and universal, to both otherness and relation, is to be derived from the 
one place where they can satisfactorily be based, a conception of God who is 
both one and three, whose being consists in a relationality that derives from the 
otherness-in-relation of Father, Son and Spirit.95 
In the previous dealing with the latter part of this passage, I suggested using “spatiality” 
for relationality, or understanding the latter in the sense of the former. What I want to 
suggest here is to understand the “three” in the “conception of God who is both one and 
three” in the sense of the “many” in a transcendental context while saving the “three” 
for a whole being that is both one and many. There are three grounds for this suggestion. 
Firstly, even in Gunton’s work itself, there is an example of the theological use of 
“many,” i.e., ‘a theology in which both the one and the many have due place,’96 which 
in Gunton is equivalent to the aforementioned phrase “a conception of God who is both 
one and three,” both in apparent reference to the triune God.97 Secondly, the use of the 
“three,” as in the citation above, goes against Gunton’s emphasis on conceptual clarity 
since it muddles the distinction between the three and the many, the distinction 
maintained in the title of the book of his transcendental project. Also, thirdly, the 
“three” that is used next to the “one” as if in the sense of the “many” would not help 
Gunton’s argument for the third concept (‘a third factor’) without whose mediation, he 
                                           
93 Cf. OTM 16–21. ‘Thus we return to the two themes adumbrated in the first chapter: of the one and the 
many of the social order, and of the relation of that order to the one and the many of cosmic order’ (219). 
94 For two examples, see OTM 150. That is, in a passage about the triune God from Gregory of Nazianzus, 
Gunton finds ‘a dynamic dialectic between the oneness and the threeness of God of such a kind that the 
two are both given equal weight in the processes of thought.’ Then speaking of possibilities for 
transcendental exploration, Gunton says that ‘they begin to appear when we develop some of the concepts 
which the Fathers used in order to hold together the one and the three in their doctrine of God.’ In both 
citations emphasis added. 
95 OTM 7f. Emphasis added. 
96 OTM 140. 
97 See OTM 141, where Gunton makes it clear what he seeks to develop: ‘a trinitarian analogy of being 
(and becoming): a conception of the structures of the created world in the light of the dynamic of the 
being of the triune creator and redeemer.’ 
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says, Parmenidean one (antiquity) and Heraclitean many (modernity) tend to collapse 
the one into the other,98 because the locus of the third concept is God, which is for 
Gunton not simply one or three but a dynamic of the one and the many.99 
 
Now, with “the three” added in the way described above, we have a revised scheme of 
the one and the many in which “the one” does not need to be used twice for the 
relational and for what we have called the spatial. The burden of indicating the latter is 
now laid upon the notion of “the three.” That change would involve further 
modifications in the use of the one and the many, considering these three: the 
installation of “the three” for the spatial; the collective connotation of “the many,” 
making it difficult to be used for the particular; and yet the need to have a referential 
element corresponding to the particular. Hence, in a modified scheme, “the one” can be 
used for the particular or the singular (rather than for the relational), and “the many” for 
the relational or the plural (rather than for the particular). These uses are different from 
Gunton’s, so they might be seen as forced or even as distorting Gunton’s work in which 
the one and the many are employed in his own ways. In that case, two things need to be 
recognised. The first is that we have followed Gunton first and it is on that basis that the 
suggestion is made, and only to have Gunton’s conceptual framework better understood 
than has been left by him. The second is that the use of “the one” for the singular and 
“the many” for the plural is not unprecedented but is found in the Bible and biblical 
studies. 
 
6.2.1. One and many in the Bible 
There are two kinds of “one” that is used in the Bible, correspondingly two kinds of 
“many.” The first is the use of the one in reference to an individual member within a 
larger entity, mainly in the sense of numerical oneness. It is seen in the first part of the 
imagery of one member among the many. Thus, 1 Corinthians 12:26: ‘If one member 
suffers, all suffer together with it; if one member is honoured, all rejoice together with 
it.’ Here the word “one” is used not for the unity of the many, as in Gunton, but in 
reference to the singular, a particular one among many, with an implied emphasis on the 
significance of that particular one for all (members).100 Gunton appears wanting to use 
“the many” for that purpose, with a particular concern for particularity, but, as noted, its 
                                           
98 OTM 28. Parallel to the problem of the one and the many is the problem of the subjective and the 
objective. Cf. also, OTM 66 and 213, for the effect of the lack of the third factor, a mediating concept.  
99 Cf. OTM 141, 144, 149f, 163f; PTT 145. 
100 See, also, Rom 5:12, 18; 1 Cor 15:22. 
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inherent collective connotation makes it unsuitable for that purpose.  
 
We might use the reference to “all” in the cited passage as an opportunity to look at 
Scripture’s use of the many as in this part of 1 Corinthians 12:12: ‘just as the body is 
one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one 
body, so it is with Christ.’101 Upon these examples, we can say that Scripture uses 
“many” in relation to the plural aspect of being, namely to many members of one body 
or one kind. This use is similar to Gunton’s use of the many insofar as plurality is 
concerned, yet they are different in two respects. First, Gunton uses the many even for 
the particular and the one for the relational, yet this biblical use of “many” is meant only 
for the plural when using “one” for the particular. Secondly, for Gunton the many is a 
concept that has ontological significance for the one, whereas what we have here is a 
biblical notion of the many that does not have the same significance for the one which is 
linked to a particular one; the many do not make up the one but, rather, the one stands 
among the many or on behalf of the many. 
 
The second kind of “one” used in the Bible is already introduced in the second passage 
cited above, that is, in the imagery of one body with many members.102 Other examples 
are: one flesh by two persons;103 one humanity out of two groups;104 and one household 
of all people of God.105 The “one” in these examples also carries the sense of numerical 
oneness,106 yet what is referred to is not a particular one standing among or alongside 
the many but a whole whose ontological content and constitution are closely related to 
how the many are related to each other. Here “many” have greater ontological 
significance for one than when it is related to the one linked to a particular one among 
many, in the sense that the one is only as the many are. With this, we have now found a 
biblical use of the one and many that is similar to Gunton’s. 
 
Considering these two kinds of the one and the many used in the Bible, we conclude 
that “one” in the Bible is used twice in different senses, the first as indicating “one of 
many” or “one among many” and the second expressible as “one constituted by many” 
                                           
101 For a similar use of the many, see also Rom 5:15, though this time it is used for many people vis-à-vis 
one person. 
102 Cf. §6.1 n.9, for biblical references. 
103 Matt 19:4–6; Gen 2:24. 
104 Eph 2:14–18. 
105 Eph 2:19–22. Cf. Gal 3:28; Col 3:5-11; 1 Tim 3:14–15; Mark 3:35; and its parallels.  
106 Cf. Matt 19:6, in particular. 
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or “one as many are,” with different ontological significance of the many for the one in 
each case. From the perspective of the many, the first happens in the natural or organic 
level, as in “one body with many members” or “one person with many personal aspects 
of the person” or even “one kin-group and many individuals within the group.” The 
second occurs in the personal and interpersonal level, as in “many tribes but one 
people” or “many peoples but one nation” or “many nations but one world.” The 
difference is that while the one in the first case can be sufficiently predicated by generic 
features, the one in the second case can hardly be predicated adequately without taking 
into account personal characteristics of the many and interpersonal relations between 
them. 
 
This is a similar situation to what we have encountered previously in Gunton’s work 
regarding a double use of the concept of ousia, substance or being.107 There was a 
suggestion made of an interpretation of Gunton’s work as having a move from the ousia 
(God) through the hypostasis (Father, Son and Spirit) to the ousia (the Trinity) on the 
basis of an assumption that while the second ousia is what Gunton means by the term 
(thus, “active-ousia”) the first ousia is supposed in his speaking of Father, Son and 
Spirit as one God (this time, “supposed-ousia”). As for Gunton’s use of the one and the 
many, however, it is difficult to find a basis for supposing such a double use of the one. 
He does not use “the one” twice for the singular and the plural but only once for unity 
or relation while using “the many” in respect to plurality, diversity, otherness, 
particularity and freedom. It is in that context that the biblical notion of “one,” used 
both in relation to the one (a part) and many and to the many and one (a whole), helps to 
see that Gunton’s scheme of the one and the many is not comprehensive enough for a 
transcendental enquiry and the validity of the modified scheme suggested at the end of 
the previous section, the scheme according to which a particular entity (the one) is 
hypostasised by its constituents (the many) into a unique shape (the three).
                                           
107 §3.1.5. 
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Chapter 7 One, God of the World 
 
The previous discussion, by promoting the conception of being (“one”) formed by its 
constituents (“many”) into a particular shape (“three”), made it necessary to look at the 
theological uses of the word “one” in the Bible. In this chapter, therefore, we shall 
examine the so-called Shema texts in the OT and the NT in which the word “one” is 
used of God or YHWH in the case of the OT. One reason is to see whether there is any 
theological support from the Bible for the argument of the previous chapter. Another is 
to establish a biblical basis upon which to pursue further questions about Gunton’s work 
that will be discussed in the next chapter. It needs to be noted at the outset that the 
investigation undertaken in this chapter is mainly biblical and hermeneutical, with 
attention focused on the interpretation of the word “one” used in the Bible. To that 
extent, the discussion will be a bit distant from an engagement with Gunton’s work. One 
justification, as noted, is the significance of the one God motif for Christian faith as well 
as Jewish theology and even Islamic monotheism. Another is that there are two 
remaining questions for our enquiry about Gunton’s ontology that can be answered 
properly by knowing the meaning of the one God, the first about the relationship 
between the theology of the OT and that of the NT, and the second about the universal 
applicability of Gunton’s transcendental conceptuality as intended by him. 
 
7.1. The Shema (Deut 6:4)1 
There is little to question concerning the significance of the last word in Deut 6:4, דָחֶא 
(“one”),2 for the three Abrahamic faiths, whether monotheistic Judaism,3 trinitarian 
Christianity,4 or Islamic monotheism.5 Perhaps, because of its importance, the 
                                           
1 The name “Shema” is used here in reference to Deut 6:4–5, yet with awareness that the name is mainly 
used as a title of daily prayer in Judaism, recited morning and evening, and the scope is broader, including 
Deut 6:6–9; 11:13–21; and Num 15:37–41. 
2 The default translation of “דחא” in this work is “one,” without a commitment to a particular sense until 
we reach a conclusion. When needed, therefore, a qualification will accompany the word. 
3 Cf. Jeffrey H. Tigay, Deuteronomy, Philadelphia and Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1996, 76. 
Cf. also, R. W. L. Moberly, ‘“Yahweh is one”: The Translation of the Shema,’ in his From Eden to 
Golgotha: Essays in Biblical Theology, Atlanta: Scholars, 1992, 75–81 (75); Patrick D. Miller, ‘The Most 
Important Word: The Yoke of the Kingdom,’ Iliff Review 41, 1984, 17–29; and J. Gerald Janzen, ‘On the 
Most Important Word in the Shema (Deuteronomy VI 4–5),’ Vetus Testamentum 37, 1987, 280–300. 
4 Cf. N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, London: SPCK, 1992; Richard Bauckham, 
Jesus and the God of Israel: God crucified and other studies on the New Testament’s Christology of divine 
identity, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008; Suzanne Nicholson, Dynamic Oneness: The Significance and 
Flexibility of Paul’s One-God Language, Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2011. 
5 ‘Say, He is Allah, the One,’ Sura 112:1. ‘In Islam, all five daily prayers repeat sura 117 from the Qur’an 
that opens “God is one.” Significantly, this prayer uses the Hebrew word for “one” (ahad) rather than the 
Arabic wahad. The three Abrahamic faiths are united in this affirmation’ (Kenneth E. Bailey, Paul 
through the Mediterranean Eyes: Cultural Studies in 1 Corinthians, London: SPCK, 2011, 235f). 
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theological element of the Shema has been patient of various interpretations, despite that 
it is made of four words and notwithstanding exegetes’ common commitment to 
exegetical integrity and the need to do justice to the text itself. Thus, while two exegetes, 
Stephen Geller and General Janzen, emphasise the importance of “detailed exegesis 
against selective quotations of passages and synthetic analysis”6 and of “avoiding 
importation of anachronistic philosophical and theological concerns,”7 none the less 
they come to a different conclusion about how to interpret the word “one” in the Shema. 
That was the case three decades ago,8 yet still the same polarity can be observed two 
decades later.9 There is a possibility, then, that the text of Deut 6:4 allows for more than 
one legitimate meaning, not denying that it has one intended meaning but rather 
recognising that, whatever the meaning might be, it should be the kind that allows for 
different approaches and interpretations. Jewish commentator Jeffrey Tigay even 
purports that ‘the precise meaning of the Shema is uncertain and it permits several 
possible renderings.’10 It is in this recognition that he considers the third translation on 
the list below to be ‘the most likely,’ yet qualifying his choice by saying that ‘it is not 
certain.’11 This is a significant remark for our discussion, in that even a text consisting 
of four particular words is open to different approaches and interpretations. That said, 
we now proceed to an interpretation of Deut 6:4, surely in due recognition of it as “an” 
interpretation, yet still a move towards the meaning. The discussion will be carried out, 
not by forcing foreign ideas into the text to draw out a predetermined conclusion but 
following what the words actually say about God in conversation with their 
interpretations by scholars and commentators. 
 
To see the issues at stake, we begin by looking at four major translations of the four 
words in Deut 6:4 that come after shemaʾ yisrael (Hear, O Israel), that is, Adonai 
eloheynu Adonai echad (דָחֶא הָוהְי וּניֵהלֱֹא הָוהְי):12  
 
(a) YHWH our God is one YHWH (cf. KJV, ASV, RSV);13 
                                           
6 Stephen Geller, ‘The God of the Covenent,’ in B. N. Porter (ed.), One God or Many? Concepts of 
Divinity in the Ancient World, Chebeague, ME: Casco Bay Assyriological Institute, 2000, 290. 
7 In contrast to the way that ‘identifies a concern for the “oneness” of Israel’s God squarely within Israel’s 
religious history and at the heart of the covenant traditions.’ Janzen, ‘Most,’ 280f. 
8 As observed by Janzen, ‘Most,’ 280 and 297. 
9 As noted two decades later by Briggs, One, 11. 
10 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 76. 
11 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 440. 
12 The Tetragrammaton is used in the translations given on the list only for the sake of discussion, 
especially to maintain its particularity. 
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(b) YHWH our God, YHWH is one (cf. JPS, NIV, NKJV, ESV);14 
(c) YHWH is our God, YHWH alone (cf. NRSV, NJPS, NLT);15 
(d) YHWH is our God, YHWH is one (cf. NASB).16 
 
Six observations can be made regarding these four various translations which may serve 
as a preparation for engaging with underlying arguments. First, whilst the renderings are 
diverse, they are all of the three words: YHWH (הוהי), our God (וניהלא), one (דחא), only 
with the first occurring twice. The second is that one particular area of the translational 
variation is the syntactical relation of the four Hebrew words. As for the first two words, 
YHWH and our God, there is little disagreement concerning their meanings, yet there 
are differences as to how they are syntactically related, the question being whether they 
are in a subject-predicate relation (YHWH is our God) or an apposition relation 
(YHWH, our God). Thirdly, then, what we have is either two nominal clauses put in 
sequence as in the translation (d) or one nominal clause with three possibilities as to 
subject and predicate as in (a), (b) and (c), providing one of the translations is correct. 
Fourthly, the last word דחא (“one”) is another cause of variation, not only syntactically 
but also semantically, providing us with two questions as to whether it is a sole 
predicate or a second predicate and in what sense it is used. Fifthly, all four translations 
on the list have the word “one” directly connected to YHWH, and only indirectly to 
God, implying that the “one God” language commonly used in the NT scholarship is not 
an exact representation of the terminology of the Shema.17 Finally, there are changes in 
translation that accompany the movements from old versions to new ones, which is for 
me hermeneutically significant as movements towards the meaning of the text. For 
                                                                                                                           
13 King James Version, Cambridge: Joseph Bentham Printer, 1769; American Standard Version, New 
York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1901; and Revised Standard Version, New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 
1952. Also, “der HERR, unser Gott, ist ein einiger HERR” (Luther Bible) and “Yahweh our God is the 
one Yahweh” (JB). Cf. S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1969, 89. 
14 Jewish Publication Society of America Version, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 
1917; New International Version, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1978; New King James Version, 
Nashville et al: Thomas Nelson, 1982; and English Standard Version, Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001. 
Likewise, “κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν κύριος εἷς ἐστιν” (LXX), and “Dominus Deus noster Dominus unus est” 
(VUL). Cf. Nathan MacDonald, Deuteronomy and the Meaning of “Monotheism,” Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2003, 59. 
15 New Jewish Publication of Society of America Version, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of 
America, 1985; New Revised Standard Version, Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1989; and New Living 
Translation, Cambridge: Tyndale, 1996. Cf. Tigay, Deuteronomy, 76; S. Dean McBride, “The York of the 
Kingdom: An exposition of Deut 6:4–5,” Interpretation 27 (3), 1973, 274; D. L. Christensen, 
Deuteronomy 1—11, Dallas: Word Books, 1991, 142. 
16 New American Standard Bible, Nashville et al: Thomas Nelson, 1977. Cf. Ephraim E. Urbach, The 
Sages: their Concepts and Beliefs, tr. Israel Abrahams, Jerusalem: the Hebrew University, 1979, 20. 
17 An exception is “Our one God is the LORD, the LORD,” suggested by F. I. Andersen, The Hebrew 
Verbless Clause in the Pentateuch, New York, Nashville: Abingdon, 1970, 17, as introduced by C. L. 
Miller, Verbless Clause in Biblical Hebrew: Linguistic Approaches, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1999, 
5. 
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example, KJV has moved from (a) to (b) in NKJV, RSV from (a) to (c) in NRSV, ASV 
from (a) to (d) in NASB, and JPS from (b) to (c) in NJPS. 
 
7.1.1. The syntactical 
Focus here is the grammatical and contextual relations of the four words in Deut 6:4 
that have given rise to various translations. The argument being developed here is that it 
is best to interpret them as constituting two verbless clauses, with one subject (YHWH), 
which is repeated for a reason, and two predications (our God and One), thus “YHWH 
is our God” for Deut 6:4b (וניהלא הוהי) and “YHWH is One” for 6:4c (דחא הוהי). This 
interpretation is least preferred, even among the NT scholars.18 It can be supported, 
nonetheless, by the following five considerations, the fifth being the meaning of the 
word “דחא” that will be explored separately in the subsequent section. 
 
Four words, two clauses 
Janzen correctly understands Deut 6:4 in terms of ‘the dependable ground upon which 
an exhortation to wholehearted loyalty may appropriately be made,’19 given what 
follows in verse 5 (‘You shall love YHWH your God with all your heart, and with all 
your soul, and with all your might’). While it is possible to find that ground in the 
statement “YHWH our God is one,” as Janzen does, there is a problem with that 
interpretation: it makes the second YHWH grammatically redundant or as an emphatic 
repetition. This is hardly acceptable, considering that what Israel is to hear, the object of 
the imperative עַמְש, is not “דחא וניהלא הוהי” but “דחא הוהי וניהלא הוהי.” Treating one of the 
“four” words as not essential to the meaning of the text of which the word itself is an 
important part appears to be too great a price to pay. The same goes with the 
interpretations of the Shema by Geller and Moberly, as they argue that there is only one 
predicate in the Shema and that is the last word “one.” In this case, as Tigay points out, 
‘“YHVH our God is one” would have sufficed.’20 It is not abnormal but more natural 
than other suggestions that the first YHWH leads the same construct as the second. We 
will keep getting back to this matter of double use of YHWH. The initial point to be 
made here is that YHWH being “our God” and YHWH being “one” both need to be 
                                           
18 NT scholars work with different translations of Deut 6:4. With (a), for example, D. J. Moo, The Epistle 
to the Romans, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996, 251f; with (b), Bauckham, Jesus, 181 and 185; with (c), 
D. J. A. Fitzmyer, S.J., Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, New York et al: 
Doubleday, 1993, 365; and, with (d), M. Nanos, The Mystery of Romans, Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996, 
181 and 185. In Gunton’s case, both (a) and (b) are found, even a single work (CF 183 and 83). 
19 Janzen, ‘Most,’ 281. 
20 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 439. 
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given due consideration, each as a possible ground on which the call to love for YHWH 
in verse 5 stands. 
 
YHWH is our God 
As a statement that can be made by the first two words, “YHWH is our God” must be a 
sufficient ground for the call to love him wholeheartedly, at least more than “YHWH 
our God is one,” more so if the latter means the word “one” in a numerical sense. Be 
that as it may, the upholders of the translations (a) and (b) have a justifiable reason, that 
in most Deuteronomic parallels the words “YHWH” and “our/your God” stand in 
apposition to each other, rather than as subject and predication.21 This observation, 
however, does not necessarily support their choice because it faces us with two options: 
to interpret the words of the Shema in the same way as in others; or treat the Shema as 
an exception to the general rule. Preference, here, will be given to the second 
interpretation that takes the two words of Deut 6:4b as in a subject and predicate 
relationship: not simply by treating the Shema as an exception to the general rule but by 
showing its difference from other examples that make the rule. For example, while 
“YHWH” and “our/your God” in all the parallels function as a noun phrase (e.g., Deut 
4:10; 7:6; 12:12 et al), meaning that they always go together, the text under discussion is 
part of verbless clause(s) whose syntax is still in debate, with questions over which one 
is the predicate.22 More importantly, while the two words are appositional to each other 
in most parallels, as pointed out already, what we have in Deut 6:4 is not “YHWH/our 
God” but “YHWH/our God/YHWH.” Statistically considered, “YHWH” and “our God” 
should be seen as the two words in an appositional relation.23 Yet, statistically speaking 
again, there is no parallel to “YHWH” and “our God” and “YHWH” coming in as a 
single subject. Further, it is hardly satisfactory to treat the repetition of YHWH as a 
matter of customary idiom, as done by Moberly.24 Nor is to interpret it as part of the 
casus pendens, thus ‘As for the LORD our God, the LORD is one.’25 This may be a neat 
solution to the problem of the recurring YHWH—if it is indeed a problem, yet the 
translation which begins with a conjunction sounds too awkward to come after the 
                                           
21 Cf. Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–11, New York et al: Doubleday, 1991, 337; Miller, Verbless, 4; 
Tigay, Deuteronomy, 439; Moberly, ‘YHWH,’ 78f. 
22 Cf. Moberly, ‘YHWH,’ 75; Miller, Verbless, 4. 
23 Moberly argues, from the statistics that in 312 instances where YHWH and God are juxtaposed, the two 
words are always in apposition, ‘in the 313th instance, i.e. Deut 6:4, the same idiom should be discerned’ 
(‘YHWH,’ 79). 
24 Moberly, ‘YHWH,’ 80. This will be discussed in the next section. 
25 Jacob Hoftijzer, ‘The Nominal Clause Reconsidered,’ Vetus Testamentum 23, 1973, 484. Cf. also, 
MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 70. 
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imperative ‘Hear, O Israel,’ let alone that it does not have a parallel in Deuteronomy 
either. Furthermore, there are a handful of cases in which “YHWH” and “God” occur as 
subject and predicate, though divided by the pronoun “he” ( הוא ), to form a ground of 
what follows.26 As is said in Deut 4:39, for example, “YHWH, he is God (םיהלאה אוה 
הוהי),” followed by an exhortation to keep his decrees and commands.27 This is not an 
exact parallel to the wording in Deut 6:4, as noted by Moberly, yet at least it has a 
parallel structure in which “YHWH is God” is the ground for something, here 
obedience to his commands and in 6:4 total commitment to him, a point that is not 
considered by Moberly.28 It does provide support to an interpretation of the two words 
of 6:4b as constituting a nominal clause functioning as a ground for what follows in 
verse 5 (“YHWH is our God, so love him …”).29 The point here is that “YHWH” being 
“our/your God” should be such a condition for the kind of covenant love demanded in 
the Shema as that it can hardly be appropriate to put the words in apposition just 
because that is the case in general. In addition, in an important sense, the statement 
“YHWH our God is one” is different from “YHWH is our God ….” That is, in the first 
case, “YHWH our God” is a subject and so old information (“old” in the sense of being 
in the position to be predicated of, not the predicate itself) that is predicated by new 
information “one” (“new” in the sense of coming into the position to predicate of the 
known subject). In the second case, on the other, “our God” is new information (“new” 
in the grammatical sense explained above, not in the sense that it is previously 
unknown) so that YHWH being our God can be taken as a proper basis of the 




                                           
26 E.g., Deut 4:35, 39; 7:9; 10:17, 21 et al. These passages are not included in Moberly’s list of parallels, 
the reason being that the two words “YHWH” and “our/your/my God” in them are not directly juxtaposed 
but separated by the insertion of the pronoun “he,” thus not exact parallels to Deut 6:4. 
27 The nuance of םיהלאה will be discussed later. 
28 Another reason for which Moberly dismisses a consideration of “YHWH he our God” passages for 
interpreting Deut 6:4b predicatively is that, while all other parallels are always appositional, Deut 6:4b 
does not have some indication of distinctive usage that one could expect, were that intended, like the 
insertion of the pronoun “he.” 
29 In addition, to indicate the significance of the proposition made of the two words (YHWH is your God) 
for the claim upon Israel to love YHWH, we might include some other Deuteronomy passages which 
contain the theme of the YHWH-and-love-him having only “YHWH your God” (ךיהלא הוהי) in them. Cf. 
6:5; 10:12; 11:1, 13, 22; 13:3; 19:9; 30:6, 16 and 20. 
30 For the use of the terms of pragmatics in this study, such as “presupposition” and “assertion,” cf. 
George, Yule, Pragmatics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 25f; Robert C. Stalnaker, Context and 
Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, chs.2 
& 4. 
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YHWH is One 
The interpretation of the first two words of Deut 6:4 as subject and predicate leaves us 
with two options about how to understand the relation of the remaining two words of 
the verse in relation to them. One is, like translation (c), to interpret them as a non-
clausal qualification of what has just been said (“YHWH is our God”), thus meaning 
that YHWH alone, or only YHWH, is our God. The other is, like translation (d), to 
construe them as constituting a verbless clause, grammatically independent from the 
first (YHWH is our God), with its own subject and predicate, thus “YHWH is one.” The 
first option is taken by a majority of contemporary English translations and preferred by 
several scholars.31 Thus, Tigay concludes his consideration of three different 
translations on the basis of present evidence by saying that ‘translation (1) [(c) in our 
list] seems the most likely.’32 For Moberly, however, this interpretation involves two 
mistaken judgements about the Hebrew. To introduce the second first—because it is 
already touched on in the previous discussion and the first is more relevant to the next 
discussion, it is possible to take “our God” as the predicate of “YHWH,” yet a survey of 
Deuteronomic usage shows that the two words are always in apposition and never in a 
relationship of subject and predicate.33 If Moberly is correct in applying this observation 
to coming up with his preferred translation (“YHWH our God, YHWH is one”) then he 
would need to explain the repetition of YHWH in reply to Tigay’s point that the 
translation leaves the second YHWH superfluous. His explanation is that the name 
YHWH is used twice because the writer wanted to say “YHWH is one” but also 
introduce the name in his customary idiomatic way, “YHWH our God.”34 This 
explanation is not very satisfactory, let alone being too speculative though based on 
evidence, because it makes the first two words irrelevant or secondary, at least 
grammatically, to the overall meaning of Deut 6:4. Yet, to repeat, the statement that 
YHWH is our God can hardly be in a secondary position in demanding such a 
wholehearted love for YHWH as expressed in Deut 6:5.35 That should be the case even 
if the two words are in apposition, as pointed out by Moberly that ‘that exclusive 
relationship is indeed presupposed by the words “YHWH our God”.’36 To be reminded, 
however, what is presupposed belongs to old information, and so is not directly active in 
making a connection with the immediately following sentence. In Moberly’s translation, 
                                           
31 Moberly’s observation in ‘YHWH,’ 77. For the list of scholars, see Tigay, Deuteronomy, 439f. 
32 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 440. 
33 Moberly, ‘YHWH,’ 79f 
34 Moberly, ‘YHWH,’ 80. 
35 See the argument developed just above under Four words, two clauses. 
36 Moberly, ‘YHWH,’ 81 
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therefore, while the statement “YHWH is one” connects with the claim to the total love 
of YHWH, “YHWH is our God” remains at the background like a further qualification 
of YHWH. However, the call to love YHWH in Deut 6:5 requires such a ground as that 
YHWH is our/your God, which necessitates that the first two words “YHWH” and “our 
God,” even if translated as appositional, be maintained on the same level with “YHWH 
is one,” as in the translation (d).37 Therefore, unlike Moberly, we shall take “our God” 
as the predicate of the first YHWH and yet, like him, we shall take the word “one” as 
the predicate of the second YHWH, although the discussion of the meaning of דחא in 
Deut 6:4 may lead to a different conclusion than his.38 
 
YHWH, God of Israel, YHWH, God of the whole world 
Before we move on to the discussion of the meaning of דחא in the Shema, let us explore 
an explanation of the relation between the two statements made of the four words, 
namely “YHWH is our God” and “YHWH is one.” For a better result of this part of 
discussion, it is advisable not to bring a predetermined meaning of דחא into discussion, 
whether it is “one” or “alone,” because it might affect our analysis.39 Let us suppose that 
the meaning of דחא is unknown—not so much because we do not know the literal 
meaning of the word but because there are so many suggestions that need to be 
discussed, and put it “b” in comparison to the uncontroversial meaning of “our God” for 
which we have “a.” Using these symbols, we have “YHWH is a; YHWH is b.” By this 
we can see that the same subject (YHWH) is expressed in two different ways (a and b), 
a structure similar to Hebrew parallelism in which one idea is expressed in two different 
ways for different purposes.40  If “a” and “b” are related to each other in signification, 
both as predicates of the subject YHWH, we might get close to the meaning of the 
unknow information “b” by moving from the known “a.” If “a” is something about what 
or who YHWH is, for example, “b” would be concerned with information of the same 
category. It is unlikely, however, that the content of “b” is the same as that of “a” or the 
                                           
37 This translation is actually on Moberly’s list of four translations of Deut 6:4 as the fourth one, only 
though that he does not discuss it separately but includes its discussion in his arguments against the 
interpretation of the first two words as subject and predicate, arguments that need to be reconsidered 
against the points made in our discussion. 
38 As is found in R. W. L. Moberly, ‘Towards an Interpretation of the Shema,’ in Christopher R. Seitz, 
Brevard S. Childs & Kathryn Greene-McCreight, Theological Exegesis: Essays in honor of Brevard S. 
Childs, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998, 132f. 
39 As we saw, for those like Moberly who take the Hebrew word in a numerical sense, דחא tends to be the 
predicate, whereas for those like Tigay who take it in a relative sense, as a qualifying description of 
YHWH, “our God” is the predicate. See, e.g., Tigay, Deuteronomy, 439, where he rejects a translation 
that has “one” as the predicate on the basis of his understanding of the meaning of דחא. 
40 For a brief introduction to Hebrew parallelism, see W. G. E. Watson, Classical Hebrew Poetry: A Guide 
to its Techniques, Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1984, 114–59. 
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former is less than the latter in significance; they should be at least different in content, 
though may be the same or increased in significance. The question, then, is what 
YHWH would be other than “our God” that its declaration can be a ground on which to 
demand a total love for him. The best candidate, which will be proposed in the 
following discussion of the meaning of the “one,” is something of “God of all peoples” 
or “God of the whole world.”  
 
If that is the case, then a better parallel to the syntax of “YHWH our God YHWH one” 
in Deut 6:4 than considered by Moberly would be that of “YHWH your God he [the] 
God” in Deut 7:9. The literal translation of the last word in the second verse is “the 
God” (םיִהלֱֹאָה), which is normally used in a context in which YHWH is proclaimed as 
the true God.41 Indeed, with or without the article ( ָה), םיִהלֱֹא means “God” as the subject 
of a singular verb.42 Yet, when used with the article without appositives or descriptive 
phrases following, םיִהלֱֹאָה needs to be understood as having a specified sense, like when 
followed by possessive pronouns or nouns like in “our/your/my God” or “God of 
Israel.”43 The question is whether there is a better sense for that than “God of all” or 
“God of all nations,” as suggested above and explored below.44 Here suffice it to look at 
1 Kings 18, where the repeated “YHWH, he is [the] God” in verse 39 is a response to 
Elijah’s challenge in verse 12, ‘if YHWH is [the] God, follow him; but if Baal, follow 
him.’45 In that sense, the “one” in Deut 6:4 and “[the] God” in Deut 7:9 (cf. 4:39) are 
mutually illuminating, both in syntax and semantics. Thus, with the help from the latter, 
we might paraphrase our translation of the former as “YHWH is our God; YHWH is 
God of the whole world.” With this understanding of “one” in place, translations like (c) 
                                           
41 Cf. R. L. Harris, Gleason L. Archer Jr., and B. K. Waltke (eds), Theological Wordbook of The Old 
Testament, Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1980, 93. 
42 After considering 1 Kings 18 in a similar way to that presented below, MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 80 
complicates the matter by suggesting a rendering of םיִהלֱֹאָה as “God” while rendering םיִהלֱֹא as “god” or “a 
god,” appearing to show the limit of his interpretation of the oneness of YHWH in terms of uniqueness. In 
Genesis 1:1, for example, we have םיִהלֱֹא, without the definite article, yet it does not help much to 
translate it as ‘In the beginning [a] god created the heavens and the earth.’ The result would be better if 
we keep the traditional rendering of םיִהלֱֹא as “God” when used of YHWH and to understand םיִהלֱֹאָה as 
having a specific connotation of God. 
43 It is notable that the Hebrew expression of “God of Israel” or “the God of Aram” does not have the 
article prefixed to םיִהלֱֹא. Thus, in 1 Chr 29:10, we have וּניִבָא לֵאָרְשִי יֵהלֱֹא הָוהְי, and, in Jdg 10:6, םָרֲא יֵהלֱֹא. 
without the article ( ָה). 
44 A meaning that, otherwise, would be achieved by םיִהלֱֹא in construct, without the article prefixed yet 
instead followed by appositives or descriptive phrases. Some examples given by Harris, Archer, Jr. and 
Waltke include “God of all the land” (Isa 54:5), “God of all flesh” (Jer. 32:27), “God of heavens” (Neh 
2:4, 20), “YHWH, God of heavens” (Gen 24:7) and “God of gods and Lord of Lords” (Deut 10:17). 
45 In NRSV’s translation of 1 Kg 18:39, “the LORD indeed is God,” is slightly different from RSV’s and 
most other versions’ “the LORD, he is God.” Perhaps, the difference indicates a decision that the old 
version is not sufficient. In my view, however, even the new version does not fully represent the delicacy 
that might be involved in the Hebrew expression “םיִהלֱֹאָה אוּה הָוהְי.” 
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on our list, “YHWH our God, he is one” or even “YHWH our God is one” would also 
be acceptable as the intended meaning. 
 
7.1.2. The semantic 
There are various suggestions concerning the meaning of “דחא” in Deut 6:4. Among 
them are the following five: “one” (numerical), “alone” or “only,” “supreme” or 
“unparalleled,” “unity” and “One” (nominal).46  
 
One (numerical) 
The first to consider is the interpretation of דחא in Deut 6:4 in the numerical sense of 
“one,” and not two, three or many.47 Most modern scholars are aware of the limit of this 
sense. As George Knight comments, ‘It is only too easy in this scientific age to take for 
granted that its significance is exhausted when it is understood mathematically.’48 ‘It 
can,’ Knight continues, ‘and does represent the idea of mathematical oneness, but at the 
same time that of comprehensiveness.’49 Yet it is not the numerical sense of דחא that 
Knight disapproves so much as the limitation or exhaustion of its meaning to that sense. 
Likewise, for Stephen Geller, the numerical sense of “one” is a least possibility as the 
meaning of דחא. He rather prefers a qualitative sense, as we will see, yet he also notices 
the irreducibility of the numerical by admitting that ‘there is a tension between the two 
nuances.’50 In modern context, then, it is arguable that while the meaning of דחא is not 
limited to a numerical sense of “one,” that will remain as the basic sense of the word 
used in Deut 6:4, though whether it is restrictive or productive of other senses is another 
matter.51 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Deut 6:4 has been the benchmark for Jewish and 
Christian arguments for monotheism. The Shema, as Tigay comments, ‘became the 
preeminent expression of monotheism,’ due to the word “דחא” whose numerical sense 
“one” makes it ‘a suitable response to the many theological challenges that Jewish 
                                           
46 A similar list of interpretations is found in MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 69f; Erik Waaler, The Shema and 
the first commandment in first Corinthians, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008, 105, where the fifth meaning 
is simply a “name for God.” 
47 Cf. G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren (eds), Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament 
Volume I, tr. John T. Willis, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1974, 193f. 
48 George R. Knight, ‘The Lord is One,’ Expository Times 79, 1968, 8. Cf. also, Geller, ‘God,’ 290–302. 
49 Knight, ‘The Lord,’ 9. 
50 Geller, ‘God,’ 294. 
51 In the ancient world, as commonly known, numbers have special qualities, and the numerical “1” will 
be the official name of God in the end days, according to C. H. Gordon, ‘His Name is “One”,’ Journal of 
Near Eastern Studies 29, 1970, 198–9. 
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monotheism confronted throughout history.’52 However, that is a general use of the 
Shema, and whether the meaning of the word “דחא” agrees with that use is a matter of 
discussion. Tigay himself is of the opinion that the Shema began as ‘a declaration of 
allegiance rather than of monotheism.’53 While we shall keep with the sematic 
investigation, there are two comments that can be made here about Jewish and Christian 
use of the Shema for a monotheistic argument. Firstly, as noted previously, in the Shema 
the word דחא (“one”) is directly linked with “YHWH,” and only indirectly with “God.” 
An implication is that the primary purpose of the word in Deut 6:4 is perhaps not to do 
with “one God” in the sense of mono-theism. Tigay affirms, as noted above, ‘the Shema 
is not a declaration of monotheism.’54 Yet it is only because of the word דחא that 
normally means “one” in numerical sense that the Shema has come to be understood as 
a “preeminent” expression of monotheism and to be used as a “proper” response to 
various challenges to the theology understood that way. Secondly, if the Shema was 
indeed meant to be a statement of monotheism, meaning that there is only one God, 
YHWH, and no one else in the whole world, Christian theology would be among those 
challenges against which Tigay says the Shema was used in Judaism: ‘in the face of 
Zoroastrian and Gnostic dualism it meant one, not two; in the face of Christian 
trinitarianism it meant one, not three; and in the face of atheism, one and not none.’ 55  
 
Alone or unique 
Tigay brings in a different kind of monotheism, close to monolatry or even henotheism, 
by interpreting Deut 6:4 as ‘a description of the proper relationship between YHVH and 
Israel: He alone is Israel’s God.’56 This can be treated as a “weak” monotheism in which 
the existence of the other gods for other nations is neither denied nor approved, in 
comparison to a “strong” or “strict” monotheism according to which there is one God 
and no other gods exist.57 The emphasis is rather that there is no other God for Israel but 
YHWH. In other words, ‘Yahweh is the one and only God for Israel. … Yahweh 
is ’echadh, “one,” with regard to the one who is addressed, viz., “Israel.” … As the God 
                                           
52 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 440. 
53 Ibid. Tigay also informs that in an unpublished writing (‘Why the Shema?’) J. Satlow also observes, 
‘Deut 6:4–9 is a more suitable expression of Israelite belief than the Bible’s explicit declarations of 
monotheism because it expresses the one God’s connection to Israel as well as a fuller range of religious 
thought’ (Deuteronomy, 531 n. 17). 
54 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 76.  
55 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 440. 
56 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 76. 
57 Cf. MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 72. 
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whom Israel loves, Yahweh is Israel’s only one and unique one.’58 The sense of דחא 
corresponding to this interpretation is then “only” or “alone.” Hence Tigay’s translation: 
‘the LORD is our God, the LORD alone.’59 One difficulty of this interpretation is, as 
noted by Tigay himself, that ‘Hebrew normally expresses “alone” with levad-, as in 
“You alone [levadekha] are God of all the kingdoms of the earth” (2 Kings 19:15,19; cf. 
v. 19 and Ps.86:10).’60 Another is that while it is possible to interpret דחא as “alone,” 
that sense is otherwise unparalleled in the OT, as well pointed out by Moberly. He 
examines the five passages that are used in support of the interpretation of “one” as 
“alone,”61 concluding that ‘none of these is a clear example, and in all of them ’eḥad 
probably retains its basic meaning of numerical singularity.’62 
 
Moshe Weinfeld, for whom ‘lĕbaddo is an adverb and thus inappropriate in a nominal 
sentence,’63 argues that the דחא in the Shema demands it to be understood as meaning 
“one,” “sole,” “single,” even “exclusive.” He likens the ‘love of God with one’s whole 
entity, to the exclusion of any rival to that love’ to the ‘love of a woman for her husband 
and of a father for his son.’64 Whilst Weinfeld notes that there is no explicit notion of 
exclusiveness attested in the Shema,65 as in other passages,66 and that it is during the 
Exile that the monotheistic consciousness sharpened and came to full expression,67 he 
argues, nevertheless, that the דחא statement of the Shema still implies monotheism. As 
such, coming to full expression of monotheism in the Exilic period does not mean that 
the concept of monotheism was created then.68 There is no need to refute this because, 
as we saw, the numerical sense of דחא is in the Shema and it will remain so. The 
questions raised are whether aloneness or uniqueness is the primary sense of the “one” 
in Deut 6:4 and whether the meaning of דחא is limited to that sense in that context. 
                                           
58 TDOT, vol. 1., 196. Cf. also, MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 84f, which interprets even Deut 4:35 and 36 in 
the same light. 
59 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 76 and 439f. 
60 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 439. 
61 Isa 52:2; Ezek 33:24, 37:22; Zech 14:9; 1 Chr 29:1, as cited by A. D. H. Mayes, Deuteronomy, Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979, 176. 
62 Moberly, ‘YHWH,’ 77f. 
63 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, 337f. 
64 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, 350. Cf. also, M. Weinfeld, ‘The Covenant of Grant in the OT and in the 
Ancient Near East,’ Journal of the American Oriental Society 90, 1970, 184–203; W. L. Moran, ‘The 
Ancient Near Eastern Background of Love of God in Deuteronomy,’ Catholic Biblical Quarterly 25, 1963, 
77–87; and Y. Muffs, Love and Joy: Law, Language and Religion in Ancient Israel, New York and 
Jerusalem: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1992. 
65 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, 338. 
66 E.g., Deut 4:35; Isa 44:6; 45:6, 14, 18, 22; 46:9; 1 Kgs 8:60; 2 Kgs 19:15, 19, as mentioned in Weinfeld, 
Deuteronomy, 349. 
67 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, 349f. 
68 Ibid. As earlier literature he has in mind 1 Kgs 18:39; 2 Kgs 5:15; Deut 7:9; 10:17. 
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Weinfeld’s answer is positive. Interestingly, however, his translation is close to 
translation (a), with “one YHWH,”69 when his argument would rather go better with 
translation (c), with “YHWH alone.” The reason of this choice is that the first two 
words YHWH and our God stand in apposition to each other and together constitute the 
subject, the same observation considered above in the discussion of the syntax. The 
question is how his choice of ‘one YHWH’ goes with the great emphasis he puts on 
monotheism, because the translation, “one YHWH,” conveys an implication of the 
existence of many YHWHs.70 Weinfeld says, ‘whether the unity of YHWH in Deut 6:4 
is intended to exclude the existence of local manifestations of YHWH’s is a moot 
question.’71 The reason is that ‘this phenomenon is never brought up as an argument in 
the issue of unification of worship,’72 and ‘the fragmentation of YHWH into numerous 
deities is never explicitly recognized as a problem.’73 Upon this notion of one YHWH in 
many manifestations, we can say that Weinfeld’s monotheism has a conception of 
‘unity’ that is not unitary but manifold. The problem for us is that his translation 
maintains that sense by altering a proper name (YHWH) into a common name. If his 
interpretation is correct we would have to conclude that there are two senses of דחא at 
work in the Shema (“sole” and “unity”) and that the oneness of YHWH is affirmed not 
vis-à-vis other gods so much as in view of the manyness of local features of YHWH. 
While the former may be acceptable, providing the meaning of דחא is not limited to 
numerical oneness in its narrowest sense, the latter can hardly be adequate in the context 
of Deuteronomy.74   
 
Supreme 
A qualitative sense of דחא is introduced by Geller who interprets its use in Deut 6:4 as 
‘supreme’ or ‘unparalleled.’75 As he argues, against monotheistic interpretations, ‘’eḥād 
does not, in fact, bear this meaning [“alone”], for which there is in Hebrew a perfectly 
good term, lĕbaddô.’76 Geller does not substantiate his argument, while there are others 
                                           
69 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, 337. 
70 For a short treatment of the idea of YHWHs of many places (YHWH of Samaria, YHWH of Teman, 
etc.), see also Tigay, Deuteronomy, 439. 
71 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, 350. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. Cf. S. Dean Jr., McBride, ‘The York of the Kingdom: An exposition of Deuteronomy 6:4–5,’ 
Interpretation 27, 1973, 295. 
74 See Geller, ‘God,’ 290f. 
75 Geller, ‘God,’ 290–302. There are only two nuances in Geller’s consideration: numerical and qualitative. 
This leads him to treat “alone” as a numerical sense. Although he shows awareness of the difference in 
nuance between them as in “He is one” and “He is alone,” this remains only implicit and is not actually 
taken into account in his discussion. 
76 Geller, ‘God,’ 290f.  
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who include ‘alone’ among the senses of דחא.77 Besides, as noted previously, ‘lĕbaddo 
as an adverb would be inappropriate in a nominal clause.78 There are two examples 
Geller uses for his argument, which however do not appear to support his interpretation. 
In the case of 2 Samuel 7:22 (ץֶרָאָב דָחֶא יוֹגּ),79 while the sense of “supreme” may be 
implicit for YHWH, as for the nation “one” or “only” appears to sit there more 
comfortably than “supreme.” Within the Deuteronomist context, at least, YHWH did not 
go out to redeem Israel through great and awesome wonders because Israel was the 
most supreme and best of people.80 The verse can be better used as an example showing 
a use of דחא in numerical sense, involving neither an exclusion of the existence of other 
peoples nor an implication that Israel is ‘the only people in the world.’81 In the second 
case, Song of Songs 6:9 ( יִתָמַת יִתָנוֹי איִה תַחַא הָּמִאְל איִה תַחַא ), Geller interprets דחא in terms 
of ‘unique, supreme, the best.’82 Moberly and MacDonald appeal to the same text for a 
similar interpretation.83 The problem is that Geller understands it also in the sense of 
‘one and only, beloved.’84 The question here is not whether דחא can have both meanings 
or not, but whether such senses as “unique,” “only” and “beloved” can be better 
grouped with “supreme” or with “alone” or “one.” If the latter is the case, as it appears, 
Geller has weakened his own argument against monotheistic interpretations. 
 
Yet Geller introduces another sense of דחא by saying that ‘under the guise of declaring 
God’s oneness, what is also, or really, being demanded is that one achieve unity of the 
self, both of one’s mind (“heart,” lēb) and one’s appetites/emotions/life (nepeš), through 
singular attachment to God.’85 The point gets clearer with his further comments that 
‘covenant religion is premised on a new, unitary view of the individual’ and that ‘the 
one self needed a single God to comprehend itself by projecting itself onto that new 
                                           
77 Cf. TDOT, vol. 1., 194; Knight, ‘Lord,’ 8.  
78 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy, 235f. 
79 The reference should be corrected to 7:23, not 7:22. 
80 See, for example, Deut 7:7–8 and 9:4–6 where it is explicitly stated that YHWH did not choose Israel 
because they were more numerous (or, by implication, greater or stronger) than other peoples or because 
of Israel’s righteousness, but on account of his promise to Abraham and the wickedness of the great and 
strong nations of the land. To be sure, Israel is sometimes referred to as a “supreme” or “great” nation by 
other nations or by herself (e.g. Deut 4:6, 7; 26:5). For two reasons, however, they cannot be taken to be 
supportive of Geller’s using of 2 Sam 7:23 for his interpretation of the Shema. On the one hand, the 
Hebrew word used in them is not דחא but לודג. On the other, in almost all cases, Israel sees other nations 
as “greater,” “larger” and “stronger” (e.g. Deut 4:38; 7:1, 17; 9:1; 11:23, to name a few around the 
Shema). 
81 As it concerns Geller, for whom his ‘the one people of the earth’ is equivalent to “the only people in the 
world” here. Cf. ‘God,’ 291. 
82 Geller, ‘God,’ 292. 
83 Moberly, ‘Interpretation,’ 132; MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 74. 
84 Geller, ‘God,’ 293. 
85 Geller, ‘God,’ 295. 
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concept of divinity. The great individual, the true personality of the Hebrew Bible, is 
God, a self whose unity also allows great complexity, just as the newly apprehended 
unity of the human self did.’86 Now, maintaining focus on semantics, we have three 
senses of דחא at work in Geller—“supreme,” “single” or “unitary” and “unity that 
allows complexity.” Again, the question is not whether the Hebrew word דחא can have 
different senses, but how such distinct senses can be considered as the meaning of the 
word used once in a single passage and whether Geller has a conception whereby to 
have them all. 
 
Unity 
As the meaning of דחא, Janzen considers a different kind of unity than we saw in Geller, 
that is, “a moral unity.” He summarises various construals of the word in two kinds: (a) 
it says something about Israel’s God in se; or, (b) something about the claim of this God 
upon Israel. The former goes with the interpretation of Deut 6:4 as containing an 
affirmation to Israel about what or who YHWH is (e.g., “YHWH is one”), while the 
latter goes with a claim upon Israel for exclusive covenant loyalty to YHWH (e.g., 
“YHWH is our God, YHWH alone”).87 Janzen posits that ‘the claim upon Israel to love 
Yahweh its God with all its heart and soul and strength follows upon an affirmation to 
Israel that Yahweh is ’eḥād, “one”.’88 In other words, ‘the demands of the covenant are 
rooted in the affirmation of the identity and character of the God who establishes the 
covenant.’89 Janzen refers to Patrick Miller’s saying, ‘it is as the God who sets an 
afflicted and enslaved people free that the Lord creates and claims a relationship with 
the people.’90 Thus, for Janzen, the “YHWH one” refers to YHWH’s ‘integrity or a 
moral unity’—a ‘unity between desire and action, between intention and execution.’91 
This unity, understood in the sense of ‘fidelity’ and ‘integrity,’ according to Janzen, 
becomes a burning issue under the vicissitudes of Israel’s history, creating a crisis 
within Israel—a crisis that can be resolved either to a turn to other gods or a re-
affirmation of the unity. ‘It is as one such re-affirmation that we are to hear the word, 
                                           
86 Geller, ‘God,’ 302. 
87 Janzen, ‘Most,’ 280. 
88 Janzen, ‘Most,’ 281. 
89 Janzen, ‘Most,’ 281f. To put in a fuller form, the “identity” of Israel’s God is the ground of the 
“redemption” of Israel from Egypt which, in turn, is the ground of the “covenant” at Sinai. 
90 Miller, ‘Most,’ 20, as cited in Janzen, op. cit. 281. Emphasis added. 
91 Op. cit. 287, 291. In the absence of more immediate and direct evidence, Janzen appeals to a number of 
texts outside Deuteronomy in order to support his interpretation. The major texts surveyed include (1) 
Exod 3, 22–23; (2) Num 13–14; (3) Hos 1, 11; (4) Job 23:13–14; (5) Jer 32:38–41; and, from within 
Deuteronomy, Deut 7:4, 9. 
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“Yahweh ’eḥād”,’92 that is, ‘faithful [or consistent, or “integrous”, if there were such a 
word].’93 One difficulty with Janzen’s interpretation is how to reconcile his 
understanding of the דחא in the Shema and his explanation of it. That is, while he 
understands the “YHWH one” as saying something about Israel’s God in se (“unity 
within himself”), he explains that in terms of character or attribute (“fidelity” or 
“integrity”). 
 
Jeff Benner presents another approach worth considering at this point when discussing 
the category of unity.94 Holding that דחא is one of the Hebrew words whose Hebraism 
have been lost through its translation into the English “one,” Benner turns for its 
original meaning to the imagery of its parent root (ḥd)—a tent “wall” and “door,” 
explaining that the wall “separates” a tent into two parts while the door “unties” the 
separated parts.95 From this Benner draws out the senses of “separation” and “unity,” 
saying ‘those that are separated come together in unity.’96 He then argues that the דחא in 
Deut 6:4 is better translated as “unity” than “one,” ‘unity within himself’ meaning ‘an 
infinite God that can manifest in many ways, all of which are in unity.’97 This sense of 
unity appears to be closer to answering the question as to who or what YHWH is than 
Janzen’s unity as fidelity, though the latter appears to be better in relation to what 
follows in Deut 6:5. The question here is whether the word “unity” is suitable for 
expressing the meaning of דחא that is explicated by Benner as a concept encompassing 
both senses of “separation” and “unity.” If unity is used in a narrow sense that stands 
next to that of separation it would not be suitable for the purpose intended by Benner as 
the meaning of דחא. If, on the other hand, used in a broader sense encompassing both 
separation and unity then what we have would be another example of using the concept 
of unity twice for different purposes. Even if such a problem be taken out of 
consideration it is still questionable whether “unity within himself” can be a ground for 
such an exclusive loyalty as described in Deut 6:5.  
 
One (nominal) 
Cyrus Gordon offers an interesting suggestion that דחא is a Hebrew name of a particular 
                                           
92 Janzen, op. cit. 282. 
93 Janzen, op. cit. 291.  
94 J. A. Benner, His Name Is One, Zechariah 14:9: An Ancient Hebrew Perspective of the Names of God, 
College Station, TX: Virtualbookworm.com, 2002, 23. 
95 Benner, Name, 20–3. 
96 Benner, Name, 23. 
97 Benner, Name, 24. 
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deity that other nations also had in different names.98 According to a common belief 
among Hebrews, Greeks and other Near Easterners, Gordon explains, God was “One” 
or there was a god called thus. In Mesopotamia, the “One” (written d I), fitting into a 
pattern of deities corresponding to numbers, can designate the god of heaven “Anu.”99 
In Egypt, ‘the great god Amon-Re, Lord of the Universe, was called wc wc (literally 
“one, one”) “the one ‘One’”.’100 In Greece, Xenophanes identified ‘[the] God (ὁ θεός)’ 
with ‘[the] One (τὸ ἕν),’ Parmenides refined the concept, and the Pythagoreans made 
much of the link between numbers and qualities. A detailed discussion of the matter in 
Plotinus’ Enneads has the opening statement that “all things that exist are extant by 
reason of the One”.’101 Gordon applies the same perspective to interpreting the three 
occurrences of “דחא” related to YHWH in the Hebrew Bible: Deut 6:4; Zech 14:9; Job 
23:13.102 As for the first, he says, ‘it is quite possible that דחא means not only that there 
is but one God, but also that his name is דחא “One”.’103 He goes on to say that ‘the 
numerical דחא “1” will be the official name of God in the End of Days.’104 For Gordon, 
therefore, דחא is the name of God for the Hebrew as to hen, wc and d I are for the Greek, 
the Egyptian and the Mesopotamian respectively. If Gordon is correct it would be 
necessary to translate דחא as “One.”  
 
This suggestion, despite general atmosphere of indifference and dismissal,105 makes a 
good sense within the context of the three Hebrew texts considered by him. If, that is to 
say, “One” is a name for God who was well known to the first audience in the sense 
suggested by Gordon, the linking of YHWH with that name would fit well with the 
notions that YHWH is the king of the whole world (Zech 14); that he is in a position to 
demand his people to love him with all their heart, soul and might (Deut 6); and that no 
one can dissuade him (Job 23).106 My concern is only with Gordon’s account of the 
relation of the divine names expressed in his saying, ‘This is the plain sense of the 
                                           
98 Gordon, ‘Name,’ 198–9. 
99 Gordon, ‘Name,’ 198. 
100 Gordon, ‘Name,’ 199. 
101 Gordon, ‘Name,’ 198. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads VI. 9. ‘On “The Good” or “the One.”’ 
102 Gordon’s translation ‘Since He is “One,” who can thwart Him?’ takes the “ב” of “דָחֶאְב” as the “ב of 
predication or equivalence,” as he also finds it in Ps 68:5; Isa 26:4; and Exod 6:3. ‘Name,’ 198 n.1.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Cf. Moberly, ‘YHWH,’ 76 n. 7; Macdonald, Deuteronomy, 70; Waaler, Shema, 102; and D. J. A. Clines, 
Job 21–37, Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 2006, 579. 
106 Many commentators, including Pope (mentioned by Gordon) and Clines (rejecting Gordon’s 
suggestion), prefer to amend דחאב אוהו to רַחָב אוהו. Clines’ translation ‘If he has decided’ might make a 
better sense than Gordon’s ‘Since God is One,’ yet the latter has the advantage that it does not have to 
change the wording of the Masoretic Text, over the former which not only needs an emendation but also it 
needs to find a parallel in which רחב is used in the sense of “determine” without an object following. 
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passage [Zech 14:9], and must in any case be correct because God has not one but many 
names such as El, Elohim, Yahweh, Yah, Adonai, Shaddai, etc.’107 The problem is that if 
YHWH is a name of God, and דחא is another name of the same God, as argued by 
Gordon, the phrase “God is YHWH” or “God is One” would be more commonly 
appearing than the phrase “YHWH is God”108 or “YHWH is One.”109 The point is not to 
disregard Gordon’s discovery of the existence of the common name “One” in the 
ancient world but to highlight that there should be a better way to make sense of it than 
interpreting that there was one and the same God who had different names among 
nations, such as El, Elohim, Yahweh, Adonai, Shaddai, Baal, Anu, Amon-Re, etc., and 
One. Such a notion fails to do justice to the significance of the name “YHWH” for the 
Israelites in comparison to other names,110 let alone the biblical stress on the difference 
of the being of YHWH from that of other gods.111  
 
What Gordon’s comparative study suggests other than his own is an interpretation of the 
דחא (“One”) in Deut 6:4 as a general noun like the word “God” yet having a specified 
sense as Gordon found in the names of the gods of Israel’s neighbours, that is, “God of 
heaven,” “Lord of the universe,” or “the one One.” There are further grounds, in 
addition to those considered thus far, on which this interpretation can stand. First, it is 
not reasonable to think that by דחא Moses and Zechariah are referring YHWH to a 
“particular” deity that is also known in other nations by different names, especially the 
former in the context demanding of Israel an exclusive and wholehearted love for her 
God and the latter in an eschatological vision of the kingdom of Israel in which YHWH 
will be [the] king of the whole world. However, secondly, it is difficult to think that in 
the examples discussed above, especially in Deut 6:4, the meaning of דחא is meant to be 
“mysterious” or “obscure.” Being as it may, it is equally possible that the meaning was 
too “obvious” to the first audience to require an explanation.112 Thirdly, whatever is 
meant by “דחא הוהי” (YHWH one), its meaning must be as significant enough to be the 
basis of the demand for a total loyalty, along with the idea expressed in the phrase or 
                                           
107 Gordon, ‘Name,’ 198. Emphasis added. 
108 Cf. For “YHWH is God,” Josh 22:34; Deut 4:35; 1 Kgs 18:21, 39; 2 Kgs 19:15; Ps 100:3; Jer 10:10 et 
al. In a monotheistic faith, “YHWH is God” would be the same in meaning as “God is YHWH,” except 
that “God” is still more general in signification than “YHWH.” 
109 The three examples considered by Gordon all have ‘YHWH is One” rather than “God is One.” 
110 Cf. Werner H. Schmidt, The Faith of the Old Testament: A History, tr. John Sturdy, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983; Mark S. Smith, The Early History of God: Yahweh and the Other Deities in Ancient 
Israel, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990. 
111 Cf. Exod 15:11; Deut 3:24; 10:7; 2 Kgs 8:23; Neh 9:6; Ps 18:31; 136:2–3 et al. See also above. 
112 ‘[T]he repeated calls to hear or read or obey what is written presuppose that what is written is 
intelligible’ (D. A. Carson, Collected Writings on Scripture, Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010, 180). 
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statement “YHWH [is] our God,” and much more so if the two words of the latter are 
appositional. Numerical singularity, relative uniqueness, qualitative supremacy, or 
ontological unity all can be the basis, yet none of them alone is as strong enough to 
further the import of “YHWH [is] our God” as the “One” understood as a general noun 
for God with a specified sense such as “God of the universe,” “King of the world,” 
“Lord of all nations,” and the like. 
 
7.1.3. Conclusion 
Our discussion of the syntactical and semantics of Deut 6:4 indicates that translation (d), 
“the LORD is our God, the LORD is One,” is the most likely among the four on the list 
given previously, though least popular among scholars and commentators. This 
translation maintains the word “one” (דחא) in parallel to the word “our God” (וניהלא), 
sharing a common subject by YHWH. An implication is that the first word (“one”), 
whatever it means, needs to be grammatically nominal, syntactically predicative, 
semantically relevant to the word “our God” yet different in signification, and 
contextually part of both the object of the injunction to hear and of the ground of the 
demand for a total love for YHWH. The best candidate that meets such requirements is 
“God of the world” or “God of all peoples,” corresponding to “our God,” i.e., “God of 
Israel.” That is a sense that is also mentioned by most NT scholars, as we will see soon, 
only though they draw out the universal concept from the numerical sense of “one.” 
That opens three possibilities to consider as we move onto the discussion of the Shema 
in the NT, in relation to the conclusion that is drawn above: (1) that our conclusion is 
mistaken, because even the NT writers used the “one” language of the Shema in a 
numerical sense, and that is in fact the sense in which the word was used in the original 
context, whatever one might to say otherwise; (2) that our interpretation of Deut 6:4 is 
correct, but the NT writers used it in their own ways; and (3) that the NT writers were 
actually using the Shema in a sense being suggested in this study. 
 
7.2. The Shema in the NT 
While we shall see some of the passages in the NT that are commonly treated as having 
a connection with the Shema,113 it is notable that each of them comes in its own 
complexities. Gal 3:20, for example, while considered to have allusion to the Deut 6:4, 
                                           
113 It is not within the purpose of this study to examine all the passages in the NT that might be related to 
the Shema. For a comprehensive study, cf. Birger Gerhardsson, The Shema in the New Testament: Deut 
6:4–5 in significant passages, Lund: Novapress, 1996. A summary of this through work is found in 
Waaler, Shema, 208–16. 
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has been given more than 300 interpretations.114 ‘It is perhaps ironic,’ comments 
Suzanne Nicholson, ‘that a text describing God’s oneness should have innumerable 
interpretations.’115 Part of the complexity, I suppose, is to do with some apparent 
mismatches between the words in the OT texts and the NT and exegetical failures to pay 
due attention to them. One is a difference noted previously, that while NT writers speak 
always of “one God,” the word “one” in the OT (Deut 6:4 and Zech 14:9) is directly 
connected to “YHWH (or LORD),” and only indirectly to “God (or our God).”116 In 
other words, while the word “one” in the OT texts is used of YHWH (the LORD), the 
NT texts considered to have resemblance to the words of Deuteronomy and Zechariah 
uses the “one” language for “God” rather than “Lord.” Another is that, in the OT, “one” 
is a complement that predicates of “YHWH” but, in the NT, “one” is mostly an 
adjective that qualifies “God.” The third is that while the established theology of the OT 
is that according to which YHWH (the LORD) is God and vice versa, the NT has a 
theology according to which God (the Father) is distinct from the Lord (Jesus Christ). 
These differences, despite their significance for further investigation, tend to fail to be 
noticed by scholars assuming that the Shema is a statement of “monotheism” and it is 
used by the NT writers in that sense.117 The first assumption was addressed in the 
previous section, with the conclusion that, in whatever way Judaism and Christianity 
might have used the Shema, the word “one” in Deut 6:4 itself is better understood as a 
nominal term, specifically referring to the “God of the whole world,” than in a mono-
sense like “alone” or “one.” It is the second assumption to which we now turn, and the 
question is how and in what sense the Shema is used in the NT. 
 
7.2.1. Mark 2:7, James 2:19, 1 Timothy 2:5 and 6:15 
These passages are selected for introducing the question raised above without going into 
much detail over exegetical matters. One is Mark 2:7, “… He is blaspheming; who can 
forgive sins but God alone?” (NASB).118 The Greek structure (εἰ μὴ εἷς ὁ θεός) is a 
preposition followed by a nominal phrase with no “to be” verb in them, thus 
                                           
114 Cf. Ernest de Witt Burton, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1980, 191. 
115 Nicholson, Dynamic, 105. 
116 An exception is the observation of Eric Peterson, taken up by Anthony J. Guerra, ‘The One God Topos 
in Spec. Leg. I.52.,’ in David Lull (ed.), Society of Biblical Literature 1990 Seminar Papers, Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1990, 148–57; Romans and the Apologetic Tradition: The purpose, genre and audience of 
Paul’s letter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, which will be discussed later. 
117 Many scholars, including Dunn, Paul, 31–33, Wright, New Testament, 248; and Bauckham, Jesus, 96. 
118 For a link between this and the Shema, see J. Marcus, ‘Authority to forgive sins upon the Earth: The 
Shema in the Gospel of Mark,’ in W. R. Stegner and C. A. Evans (eds), The Gospels and the Scriptures of 
Israel, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994, 198. 
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grammatically controlling εἷς ὁ θεός not to be translated as a clause like “but God is one” 
but rather as a phrase like “but the one God” or “but God alone.”119 The last is the 
translation preferred by most English translations, yet it needs to be noted that “but God 
alone” corresponds better with “εἰ μὴ μόνος ὁ θεός” in Luke 5:21. It is indeed arguable 
that heis and monos are interchangeable in meaning “alone,” and Luke chose the latter 
only because it is more precise in delivering the common sense.120 Even that is, however, 
a recognition that there is a difference in nuance between the two words.121 To be 
precise, therefore, something essential to the textuality of Mark could be lost if the 
words of Luke 5:21 are brought in for translating the words of Mark 2:7. Matthew, 
interestingly, has neither heis nor monos in reporting the same event but only ‘this man 
is blaspheming,’ without the question following, “who can forgive sins but …” (9:3). 
Perhaps, as commonly noted, ‘“this man is blaspheming” contains the same unavoidable 
implication.’122 Be that as it may, it remains that Matthew does not provide a clue about 
how to interpret εἷς ὁ θεός in Mark 2:7.123 Thus, given the differences between the 
Synoptic parallels, it is recommendable to maintain Markan terminology by “but the 
one God,” rather than glossing it over by “but God alone.” The reason is that while the 
former leaves room for a further investigation into its meaning, the latter will in effect 
close the door to any more enquiries. 
 
An additional passage to consider is Jas 2:19, “You believe that God is one. You do 
well; the demons also believe, and shudder” (NASB).124 “God is one” is one way of 
translating the Greek sentence εἷς ἐστιν ὁ θεός,125 and another is “there is one God.”126 
Both deliver a monotheistic sense, yet there is a difference in that while the latter limits 
the sense to monotheism, the former leaves open a possibility that the word “one” can 
have more than a numerical sense. That said, against a common understanding of the 
expression “God is one” as a “monotheistic” statement,127 one might ask why or on 
                                           
119 Cf. Mark 10:18, for the same syntax and words in Jesus’ mouth. 
120 Marcus, ‘Authority,’ 197f, as noted by K. H. Tan, ‘The Shema and Early Christianity,’ Tyndale Bulletin 
59 (2), 2008, 201. While making an interesting observation that in neither Mark 2:7 and 10:18 is the word 
εἷς really necessary for the sense “except God,” and asking an important question of why Mark has the 
word in the two places, he answer is rather disappointing: ‘because it is the key-word of the Shema.’ 
121 While “alone” is the sole meaning of monos (μόνος), both as adjective and adverb, heis (εἷς) has the 
meaning of the numerical “one” also and others. 
122 Donald A. Hagner, Matthew 1–13, Dallas: Word, 1993, 233. 
123 Hagner, rather, draws the sense of blasphemy in Matthew from the rhetorical question in Mark 2:7b, 
rendering it as ‘who is able to forgive sins but God alone?’ 
124 For this passage being connected to the Shema, see Ralph P. Martin, James, Nashville: Thomas Nelson 
Publishers, 2010, 77. 
125 Cf. ASV, RSV and ESV. 
126 Cf. KJV and NIV. 
127 E.g., Martin, James, 77. 
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what ground we are then to think the demons believe and shudder at God being one 
(“one” in the numerical sense). The question is whether it is not more reasonable to 
think that the demons shudder because they know the identity of the one they face rather 
than because they know God is one in number or there is only one God in the world.128 
The two are closely related, and the latter is not implausible, yet notable is that demons’ 
responses described in other places of the NT are usually concerned with the identity of 
the one confronting them.129 In Mark 5, for example, a man with an evil spirit, comes to 
Jesus to plead with him not to torment him, calling Jesus, “the Son of the Most High 
God” (v 7), using the title “the Most High” (ὑψίστος,  ןוֹיְלֶע) which indicates “the 
Sovereign God over all things” or “El Elyon presiding over other gods in the heavenly 
council.’130 
 
1 Tim 2:4 appears to be an example in which the oneness of God is most likely 
expressed in a numerical sense. That said, it needs to be noted that for this verse most 
Greek manuscripts have the article ὁ missing (εἷς γὰρ θεός), unlike other εἷς ὁ θεός texts, 
thus English translations unified with “For there is one God.” An implication is that this 
example is not to be treated as the same as the other examples with the definite article 
without a qualification. A similar numerical notion of oneness is expressed in 1:17 by 
“only God” (μόνῳ θεῷ) and in 6:15 by “the blessed and only Ruler” (ὁ μακάριος καὶ 
μόνος δυνάστης). Two subtleties draw attention, however. Firstly, the Greek word 
translated as “only” or “one” is μόνος rather than εἷς, confirming the observation made 
above that the former word is more precise in expressing the notion of numerical 
oneness or relative aloneness. Secondly, however, the phrase “the blessed and only 
Ruler” is followed by “the King of kings and Lord of lords,”131 which are titles that 
were considered in the previous discussion as the possible meaning of the Shema 
“One.” What we have in this passage then is an example showing that “one God,” even 
in the sense of “only God,” has the connotation of God of the world, ‘a mighty and 
transcendent God.’132  
                                           
128 Cf. Martin, James, 89, which notes that ‘[t]he demons express a belief in the divine elsewhere in the 
NT (Mark 1:24; 3:7; Acts 16:17; 19:15) and exhibit fear before God as they confront Jesus (Mark 1:23, 
24; 5:7), usually in the stories of exorcisms (BGD, 866). … demons react to the divine numen (1 Enoch 
13.3; 69.1,14).’ 
129 E.g., Mark 1:23–24, Acts 16:17 and 19:15. 
130 Cf. Bauckham, Jesus, 115f and 118f. For the divine council, cf. Deut 32:8–9, Ps 97:9 and 82:6, as 
mentioned by Bauckham. 
131 Titles used for both YHWH (Deut 10:27; Ps 136:2–3) and Jesus (Rev 17:14; 19:15).  
132 William D. Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, Dallas: Word, 2000, 361. 
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7.2.2. Romans 3:29–30133  
Paul asks, in verse 29, “Is God the God of the Jews only? Is He not the God of Gentiles 
also?” Paul’s answer to the question is “Yes, of Gentiles also.” Paul continues to say, 
now in verse 30, “since indeed God who will justify the circumcised by faith and the 
uncircumcised through faith is one” (NASB).134 However this passage is translated, we 
can see that it envisages two relationships that God has with people on earth: God of 
Israel in relation to the Jews; and God of the world in relation to the whole world, 
including both the Jews and Gentiles. Paul’s point is that God, being one, has a common 
way, faith, by and through which he will justify the Jews and Gentiles. Most interpreters 
surveyed for this study derive the universal aspect from the phrase “εἷς ὁ θεὸς” by 
translating as “God is one” and understanding the word “one” in the sense of “alone” or 
numerical “one.”135 While this will be discussed below in more detail, the question here 
is whether that is how Paul also reasons in our passage, drawing out a concept of divine 
universality from the numerical oneness of God as the meaning of the “one” in the 
Shema, or whether Paul appeals to the “one” language because it already contains a 
universal element. The former is most preferred but, nonetheless, the latter is more 
likely to be the case, if seen from the perspective achieved in the previous discussion of 
the theology of the Shema. With that possibility in mind, let us take following 
considerations of our passage to see whether we come to the same conclusion as the 
previous one. 
 
The first is concerned with a grammatical difficulty with which to demarcate the subject 
of the clause led by the first word εἴπερ. If the word functions to introduce ‘the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the affirmation just made,’136 what follows it must 
contain a reason or ground for Paul’s case that God is the God of Gentiles also. That 
being so, though, it is difficult to demarcate the subject of the clause led by the 
                                           
133 This passage is commonly regarded as a Shema text in the NT. Cf. C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and 
Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle to the Romans, volume 1, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975, 221f; J. D. 
G. Dunn, Romans 1–8, Waco, TX: Word Books, 1988, 189; Fitzmyer, Romans, 365; Moo, Romans, 251f; 
T. R. Schreiner, Romans, Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998, 205; A. J. Hultgren, Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans: A Commentary, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011, 172. Cf. also, N. A. Dahl, ‘The One God of 
Jews and Gentiles (Romans 3:29–30),’ in his Studies in Paul: Theology for Early Christian Mission, 
Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1977, 178–91. 
134 With one or two minor differences, Greek manuscripts run like this: εἴπερ εἷς ὁ θεὸς ὃς δικαιώσει 
περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως καὶ ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως. The version is named to indicate that the 
translation represents one way of understanding the Greek text and there are others, without a 
commitment to the translation. Yet, for the same rendering as given above, see Nanos, Mystery, 181; R. W. 
Thompson, ‘The Inclusion of Gentiles in Rom. 3.27–30,” Biblica 69, 1988, 545f. 
135 Cf. Dahl, ‘One,’ 191; Dunn, Romans, 189 and 193; Schreiner, Romans, 205; Bauckham, Jesus, 96. 
136 Dunn, Romans, 189. 
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conjunction, unlike in 8:9 and 17, especially because of the lack of a “to be” verb 
linking εἷς and ὁ θεὸς and the presence of a relative pronoun ὃς. There are two options 
available about what we have: either (1) a compound sentence made of two clauses 
linked by an independent relative pronoun ὃς, thus ‘God is one, and he will justify …’ 
(RSV) or ‘there is only one God, who will justify …’ (NIV); or (2) a clause with a 
descriptive relative pronoun standing between a compound subject and the predicate, 
like ‘since it is the one God who will justify …” (KJV) or ‘the God who will justify … 
is one” (NASB).137 The first option is preferred by most scholars, yet it requires that a 
copular be inserted into the verbless phrase εἷς ὁ θεὸς.138 For Bauckham, for example, 
such flexibility is possible because the form (εἷς ὁ θεός) is ‘more or less standard’ to the 
extent to be translatable just like the usual form with a “to be” verb (εἷς ὁ θεός ἐστι or 
εἷς ἐστιν ὁ θεός)139 It is a flexibility, however, that is exercised to the degree that in 
Mark 2:7, as we saw, the same phrase (εἷς ὁ θεός) is translated as “God alone” by most 
versions that translate it here as a clause (“God is one” or “there is only one God”).140 In 
both places, thus, justice is not done properly to the actual form of εἷς ὁ θεὸς if it is a 
noun phrase as we saw in Mark 2:7. Therefore, as I argued previously regarding the 
Markan phrase, it would be advisable to apply the same rule to the translation of εἷς ὁ 
θεός here too, though the result may vary. A possibility is “since the One God [who] 
will justify both the circumcised by faith and the uncircumcised through faith.” 
Alternatively, if εἷς ὁ θεός is indeed an abbreviated form of εἷς ὁ θεός ἐστι, with the “to 
be” verb implied, as in πιστὸς ὁ θεός in 1 Cor 1:9 (‘God is faithful who …’), then we 
would have ‘since God is one, who will justify …’ (cf. Dunn), or ‘God who will justify 
… is one” (NASB). The point is to maintain the whole verse as having one idea, rather 
than two,141 and translate εἷς ὁ θεὸς in such a way that its interpretation is not 
predetermined to a numerical sense of the word “one” but has room for an appreciation 
of other senses. That is because if in this passage Paul indeed refers or alludes to the 
Shema in a positive sense, then there should be a correspondence between “one” here in 
Rom 3:20 and “one” there in Deut 6:4, and we have established that the latter “one” is 
not limited to a numerical sense. 
                                           
137 Cf. Nanos, Mystery, 181; Thompson, ‘Inclusion,’ 545f. 
138 According to J. Lambrecht, ‘“is” must certainly be added in v. 30a since the grammatical function of 
“one” is that of predicate: “God is one.”’ (‘Paul’s logic in Romans 3.29–30,’ Journal of Biblical Literature 
119 (2000), 526). This grammatical argument needs to provide an explanation for the phrase εἰ μὴ εἷς ὁ 
θεός in Mark 2:7; 10:18 because the application of the same rule to it would result in “except God is one.” 
139 Bauckham, Jesus, 95. 
140 E.g., NIV, NRSV, NASB and ESV. While they all have “God only” for Mark 2:7, the latter three 
versions have “God is one” for Rom 3:30 and the first has “there is only one God.”  
141 For discussion of this matter, see Lambrecht, ‘Logic,’ 527; Thompson, ‘Inclusion,’ 545f. 
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The second to consider concerns the observation mentioned previously that the word 
“one” in Deut 6:4 is directly connected to “YHWH” and only indirectly to “God.” It is 
strange that most interpreters do not mention this or else treat it as a matter of difference 
in wording, arguing that what matters is not the exact wording but the general 
conception.142 For Anthony Guerra, however, it is not an insignificant observation. 
Rather, ‘it points us in the right direction as to the Hellenistic provenance of the “one 
God” formula.’143 Moving in that direction, Guerra finds that the “One God” 
formula/topos, scant though in biblical and ancient Jewish literature, is amply 
documented in Hellenistic Jewish apologetic literature. His conclusion is that Paul’s use 
of the “one God” language in our passage has no direct connection with the Shema but 
finds a direct parallel in ‘Philo’s apologetic employment of the “One God” topos for the 
purpose of including the Gentiles (proselyte) as equal members of the Jewish 
community.’144 Be that it may, there is a problem that needs to be addressed by Guerra, 
namely an apparent disparity between the use of the “One God” in the Jewish apologetic 
literature used for his argument and Paul’s. In the current passage, Paul uses the “one 
God” language for the case that God is not only God of the Jews but God of Gentiles 
also and Gentiles do not need to become Jews in order to be justified since God, being 
one, will justify them both by and through faith, not by the observance of the law given 
only to the Jews. On the other hand, the literature surveyed by Guerra, while 
corresponding better with Paul’s language, nonetheless contains the use of the “one 
God” language ‘to propagandize for the superiority of Mosaic legislation over all 
alternative religio-social-political worldviews.’145 Thus, without a further consideration, 
it would be difficult to locate Paul’s use of the “one God” language wholly in the 
context of the Jewish apologetic tradition. Of course, there are also other uses made of 
the “One God,” as noted by Guerra himself, including ‘to promote unity and equality 
between Jews and Gentiles as a direct implication of the affirmation of One God.’146 
Such a use, however, is still acceptable even within such a framework that understands 
the Shema as in these words: ‘I am God over all that come into the world but I have 
joined by name only with you; I am not called the God of the idolaters, but the God of 
                                           
142 Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 205 n.9. This is a matter that is not mentioned by most commentator and 
scholars, including Dunn and Bauckham. 
143 Guerra, Romans, 84. 
144 Guerra, Romans, 101. Schreiner may be correct in dismissing Guerra’s objection, yet Eric Peterson’s 
observation used by Guerra remains, to repeat, that in Deut 6:4 “one” is used of “YHWH” and not “God,” 
and that the Shema itself does not provide the formula that Paul uses in our passage. 
145 Guerra, Romans, 94.  
146 Guerra, Romans, 95. 
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Israel.’147 This understanding is certainly conceivable within the framework of the 
Shema itself, and probably all the more so if the word “one” in it is taken in a numerical 
sense. Perhaps, living in the Hellenistic world, the Jewish apologists found the need to 
defend their theology (or an opportunity to promote it) by saying that the One (τὸ ἕν), 
the highest God even for the Greeks, is their God, YHWH. It is arguable, then, that 
while Paul’s word may be more reflective of the language prevalent in the Jewish 
apologetic literature (one “God”) than that of Deut 6:4 (one “YHWH”), we need to 
conclude that his conception of the one God is less of Hellenistic Jewish apologetics 
and more of the theology of the Shema itself. He must be appealing to an aspect of the 
Shema to correct a particular understanding that puts the Jews in a privileged position 
over Gentiles regarding justification.148 The question is whether such a view is a correct 
understanding or misunderstanding of the Shema or even abuse of it. The former would 
be the case if the “one” in the Deut 6:4 really means “alone” or “one” in a numerical 
sense, because it says, “YHWH is one” or “YHWH is one YHWH,” and not “one God” 
or “God is one.” 
 
The third consideration is concerned with the aspect of the Shema to which Paul is 
thought to be appealing for his case, that is, the universal aspect of God as Creator and 
Ruler.149 ‘The appeal,’ says Dunn, ‘in fact is to God as Creator, from one arm of the 
twofold dogma (God as Israel’s Lord) to the other (God as Lord of all).’150 Bauckham 
also speaks of the ‘two aspects of the divine identity according to the Shemaʿ.’151 To be 
precise, however, Deut 6:4 has “YHWH our God” and then “YHWH one,” not “YHWH 
Lord of all” or “YHWH the Creator.” Thus, if the “one”’ in the Shema is not a name or 
title for God of the world, the universal aspect of God should be drawn by inference 
from the numerical oneness of YHWH. Thus, in Bauckham’s words, ‘since he is the one 
and only God there is, he must also be the God of Gentiles.’152 For Paul, in other words, 
the “one” in the Shema means that there is only one God in the world and from that 
sense he draws the universal aspect of God. Interestingly, Bauckham takes Zech 14:9 as 
                                           
147 Exodus Rabbah 29 (88d), as cited by Guerra, Romans, 75. 
148 Dunn, Romans, 193, says that ‘“works of the law” signify that attitude which affirms that in effect God 
is only God of the Jews.’ Cf. also, Mounce, Pastoral, 87: ‘In Paul’s day, sectarian Judaism emphasized 
“our” in an exclusive sense ….’ 
149 According to Bauckham, Jesus, 7–11, “Creator” and “Ruler” are the markers of the unique identity of 
the true God, the God of all things. 
150 Dunn, Romans, 189. 
151 Bauckham, Jesus, 96. 
152 Ibid. Cf. also, Nanos, Mystery, 184. 
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envisaging ‘a universalizing of the Shemaʿ,’153 interesting because it appears to conflict 
with what he has previously explicated of the words of the Shema, now implying that 
the Shema itself does not have the idea of universality which is rather to be inferred 
from its words, as done by Zechariah and Paul.  
 
In my view, however, there are some considerations that need to be taken by any 
attempt to draw universal aspects of God simply out of a numerical oneness. If, in the 
first place, there is only one God in the world and he is the God of Israel, YHWH, and 
that is the theological teaching of the Shema, Paul would have left some markers 
showing how he draws such a “radical conclusion”154 as that Gentiles do not need to 
become Jews to be justified simply by referring or alluding to the Shema, because more 
logical a conclusion on such a condition would be that, to be justified, Gentiles need to 
keep the law given to the people of Israel by the only God. ‘Gentiles will be accepted,’ 
in other words, ‘if they keep Torah precisely because there is only one God.’155 In 
addition, Paul’s use of εἷς ὁ θεός in verse 30 in the way discussed above does not 
support an interpretation that he is deliberately showing how he draws the universal 
aspect of God from the existence of the only one God in the world. Considering the 
“presuppositional” nature of the form taken by Paul, without using a “to be” verb yet as 
if using an established formula, as discussed above, it is more likely that Paul is simply 
appealing to the idea of “one God” for his argument because that is how he understands 
the meaning of the “one” in the Shema. Besides, given the semantic continuity between 
Deut 6:4 and Zech 14:9, noted by Moberly in that the latter is a citation of the former 
indicates, it is reasonable to use the latter in interpreting the former.156 It is very likely, 
then, that the universal aspect of YHWH envisaged by the word “one” in Zechariah 14 
is not something to be inferred from the word “one” of the Shema but already contained 
and clearly expressed in the word, and such is the meaning of the “one” God to which 
Paul appeals as the ground of the case that God is one, the God of the Jews and of 
Gentiles also, who will justify both the circumcised by faith and the uncircumcised 
through faith. When, therefore, speaking of ‘the universalism embedded in the 
                                           
153 ‘All peoples,’ that is to say, ‘will be YHWH’s peoples, all will love YHWH as the Shemaʿ requires, all 
will therefore worship him at Tabernacles, and all will receive the paradigmatic divine blessing on those 
who love him’ (Bauckham, Jesus, 97). 
154 Ibid. 
155 Tan, ‘Shema,’ 196, in reference to T. L. Donaldson, Paul and the Gentiles: Remapping the Apostle’s 
convictional world, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997, 84–6. Whether this ‘usual Jewish thought on 
universalism’ is the correct understanding of the Shema or a misunderstanding is a matter of discussion, in 
comparison to Paul’s argument for Gentiles. In either case, anyway, Paul is not drawing out a new idea 
from the Shema if he is saying what he believes it actually says.  
156 Moberly, ‘YHWH,’ 78 and 80.  
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monotheistic faith of Israel—for the One God of Israel was also the One God of the 
nations (“the Lord is One”),’157 Nanos sails close to the argument being advocated in 
this study, certainly closer than anyone else, albeit hampering the process by the 
predetermined “monotheistic” emphasis. The point can be shown by slightly modifying 
his sayings about the one God, from the perspective being developed in this study, for 
example, ‘he is also the One God of all creation’158 to “he is also One, God of all 
creation,” ‘he is the One God of all the nations’159 to “he is One, God of all the nations,” 
and ‘for the One God of Israel is equally the One God of all the nations that turn to him, 
or else he is the One God of Jews only (a denial of his oneness of all people created by 
him), and thus not really the One God of at all’160 to “For the One of Israel is indeed the 
God of all nations that turn to him, or else he is the God of Jews only …, and thus not 
really the One at all.” 
 
There is no suggestion, here, that the God of covenant, revealed in concrete life 
situations, is an abstract entity. Rather, the hope is merely to support the point being 
made in this work, namely, that both aspects of particularity and universality are already 
explicit in the confession of the Shema, as Nanos demonstrates, the former in Deut 6:4b 
(‘the Lord is our God’) and the latter in 6:4c (‘the Lord is One’).161 Yet, unlike Nanos 
and others, the universal aspect is not something to be inferred from the word “one,” 
because different conclusions are to follow from the inference itself, as we can see in 
Nanos’ observation of a contrast between Paul and Philo.162 Therefore, unless the Shema 
has the universal aspect stated explicitly enough to be simply referred to for an 
argument, a simple appeal to it would not provide a direct support for Paul’s case.163 At 
least, we might say, the inference itself should go simultaneously with the pronunciation 
of the word “one.” Otherwise, that is, if the numerical sense of “one” is the definite 
sense that only is explicit in the Shema, then those Jewish believers who insist on the 
                                           
157 Nanos, Mystery, 181. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Nanos, Mystery, 184. 
160 Nanos, Mystery, 186. 
161 Nanos’ translations, with his emphasis. Mystery, 181. 
162 The contrast between Philo’s concern not in the inclusion of the gentiles as gentiles in the people of 
God but gentiles who had become Jewish proselytes and Paul’s concern for Jews as Jews and gentiles as 
gentiles under the rule of the One, the God of all the nations. Nanos, Mystery, 186. 
163 Thompson says, ‘Monotheism alone was insufficient to lead to the idea of God’s total lordship over the 
Gentiles’ (‘Inclusion,’ 546), yet adds, rather unconvincingly, ‘but if the monotheistic God justifies 
everyone by faith, then, of course, he is really the God of the Gentiles’ (ibid). Dunn, Romans, 193, draws 
a similar conclusion about the oneness of God to Thompson’s. Both are unconvincing, because even if the 
monotheistic God justifies everyone by works of law he would still be the God of the Gentiles, providing 
he is the one and only God. 
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necessity of keeping the law, even by Gentiles, are not, in fact, “compromising” the 
oneness of God,164 but rather they are being “faithful” to its meaning. The reason is that 
if YHWH, as the God of Israel, was the only God in the world, as we considered, and 
that was Paul’s theology, then no other being, divine or human, would be able to be 
added or included to that unique identity of God without raising a question about the 
nature of the being called “one,” like the one that will be pursued in the next chapter as 
a way to answer the second question indicated at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
7.2.3. First Corinthians 8:4–6 
Most scholars and commentators consider this passage to have a connection with the 
Shema in one way or another.165 Bauckham, for example, believes that ‘Paul has the 
Shemaʿ in mind from the beginning of the chapter, for “loves God” in verse 3 is already 
an allusion to it.’166 That being the case, there is some debate about whose position is 
being spoken of in this passage, though that is not our concern.167 What concerns us 
here is a common “tendency” among the scholars, viz., to take the word “one” in verses 
4 and 6 both in a numerical sense of “one” and that sense only. The argument being 
advanced in this thesis does not seek to challenge any notion of early Christian 
monotheism flowing from Second Temple Jewish monotheism in the first century.168 
The question, rather, concerns whether this tendency is justifiable against evidence of 
the text itself. To put forward my answer in advance, the two uses of “one” in verse 6 
are doubtless used in numerical senses, yet “one” in verse 4 is better taken in a broader 
sense, such as that explored in our previous discussion of the meaning of the “one” in 
                                           
164 Cf. Nanos, Mystery, 181, 182 and 184. 
165 F. Fisher, Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians, Waco, TX: Word Book, 1975, 132; J. D. G. Dunn, 
Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation, 
London: SCM Press, 1980, 179–83; G. D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1987, 415; L. W. Hurtado, One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish 
Monotheism, London: SCM Press, 1988, 97; N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the 
Law in Pauline Theology, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991, 127f; A. C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2000; D. E. Garland, 1 
Corinthians, Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003, 375; J. A. Fitzmyer, S.J., First Corinthians, New 
Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2008, 341; Bauckham, Jesus, 97–104; James F. McGrath, The 
Only True God: Early Christian Monotheism in Its Jewish Context, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2009, 38–42. 
166 Bauckham, Jesus, 100. Cf. also, Chris Tiling, Paul’s Divine-Christology: The Relation Between the 
Risen Lord and Believers in Paul, and the Divine-Christology Debate, Brunel University: PhD Thesis, 
2009, 60–88. 
167 Cf. Tiling, Divine-Christology, 67, which provides three views: (1) 1 Cor 8:4–6 is entirely reflective 
Paul’s position; (2) 8:6 is Paul’s response to the Corinthian position in 8:4; and (3) 8:6 is the Corinthian 
position to which Paul responds in 8:7. 
168 As Bauckham says, ‘there is no good evidence for the idea that non-monotheistic forms of Israelite 
religion survived through the Second Temple period to be available to the early Christians’ (Jesus, 95). 
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the Shema, that is, as a general term like the word “God” but with a specified sense like 
“God of all” or “God of the whole world.” 
 
It is difficult to deny that the sense of the “one” in verse 4 is numerical, not only 
because that is the most common sense of the word but also because that is how it is 
understood by most interpreters. That said, the following considerations can be made for 
the possibility that here too Paul is using the word “one” in the sense suggested in the 
previous discussions in relation to the “one” language in Deut 6:4 and in Romans 3:20. 
First, the apparent parallel structure between “no idols in the world” and “no god but 
one” indicates that, like the word “world,” the word “one” may be meant as a general 
noun, thus translatable as “no god but One (or, no god but the One God).” On the other 
hand, secondly, if one still want to take the “one” in a numerical sense, then he or she 
would consequently have a conflict of identities of the one and only God known in Deut 
6:4 (YHWH) and 1 Cor 8:6 (Father) or else have to identify YHWH and the Father, 
with the difficulties mentioned previously, particularly against most common 
observation of the identification of Jesus with YHWH.169 Thirdly, however, such a 
conflict would not follow if the “one” is taken as a general term like “God,” as 
suggested in our previous discussions. Fourthly, many interpreters explain verse 6 in 
terms of “bifurcation,”170 “reformulation”171 and even “mutation,”172 yet, whatever these 
observations are meant to say, they can hardly be of the number “one” but rather of the 
thing or being counted or called “One” or its content. Such an observation, in other 
words, would be meaningless unless the “one” in verse 4 is a reference to a being that 
can bifurcate, because only an object or entity, rather than their amount or quantity, 
bifurcates. Think of a cell bifurcating into two; it is the “cell” and not the “a” of which 
the bifurcation happens. Thus, the only way to explain this observation of bifurcation in 
verse 6 would be to say that the being called one in verse 4 is of the nature that allows it 
to happen.173 Finally, again in relation to verse 6, the “one” God in verse 4 cannot be 
merely numerical, because he is soon to be known to consist of “one” God and “one” 
Lord. One might ask whether it is not simply the “one God” in verse 6, excluding the 
                                           
169 Cf. D. B. Capes, Old Testament Yahweh Texts in Paul’s Christology, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), 1992, 186; Bauckham, Jesus, 101; C. Kavin Rowe, Early Narrative Christology: The Lord in 
the Gospel of Luke, Berlin et al: Walter de Gruyter, 2006, 218. 
170 Dunn, Christology, 180. Or, “modification in two ways,” Garland, 1 Corinthians, 342. 
171 Bauckham, Jesus, 97. 
172 Or, “adaptation” of the Shema, Hurtado, One God, 99. Cf. also, Dunn, Paul, 253, in which Dunn refers 
that perspective also to his Christology, 180; Partings, 180, 182; Wright, Climax, 114–8, 121, 128–32. 
173 It is interesting to note that while the Hebrew words for God (םיִהלֱֹא) and Lord (יָנֹדֲא) are singular in 
reference when used of YHWH, grammatically they are both plural, the latter word literally meaning “my 
Lords” (only with Kamatz instead of Patach). 
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“one Lord,” that refers to the “one God” in verse 4. That would maintain the numerical 
oneness of God, yet at the expense of making the nature of the “Lord” in verse 6 
ambiguous, referring to a divine being, or a human, or something in between. The third 
option, namely, “Lord” as a title referring to a middle being between the divine and the 
human, like an angel,174 may have little support from the Bible in which angels are 
clearly distinct from YHWH and Jesus.175 The second might be given some biblical 
support,176 yet “Lord” as a title referring to a human being goes against the general use 
of the word in the Bible.177 We are, then, left with the first option, traditional and most 
likely according to the general use of the title “Lord” in both the OT and the NT. In that 
case, however, because in verse 6 one Lord Jesus Christ is distinct from one God the 
Father, the “one” in verse 4 needs to be a “category” that Jesus and the Father both 
belong to or share in. Perhaps, we might have to think of this as another example of a 
double use of a term that we saw in the use of the word “one” in the Bible and “being” 
in Gunton, now of the word “one” in reference to “God,” one in a narrow sense as in 
verse 6 (one God the Father) and the other in a broader sense as in verse 4 (no god but 
One). What we have in verse 4 then is “One” God who is not only “one” in number but 
the being called “One.” 
 
As for verse 6, literally ‘yet for us one God, the Father, from whom all things and we for 
him, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things and we through him,’ many 
notice that here Paul is stating or doing something “unprecedented.”178 Yet, syntactically 
and terminologically, nothing here is new compared to the Shema.179 What is new is 
                                           
174 Cf. Margaret Barker, The Great Angel: A Study of Israel’s Second God, London: SPCK, 1992, 3, 5 and 
ch.5, treating Jesus (Son of God, Messiah and Lord) as a manifestation of Yahweh (a son of God, 
manifested on earth in human form as an angel, before his fusion with El-Elyon). Cf. also, McGrath, God, 
13, 56, 57 and 69, applying the language of “neither uncreated nor created” drawn from Philo’s 
description of the Word (Logos) as “neither uncreated as God, nor created … but between the two 
extremities” to his explication of Jesus (Word, Lord, Messiah) as a middle figure that bridges the gap 
between the transcendent God and the creation. 
175 Cf. 2 Sam 24:17; Rev 22:6. Angels may do the work of the Lord (e.g., Num 20:16), even to the extent 
that it is difficult to know who is speaking or acting (e.g., Gen 16:7–13; 19:1, 15; 22:12–12), but the word 
“angel” (ךְָאְלַמ, ἄγγελος) is itself a general noun and thus those called an angel, whether Michael in the OT 
and Gabriel in the NT, are never called “Lord.” 
176 Cf. Rom 5:15; 1 Tim 2:5. 
177 Cf. of YHWH, Ex 34:23; Deut 3:24; Isa 30:15; Ezek 6:3 et al, and, of Jesus, Matt 16:16 and 26:63 
(Mark 14:61; Luke 22:67, 70). As Donald Macleod says, ‘for all the cultural streams which flow through 
the New Testament, kurios implied deity’ (Jesus Is Lord: Christology Yesterday and Today, Feam, Ross-
shire: Mentor, 2000, 52). 
178 Cf. E. Käsemann, Commentary on Romans, tr. G. W. Bromiley, London: SCM Press, 1980, 103; Dunn, 
Christology, 180; Wright, New Testament, 136; Waaler, Shema, 445f. 
179 ‘The whole complex is a double nominal sentence, which needs no verbs in Greek, but which has to be 
rendered with verbs in English …’ While this is what Garland says about 1 Cor 8:6 (op. cit., 343), it 
appears to throw some light back on the syntax of Deut 6:4, which we also understood in terms of a 
double nominal sentence. 
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rather to do with what comes into the syntax and terminology of Deut 6:4: (a) the “one 
God” identified as the Father;180 (b) the “one Lord” identified as Jesus Christ;181 and (c) 
descriptions unique to God the Creator now shared between one God the Father and one 
Lord Jesus Christ. The significance of these new elements in relation to those of the 
Shema has been understood in various terms, as we saw previously. Three suggestions, 
among others, can be considered here, that is, a “bifurcation” of the oneness of God,182 
an “addition” of the one Lord to the one God,183 and an “inclusion” of Jesus in the 
unique identity of the one God.184 The viability of the first interpretation requires, as 
discussed above, a condition that the divergence is that of the one “God” rather than 
simply from the “one” God. The second is the view held by McGrath against both the 
first and the third, according to which 1 Cor 8:6 is more likely to be ‘a paraphrase of the 
Shema with an additional affirmation added alongside it’ than ‘a splitting of the Shema’ 
to include Jesus Christ in the Shema.185 That is to say, ‘Paul uses a statement about one 
God, which is sufficient to reiterate the point of the Shema, and then goes further to talk 
about “one Lord”.’186 Three points can be briefly made about this interpretation. One is 
that while McGrath supports his argument by showing that the language of “one God” 
was a well-known way of summarising the Shema, he does so without providing an 
explanation of the difference of the “one God” language from that of the Shema itself in 
which it is YHWH who is one. This is problematic because it is equally possible that 
Paul is using the “one” language to challenge a narrow understanding of God confessed 
in the Shema or prevalent among his contemporary Jews. There is another difference 
that is not addressed by McGrath, despite its significance, namely that while the one 
God in the Shema is YHWH, as noted by McGrath himself,187 the one God asserted by 
Paul is the Father. McGrath simply assumes their identification, yet such an 
identification needs to be shown rather than assumed. Thirdly, McGrath’s treatment of 
the title “Lord” applied to Jesus as different from that applied to God in the Shema,188 
the latter in identification with God and the former as “God’s supreme agent bearing his 
                                           
180 For the difference between God as father in the OT and the Father in the NT, see above n.12. 
181 Whether it is used as a proper name, or as a general title, as long as it is about God, the referent of 
“Lord/LORD” in the OT is always YHWH. 
182 Dunn, Christology, 180. 
183 McGrath, God, 39–42. 
184 Bauckham, Jesus, 101. 
185 McGrath, God, 40. 
186 Ibid. 
187 An observation made by McGrath for the reason why he thinks ‘it would be very difficult for Paul to 
distinguish between “God” in the Shema as referring to the Father and “Lord” in the Shema as referring 
to the Son’ (God, 39). 
188 McGrath, God, 39f. 
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name,”189 does not agree with Paul’s use of the title in general.190 The third way is found 
in Bauckham, who disapproves the second by arguing that ‘from the perspective of 
Jewish monotheism, he [Paul] would certainly be producing, not Christological 
monotheism, but outright ditheism.’191 Bauckham concludes, ‘The only possible way to 
understand Paul as maintaining monotheism is to understand him to be including Jesus 
in the unique identity of the one God affirmed in the Shemaʿ.’192 It is questionable, 
however, whether such an inclusion is acceptable from the same perspective that 
dismisses the second suggestion for the reason of ditheism. Though, for Bauckham, it 
does not lead to ditheism because Paul includes Jesus in the identity of the one God by 
‘identifying Jesus as the “Lord” whom the Shemaʿ affirms to be one.’193 On a deeper 
level, however, there is a problem that the word “Lord” is one of the two forms in which 
the proper name of the God of Israel is written (YHWH) and read (adonai). The 
difference remains, that the “Lord” read of YHWH in Deut 6:4 is a proper name, 
whereas the “Lord” applied to Jesus in 1 Cor 8:6 is a general noun like “God.” 
Therefore, Paul’s use of the Greek term (κύριος) does not necessarily mean that he had 
the proper name of the God of Israel in mind when saying “one Lord.” Besides, the 
word “Lord” (adonai) used as a title in distinction from the proper name YHWH is 
abundantly found in the OT,194 especially in Isaiah195 and Ezekiel.196 Another problem is 
to do with the place of “God the Father” in our passage. For, if Paul is in fact identifying 
“Jesus” with the “Lord” that is affirmed to be one in the Shema, then little room would 
be left for “God the Father.” While, according to the Shema, YHWH (κύριος, Lord) is 
the God of Israel and one (whatever it means), what we have in this passage is not only 
the assertion that there is one God and there is one Lord, but also that the two are 
distinct, the God as the Father and the Lord as Jesus Christ. These problems, however, 
might be obviated, even within the framework of Bauckham’s interpretation, if we take 
following considerations. 
                                           
189 For this meaning, McGrath, God, 49, appeals to an extra biblical source, this time Apocalypse of 
Abraham 10:3, 8. 
190 For Philo’s use of kyrios as referring to “God,” see Waaler, Shema, 167f. For a different account of the 
use of kyrios for Jesus by Christians, cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, A Wandering Aramean: Collected Aramaic 
Essays, Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979, 127–32; and idem, To Advance the Gospel: New Testament 
Studies, New York: Crossroad, 1981, 218–29, which suggests ‘a Gleichsetzung of Jesus with Yahweh, a 
setting of him on par with Yahweh, but not an Identifizierung—because he is not ʾabbāʾ.’ Advance, 223. 
191 Ibid. Bauckham does not provide information as to who holds this position. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Cf. Gen 15:2; Ex 23:17; Deut 3:24; Jos 3:13; Jds 6:17; 2 Sam 19:28; 1 Kgs 8:53; Neh 10:29; Ps 69:6; 
71:16; 73:28; 109;21; Jer 1:6; 2:22 et al; Amos 3:7; Obad 1:1; Mic 1:2; Hab 3:19; Zeph 1:7. 
195 Isa 1:24; 7:7; 30:15 et al, more than 30 times (“Lord YHWH” or “the Lord YHWH of hosts”). 
196 Ezek 2:4; 3:11 et al, almost always when YHWH is referred to (“Lord YHWH”). 
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Firstly, while 1 Cor 8:6 may be interpreted as including Jesus in the identity of the one 
God, the “one” God language can be understood as having a sense that is not limited to 
a number, as indicated by our discussion of verse 4. Secondly, if Paul is indeed 
including Jesus in the identity of the one God one would need to understand him as 
doing so, not by fully identifying Jesus with YHWH in all aspects of his being for Israel 
and the Jews, so much as by letting Jesus take possession of the place of the “Lord,” 
without trespassing on the unique place of YHWH for Israel, while leaving the place of 
“God” with the Father. Therefore, thirdly, the novelty that this passage has in relation to 
the Shema needs to be located not simply in the inclusion of Jesus in the unique identity 
of the one God but, rather, in the change of the identity itself in content. Numerically 
and referentially, the one God from whom are all things and for whom we are is now the 
Father, not the LORD or of YHWH, but of Jesus Christ who is the one Lord through 
whom are all things and through whom are we. This is not something that can be 
achieved by simply rearranging the words of the Shema (“God,” “Lord,” “our” and 
“one”) so much as an affirmation of the new identity of God and Lord as revealed in 
Jesus Christ through the old way prepared by the words of the Shema and the OT in 
general, just as the old identity was established by YHWH being God through the older 
way prepared in the ancient Near Eastern world.197 
 
7.2.4. Conclusion 
After our interpretation of the Shema and before our discussion of the Shema in the NT, 
three possibilities were postulated in relation to the preferred interpretation of the “one” 
in Deut 6:4. The conclusion we have reached is that (a) that the NT writers are using the 
“one” language in a numerical sense and (b) that they are misusing it contrary to its 
original use are less likely than (c) that they are in fact using the “one” language in the 
sense in which it is used in Deut 6:4, that is, in a nominal sense referring to “God of all” 
compared to “our God” or “God of Israel.” This continuity in the use of the “one” 
language in the OT and the NT can be disrupted, as it has, by stronger emphasis on 
monotheism than required. Saying that does not necessarily imply that we need to reject 
or object an approach from the perspective of monotheism. It is said, rather, in order to 
point to a possibility that monotheistic concerns in the Bible as a whole are secondary or 
presuppositional, and even absent if in a bare mathematical sense of monotheism. The 
focal point is rather who the being called or even counted one is. Thus, in the OT, 
                                           
197 Cf. R. W. L. Moberly, The Old Testament of the Old Testament: Patriarchal Narratives and Mosaic 
Yahwism, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992; Margaret Barker, The Older Testament: The survival of 
themes from the Ancient Royal Cults in Sectarian Judaism and Early Christianity, London: SPCK, 1987. 
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YHWH alone is the One, the Lord of Israel and the God of the world and, in the NT, the 
Father is God and Jesus is the Lord, together the One, or each the One in their 
perichoretic relatedness. The universal aspect of this One can be drawn, indeed, from 
the numerical oneness of God, yet it is the thesis of this study that that aspect is already 
existent in the word “one” of the Shema and the NT writers used the “one” language in 
the same spirit as in which it was first used in the OT, both numerically and nominally. 
Interestingly, though, the concept of “one” that is used most certainly in numerical sense 
in the NT (1 Cor 8:6) is the one used for saying something quite different from what is 
explicitly stated in the OT (Deut 6:4), interesting in that it suggests a need to recover 
focus on “being” (one “God”), and hypostasis (YHWH, Father, Jesus) for knowing that, 
from on number (“one” God or “one” Lord).
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Chapter 8 Trinity and Being as Space 
 
In the previous chapter, anticipating the discussion of this chapter, we looked at the 
Shema texts in the OT and in the NT, with the result of some interesting discoveries that 
the “one” language used of “YWHW” (LORD) in the OT is best understood in a 
nominal sense meaning “God of the whole world” and that it is in that sense that the 
“one” language used of “God” in the NT (and perhaps also in the Second Temple period 
Jewish literature) is better understood than simply in a numerical sense. The present 
study is not in the position to consider whether these discoveries are the correct 
interpretation of “one” language in the Bible. Nonetheless, however, they have been 
pursued to such an extent as done in the previous chapter because it is only upon them 
that the following answers can be offered to the two questions that initially precipitated 
them. The first is how Gunton understands the God of the OT is the same God as the 
God of the NT, and the second whether his concept of being in communion developed 
from a doctrine of the Trinity can be universally applicable. 
 
8.1. One God and the Trinity 
For Gunton, as for others, the God of Israel (YHWH) is the same God as the God of 
Jesus (the Father) and the God of the Church (Father, Son and Spirit).1 That being the 
case, however, Gunton has not provided an explanation as to how or in what way he 
understands the two are united, unlike some other trinitarian theologians who do so by 
identifying the God of Israel, YHWH, with the Father of Jesus Christ,2 or the Lord Jesus 
Christ,3  or Father, Son and Spirit.4 The identification of YHWH of the OT with the 
Father of the NT, though most common, needs to face the passages in the NT in which 
the YHWH passages of the OT are applied to Jesus,5 let alone passages showing a 
contrast between the God of Israel the Jews call father and the God of Jesus Christ, the 
Father.6 The identification of Jesus with YHWH, though supported by ample evidence, 
                                           
1 CF 188f. 
2 E.g., W. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, tr. G. W. Bromiley, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1991, 259f. 
3 E.g., McCleod, Jesus, 53f; Rowe, Christology, 217f. 
4 E.g., R. Jenson, ‘The Triune God,’ in Braaten and Jenson, Dogmatics I, 92–5; R. K. Soulen, The Divine 
Name(s) and the Holy Trinity, Volume 1: Distinguishing the Voices, Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2011, 22f. 
5 Cf. Capes, Yahweh Texts in Paul’s Christology, as referenced above at 180 n.169. For the short list of 
Christological reading of YHWH texts in the NT, see Bauckham, Jesus, 186–9 and 219–22. 
6 In John 8:31–59, for example, the exchanges between Jesus and the Jews who had believed him indicate 
that the Jews misunderstood God, or that God Jesus calls “your father” is different from God Jesus calls 
“my father.”  
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raises the question about how the two distinct beings identified by proper names can be 
recognised as the same without their personal particularity being obliterated. It also 
makes the place of the Father of Jesus Christ problematic because in the NT the place of 
“one God” is reserved for the Father, as we saw, whereas in the OT the word “one” is 
used only of YHWH.7 Gunton appears to belong to the third group who link the God of 
Israel with the triune God. This way of relating the theology of the OT and the theology 
of the NT has an advantage over the other two in that the identification takes place 
between the God of Israel (rather than YHWH) and the triune God (rather than Father or 
Jesus). The issue remains, however, concerning how Father, Son and Spirit, three 
persons, connect with YHWH who is proclaimed to be “one,” if the word “one” is taken 
in a numerical sense, as is the case even by those belonging to this particular group. For 
Gunton, interestingly, this conundrum is not a problem because he does not work with a 
strict monotheism; on his understanding, the oneness of the Shema is a ‘oneness that 
brooks no rivals, not one of bare mathematics,’8 and the unity of God in the OT is ‘not a 
blank unity, but a richly diverse personal agent whose works in the created world are 
mediated by his word, his wisdom, his glory, his name, his spirit.’9 For Gunton, 
consequently, trinitarian categories are already there in the words of OT theology, albeit 
in limited senses.10 In other words, the OT has a conception of God who is both one and 
three.11 It is this trinitarian conception of God, drawn from the doctrine of the Trinity, 
that appears to be the way whereby Gunton relates the theologies of the OT and of the 
NT. The problem here, however, is that we are not sure whether that is the case and, if it 
is, we would still have to face how to use that conception for identifying the OT’s God 
(one personal agency and many intra-personal mediation) and Gunton’s God (three 
inter-personal agents working together) without a qualification or mediating concept. 
This is a question, however, that has not drawn Gunton’s attention. What follows is an 
                                           
7 There are only three texts in the OT that has the word “one” connected unambiguously to YHWH or 
God: for the former, Deut 6:4 and Zech 14:9, and for the latter, Mal 2:10. Job 31:15 might be taken as 
belonging to the second group. The point to make is twofold. First, if the word “one” means a cardinal 
number, then we would have to note the imbalance between the meagre proportion of the “one” language 
used in the OT and the abundance of later interpretation of the word as the cardinal expression of 
monotheism. If it means what is suggested in this study, however, the rare occurrences of the word in the 
OT would be a condition that needs support from wider context. 
8 CF 84. The idea expressed here resonates with Bauckham’s understanding of YHWH’s uniqueness in 
terms of ‘unrivalled power’ (Jesus, 69). 
9 CF 182f. 
10 For the use of such broad senses for a view of Jewish literature from a trinitarian perspective, see J. C. 
O’Neill, Who did Jesus think he was? Leiden et al: Brill, 1995, chapter 6, ‘The Trinity and the Incarnation 
as Jewish Doctrines,’ 94–114. 
11 Cf. OTM 7. 
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answer to the question attempted on the basis of previous discussions, though still 
driven by the initiation of Gunton’s work and with the help of his conceptuality. 
 
To begin with an implication of our discussion thus far, the ontology of God expressed 
in the Bible has two sides or aspects: the general and the particular. This is the case even 
in the Shema, where we have a proper name “YHWH” (the particular) and a general 
noun in “our God” and “one” (the latter if we are correct in our interpretation of the 
word). Knowing these two aspects concerning the Shema and the OT in general is 
important for identifying what is old and what is new in the NT. Thus, in the case of 1 
Cor 8:6, for example, we have “God” and “Lord” on the general side (the old), and “the 
Father” and “Jesus Christ” on the particular (the new). If Paul is alluding to the Shema 
in this passage, as normally understood, then it is interesting to see how the proper name 
in the Shema (YHWH = Lord) is deprived of its particular aspect as a proper name of 
God, now functioning only in one aspect of its original capacity, viz., as a general term, 
like the word “God.” It is not surprising, though, because, by the rule set by the inner 
structure of Deut 6:4, an element of particularity (YHWH as a proper name) cannot be 
on the side of the general. If, therefore, Paul wanted to maintain the proper name 
YHWH in its particularity the result would be “one God, YHWH” and “one Lord, 
YHWH.” Only, though, that is not what he says, which is rather “one God, the Father” 
and “one Lord Jesus Christ.” In so doing, Paul maintains the general side of the Shema 
(God, One) while defining it from the particular side (Father, Jesus). 
 
The significance of the particular for the general is both ontological and epistemological. 
Ontologically, the general (God, Lord, One) is revealed, even constituted, by the 
particular (YHWH, Jesus), while the particular is conditioned by the general. Thus, 
within the theology of the OT in which “YHWH” is identified with “God,” the former 
(the particular) is what the latter (the general) is and the latter is what the former shows 
it to be. Epistemologically, we know the identity of the general by knowing the 
particular, and the “nature” (physis) of the particular by knowing the general. In 1 Cor 8, 
thus, we know the identity of the “One” God in verse 4 by knowing the Father and Jesus 
Christ introduced in verse 6, while we know the nature of the “Lord” Jesus Christ in 
verse 6 by knowing the one “God” in verse 4. It should be noted that the particular does 
not determine the nature of the general because, by nature, the divine is divine, and the 
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human is human, regardless of how they are, but provides the means whereby God 
reveals, and we know, who and what and how he is.12 
 
Now, using the analogy of the general and the particular, we can draw an answer to our 
first question of this chapter. That is, the God of the OT is the same God as the God of 
the NT in that they are “God” or “One” (or, less satisfactorily, “one God”), while they 
are different, in content, the former consisting of “YHWH, God of Israel and Lord of the 
world,” and the latter consisting of “God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.”13 This 
construal of the relationship between the God of the OT and the God of the NT, each in 
terms of the general and the particular, is not alien to the biblical texts we have 
examined but rather has three benefits to explicating them: (1) it helps to see that, in 
both cases, the general (“God,” “One,” “Lord”) is accompanied by the particular 
(“YHWH,” “Father,” “Jesus [Christ]”), meaning that both the OT and the NT have both 
elements of the old and the new; (2) that, in both cases, the particular comes into the 
place established by the general which in turn is established and made known through 
the particular, thus YHWH in the OT and Jesus in the NT revealing who/what/how God 
is; and (3) that the general title “Lord” in the NT is continuous with the proper name 
“YHWH” in the OT, implying a transition of the same element (kyrios) from the 
perspective of the particular to that of the general. It appears, as might be noticed by 
some, that we have encountered a biblical basis of the trinitarian terms of ousia and 
hypostasis.14 These terms tend to be taken as philosophical or abstract and dismissed as 
foreign to the Bible.15 Properly understood, however, not only by the analogy of “the 
common and the particular” but also by that of “the separated and the conjoined,”16 then 
one now would be able to see that they correspond very well with what we are 
discussing here in terms of the general (ousia) and the particular (hypostasis). Thus, 
even in the Shema, one can see by them that while it has both elements of ousia (God or 
One) and hypostasis (YHWH) they are related to each other in such a way as that their 
values can be recognised only from a perspective with more advanced a conceptuality 
like that of the Cappadocians.17 With the help of later concepts applied to OT theology, 
we understand further that the concept of “mono-theism” or its link with the Shema 
                                           
12 Cf. CF 90f, for Gunton’s discussion of “nature” in relation to person. 
13 The language of “consist of” is taken from Bauckham, Jesus, 101. 
14 In the Cappadocian letter examined in Chapter 4, ousia and hypostasis are explained first in respect to 
human beings and then applied to theology. 
15 Cf. McGraths, God, 48, for a description of the critical atmosphere. 
16 Cf. §4.3. 
17 As we saw, ousia and hypostasis meant the same thing before their de-synonymisation by the 
Cappadocians. 
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needs to be reconsidered because the defining factor in the Shema is one hypostasis 
(YHWH) rather than one ousia (God). 
 
The preferability of the analogy of the general and the particular can be demonstrated by 
comparing it with other approaches. One is the analogy of the old and the new that is 
proposed by Moberly against modern discussions of the relationship between 
patriarchal and Mosaic religion.18 Moberly proposes the analogy of the Old Testament 
and the New Testament for understanding the theological issues posed by Exodus 3 and 
6 or Genesis 12–50 and Mosaic Yahwism in Exodus onward.19 As an analogy drawn 
from Christian theology, he justifies its use by saying that despite the danger of 
anachronistically reading things into the text, later theology ‘may contain precisely or 
substantially the same dynamic that is present in the biblical text.’20 That being the case, 
however, the use of this analogy, whether for explaining the relationship between the 
OT and the NT or between the OT and the OT of the OT, has a twofold shortcoming. On 
the one hand, it does not give an appropriate explication of how the God of the OT is 
identical with the God of the NT. As for Christian conviction of identity, Moberly says, 
‘YHWH the God of Israel is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.’21 This may 
be a commonly held description of the relationship between the two theologies, but our 
discussion thus far enables us to see that the description is too ambiguous to do justice 
to the complexity involved in both theologies. It is not clear in what sense the reader is 
to conceive the identity of “YHWH the God of Israel” with “the God and Father of our 
Lord Jesus Christ.” As for the conviction of discontinuity, on the other hand, Moberly 
explains it in terms of God’s act or revelation, rather than God’s being or nature. He 
says thus, ‘God has done a new thing in Jesus, through whose life, death, and 
resurrection humanity can know and relate to God in a way not possible before.’22 
Moberly knows that one of the issues at stake is the nature of theology, yet he provides 
only an account of ‘the nature of God as one, yet revealed in different ways.’23 Thus, for 
Moberly, the God of Israel is the same as the God of Jesus Christ only because they are 
“one” in number, and they are different because the one and same God acted in two 
different ways. The problem is the seeming ignorance of the theological weights put on 
the identity of YHWH with (the true) God in the OT and on the definite revelation of 
                                           
18 Cf. Moberly, Old Testament, 107–26. 
19 Moberly, Old Testament, 125f. 
20 Moberly, Old Testament, 125. 
21 Moberly, Old Testament, 127. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Moberly, Old Testament, 127f and 172. 
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the identity of the one God in Jesus Christ as the Father by the NT writers. Not 
surprisingly, Moberly locates the element of discontinuity predominantly in ‘formal 
religious ethos and practice’ and that of continuity predominantly in ‘the values and 
goals of personal (communal and individual) spirituality.’24 The implication is that the 
locus of the old and the new should be something other than theology proper, or God in 
se, with the likely result of a homogenisation of the theologies of the old and the new 
(losing difference), because they are one and the same, or a replacement of the old by 
the new by the same numerical force (losing identity). 
 
Another approach to the question of identity and difference is offered by Bauckham 
who states that ‘the unique identity of the one God consists of the one God, the Father, 
and the one Lord, his Messiah (who is implicitly regarded as the Son of the Father).’25 
The sense delivered here is quite similar to, yet different from, what has been argued 
above when speaking of the identity in terms of the general and the particular. The 
following three can be considered as the respects in which lies the difference: (1) that 
“the one God” is repeated twice, thus being identified twice, first with the one God the 
Father and second with the Father and the Lord together;26 (2) that the terminological 
difference between “God” and “Lord,” which is important for the identification of the 
biblical God, is obliterated by the rushed-in assumption that the latter is the Son of the 
former, which is neither stated nor implicated in 1 Cor 8:6;27 and (3) even if the Son is 
implicated in the title Messiah, the first problem would still remain, because we have 
one “God” and one “Lord,” thus two. One way of avoiding these problems is to think of 
Bauckham’s first “one God” as saying in terms of a specified sense of God, such as 
being suggested in this study, that is, “God of the world” rather than “the only God in 
the world.” Although the former is an implication of the latter, it needs to be noted that 
even the latter is not a sense explicitly expressed in Deut 6:4 but, as we saw, a sense that 
                                           
24 Moberly, Old Testament, 127–30 and 172. 
25 Ibid. 
26 An aspect (duality or triplicity) embedded in the language of “one,” as we saw, especially in the biblical 
imagery of “one body,” which can be used in reference to (a) one body in number, thus not two or three 
bodies (e.g., Matt 19:6), (b) unity of all members belonging to one body (e.g.,1 Cor 10:17), or (c) 
ontological shape of the one body that is constituted by the members in their relations to each other (e.g., 
John 17:21). 
27 A “rushed-in assumption” only in that, as far as it concerns the text Bauckham is reviewing for 
expressing the idea of Messiah as the Son of God, that is 1 Cor 8:6, it is neither stated nor implicated in it. 
Yet, cf. 1 Cor 1:9 speaking of ‘his Son Jesus Christ our Lord,’ which is perhaps the only place in the first 
letter to Corinthians where the relation between God and Lord is explicitly expressed in terms of the 
Father and the Son through the mediation of Jesus being “Messiah” or “Christ.” In the wider context, we 
have ‘I and the Father are one’ (John 10:30), which is another allusion to the Shema, at least for 
Bauckham, Jesus, 104f. 
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is worked out through at least two stages of inference (interpreting the word “one” in a 
numeral sense and then combining that sense to the word “God”). 
 
Finally, by using the analogy of the general and the particular, we can reveal some 
problems of Dunn’s account of Christ’s Lordship in relation to God as one from his 
observation of the repeated formula in the Pauline letters in which ‘God is spoken of as 
“the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ”.’28 Dunn points to what he takes as ‘the 
striking feature,’ namely ‘Paul speaks of God not simply as the God of Christ, but as 
“the God . . . of our Lord Jesus Christ”.’29 ‘Even as Lord,’ argues Dunn, ‘Jesus 
acknowledges his Father as his God.’30 ‘Here it becomes plain,’ Dunn continues, ‘that 
kyrios is not so much a way of identifying Jesus with God, but if anything more a way 
of distinguishing Jesus from God.’31  I have no question about the distinction of Jesus 
from God by kyrios. Yet, what appears to be a sound argument based on a correct 
reading of the formula becomes problematic if one looks at it with sensitivity to the 
interplay of the general and the particular. Even in this formula, “God” and “Lord” 
belong to the general side identified by the particular, “Father” and “Jesus Christ.” 
Interestingly, in both Dunn’s reading of the formula and his argument based upon it, 
there is a striking absence or deliberate omission of the name “Father” and equally 
striking a consistent paralleling of the particular “Jesus” with the general “God.” These 
are striking in two senses. Firstly, the paralleling of “Jesus” with “God” which better 
parallels with “Lord” disrupts the relation between “Father” and “Jesus Christ.”32 
Secondly, more natural reading of the formula would be that in which the particular 
“Father” identifies the general “God,” just as the general “our Lord” is identified by the 
particular “Jesus Christ.” That is, “God is spoken of as the Father of our Lord Jesus 
Christ” is more natural and simpler a way to understand the formula than Dunn’s “God 
is spoken of as the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.” A problem remains, 
however, that what we have is the phrase, word for word, “the God and Father of …” 
rather than “God the Father of …,” which appears to support Dunn’s interpretation. 
                                           
28 Dunn, Theology, 254. References given are Rom 15:6; 2 Cor 1:3; 11:31; Col 1:3; Eph 1:3, 17; and 1 Pet 
1:3. To note, Col 1:3 is different from the rest in that it does not have “and” between “God” and “Father.” 
See, also, 1 Cor 1:2 in which we have “God” followed by “our Father,” meaning “God our Father” or 
“God, our Father.” 
29 Ibid. Dunn’s emphasis. 
30 Ibid. To note, it is not Jesus but Paul who is speaking here. 
31 Ibid. Dunn’s emphasis. 
32 Cf. O’Neill, Who, 78f, which provides similar words to Dunn’s in which he deals with Socinians’ 
taking of the formula to be the simplest case against the doctrine of the Trinity: ‘If God was Jesus’ God, 
Jesus could not have been thought of as the eternal Son of God, let alone the Second Person of the 
Trinity.’ 
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O’Neill, however, appears more correct in saying that ‘the word Father in this position 
in Greek would not take an article, even though the word is a further description of God; 
the absence of an article does not signal what it would in English, that the word was 
bound under the previous article,’33 and ‘the Greek article before the word God by no 
means governs the genitive of Jesus Christ. That genitive goes with the word Father, 
and Father is coordinate with God, giving fuller information about him.’34 Thus, for 
O’Neill, ‘God was not spoken of as the God of Jesus Christ; rather, God was further 
defined and picked out as the one now recognized as the Father of Jesus Christ.’35 This 
is the strong probability that O’Neill thinks Socinians overlooked, and it appears that 
Dunn repeats the same.36 
 
8.2. Being as Space 
For Gunton the doctrine of the Trinity is the source of what he calls trinitarian analogies 
of being and becoming.37 There is a problem, however. Gunton’s transcendentals are of 
the triune God, neither of any God nor God in general. Besides, the meaning of the 
doctrine of the Trinity is a matter of ongoing discussion.38 The question is how Gunton’s 
transcendental concepts developed from a particular doctrine of the Trinity whose 
precise meaning is still controversial, even among Christians, can be applied to 
understanding all beings, however appropriately they are developed. What we are 
seeking is a conception of the being of God that is more fundamental than Gunton’s 
God as communion and so has the capacity to better serve as a basis for his 
transcendental purpose. We shall approach it by dealing with an ontological question 
that is raised by the previous discussion: what kind of being that God is whose identity 
                                           
33 O’Neill, Who, 79. 
34 O’Neill, Who, 79 n.10. 
35 O’Neill, Who, 79. Original emphasis. For a similar understanding, see Peter T. O’Brien, Colossians-
Philemon, Dallas: Word Books, 7, which has ‘τῷ θεῷ πατρὶ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (“to God, 
the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ”).’ 
36 It is difficult to find a reference to “God” immediately followed by “of Jesus Christ” (or reference to his 
person), while the reference to “Father” followed by “of Jesus Christ” is numerous. Yet cf. Matt 27:46 
(Mark 15:34), which seems to be the only one of the case in which Jesus calls God “my God.” The weight 
of this example is not so strong against the other case because it is the only evidence supporting “Jesus’ 
God,” let alone that it comes in the form of citation from Psalm 22. On the other hand, we find “my God” 
addressed to Jesus in John 20:28 and “our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ” in 1 Titus 2:13. 
37 Cf. OTM 140f. 
38 See, for example, Gunton’s and Kilby’s view of Augustin’s speaking of “hypostases or persons” (Trinity 
7.4) in Gunton, ‘Trinity,’ 940 and Kilby, ‘Trinity,’ 519. Jason S. Exton and Stanley N. Gundry (eds), Two 
Views On the Doctrine of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2014) is interactions of the 
arguments between two models of the Trinity (“Classical” and “Relational”). Debates are ongoing 
between Brian Leftow (“Latin Trinitarianism”) and William Hasker (“Social Trinitarianism”). Thus, Dale 
Tuggy, ‘The unfinished business of Trinitarian theorizing,’ Religious Studies 39, 2003, 163–83. 
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remains the same while undergoing such a change as from “YHWH God” in the OT39 to 
“God the Father,”40 or even “God the Father, the Son and the Spirit,”41 in the NT. 
 
Before going further, a note needs to be taken that any revealed identity is not the object 
of our investigation. For divine identity, or any personal identity,42 is more a matter of 
revelation than of definition, something first to be revealed by God himself.43 All 
revelation, consequently, whether of YHWH to Moses or the Father in Jesus Christ, is 
something to be accepted, rejected or ignored. That being the case, we are not dealing 
with a direct revelation of which we have those choices but the literature or traditions 
that contain information about divine identities that are already revealed and accepted.44 
This helps to put aside studies in which revelation has no bearings on the treatments of 
the biblical texts and their theological issues, as is the case especially among the 
scholars of history of religions school and those adapting their tenets.45 It also helps to 
explore something similar to what Gunton understands the established doctrine of the 
Trinity was meant to be, that is, ‘a way of characterising the being of God, that is, of 
saying something of the kind of being that God is.’46 Gunton expresses it in terms of “a 
communion of persons,” “a being in relation,” and “a dynamic personal order of giving 
                                           
39 The appearance of “YHWH” in identification with “God” in the OT is countless, more than a thousand 
times. Cf. Ex 34:23; Deut 7:21 et al. 
40 “God the Father” is not only the name of the God of Jesus Christ and the apostles, but also a name that 
is virtually absent in the OT if understood in the sense of it in the NT. God is indeed called “father” in the 
OT but all references to God as “father” in the OT (Ps 68:5; 89:26; Isa 63:16; 64:8; Jer 3:4, 19; Mal 1:6; 
2:10), except Isa 9:6, are mainly about the saving aspect of God in relation to Israel, unlike the Father in 
the NT which takes the universal aspect beyond the boundary of Jerusalem, and its sense is mostly 
metaphorical than nominal or referential as in the NT. 
41 Most explicitly in Matt 28:19. For a trinitarian structure, cf. also, Matt 3:16–17 (Mark 1:10–11; Luke 
3:21–22); John 14:26; Acts 10:38; 2 Cor 13:14 et al. 
42 As Gunton perceptively comments, ‘revelation is in large measure something that is mediated to us, by 
and through the other. We require the other if we are to know anything at all; we therefore require 
revelation if we are to understand our neighbour and the world …’ (BTR 22). 
43 The credal statements in the Bible are, for Gunton, ‘confessions made in response to revelation, and so 
become, or may become, mediators of it’ (BTR 14. Gunton’s emphasis).  
44 Cf. 1 John 1:1–4; 1 Cor 5:1–8. Gunton is not thinking of ‘a naive view of the relation of words and 
world’ but ‘a reality already mediated through language’ (IA 42), as also noted by Schwöbel, ‘Shape,’ 204. 
45 E.g., Robert Karl Gnuse, No Other Gods: Emergent Monotheism in Israel, Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1997; and James S. Anderson, Monotheism and Yahweh’s appropriation of Baal, London 
et al: Bloomsbury, 2015. For a substantial critique of this “developmental” or “evolutionary” approach in 
German scholarship, see Moberly, Old Testament, 107–25; for a critique of Gnuse’s work in particular, 
Bauckham, Jesus, 71–82. Anderson closely follows his predecessors to come up with a historical 
reconstruction of the development of monotheistic Yahwism by appropriation of Baal, which however is 
selective, speculative and even arbitrary: selective because it uses minor evidence that is also contained in 
the OT against the general message of the OT; speculative since one cannot be sure whether biblical 
writers indeed appropriated the traits of El, Baal and Asherah or displaced them from the place of God; 
and arbitrary in that monotheism is not the end point of the biblical movement, which is rather the true 
God, and the notion of “development” or “evolution” does not reflect the way in which biblical books 
were written and collected from perspectives given by the end point. 
46 OTM 145. Cf. also, AB 94f. 
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and receiving.”47 Gunton’s, therefore, is an attempt to understand and express the kind 
of God who is revealed in Jesus Christ, recoded in the Bible and established by the 
doctrine of the Trinity.48 A similar attempt is being made here, yet now in the pre-
trinitarian context of early Christianity in which we have seen an old identity of God 
(YHWH God) give way to a new one (God the Father) in the context of One God.49 
Here, to repeat, we are not probing divine identity but, rather, the kind of being God is 
who allows for a change in identity while remaining the same through the change.  
 
The key is to know what is common to both theologies of the OT and the NT and the 
nature of the change in identity. An approach can be considered by looking at Tiling’s 
promotion of the conception of “relational monotheism” over “numerical 
monotheism.”50 Drawing on the works of MacDonald and others,51 Tiling notes that ‘it 
[Shema] emphasises the personal and relational in terms of the confession that YHWH 
is one.’52 ‘The “monotheism” of the Deuteronomy,’ he argues, ‘is relational in import, 
concerned with love and devotion to this one God.’53 Although this is said apart from 
his second point about the relation between YHWH and Israel, he says little about the 
being confessed as one. The discussion, rather, swiftly moves focus onto the relation 
between Israel and her God as the sole basis of an explication of a relational 
understanding of Paul’s monotheism in 1 Cor 8:1–3 and 6.54 Again, the relational 
discussed is of Paul’s understanding of true faith in God, rather than the being of God. 
What is then common to both Deut 6:4 and 1 Cor 8:1–6 according to Tiling is that the 
one God is relational in import, yet relational not in se but in relation to his people. This 
is surely an advancement from a numerical understanding of monotheism, highlighting 
the importance of understanding “one YHWH” or “one God” in the context of love 
rather than non-committal knowledge. That said, however, this relational monotheism 
provides little for finding what we are looking for because it says little of the being of 
God in se. 
 
                                           
47 OTM 214, 225. 
48 Thus, for Gunton, the doctrine of the Trinity has two capacities: it establishes an identification of the 
God revealed in Jesus Christ; and it shows something of the kind of being that God is who is revealed that 
way. 
49 Cf. Bauckham, Jesus, 56, for a similar observation. 
50 Tiling, Divine-Christology, 67–71. 
51 Cf. MacDonald, Monotheism, 97, 151 and 207; Geller, ‘God,’ 293. 
52 Tiling, Divine-Christology, 69. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Tiling, Divine-Christology, 69–71 and 73–6. 
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Bauckham has more to say regarding the relational nature of God in se in his discussion 
of John 10:30 as an allusion to the Shema.55 In this passage, according to him, ‘Jesus is 
not saying that he and the Father are a single person, but that together they are one 
God.’56 This oneness of Jesus and the Father is not simply a matter of ‘closeness of 
association or concurrence of will’ but a sort of ‘relational unity’57 in which ‘the Father 
is who he is only in relation to the Son and vice versa.’58 ‘It is in the portrayal of this 
intra-divine relationship,’ says Bauckham, ‘that John’s Christology steps outside the 
categories of Jewish monotheistic definition of the unique identity of the one God.’59 
Bauckham qualifies this stepping out as not a denial of or a contradiction to the unique 
identity of the one God but a redefinition of it as ‘one in which Father and Son are 
inseparably united in differentiation from each other.’60 The language here is very 
similar to that whereby we saw how Gunton understands the doctrine of the Trinity. To 
that extent, however, the former shares the weaknesses of the latter. The question 
common to both is whether we can apply their conceptuality to the understanding of the 
theology of the Shema. The answer is negative in that there we have YHWH and God 
(and One) as two different words referring to the same being, while in the fourth Gospel 
we have Father and Son as two different words referring to distinct beings, one the sent 
(Son) and the other the sending (Father). Thus, we are prevented from taking such a 
relational unity as found by Bauckham as common to the theologies of the OT and the 
NT. 
 
That said, however, Bauckham’s account of Christological innovation within the 
contours of the early Jewish monotheism has an implication that the theology of the OT 
is of the nature that is formed by God’s interaction with his people and open to 
redefining or reshaping from the perspective given by a new revelation of God in his 
interaction with his people. What is involved in writing is a two-way movement in 
which the OT writers provide general ways (God, Word, Wisdom, Lord, etc.) which are 
originally linked to YHWH and through them the NT writers express a new identity of 
God reflected upon the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. That being the case, it would 
be quite inappropriate to understand this identity change in terms of a ‘transition from 
                                           
55 Bauckham, Jesus, 104–6. 
56 Bauckham, Jesus, 104. 
57 Bauckham, Jesus, 105. Cf. M. L. Appold, The Oneness Motif in the Fourth Gospel, Tübingen: Mohr 
(Siebeck), 1976, 281f. 




YHWH to the God of Jesus Christ’ as precedented by the ‘transition from the God of the 
patriarchs to YHWH.’61 The problem is that by identifying the particular with the 
general, or not upholding them in distinction, it fails to grasp the general aspect of the 
ontology of God that endures through the changes. The name YHWH disclosed to 
Moses, to be precise, does not replace or surpass the identity of the God of the 
patriarchs but, rather, makes it known (Thus, in Ex 3:15, “YHWH, God of your fathers, 
God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob …”). And, later in the NT, it is still the 
God of the patriarchs, “the God of our fathers,” who is said to have glorified his servant 
Jesus (Acts 3:13).  
 
The analogy of the general and the particular might help us to get a better explanation of 
the identity transition observed by Bauckham, by saying that the (general) identity of 
God remains the same, whereas the substance of the general (God) changes with the 
change on the side of the particular. God remains the same as God, in other words, as 
the NT maintains the general side of the Shema or the OT in general, while the identity 
of the general undergoes a change in content alongside the changes on the side of the 
particular. This analogy also helps us to see that the movement of the change in identity 
is not directly from one general to one particular (e.g., from “God” to “Father”) or from 
one particular to one general (e.g., from “YHWH” to “the triune God”) but an indirect 
one from one general to another (e.g., “God” to “the triune God”) through the change 
from one particular to another (e.g., “YHWH” to “Father” or “YHWH” to “Jesus”) 
which takes place through the mediation of the general (e.g., God, Lord, Word, Wisdom 
etc.). Here is then what we have been looking for, a concept that not only bridges the 
theology of the OT with the theology of the NT but also provides a universal basis on 
which one might understand and use Gunton’s transcendental conceptuality: being as 
space (koinonia, perichoresis) in which the general (ousia) interrelate to the particular 
(hypostasis) in such a way that the former conditions the latter which in turn constitutes 
the former in relation to one another. 
 
8.3. Space and Personhood 
Having considered various matters of relevance to this study, we are now in a position 
to answer the three questions that were raised at the beginning of this work regarding 
the concept of space used in Gunton’s discussion of the doctrine of the image of God.62 
                                           
61 Bauckham, Jesus, 56f. For other approaches, see the discussion at §7.2.3. 
62 Introduction, 9. 
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To the first question as to whether the concept of space is not more fundamental than 
that of communion, we can now say that it is so in the sense that it can be used for 
referring to the “conditional” aspect that makes a communion of persons possible and 
allows for the communion to have a certain shape. We can also answer the third 
question, about the “consequential” aspect of the being of God, by saying that Gunton’s 
conceptuality requires a concept indicating what he conceives of the three persons 
making together in their relations to one another, and the concept of space may well 
serve the purpose. As for the second question regarding what Gunton refers to by ‘their 
personal being,’ we can say that it is to the ‘personal space in which the three persons 
are for and from each other in their otherness.’63 Being as space, therefore, is not 
something alien to Gunton’s work but, rather I wish to argue, is the direction in which 
his ontology was moving though it was not fully realised in his work. 
 
On the one hand, Gunton approximates asserting the idea of being as space by using 
such terms as “shape,” “taxis,” “structure” or even “space” in his enquires about 
ontology, all indicative of ontological spatiality.64 Thus, of the being of the triune God, 
he says ‘a personal taxis of dynamic and free relations,’65 ‘a structure of love—of 
persons in communion,’66 and ‘the personal space in which persons give to and receive 
from each other what they are.’67 He also says, now of the church, ‘the place—the living 
space—where the kingship, priesthood and prophetic work of Jesus is appropriated.’68 
On the other hand, however, these terms of spatial imagery tend to be used only for 
explicating the “relational” aspect of being, falling short of becoming a term for 
referring to the ontological aspect that comes into view only by knowing the ways in 
which the persons are related to each other. A recognition of this double status of the 
concept of space in Gunton started our discussion, and through the process we sought to 
argue for a fuller realisation of it within Gunton’s conceptual framework. 
 
Here, finally, I wish to suggest a way in which one can make use of the concept of space 
for the ontology of being in relation or in communion, at least to the extent that he uses 
the concepts of “relation” and “otherness” for his ontological explorations. It can be 
                                           
63 PTT 110.  
64 Of relevance here is the concept of “shape” used by Schwöbel as meaning ‘a structured whole of 
connected theological insights, combining positions he shared with others with his own particular 
emphases’ (‘Shape,’ 182). For Gunton’s use of the word “shape” in such a sense, see PTT 32. 
65 PTT 145. 
66 FSS 32. 
67 PTT 134. Also, 128. 
68 CF 123. 
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used, that is to say, for indicating the ontological aspect that Gunton attempted to 
express in various terms, such as ‘a communion of persons, each distinct but inseparable 
from the others, whose being consists in their relations with one another’ (of God);69 ‘a 
dynamic of beings in relation’ (of the world);70 and ‘a being in relation’ (of the 
person).71 The intended notion is that all beings are substantial (one, ousia), relational 
(many, hypostases) and spatial (three, koinonia).  
 
There are two advantages of using the concept of space in this way in relation to 
Gunton’s conceptuality. Firstly, it helps to overcome a difficulty involved in the 
application of Gunton’s conception of being in relation even to a hypostatic being. As 
for ousianic beings such as God, church and world, we know that Gunton speaks of 
relation and otherness between the particulars (hypostases) within or constituting a 
being. As for the particulars, however, the question is what “relation” Gunton has in 
mind in speaking of them as a being in relation or communion. Given that in most 
discussions he speaks of the human in plural, for example, ‘humankind as finite 
persons-in-relation,’72 one can safely say that he conceives the person as a being in 
relation, mainly in relation to God, people and the rest of the world. Here, however, the 
relation is not between intra-personal constituents, such as body, mind and spirit, or 
faith, love and hope, as is the case with Gunton’s ontology of God, world and church. 
Gunton has justifications for being cautious, though. For one, he knows well the 
problematic consequences resulting from the approach that stresses one characteristic of 
the human (e.g., reason) to the exclusion of others (e.g., body).73 Another is that person 
is an “idea” that is logically primitive reflecting what is ontologically primitive and so 
difficult to define in other terms.74 That being the case, however, defining personhood 
only in relation to other beings may run the risk of turning the personal to the 
impersonal,75 making the concept of person useful only for defining ousianic being. 
That is perhaps why Gunton’s emphasis on relation and his conception of communion 
discomfort, perhaps against his will, some who are particularly concerned about the loss 
of personal identity.76 If they have any justification for their concern it should be only to 
                                           
69 PTT 109. 
70 PTT 111. 
71 PTT 114. 
72 Cf. PTT 117. 
73 Cf. PTT 100–3. 
74 PTT 109; AB 95. 
75 The concern expressed by John Aves, ‘Persons in Relation: John Macmurray,’ in Schwöbel and Gunton, 
Persons, 129–35. 
76 Cf. §3.2.6. 
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do with a concept whereby the enduring aspect of personal identity is maintained, rather 
than Gunton’s emphasis on relation against the ontology of the individual.77 We are 
faced, ultimately, with the challenge of overcoming a difficult tension: with Gunton’s 
legitimate emphasis on constitutive relationality on the one hand and his critics’ valid 
concern against the loss of personal identity to relationality, on the other. One merit of 
the concept of space is that it can be used for both ousianic and hypostatic beings. Put 
another way, the use of the concept of being as space in the ways discussed thus far in 
this study can help to set the concept of person free from its tight attachment to 
hypostasis and stand on its own terms as a word for an ousianic being which has its own 
hypostases and relations between them.78 At the end of the day, by ousianic and 
hypostatic beings, we are not speaking of two separate beings but two distinct aspects of 
one being. 
 
Secondly, the ontology of being as space can help to uphold various aspects integral to 
Gunton’s ontology. For example, in speaking of the church in terms of “institution” and 
“community,” he explains the former as given reality and the latter as constituted reality, 
though he puts emphasis on the latter without doing away with the former.79 He also 
speaks of creation as a “project” that is ordered yet not closed but open to God’s 
action.80 Likewise, he understands the person as both created and oriented to an end, 
putting it under the light of “protology” as well as “eschatology.”81 While the operation 
of these contrasting yet complementary categories is essential to Gunton’s ontological 
thinking, his ontology itself remains vaguely demarcated. An attempt to move beyond 
the dialect is found in Zizioulas’ quest for ‘a new ontological category’ after considering 
human existence in terms of “biological” and “ecclesial” hypostases, and finds or 
locates it in the holy eucharist, ‘a community, a network of relations.’82 The question is 
whether this “sacramental or eucharistic” hypostasis is not another aspect of human 
existence complementing the biological and the ecclesial, rather than of hypostasis itself, 
though its connotation is more comprehensive than the other two. Yet, again, it is a 
                                           
77 Cf. PTT 84–7; OTM 26f and 168f. 
78 Cf. FSS 178f, where Gunton speaks of ‘a spiritual-material unity,’ ‘a psycho-physical person,’ and ‘a 
material-spiritual being,’ in his discussion of the humanity of Jesus Christ, with reference to Hans W. 
Wolff, The Anthropology of the Old Testament, tr. Margaret Kohl, London: SCM Press, 1973, chs.2–4. 
79 TtT 198. Cf. also, CF 121. 
80 Cf. PTT 180–4; TC 12; CF 35f. for a critical engagement with Gunton on providence and God’s action, 
cf. Terry, J. Wright, ‘Colin Gunton on Providence: Critical Commentaries,’ in Harvey, Gunton, 146–64.  
81 PTT 115. Proctology in reference to Graham MacFarlane, ‘Strange News from Another Star. An 
Anthropological Insight from Edward Irving,’ in Schwöbel and Gunton, Persons, 98–119, and 
eschatology in reference to Zizioulas (work not specified, and appears to refer to the discussion in 
Zizioulas, Being, 49–65).  
82 Zizioulas, Being, 59f. 
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problem that can be overcome with the help of spatial thinking. Among the connotations 
the concept of space has are inclusiveness and boundedness, which enables the word 
“space” to be used for referring to the general side of personal identity (including 
aspects of relation and otherness, of mind and body, of biological, ecclesial and 
eucharistic), rather than leaving it unbounded or undefined. However, due to its 
association of openness, receptivity, pervasiveness and so on, the concept of space can 
also help to sustain the other aspect of personal identity that undergoes changes with 
time yet is no less important than the enduring aspect for what/who the person is. If the 
general side of being a person is the enduring aspect of personal identity (“the same 
yesterday, today and for ever”),83 particulars, including intra-personal constituents and 
inter-personal interactions, together determine who or what the person is then, now or in 
the future. ‘If,’ therefore, ‘anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation’ (2 Cor 5:17), yet not 
just ‘brought within a new pattern of relationship,’84 but also for an ontological 
reshaping in the relationship.85 We saw that Gunton thinks of being, whether ousianic or 
hypostatic, in both terms but less misunderstandings of his work would have followed 




                                           
83 See YT 157, for Gunton’s effort to maintain this ‘continuous’ aspect by the concept of substance: ‘If 
Jesus Christ is a human and divine reality, the same yesterday, today and for ever, then models evoking 
the reality of this continuity will be proper ones.’ See TC 33, for what Gunton does not mean by 
“enduring aspect of being.” 
84 FSS 213. 
85 Schwöbel considers three senses of new being in Jesus Christ in his ‘Human Being As Relational 
Being: Twelve Theses for a Christian Anthropology,’ Schwöbel and Gunton, Persons, 148, yet all from 
the perspective of relational ontology, with focus concentrated on relationship rather than the old being 
renewed in relationship: (a) new in the sense of being grounded in the relationship of God the creator to 
his creation; (2) new in the sense of the reconstitution of the relationship between God and humanity 
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